Anglo-Korean Relations 1883-1910


Korean Minjok Leadership Academy
AIC



Table of Contents


Full Paper, 1st Draft
Bbliography, 2nd Update
Chapter 2 1st Update
Chapter 6
Chapter 5
Chapter 4 2nd draft
Working Table of Contents, 1st Update
Chapter 4
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 Korean p.1
Working Table of Contents
Bbliography, 1st Update
Bbliography



Full Paper, 1st Draft (as of November 24th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

I. Introduction
II. Brief Overall View on British Diplomatic Policy in the Middle of and in the Late 19th Century.
III. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea
III.1.) Background and Development of Relations between Great Britain and Korea
III.2.) Willes Treaty & Parkes Treaty
III.3.) Aftermath of the Treaties between Great Britain and Korea
IV. Occupation of Port Hamilton 1885 - 1887
IV.1.) British Interest in Port Hamilton Before 1885
IV.2.) Occupation of Port Hamilton
IV.3.) Reactions of China, Russia and Japan to Occupation of Port Hamilton
IV.4.) Reaction of Korea to Occupation of Port Hamilton
IV.5.) Reconsideration of British Government about Occupation of Port Hamilton
IV.6.) Negotiations for Withdrawal from Port Hamilton
IV.7.) Aftermath of Occupation of Port Hamilton
V. British Policy on Korea Before and After the Sino-Japanese War 1894 - 1895
V.1.) Sino-Japanese War and Reaction of Great Britain
V.2.) Change of the British Policy on Korea after the Sino-Japanese War
VI. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Collapse of Korea
VII. Conclusion
VIII. Bibliography

I. Introduction
            Since the late 19th century, the Great Powers in Europe proceeded to advance into Asia and Africa. The Great Powers benefited from Industrial Revolution exercised their influence over Asia and Africa. Korea was not also free from the advancement of the Western Powers. Korea was thrown into confusion because of competition among the United States, Russia China, and Japan. In the end, Korea failed to preserve its sovereignty and was annexed to Japan in 1910. So far, historians usually considered influence of the United States, Russia, China, and Japan when they study international relations of Korea. However, they have not been deeply concerned with power of Great Britain. Indeed, political and economic exchange between Korea and Great Britain was far less significant than exchange between Korea and other Western Powers such as Russia and the United States. Nevertheless, it is very important to understand influence of Great Britain on Korea because Great Britain had dominant power all over the world, at the moment. It is impossible to understand international situation of the late 19th century disregarding impact of Great Britain. Although it seems that international situation around Korea was determined by the competition among the United States, Russia, China, and Japan, indeed main reason of conflict among foreign nations was competition between Russia and Great Britain for East Asia. However, not many historical books and dissertations have dealt with diplomatic policy of Great Britain on Korea. Furthermore, some books and dissertations on the issue have focused on few specific topics. This paper is a study on the diplomatic policy of Great Britain on Korea from 1883 to 1905 to comprehend the international situation around Korea.

II. Brief Overall View on British Diplomatic Policy in the Middle of and in the Late 19th Century.
            British diplomatic policy in the middle of and in the late 19th century can be marked into two ways. The first remarkable trait was a free trade policy and the second remarkable trait was a policy of balance of power, also called ¡®Splendid Isolation¡¯. After Great Britain carried out the Industrial Revolution during the late 18th and the early 19th century, she conducted the free trade policy. The policy was based on the belief that the free trade would benefit both Great Britain and her trade partners. (1) Throughout the 19th century, the free trade policy became the most important principle of British diplomatic policy. Even after Great Britain indulged in boisterous imperialism in 1890s, the free trade policy was the fundamental of the diplomatic policy. ¡®Informal Empire¡¯ was also based on the free trade policy. The term, ¡®Informal Empire¡¯, indicates that the British government was not deeply interested in expanding its territory in abroad but deeply concerned with expanding its economic influences. However, ¡®Informal Empire¡¯ did not suggest peaceful interaction with other countries. To enlarge and preserve her influences in the world, strong military forces, especially strong naval forces, were prerequisite. Consequently, she had to establish and secure a strong point to promote the free trade; occupation of Hong Kong was a good example of this. (2) In late 19th century, the one of the greatest concerns of Great Britain was to promote trade with China, India, Ottoman Empire and Latin American countries. (3) Meantime, Russia sought an ice-free port and advanced to Black Sea, India and East Asia. Such movement of Russia threatened the economic and political interest of Great Britain in China, India and Ottoman Turks. As a result, various tensions between Russia and Great Britain were provoked in 19th century; the Crimean War and a tension in Afghanistan were great examples of conflicts between Great Britain and Russia.
            While British diplomatic policy on colonial problems in 19th century is summarized in ¡®Informal Empire¡¯, her diplomatic policy on European problems can be termed ¡®Splendid Isolation¡¯. After the Congress of the Vienna, Great Britain denied to involve in a permanent alliance. Instead, she preferred to make a convention which requires fewer obligations. (4) Furthermore, Great Britain attempted to avoid any diplomatic and military conflict with other countries unless they harmed her benefit and the balance of power in European Continent. (5) Great Britain was very sensitive to preserving the balance of power in Europe because peace in Europe was prerequisite for her prosperity. Expanded territories and influences made Great Britain difficult to maintain them because British military forces could not focus power in a specific place. Furthermore, British land forces were not strong enough to overwhelm those of France and Russia. As a result, 'Splendid Isolation' which was initially the policy to keep balance of power turned into desperate remoteness in European continent. At the moment, Germany became the leading part in the international situation after her unification in 1871. To isolate France, Bismarck formed an alliance against France but Great Britain did not join in the alliance. Because of her refusal to join either in the Triple Alliance or in the Franco-Russia Alliance Great Britain suffered from oppression by other European countries in 1890s. (6) Simultaneously, British territories and economic interests in abroad were severely challenged after other Western Powers succeeded to carry out industrial development in late 19th century. For example, Great Britain confronted France in Fashoda, Germany in South Africa and in Pacific Ocean, and Russia in Central Asia and in Balkan Peninsula. (7) In the end, Great Britain abandoned ¡®Splendid Isolation¡¯ and allied with Japan in 1902. Two years later, Great Britain entered into the Franco-Russian Alliance
            Overall British diplomatic policy in the middle of and in the late 19th century was also applied to her diplomatic policy towards East Asia. First of all, Great Britain attempted to preserve balance of power in East Asia as she did in Europe. Before the First Sino-Japanese War, she maintained friendly relationship with China. After the war, she promoted friendly relationship with Japan after the war. The ultimate purpose of the policy was to prevent expansion of Russia in East Asia. Great Britain sustained the policy of ¡®Informal Empire¡¯ too. The target of the policy of 'Informal Empire' was China. Korea of which the volume of trade was relatively very small was treated as a tool to preserve economic interest in China. Her policy was proved to be quite successful. Consequently, Great Britain kept her economic priority in China for decades and dealt peacefully with military tensions such as the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. In truth, Great Britain conducted a nonintervention policy in East Asia not only because of her fundamental diplomatic policy but also because of oppression by other Western Powers and hardships to preserve inordinately large empire. From the second chapter, this paper will study the diplomatic policy of Great Britain on Korea and how she dealt with problems in Korea to sustain her influence in East Asia.

Notes
(1) Martin 1999. p.102
(2) ibid. p.112
(3) ibid.
(4) Kim 1994
(5) ibid.
(6) ibid. pp.196-207
(7) Kim 1997. pp.115-118

III. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea
III.1 Background and Development of Relations between Great Britain and Korea
            The first historical contact between Great Britain and Korea was held in 1797. The Providence, a British sloop (expedition W.R. Broughton), which had surveyed the Korean East Sea coast, anchored in Busan and stayed for 10 days. Sailors recorded Korean language and collected specimens of some plants. In 1816, the Alceste (expedition B. Hall) and the Lyra visited Korea to survey the Korean Yellow Sea coast and contacted with some Koreans. To begin trade with Korea the East India Company sent the Lord Amherst, a British merchant ship, to Korea in 1832. Karl Gützlaff, the first Protestant missionary to reach Korea, embarked on the ship as a missionary, doctor and translator. Representatives of the Lord Amherst demanded the Korean government to trade but the government refused stubbornly. In the end, they just departed. However, Karl Gützlaff introduced the Bible and things Western to Koreans. Emergence of British ships increased greatly after Great Britain signed and sealed the Treaty of Nanjing with the Qing Empire (1842). (1) Also ships from other European countries began to appear in the sea near Korea. (2)
            The British government had a skeptical view of opening the doors of Korea until the 1880s although Great Britain was the first Western country which demanded a treaty and commerce. It is true that some British diplomats in the Far East consistently recommended the British government conclude a treaty with Korea and also requested Qing Empire act as an intermediary. However, the British government was not active in regard to the opening of Korea. (3) It is assumed that there were two reasons why the British government did not pay much attention to Korea. Firstly, Korea was backward in industry and commerce. Thus, it was hard to expect any economic profit from trade with Korea. Instead British merchants were greatly interested in China. Secondly, approach to Korea would like to provoke tension between Great Britain and Russia. The location of Korea was geopolitically important in East Asia. Russia was greatly interested in Korea as an object in her policy of southward expansion. The British government also recognized geopolitical importance of Korea in East Asia, but it did not want to provoke the tension in East Asia in any way. At the moment, the British government focused on resolving problems of Irish autonomy, appeasement following the Egyptian affair and defending India against a perceived threat exercised by Russia ("The Great Game"). (4) It did not have enough energy to spare for further conflicts in East Asia. For example, when a Russian fleet appeared in the Bay of Youngheung (so-called Port Lazareff), in 1857, the British government commissioned Sir John Bowring to open Korea to prevent the expansion of Russia. However, Sir Bowring gave up the idea of opening Korea after he recognized that Russia, at that time, had no intention to invade or occupy Korean territory. Such performance reflected the policy of the British government on Korea very well. Rather than a direct approach to Korea, it tried to prevent advance of Russia and other Western countries to Korea by supporting suzerainty of the Qing Empire over Korea. Not only Great Britain but also Russia adopted a policy of 'restraint' and 'prudence' to avoid conflict.
            When 'balance of power' between United Kingdom and Russia was formed in the Far East, a military conflict between Qing Empire and Russia in Xinjiang occurred. A power vacuum appeared in the Far East temporarily. It was the reason why Japan succeeded to open Korea without any interference by Russia, Qing and Great Britain. The conflict in Xinjiang and the opening of Korea by Japan affected the British policy on the Far East. The change of the policy was also caused by emergence of imperialism in Great Britain. As military power and interest of foreign territories of other European nations increased, it was inevitable for Great Britain to choose strong foreign policy. Furthermore, the British government recognized that the Qing Empire was not strong enough to stop Russian southward expansion policy. Finally, United Kingdom accepted that forming a friendly relationship with Korea was necessary to repress the expansion of Russia. Nevertheless, she showed inactive attitude to sign and seal a treaty with Korea to the last. She thought that making a treaty with Korea was against her fundamental diplomatic principle that was "no intervention unless an affair harms the interest of the Kingdom." As a result, British government waited until the United States and Korea concluded the Shufeldt Treaty. Stopping the expansion of Russia without any conflict was her primary purpose. In other words, Korea was not worth enough to make the United Kingdom submit to a conflict willingly. Indeed, the United Kingdom had the strongest naval in East Asia at the moment and her naval power was strong enough to open Korea directly. Nevertheless the British government was never concerned about using forces to make a treaty with Korea.

III.2 Willes Treaty & Parkes Treaty
            Great Britain and Korea entered into the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea twice. The first treaty, the Willes Treaty, was concluded on June 6th 1882, only two weeks after the Shufeldt Treaty was signed and sealed. However, the treaty was amended before it was ratified by the British government. The second treaty, the Parkes Treaty, was concluded on November 26th 1883 and the both governments exchanged instruments of ratifications on April 28th 1884. To understand the process of concluding the treaty, it is important to understand a role which Sir Harry Parkes played because the treaty was mainly designed by him.
            Harry Parkes was born in 1828, in Staffordshire, England. When he was 13 years old, he moved to China and experienced the First Opium War (1839-1842). Working as a translator, a consul and a diplomatic minister in East Asia, he managed many diplomatic affairs. While he worked as the British minister in Japan from 1865 to 1883, he paid much attention to working toward the conclusion of a treaty with Korea. (5) After Japan and Korea concluded the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876, he planned to get some assistance from the Japanese government in establishing a formal British relationship with Korea. Unfortunately, his plan failed since the Japanese government denied such assistance and besides, the British government did not pay much attention to Korea. However, he did not give up on improving relationship between Great Britain and Korea. To appreciate salvage by the Korean government, Parkes sent Ernest Satow, a second secretary at the United Kingdom Embassy in Tokyo, to Busan. While he appreciated the salvage, Satow demanded trade between Britain and Korea but the Korean government refused his demand again. Because of his wife's serious illness he temporarily went back to homeland from October 1879 to January 1882. J.G. Kennedy took his place. Kennedy reported diplomatic changes in East Asia and a change of attitude of the Korean government in those days. Reforming its fundamental political and diplomatic policies for imperialism and universal commerce, the British government agreed that signing and sealing a treaty with Korea was necessary. British diplomats in Japan began to search for a method to form a relationship with Korea. At the moment, Parkes responded to the government's request for advice. At the same time, Satow who was expert at Korean affair suggested using gunboat diplomacy but it was denied. On the other hand, Spence and Lord Genoa tried to negotiate with a Korean deputy delegate of Dong-rae in Busan but the negotiation was not successful. Repeating diplomatic failure, British diplomats realized that Japanese government would not help them to make a treaty. In the end, they planned to get help from the Qing Empire. (6)
            In those days, Li Hongzhang (7) was charged with diplomatic affair in Qing Dynasty. He believed that Russia and Japan threatened Qing's traditional suzerainty over Korea. He believed that Korea should open her doors to other Western nations and then, those nations would check the powers of Russia and Japan. His idea was partially correspondent to the view point of British diplomats. Indeed, Sir Thomas F. Wade, the British Minster in Beijing, requested intermediary to conclude a treaty with Korea in 1881 and the Qing government responded positively. However, the British government was very cautious on the problem. It waited until other western countries except Russia to open Korea. (8) When Robert W. Shufeldt, an American minster plenipotentiary began to negotiate with Korea through the mediation of the Qing Empire, the British government decided to sign and seal a treaty with Korea. Admiral Willes was sent to Korea with William G. Ashton and Maude, and concluded the Willes Treaty only two weeks after the conclusion of the Shufeldt Treaty. Immediate conclusion of the treaty was possible because of consistent preparation by British diplomats in East Asia and intermediation of the Qing Empire.
            Concluding the Willes Treaty, Great Britain achieved its first purpose to prevent the expansion of Russia. However, hastiness caused several problems. Although Britain attained permission for hydrographic survey in the sea near Korea, the Willes Treaty and the Shufeldt Treaty were ultimately same. Parkes criticized the Willes Treaty that it did not consider about any economic profits. He pointed out several problems in the treaty. Firstly, the tariff on luxuries and necessities was too high. Secondly, there was no clear statement about open ports and thus free transportation was not fully guaranteed. Thirdly, a right to make a marine chart was not attained. Lastly, the opium trade, which allowed British merchants to gain enormous profits in China, was banned. Actually, many British merchants in East Asia complained that the Willes Treaty was more disadvantageous than the Treaties of Tianjin which were signed in 1858. (9)
            Recognizing the necessity to amend the treaty, Parkes waited for an opportunity to make a new treaty. Fortunately, he found a chance soon. In June 1882, the soldiers of Korea's traditional army mutinied. Taking advantage of chaos in Korea, he negotiated with Park Younghyo and Kim Okgyun who were sent as Korean delegates to Japan to deal with the Japanese losses caused by the mutiny. Both were supporters for opening Korea to Western nations. They wanted to use the power of Great Britain to escape from intervention by the Qing Empire which became greater after the mutiny. (10) However, Parkes fully recognized their intention and made a reverse use of the situation. In the end, the Korean delegates agreed on amending the Willes Treaty. After then, Parkes sent Ashton to grasp the situation of Korea in March 1883. At the same time, Parkes demanded Korean government to delay the ratification of Willes Treaty. Completing preparation to have a new treaty with Korea, he was appointed as a new British minister in the Qing Empire in August 1883. After he moved to China, he was committed to sign a new treaty with Korea by British government. He departed for Korea in October with Edward Zappe, (12) a German consul general in Yokohama, Japan. In this time, he did not discuss about a new treaty with Li Hongzhang to avoid Chinese intervention. Parkes concluded the Parkes Treaty on November 26th 1883 after one-month negotiation. On April 28th 1884, both Great Britain and Korea exchanged the instruments of ratifications officially.

III.3 Aftermath of Treaties between Great Britain and Korea
            As it is mentioned before, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea was the second treaty which Korea signed with Western countries. Although Britain already established the first contact with Korea in 1797 and once demanded trade in 1832, she generally pursued the policy of 'restraint' and 'prudence' on Korea. As a result, the United States became the first Western country which signed the treaty with Korea. However, the treaty between Great Britain and Korea was very meaningful. Firstly, the Parkes Treaty became an archetype of other treaties between Western countries and Korea because the Parkes Treaty had much more advantage than the Shufeldt Treaty did. The United State also attained all benefits which Britain gained in the Parkes treaty because of most-favored-nation treatment. (11) Secondly, the Parkes Treaty was marked as the start of incursion of imperialism into Korea. Right after the conclusion of the Parkes treaty, Germany concluded a treaty with Korea. Russia and Italy also followed Britain about seven months later. Lastly, Great Britain undermined the diplomatic status of Korea. After the friendly relationship with Korea was formed, British government ordered the British minster to the Qing Empire to serve concurrently as the British minister to Korea. As a result, Great Britain only sent a general consul to Seoul. Other Western countries including Russia and Germany also followed the case of Great Britain. (12)

Notes
(1) The Qing Empire was also called as the Ching Empire, the Chinese Empire or the Manchu Empire
(2) Kim, Won-mo, pp.947-948
(3) Choi, Mun-hyeong. The Competition of Imperial Powers around Korea. pp.19 -39
(4) Park Il-geun, "British Policy towards the Opening of Korea and Sino-Japanese and Korean¡¯s Reaction" pp.114 -115
(5) "Harry Parkes" Wikipedia:. June 2nd 2008. May 31st 2008.
(6) Ku, Dae-yeol, p.116
(7) Kim, Hyun-soo, ¡°A Study of the Anglo-Korean Treaty by Reviewing Sir H. Parkes¡¯ Documents¡± pp.71-77
(8) Li Hongzhang was also called as Li Hung Chang.
(9) Association of Korean History Research. Korea-Anglo Relationship for A Hundred Years. p.55
(10) His real name was Eduard Zappe but most Korean historical books in those days recorded his name as Edward Zappe.
(11) Kim, Gi-yeol, "The Conclusion of Korean-British Treaty in 1883 and Its Background" p.231
(12) Ku, Dae-yeol, pp.119-120

IV. Occupation of Port Hamilton 1885 - 1887

IV.1 British Interest in Port Hamilton Before 1885
            In 1845, during the expedition to the near sea of Korea, Sir Edward Belcher in HMS Samarang surveyed a small group of islands, Komun-do (1). He named it after the then Secretary of the Admiralty, Captain W.A.B. Hamilton. In those days, the British navy already recognized the strategic importance of Port Hamilton. However, Great Britain did not openly express her interest in Port Hamilton until 1875.
            In 1875, Harry Parkes and the Vice-Admiral A.P. Ryder strongly urged Edward Henry Stanley, the then Foreign Secretary, to occupy Port Hamilton. They informed him that the situation around Korea became unstable. On July 20th, Harry Parkes recommended that British navy should immediately occupy Port Hamilton if this had not been done by another Power (2). Also, in his telegram to the Secretary of Admiralty, the Vice-Admiral Ryder noted

            Russia is rapidly encroaching. A German vessel is surveying west coast of Korea; Japanese vessel, the east coast; both with a view to occupation ... I submit that ¡® Sylvia¡¯ should be directed to survey south-west coast, and that if as Minister suggests, I am directed to take possession of or occupy Port Hamilton." (3)

            However, their suggestion to occupy Port Hamilton was not accepted by British government. The Foreign Secretary replied

            "... Her Majesty's government does not think it desirable to set to other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain has no title." (4)

            Furthermore, the governments of Germany and Russia instructed that they had no designs on Korea and her territory. Although the plan of occupation of Port Hamilton was not practiced, the expedition to Chosan Harbour (Korea), Tsusima, and Port Hamilton by Sir Francis Plunkett provided detailed information on them.
            Seven years later, the Admiral Willes requested to lease of Port Hamilton when he negotiated the Willes Treaty with Korean government. However, he just gave up because of the opposition of a Chinese officer (5). Introduced incidents show us that British interest in Port Hamilton was not sudden but it had lasted for several decades. Actually, Russian government already knew that Great Britain had a secret plan to occupy Port Hamilton in 1882.

IV.2 The Causes for Occupation of Port Hamilton
            In 1884, the tension between Great Britain and Russia increased significantly since Russia seized Merv Oasis, near to Afghanistan. Violating an agreement with Britain, Russian army advanced on Panjdeh Oasis in March 1885. British government worried that farther approach of Russian forces might threaten British interests and rights in India. At the moment, Great Britain confronted with another serious problem since Bismarck, the German Prime Minister, tried to prevent Turkey from entering into an anti-Russian alliance. Finally, British government made plans for war with Russia over the Afghan boundary question (6). The occupation of Port Hamilton was part of preparation for a war which was expected to break out soon. British government thought that Port Hamilton would be necessary if its navy were to attack Vladivostok, recently fortified Russian port on the coast of Pacific Ocean. Although British navy had its base in Hong Kong, Vladivostok was too far from Hong Kong. Port Hamilton was considered as a perfect place as a coaling station or a naval base. The then Governors-General and Viceroy of India D.A. Blackwood (the Earl of Dufferin) later confessed that the occupation of Port Hamilton was British strategy attacking weakest part of Russian territory to decentralize Russian attention from the Afghan boundary (7). Also, a memorandum by Mr. Francis Berite on June 8th 1894 said "In 1885, in view of possible hostilities with Russia, we occupied Port Hamilton." (8)

IV.3 The Occupation of Port Hamilton
            On April 11th 1885, the British Cabinet headed by William E. Gladstone decided to occupy Port Hamilton and informed Queen Victoria of its plan. Three days later, the Vice-Admiral Sir William Dowell was ordered to "occupy Port Hamilton and report proceedings". (12) Chinese government and Japanese government became aware of a British government¡¯s intention to occupy Port Hamilton and examined the truth of a rumor. However, British Foreign Office refused to admit the occupation of Port Hamilton. On April 17th 1885, three British vessels officially occupied Port Hamilton. The next day, the Foreign Secretary informed Marquis Tseng, the Chinese minister at London, that British naval force held Port Hamilton. In his response, Marquis Tseng claimed that the occupation of Port Hamilton "could not be viewed without concern at Peking". (13) British government agreed on Chinese suzerainty over Korea and prepared to negotiate with Chinese government instead of Korean government. British government neglected sovereignty of Korean government. Indeed, Korean government was formally informed about the occupation of Port Hamilton on May 19th, while Chinese government was officially notified on May 10th. Furthermore Granville sent a draft of agreement on the occupation of Port Hamilton not to Korean government but to Marquis Tseng. In the draft British government insisted that the occupation would be temporary, recognized the vassalage of Korea to China which was neglected in Treaties between Korea and foreign countries including the United Kingdom, and promised to pay an annual rent not only to Korean government but also to China as tribute for Port Hamilton.

IV.4 Reactions of China, Russia and Japan to Occupation of Port Hamilton
            Before its naval force occupied Port Hamilton, British government expected that China would be on its side. Both China and Great Britain were afraid of expanding of Russian influence in Far East. However, Tsungli Yamen (14), the department of foreign relation of China, was reluctant to arrange the agreement proposed by the British government. Although it promised to Chinese suzerainty over Korea, Chinese government was afraid that Russia and Japan would claim for territory in Korea. Chinese government was even opposed to laying of a cable from North Saddle Island (15) to Port Hamilton. However, it reluctantly allowed lying cable on condition that cable would be removed if it became unnecessary. At the moment, Sir Francis Plunkett raised doubt about Chinese government. He suspected Chinese government that it tried to disturb Britain to occupy Port Hamilton by inspiring resentment of Korean government. However, O'Conor denied that Chinese government had any intention to disturb British occupation of Port Hamilton. However, he admitted that Chinese government would not arrange any formal agreement to recognize the occupation of Port Hamilton. (16)
            On the other hand, Russia was not directly opposed to the occupation of Port Hamilton although a Russian vessel, 'Vladivostok' once visited Port Hamilton on May 10th. (17) Instead, she reacted in indirect way. Russia made pressure on Chinese government that she would occupy any territory of Korea if Chinese government did not oppose the occupation. Japan also reacted sensitively to the occupation of Port Hamilton. However, Japanese government also expressed its position indirectly. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Kaoru Inouye, did not show any direct opposition to the occupation of Port Hamilton but replied that Japan "... can not view without concern occupation of place so adjacent ..." and wanted to know "what arrangement had been made with Korea." (18) However, the Japanese Minister at Peking strongly forced Chinese government to oppose the occupation. Ultimately Japanese government was afraid that the occupation might cause conflict between Great Britain and Russia in Far East and such conflict would harm the safety of Japan and its interest in Korea.

IV.5 Reaction of Korea to Occupation of Port Hamilton
            Until May 19th, Korean government did not receive any official note from Great Britain about the occupation of Port Hamilton. However, it already got the information on the occupation of Port Hamilton from other foreign institutions. At the moment, Li HongZhang sent the Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang (19) with a message which advised King of Korea that Korean government should not permit concession of Port Hamilton nor sell it. The Chinese admiral brought Om, Si-young, the Chief Secretary of Council of State and Paul Georg von Möllendorff the Vice-President of Korean Foreign Office to Port Hamilton. When they arrived at Port Hamilton, there were one British gunboat and two British commercial ships. Unexpectedly, British flag was hoisted. They asked J.P. Maclear, the Captain of the ship about intention of the occupation but he denied replying to the question. Instead, he recommended them to visit Vice-Admiral Dowell who was in Nagasaki, Japan. They moved to Nagasaki and presented a note of protest to Sir Dowell. (20)
            On the other hand, Kim Yun-sik, the President of Korean Foreign Office sent a letter to the British Vice-Consul Carles regarding British official note on 19th May. In the letter, he revealed that Korean government dispatched Korean Officials, Om, Si-young and Mollendorff to ascertain rumors about Port Hamilton. Also, he strongly warned that British naval force should withdraw from Port Hamilton or Korean government would appeal to the Treaty Powers. (21) The letter of Kim was transmitted to O'Conor. After he read the letter, he decided to send Aston back to Seoul because he had full knowledge of Korean people and language. At the moment, he was in Japan because of his illness. On June 27th, Kim reasserted that British occupation of Port Hamilton could not be justified by international law and also revealed that Korea would keep neutrality when conflict among foreign countries was broken out. On July 8th, British government was reported that Korean government prepared to appeal to the Treaty Powers. The Marques Salisbury, the new Prime Minster, ordered O¡¯Conor to recommend Chinese government that it should prevent Korean government from appealing to the Treaty Powers. After then, Korean government repealed its plan to appeal and showed mild attitude toward Britain.
            During the first phase of the occupation, British government prepared to pay Korea at a cost of the occupation. Firstly, it planed to pay not exceedingly 5,000 pounds annually, while it guaranteed Korean sovereignty over Port Hamilton. British government fully understood financial difficulties of Korean government in those days. British government knew that lump sum money would allow it to gain right over Port Hamilton. However, the plan to lend or purchase Port Hamilton was postponed because of general election in Britain. In July, Aston privately suggested the purchase of Port Hamilton but Kim refused his suggestion. In September, Aston suggested the purchase of Port Hamilton again. In this time, Korean government showed its interest in Aston¡¯s suggestion because it had to pay its debt from Jardine, Matheson, and Co. Aston sent telegram to O¡¯Conor immediately that Port Hamilton might be purchased for 500,000 dollars. O¡¯Conor reported it to the Prime Minister. However, British government did not reply to the issue.

IV.6 Reconsideration of British Government about Occupation of Port Hamilton
            In early 1886, British government reconsidered the occupation of Port Hamilton. The main reason was that Afghan border crisis between Great Britain and Russia was settled down in September 1885. Both Great Britain and Russia recognized that war might harm the interests of both countries. Because the main reason of the occupation of Port Hamilton was the Russo-British Rivalry in Afghanistan, the necessity of the occupation of Port Hamilton decreased. Furthermore, the Vice-Admiralty Dowell and his successor Hamilton claimed that retaining the possession of Port Hamilton was not beneficial. According to their claim, Port Hamilton was not easily defensible and thus it should be fortified with great expense. They also believed that it would be a source of weakness of British navy in a war because the naval force would have to be detached for its defense (22). Furthermore, using it as coaling station or trade center was not profitable enough.

IV.7 Negotiations for Withdrawal from Port Hamilton
            In early 1886, Korea and China expressed their complaints about the continued occupation of Port Hamilton again. At the moment, British government seriously considered withdrawal. However, Britain wanted to secure the integrity of Korean territory and her own dignity in the Far East. British government worried about that Russian government would take possession of Port Hamilton when British navy left it or take possession of Port Lazareff in which Russia was deeply interested over thirty years. Thus, British government asked Chinese government to take responsibility for integrity of Korea. However, China refused to take responsibility alone. From September 1886, the negotiation between Russia and China about integrity of Korea started. At the moment, rumor that Korean government had requested Russia to become its protector was spread. However, Nikolai Fedorovich Ladygenskii denied Korean overtures and assured that Russia would not occupy any territory in Korea. In sequent negotiations, China demanded Russia a written agreement but it was not successful. Finally in October 1886, the oral pledge by Ladygenskii that Russia would not seize upon any portion of Korea was made. (23) On October 31st the Tsungli Yamen informed Walsham, the successor of O¡¯Conor of the oral pledge by Ladygenskii. Walsham required the formal note from the Tsungli Yamen about the oral pledge. British government was greatly gratified with the note and on November 19th, Iddeseleigh, the new Foreign Secretary stated that Great Britain was prepared to leave Port Hamilton. Arrangement for the evacuation was telegraphed on December 11th 1886, to the Chinese Admiral and the message was sent to Korea on December 23rd. Although Walsham suggested that Port Hamilton should be handed over to a Korean official but the Vice-Admiralty Hamilton refused to do this. On February 27th 1887, all British naval force withdrew from Port Hamilton.

IV.8 Aftermath of Occupation of Port Hamilton
            During the occupation of Port Hamilton, British government did not show any respect to Korean government. Instead, it fully recognized Chinese suzerainty over Korea. For example, when the occupation was executed, Great British government notified Chinese government before they notified Korean government. Also it did not seriously consider protest by Korea but paid attentions to Chinese acquiesce for the occupation. During the negotiation for the withdrawal, Great Britain supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea to prevent Russia from taking possession a warm-water port. Although she superficially guaranteed independence of Korea in the Parkes Treaty, she practically recognized Chinese suzerainty. Even in the process of withdrawal, the authority of Korean government over Port Hamilton was not regarded. Thus, it is not strange that Chinese influence over Korea was strengthened after the withdrawal of British navy. Indeed, it is true that Great Britain paid much attention to integrity of Korea. However it was not that Great Britain regarded Korea as her important partner but that she was afraid of expansion of Russia to Pacific Ocean. Because Great Britain thought that Korea was not worthy enough, she once refused to share the responsibility for integrity of Korea with China. (24)
            On the other hand, the occupation of Port Hamilton affected Russian Far Eastern Policy. Russia realized that her naval force in Vladivostok could be easily checked by British navy. Thus, Russia decided to construct Trans-Siberian Railroad to rely more on her army rather than on its naval force in Far East. Furthermore, Russia restrained from supporting independence of Korea and regarded that acquisition of territory in Korea was not beneficial in many aspects. Thus, Russian diplomatic policy on Korea became passive for several years. (25)

Notes
(1) Also pronounced as 'Geomun-do'; It is a small group of island in the Jeju Strait and consists of three islands. It is in l at. 34 N. and long. 127.25 E. It is located in strategic place which is 300 miles from entrance to the Yangtze River, 300miles from Shangtung, 200 miles from Nagasaki, 1100 miles from Hong Kong, and 700 miles from Vladivostok.
(2) Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 2, p. 39
(3) ibid. Doc. 4, p. 40
(4) ibid. Doc. 7 P. 40
(5) Association of Korean History Research. Korean-Anglo Relationship for A Hundred Years. P. 76
(6) F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p. 451
(7) Choi. Russia¡¯s Sourthward Advance and Japan¡¯s Invasion on Korea. p.197
(8) Park, Il-keun. Anglo-American Chinese diplomatic materials relating to Korea. Memorandum by Mr. Francis Berite, Foreign Office, June 8, 1894.
(9) In early 1885, Paul Georg von M?llendorff secretly negotiated independence of Korea and Russian protection with Alexis de Speyer, the Secretary of Russian Legation in Tokyo. M?llendorff suggested concession of islands or ports. He also requested Russian military advisers. However, all these negotiations were not authorized by Korean government but those were M?llendorff¡¯s personal plan. Furthermore, Russia did not accept his suggestion. This incident enraged Japan, China and Great Britain. As a result, M?llendorff lost his position although Korean King still trusted in him.
(10) Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 213, p. 289
(11) ibid. p.190
(12) F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p.450
(13) The Marquis Tseng to Earl Granville, Chinese Legation, April 27, 1885
(14) also spelled Zongli Yamen
(15) North Saddle Island is located in Shensi county, Zhousan city, off the estuary of the Yangtze River; called as Huaniao Island in Chinese.
(16) Kim Hyun-soo. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East, 1876-1905. pp.198-200
(17) ibid. p.152
(18) Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 137, p. 243
(19) also pronounced as Ding Ruchang
(20) Chu p.60
(21) Kim Hyun-soo,. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East, 1876-1905 P. 162
(22) F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 471
(23) ibid. p.474
(24) Chu p.71
(25) ibid.
(26) F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p. 479

V. British Policy on Korea Before and After the First Sino-Japanese War
            Since Imoh Army Revolt in 1882 and Gapsin Coup in 1884, Chinese suzerainty over Korea had strengthened. Moreover, it was strongly supported by Great Britain after the occupation of Port Hamilton. China was important for Great Britain not only in an economic perspective but also in a geopolitical perspective. In those days, China was an important trading partner of Britain. For her economic interests, Britain wanted to preserve integrity of China by supporting Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Furthermore, Great Britain believed that China would be helpful to check expansion of Russia. Although Japan and Russia worried about strengthened Chinese suzerainty over Korea, they gave a tacit consent to it unless China attempted to annex Korea. At the moment, Japan was more afraid about expansion of Russia in Far East. On the other hand, Russia thought that occupation of Korea was too costly because it might cause a strong protest by Great Britain and China. (1)
            However, Japan which had had great interest in Korea for centuries did not have any intention to give up its ambition to rule over Korea. Although she consented to Li HongZhang's and Yuan ShiKai's policies on Korea, it never formally approved the vassalage of Korea to China. Japan consistently insisted that Korea was an independent country. Indeed, Japan had prepared for a war against China since the mid of 1880s. However, her ambition was not boldly expressed because "Count Ito always advocated a policy of caution in regards to foreign affairs, and, in the case of Korea in particular." (2) In early 1890s, political crisis was prevailed in Japan. Thus, the Japanese Cabinet planed to provoke foreign dispute to relieve internal crisis. (3) Furthermore, Russia began to construct Trans-Siberian Railroad to reinforce its influence in Far East. Japan expected that a war against Russia would be inevitable and it would be occurred when Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed. Therefore, Japan wanted to remove Chinese influence in Korea before Russia approached to her. However, great chance came in 1894. (4)
            In March 1894, Tonghak Rebellion broke out in Jeolla Province, southern part of Korean peninsula. Tonghak Rebellion Army defeated government troops and occupied Jeonju, one of the largest cities in Jeolla Provinces. Embarrassed by the rebellion, Korean government request Chinese government send army on June 1st. Following the Tianjin Convention Chinese government informed Japanese government of sending troops to Korea. Having a scheme to provoke a war against China, Japanese government dispatched its army in spite of opposition by both Chinese and Korean governments. Even though Tonghak Rebellion was relieved by negotiations between the Rebellion Army and Korean government, both countries maintained their troops in Korea.
            On June 16th, the Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu proposed that "China and Japan should first unite to suppress the Tonghak Rebellion and then appoint a joint administrative system of Korea." (5) However, Chinese government denied the Japanese suggestion about the joint administrative. Japan continuously pressed China to provoke a war while China sought for helps from Western countries to settle down tension. However, Russia and Britain, which were most interested in Far East among Western countries, failed to check Japanese ambition and finally, on August 1st 1894, the First Sino-Japanese War was declared by the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China.

V.2 British Attempts to Prevent the First Sino-Japanese War
            Because of her economic and geopolitical interests, Great Britain supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Moreover, British regarded China as a great partner to check expansion of Russia in Far East. Actually, the Chinese military had strengthened significantly for decades, and it seemed strong enough to take a strong stand against Russia. (6) On the other hand, the Japanese military also had strengthened and thus, Great Britain formed friendly relationship with Japan. Great Britain set a scheme to prevent the expansion of Russia in Far East with cooperation of China and Japan. Thus, when the First Sino-Japanese War was impending, it was Great Britain which was most anxious about the war. She worried that the war might not only harm her economic interests in China but also give Russia a chance to invade in Far East. Thus, efforts of British government to prevent the war were not for Korean sake but for her own sake. It was clear that regardless of winner, the war would harm her supremacy in Far East.
            To avoid the war, Britain used two measures which were ineffective. As her first attempt, Great Britain warned Japan that Russia would take advantage of the war. On June 28th the Earl of Kimberly, the Foreign Secretary, sent message to Mr. Paget, the British Minister in Tokyo.

            I have to instruct you to convey a friendly message from Her Majesty's government to the Japanese government, warning them of the very grave consequence which may be expected to result from persistence in their present attitude, which cannot fail to lead to a serious quarrel with China, of which Russia alone will reap the advantage.
            I have conveyed a strong warning in this sense to the Japanese Minister here."
(7)

            Intention of British government was to evoke a phobia about Russia to Japanese government. However, its warning could not restrain Japanese aggression. On the other hand, British government recommended Chinese Government to accept Japanese proposals. Although Chinese government accepted the proposal for the joint administrative to reform Korean government, it still demanded withdrawal of troops.
            As the second attempt, British government sought to unite the Powers in a joint intervention in early July. It asked Russia, France, Germany, the United States and later Italy to participate in the joint intervention. However, the joint intervention was a total failure. Although Italy agreed on the proposal, other countries replied negatively. Firstly, Germany agreed on the necessity of peaceful arrangement between Japan and China but was reluctant to participate in the joint intervention actively because it feared to be involved in conflict between Russia and Britain about the Far Eastern problem. The United States expressed her negative opinion about the joint intervention and desired not to go further than to offer Japan the good offices. Revealing her indifference in the current crisis in Korea, the French Foreign Minister stated that it would join "as all the other Powers may decide to take in concert." Unlike other Powers, Russia was much concerned about negotiations between China and Japan. Russia was requested separately by Chinese government to mediate the dispute between China and Japan. In late June, Russia warned that "if the troops were not withdrawn, Japan would be responsible for the serious consequences." (10) However, on July 10th Nicholas de Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, gave instructions to Mr. Cassini, the Russian Minister in Peking, not to force withdrawal of the Japanese troops but to encourage the negotiations between China and Korea. Moreover, Giers ordered Cassini to reveal that Russian government would not participate in the joint administrative system. Sudden change in reaction proved that Russia did not have any consistent policy in Far East yet. (11)
            On the other hand, Russia demonstrated a positive attitude toward the joint intervention when Russia was asked by Great Britain. In his dispatch to Sir Francis Lascelles, the British Ambassador to Russia, the Earl of Kimberley, the British Foreign Secretary, said that the Russian Ambassador to Britain informed him that

            instructions (from the Russian Foreign Office) had been given to the Russian Ministers at Peking and Tokyo to cooperate with their British colleagues in endeavoring to prevent the outbreak of war between China and Japan." (12)

            However, the cooperation between Russia and Britain did not work well because of mutual antagonism between Russia and Great Britain. Both countries worried that a counterpart country would take advantage in process of the intervention
            Although her attempts to prevent the war were ineffective, Britain refused to use any direct or forceful intervention. Britain even refused to use direct or forceful intervention when Mr. Gardner, the British Consul in Seoul, was attacked by Japanese soldiers and when Kow-Shing, a steamer under the British flag under charter to the Chinese as transport, was sunk by Japanese Navy. As it was mentioned above, China was a very important partner of Great Britain in geopolitical and economic perspectives. Although the importance of relationship with Japan had increased for the last few years, still China was much more important for Britain than Japan. Thus, a question about the British attitude in prewar days arises.
            Unlike some scholars¡¯ assertion, British government already knew that the Japanese Army and Navy were superior to those of China (13). Also British government had recognized Japanese intention of provoking war since Japan attacked Kow-Shing which brought Chinese soldiers a week before the declaration of the war. The reason of passivity of Great Britain was that British government could not afford to use such bold measures. First of all, Great Britain was isolated diplomatically in those days. In Europe, Franco-Russian Alliance was newly formed in January 1894. This newly formed alliance menaced the security and interests of Great Britain both in Europe and in abroad. Furthermore, an amicable relationship between Great Britain and Triple Alliance had declined since Germany competed with Great Britain about acquisition of colony. Secondly, China Squadron had lost its supremacy in Far East since the Russian, German, American, French and Japanese naval forces were reinforced (14). Although the British Navy was strong enough to restrain Japan from provoking the war, such assertive action might irritate the naval forces of Western countries. It was evident that China Squadron would have been seriously challenged if the joint military action had been formed by other naval forces in Far East. Additionally, Lord Rosebery, the new Prime Minister, was a ¡®peaceful man¡¯. He did not want to enter a war unless one might seriously threaten the security of the British Empire. Thus, it was natural for Lord Rosebery to do his best to avoid any possible conflict in Far East. (15) Indeed, problems in Far East were sensitive enough to cause a conflict between Great Britain and Russia. In this situation, there were few choices for Britain to prevent the war between China and Japan. The most effective method was full cooperation with Russia. However, such action required ¡®diplomatic revolution¡¯ for both countries. Russia and Britain were not willing to change the most significant diplomatic principles. As a result, Japan declared the war as soon as she recognized that there would be no intervention by Western Powers.

V.3 The Development of the First Sino-Japanese War and British Intervention
            When the war broke out, Britain declared neutrality. Her matter of concern was protecting her commerce in China. (16) Her commerce was mostly concentrated around the Yangtze valley. Thus, Britain asked China and Japan not to operate war around Shanghai before the war. Furthermore, British fleet was stationed at Shanghai with orders to prevent the Japanese fleet from entering the Yangtze and British government resisted all efforts of Tokyo government to withdraw her guarantee to keep Shanghai neutral. (17) As the war started, Japan won lopsided victories. Although it was already known that Japanese military strength was superior to that of China, Japanese overwhelming victories were hardly expected. Especially, Chinese defeats of the Battle of PyongYang on September 15th and the Battle of Yalu River on September 17th embarrassed Britain. She worried that her commerce would be harmed if Chinese government collapsed because of defeat of the war. Furthermore, Russia would like to advance Manchuria and Korea. To save China, Great Britain suggested join intervention again on a basis of an indemnity for Japan and an international guarantee of Korea¡¯s independence. Her proposal was very meaningful because it indicated that Britain might not support Chinese suzerainty over Korea any more. She thought that China might not be able to check expansion of Russia. However, the proposal was rejected by the United States and Germany. Also, France was indifference to the situation of the war. Although Russia replied positively to the proposal, she could not participate actively because of serious conditions of Czar Alexander III and Nicholas de Giers. Furthermore, both China and Japan refused to accept the proposal. China did not want to give up her suzerainty over Korea and also to pay indemnity for Japan because Japan had not proceeded to Chinese territory yet. On the other hand, Japan revealed that it was too early to conclude a peace treaty because she thought that more decisive victories were required to get enough spoils of the war. Again, attempt to enforce the joint intervention was failed.
            However, the war situation was not improved and Japan proceeded to Manchuria on October 24th. Afraid to lose her territory, China called for the joint intervention by the Powers. However, the Powers including Britain were indifference to her request. They insisted that they would keep neutrality. Now, there was nothing to stop Japanese advance. Finally China surrendered to Japan and signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th 1895.

V.4 Change of British Policy on Korea after the First Sino-Japanese War
            The result of the First Sino-Japanese War was very significant. Now, Japan became the most powerful oriental country in East Asia. Although she saved her mainland thanks to Triple Intervention, it was proved that China was not strong enough to restrain expansion of Russia. Indeed, she even was not able to keep her own integrity. After the war, other Western countries began to encroach on China and British supremacy in China was challenged. Furthermore, China felt that she had been betrayed by Britain and began to form friendly relationship with Russia. As a result, Great Britain changed her Far Eastern Policy. Her sympathy shifted to Japan and Japan became the most important partner of her in Far East. Thus, it was natural that Britain changed her policy on Korea. After the First Sino-Japanese War Britain tacitly admitted Japanese suzerainty over Korea.

Notes
(1) Choi. Russia¡¯s Sourthward Advance and Japan¡¯s Invasion on Korea. pp.207-221
(2) Park, Il-keun. Anglo-American Chinese Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea. Memorandum by Mr. Gubbins, F.O. June 16 1894
(3) F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 521 - P. 529
(4) Choi. Russia¡¯s Sourthward Advance and Japan¡¯s Invasion on Korea. p.235
(5) F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 536
(6) Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894-1900. P. 100 - P. 101
(7) Park, Il-keun. Anglo-American Chinese diplomatic materials relating to Korea. The Earl of Kimberly to Mr. Paget, NO 21 F.O. June 28 1894
(8) Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894-1900. P. 82
(9) Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs Vol. 4: Sino-Japanese War, 1894. Doc. 75 , P. 47
(10) Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs Vol. 4: Sino-Japanese War, 1894. Doc. 74 , P. 47
(11) Choi. Russia¡¯s Sourthward Advance and Japan¡¯s Invasion on Korea. pp.240-245
(12) Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs Vol. 4: Sino-Japanese War, 1894. Doc. 136 , P. 70
(13) Cyprian A.G. Bridge, the Director of Naval Intelligence Department, reported on July 16th 1894, that "the Japanese organization, discipline, and training are so superior that Japan may reasonably be considered the stronger Power on the sea.¡± Also, according to memorandum on the relative Values of the Armies of China and Japan, it said ¡°how much or how little the superiority of Japan in the organization of her land forces would be modified by China¡¯s supremacy in the numbers on composition of her fleet is a matter which would call for opinion from the Department more directly concerned with naval details."
(14) Phillips P. O¡¯Brien. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 1902-1922. P. 27
(15) Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894 - 1900. P. 112 - P. 113
(16) Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894 - 1900. P. 106
(17) Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894 - 1900. P. 107

VI. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Collapse of Korea

VI.1 Forming of Anglo-Japanese Alliance
            Great Britain and Japan concluded the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30th 1902. The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was very significant for both countries. After the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, Great Britain abandoned its traditional diplomatic policy, ¡®splendid isolation¡¯ and entered into an alliance with France and Russia. On the other hand, Japan could afford to prepare a war against Russia more effectively. The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance consists of six clauses. In the treaty, both Great Britain and Japan defined their rights and interests in East Asia. The main purpose of the alliance was to preserve peace in East Asia, integral territory of Korea and fair opportunity in commerce and industry in East Asia. The first clause defines rights and interests of both countries in East Asia. The second and third clause discussed obligations of both countries as partners. And then the fourth clause regulates duties to preserve the treaty. Lastly, the fifth and sixth mentioned about mutual understanding and the term of validity of the alliance. (1)
            In early 1900s, Great Britain and Japan had a matter of common interest, how to prevent expansion of Russia in East Asia. After the Boxer Rebellion, (2) Russia deployed its army in Manchuria. (3) Also Trans-Siberian Railway was under construction to expand its influence in China and Korea. Such actions were very threatening to both Great Britain and Japan, especially to Japan. Thus, Japan sought various ways to preserve peace in East Asia. Firstly, she tried to negotiate with Russia directly. And also she tried to ally with other Western Powers. At that time, Great Britain also wanted to get an ally and reduce burden of maintaining her colonies in East Asia. Because interests of two countries were coincided, they could conclude the alliance.

VI.2 Influence of Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Collapse of Korea
            When the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed Japan wanted to get official recognition of her special rights and interests in Korea. Japan sought a clause which might justify her invasion on Korea but Great Britain denied insertion of the clause in the treaty. (4) However, Great Britain denied insertion of the clause because she was afraid that it might provoke tension between her and Russia. Furthermore, the tension between Great Britain and Russia would provoke another tension between Great Britain and France. Except for the above reason, Great Britain had no reason to reject Japanese attempts to preserve her special rights and interests in Korea. (5) Great Britain was not interest in maintaining sovereignty of Korea. Thus, Great Britain recognized Japanese special rights and interests in Korea with some limitations. (6) Great Britain did not want to be involved directly in a future conflict between Japan and Russia.
            The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance changed circumstances around Korea. Indeed, it is hard to say that the alliance was a direct reason which provoked the Russo-Japanese War. However, it is true that the alliance improved Japanese status in military and diplomacy. (7) Moreover, the alliance was the first case which recognized Japanese suzerainty over Korea instead of Chinese suzerainty. The intended purpose of the alliance for Great Britain was to concentrate her power in Europe and to sustain her superior position in East Asia at the same time. Great Britain implicitly wanted that Russia would spend its power and time to advance to Korea. She believed that such situation would restrain Russia to advance India and Europe. Indeed, Great Britain could achieve their goal by concluding the alliance. (8)
            Japan and Great Britain concluded the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance after Japan defeated Russia in 1905. The alliance was concluded in August, only one month before the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1905 (9) was concluded. The alliance fully recognized Japanese control over Korea. Unlike the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not guarantee independence and integrity of Korea. Thus, Japan could invade Korea without any restraint. (10) As a result, Japan deprived Korea of diplomatic sovereignty at the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1905. In the end, Japan forcefully colonized Korea in 1910.

Notes

(1) Kim, Bo-Yeon ¡°The Causes and Implications of the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 : British Imperial Strategy as Regional Developments¡±, 2005. P. 89 ~ P. 91
(2) The Boxer Rebellion or the Boxer Movement was a rebellion by members of the Society of Right and Harmonious Fists against foreign powers in China. The Rebellion was characterized as an anti-foreign, anti-imperialist peasant-based movement.
(3) Jung, Jin-Oh, ¡°A Study of Anglo-Japanese Alliance¡±, , Vol.11 2005
(4) Jung, Jin-Oh
(5) Kim, Bo-Yeon P. 91
(6) Jung, Jin-Oh
(7) Kim, Bo-Yeon P. 101
(8) Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902 ? 1922 P. 56 ? p. 57
(9) The Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1905, The Eul-sa Treaty or the Second Korean-Japanese Convention was a treaty which Japanese Government coerced Korean Government to conclude to deprive the diplomatic sovereignty of Korea.
(10) Jung, Jin-Oh

VII. Conclusion
            Main purpose of the diplomatic policy of Great Britain on Korea from 1883 to 1897 was restraining expansion of Russia in East Asia; it was also a derivative of the diplomatic policy of Great Britain on China and Japan. As it is mentioned above, Great Britain recognized geopolitical importance of Korea as other Powers did. Nonetheless, Great Britain was not active to opening doors of Korea because she worried that such action would provoke tension between Russia and her. She did not do her best to avoid the tension to preserve her dominance over China and India. Furthermore, the opening Korea was not attractive enough because little economic benefit was expected. The diplomatic policy of Great Britain did not change even after Great Britain signed the Willes Treaty and the Parkes Treaty. She stubbornly supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea and did not consider independent status of Korean government. Occupation of Port Hamilton demonstrated her intention very well; she did not negotiate with Korean government but Chinese government about the occupation of Port Hamilton. After the First Sino-Japanese War, Great Britain recognized Japanese dominance over Korea to preserve her political and economic status in East Asia. Ultimately, Great Britain was not interested in Korea and never considered her as a partner. Thus, it was not strange that the diplomatic policy on Korea arbitrarily changed based on the diplomatic policy on Russia, China and Japan.


Bibliography, 2nd Update (as of November 24th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

I. Books : Bibliographies
1.      Cheong, Sung-hwa and Alexander Ganse Bibliography of Western Language Publications on Korea 1588-1950. Seoul: Myoungji University Publication 2008

II. Books : Primary Sources
2.      Chung, Henry. Korean Treaties. New York: H.S. Nichols. 1919.
3.      Lo, Hui-min. Foreign Office Confidential Papers Relating to China and Her Neighbouring Countries, 1840-1914: With an Additional List, 1915-1937. Hague & Paris: Mouton. 1969.
4.      Nash, Ian Hill, et al. British documents on foreign affairs--reports and papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part I, from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America. 1989.

III. Books : Secondary Sources
5.      Berryman, John. The Assassination of Queen Min and British Policy towards Korea. Hanguk Jeongchi Oegyosa Nonchong. Hanguk Jeongchi Oegyo Sahakhoe. Vol.18 No.1 1998.
6.      Chamberlain, Muriel Evelyn. Pax Britannica: British Foreign Policy, 1789-1914. London and New York: Longman. 1988
7.      Gim, C.I. Eugene. & Gim H.K. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876 - 1910. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1968.
8.      Hoare, J.E. The British Embassy Compound Seoul, 1884-1984. Seoul: Korean British Society. 1984.
9.      Jones, F.C. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea, 1866~1894. Boston: Department of History, Havard University. 1935.
10.      Kim Hyun-soo. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East 1876~1905. Glasgow University Department of Modern History Faculty of Arts. 1989.
11.      Lynn Martin ¡°British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century.¡± The Oxford History of British Empire ? The Nineteenth Century. Ed. Wm. Roger Louis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p.102
12.      McCordock, R.S. British Far Eastern Policy 1894~1900. New York: Columbia University Press. 1931.
13.      Pak, Il-Keun. Anglo-American and Chinese diplomatic materials relating to Korea (1887-1897) : [Kundae Hanguk kwangye Yong-Mi-Chung oegyo charyojip]. [Pusan] : Institute of Chinese Studies, Pusan National University. 1984.
14.      Phillips P. O¡¯Brien. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon. 2004.
15.      S, D. W. European Settlements in the Far East : China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, etc. London: [s.n.] 1900.




Chapter 2 1st Update (as of November 20th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

            British diplomatic policy in the middle of and in the late 19th century can be marked into two ways. The first remarkable trait was a free trade policy and the second remarkable trait was a policy of balance of power, also called ¡®Splendid Isolation¡¯. After Great Britain carried out the Industrial Revolution during the late 18th and the early 19th century, she conducted the free trade policy. The policy was based on the belief that the free trade would benefit both Great Britain and her trade partners. (1) Throughout the 19th century, the free trade policy became the most important principle of British diplomatic policy. Even after Great Britain indulged in boisterous imperialism in 1890s, the free trade policy was the fundamental of the diplomatic policy. 'Informal Empire' was also based on the free trade policy. The term, 'Informal Empire', indicates that the British government was not deeply interested in expanding its territory in abroad but deeply concerned with expanding its economic influence. However, ¡®Informal Empire¡¯ did not suggest peaceful interaction with other countries. To enlarge and preserve her influences in the world, strong military forces, especially strong naval forces, were prerequisite. Consequently, she had to establish and secure a strong point to promote the free trade; occupation of Hong Kong was a good example of this. (2) In late 19th century, the one of the greatest concerns of Great Britain was to promote trade with China, India, Ottoman Empire and Latin American countries. (3) In the Meantime, Russia sought an ice-free port and advanced to the Black Sea, India and East Asia. Such movement of Russia threatened the economic and political interest of Great Britain in China, India and Ottoman Turkey. As a result, various tensions between Russia and Great Britain were provoked in 19th century; the Crimean War and a tension in Afghanistan were great examples of conflicts between Great Britain and Russia.
            While British diplomatic policy on colonial problems in 19th century is summarized in ¡®Informal Empire¡¯, her diplomatic policy on European problems can be termed 'Splendid Isolation'. After the Congress of the Vienna, Great Britain denied to involve in a permanent alliance. Instead, she preferred to make a convention which requires fewer obligations. (4) Furthermore, Great Britain attempted to avoid any diplomatic and military conflict with other countries unless they harmed her benefit and the balance of power in European Continent. (5) Great Britain was very sensitive to preserving the balance of power in Europe because peace in Europe was prerequisite for her prosperity. Expanded territories and influences made Great Britain difficult to maintain them because British military forces could not focus power in a specific place. Furthermore, British land forces were not strong enough to overwhelm those of France and Russia. As a result, ¡®Splendid Isolation¡¯ which was initially the policy to keep balance of power turned into desperate remoteness in European continent. At the moment, Germany became the leading part in the international situation after her unification in 1871. To isolate France, Bismarck formed an alliance against France but Great Britain did not join in the alliance. Because of her refusal to join either in the Triple Alliance or in the Franco-Russia Alliance Great Britain suffered from oppression by other European countries in 1890s. (6) Simultaneously, British territories and economic interests in abroad were severely challenged after other Western Powers succeeded to carry out industrial development in late 19th century. For example, Great Britain confronted France in Fashoda, Germany in South Africa and in Pacific Ocean, and Russia in Central Asia and in Balkan Peninsula. (7) In the end, Great Britain abandoned ¡®Splendid Isolation¡¯ and allied with Japan in 1902. Two years later, Great Britain entered into the Franco-Russian Alliance.
            Overall British diplomatic policy in the middle of and in the late 19th century was also applied to her diplomatic policy towards East Asia. First of all, Great Britain attempted to preserve balance of power in East Asia as she did in Europe. Before the First Sino-Japanese War, she maintained friendly relationship with China. After the war, she promoted friendly relationship with Japan after the war. The ultimate purpose of the policy was to prevent expansion of Russia in East Asia. Great Britain sustained the policy of 'Informal Empire' too. The target of the policy of 'Informal Empire' was China. Korea of which the volume of trade was relatively very small was treated as a tool to preserve economic interest in China. Her policy was proved to be quite successful. Consequently, Great Britain kept her economic priority in China for decades and dealt peacefully with military tensions such as the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. In truth, Great Britain conducted a nonintervention policy in East Asia not only because of her fundamental diplomatic policy but also because of oppression by other Western Powers and hardships to preserve inordinately large empire. From the second chapter, this paper will study the diplomatic policy of Great Britain on Korea and how she dealt with problems in Korea to sustain her influence in East Asia.

Notes
(1) Lynn Martin "British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century." The Oxford History of British Empire ? The Nineteenth Century. ed. Wm. Roger Louis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. p.102
(2) Lynn Martin p.112
(3) Lynn Martin
(4) Kim Hyun-soo "The British Foreign Policy in the Nineteenth Century ? Splendid Isolation Policy" Vol.43 No.1 1994.
(5) Kim Hyun-soo
(6) Kim Hyun-soo pp.196-207
(7) Kim Sang-soo "The Prelude to Britain's Abandonment of Her 'Splendid Isolation'" Vol.54 No.1 1997. pp.115-118





Chapter 6 (as of October 16th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

VI. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Collapse of Korea

VI.1 Forming of Anglo-Japanese Alliance
            Great Britain and Japan concluded the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance on January 30th 1902. The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was very significant for both countries. After the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, Great Britain abandoned its traditional diplomatic policy, 'splendid isolation' and entered into an alliance with France and Russia. On the other hand, Japan could afford to prepare a war against Russia more effectively. The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance consists of six clauses. In the treaty, both Great Britain and Japan defined their rights and interests in East Asia. The main purpose of the alliance was to preserve peace in East Asia, integral territory of Korea and fair opportunity in commerce and industry in East Asia. The first clause defines rights and interests of both countries in East Asia. The second and third clause discussed obligations of both countries as partners. And then the fourth clause regulates duties to preserve the treaty. Lastly, the fifth and sixth mentioned about mutual understanding and the term of validity of the alliance. (1)
            In early 1900s, Great Britain and Japan had a matter of common interest, how to prevent expansion of Russia in East Asia. After the Boxer Rebellion, (2) Russia deployed its army in Manchuria. (3) Also Trans-Siberian Railway was under construction to expand its influence in China and Korea. Such actions were very threatening to both Great Britain and Japan, especially to Japan. Thus, Japan sought various ways to preserve peace in East Asia. Firstly, she tried to negotiate with Russia directly. And also she tried to ally with other Western Powers. At that time, Great Britain also wanted to get an ally and reduce burden of maintaining her colonies in East Asia. Because interests of two countries were coincided, they could conclude the alliance.

VI.2 Influence of Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Collapse of Korea
            When the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was discussed Japan wanted to get official recognition of her special rights and interests in Korea. Japan sought a clause which might justify her invasion on Korea but Great Britain denied insertion of the clause in the treaty. (4) However, Great Britain denied insertion of the clause because she was afraid that it might provoke tension between her and Russia. Furthermore, the tension between Great Britain and Russia would provoke another tension between Great Britain and France. Except for the above reason, Great Britain had no reason to reject Japanese attempts to preserve her special rights and interests in Korea. (5) Great Britain was not interest in maintaining sovereignty of Korea. Thus, Great Britain recognized Japanese special rights and interests in Korea with some limitations. (6) Great Britain did not want to be involved directly in a future conflict between Japan and Russia.
            The First Anglo-Japanese Alliance changed circumstances around Korea. Indeed, it is hard to say that the alliance was a direct reason which provoked the Russo-Japanese War. However, it is true that the alliance improved Japanese status in military and diplomacy. (7) Moreover, the alliance was the first case which recognized Japanese suzerainty over Korea instead of Chinese suzerainty. The intended purpose of the alliance for Great Britain was to concentrate her power in Europe and to sustain her superior position in East Asia at the same time. Great Britain implicitly wanted that Russia would spend its power and time to advance to Korea. She believed that such situation would restrain Russia to advance India and Europe. Indeed, Great Britain could achieve their goal by concluding the alliance. (8)
            Japan and Great Britain concluded the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance after Japan defeated Russia in 1905. The alliance was concluded in August, only one month before the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1905 (9) was concluded. The alliance fully recognized Japanese control over Korea. Unlike the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance did not guarantee independence and integrity of Korea. Thus, Japan could invade Korea without any restraint. (10) As a result, Japan deprived Korea of diplomatic sovereignty at the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1905. In the end, Japan forcefully colonized Korea in 1910.

Notes

(1) Kim, Bo-Yeon "The Causes and implications of the first Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 : British imperial strategy as regional developments", 2005. pp.89-91
(2) The Boxer Rebellion or the Boxer Movement was a rebellion by members of the Society of Right and Harmonious Fists against foreign powers in China. The Rebellion was characterized as an anti-foreign, anti-imperialist peasant-based movement.
(3) Jung, Jin-Oh, "A Study of Anglo-Japanese Alliance", , Vol.11 2005
(4) Jung, Jin-Oh
(5) Kim, Bo-Yeon p.91
(6) Jung, Jin-Oh
(7) Kim, Bo-Yeon p.101
(8) Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1902?1922 pp.56?57
(9) The Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1905, The Eul-sa Treaty or the Second Korean-Japanese Convention was a treaty which Japanese Government coerced Korean Government to conclude to deprive the diplomatic sovereignty of Korea.
(10) Jung, Jin-Oh



Chapter 5 (as of July 23rd 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

V. British Policy on Korea Before and After the First Sino-Japanese War

V.1 Origin of the First Sino-Japanese War
            Since Imoh Army Revolt in 1882 and Gapsin Coup in 1884, Chinese suzerainty over Korea had strengthened. Moreover, it was strongly supported by Great Britain after the occupation of Port Hamilton. China was important for Great Britain not only in an economic perspective but also in a geopolitical perspective. In those days, China was an important trading partner of Britain. For her economic interests, Britain wanted to preserve integrity of China by supporting Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Furthermore, Great Britain believed that China would be helpful to check expansion of Russia. Although Japan and Russia worried about strengthened Chinese suzerainty over Korea, they gave a tacit consent to it unless China attempted to annex Korea. At the moment, Japan was more afraid about expansion of Russia in Far East. On the other hand, Russia thought that occupation of Korea was too costly because it might cause a strong protest by Great Britain and China. (1)
            However, Japan which had had great interest in Korea for centuries did not have any intention to give up its ambition to rule over Korea. Although she consented to Li HongZhang's and Yuan ShiKai's policies on Korea, it never formally approved the vassalage of Korea to China. Japan consistently insisted that Korea was an independent country. Indeed, Japan had prepared for a war against China since the mid of 1880s. However, her ambition was not boldly expressed because "Count Ito always advocated a policy of caution in regards to foreign affairs, and, in the case of Korea in particular." (2) In early 1890s, political crisis was prevailed in Japan. Thus, the Japanese Cabinet planed to provoke foreign dispute to relieve internal crisis. (3) Furthermore, Russia began to construct Trans-Siberian Railroad to reinforce its influence in Far East. Japan expected that a war against Russia would be inevitable and it would be occurred when Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed. Therefore, Japan wanted to remove Chinese influence in Korea before Russia approached to her. Fortunately, great chance came in 1894. (4)
            In March 1894, Tonghak Rebellion broke out in Jeolla Province, southern part of Korean peninsula. Tonghak Rebellion Army defeated government troops and occupied Jeonju, one of the largest cities in Jeolla Provinces. Embarrassed by the rebellion, Korean Government request Chinese Government to send army on June 1st. Following the Tianjin Convention Chinese Government informed Japanese Government of sending troops to Korea. Having a scheme to provoke a war against China, Japanese Government dispatched its army in spite of opposition by both Chinese and Korean Governments. Even though Tonghak Rebellion was relieved by negotiations between the Rebellion Army and Korean Government, both countries maintained their troops in Korea.
            On June 16th, the Japanese Foreign Minister Mutsu proposed that "China and Japan should first unite to suppress the Tonghak Rebellion and then appoint a joint administrative system of Korea." (5) However, Chinese Government denied the Japanese suggestion about the joint administrative. Japan continuously pressed China to provoke a war while China sought for helps from Western countries to settle down tension. However, Russia and Britain, which were most interested in Far East among Western countries, failed to check Japanese ambition and finally, on August 1st 1894, the First Sino-Japanese War was declared by the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of China.

V.2 British Attempts to Prevent the First Sino-Japanese War
            Because of her economic and geopolitical interests, Great Britain supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea. Moreover, British regarded China as a great partner to check expansion of Russia in Far East. Actually, the Chinese military had strengthened significantly for decades, and it seemed strong enough to take a strong stand against Russia. (6) On the other hand, the Japanese military also had strengthened and thus, Great Britain formed friendly relationship with Japan. Great Britain set a scheme to prevent the expansion of Russia in Far East with cooperation of China and Japan. Thus, when the First Sino-Japanese War was impending, it was Great Britain which was most anxious about the war. She worried that the war might not only harm her economic interests in China but also give Russia a chance to invade in Far East. Thus, efforts of British Government to prevent the war were not for Korean sake but for her own sake. It was clear that regardless of winner, the war would harm her supremacy in Far East.
            To avoid the war, Britain used two measures which were ineffective. As her first attempt, Great Britain warned Japan that Russia would take advantage of the war. On June 28th the Earl of Kimberly, the Foreign Secretary, sent message to Mr. Paget, the British Minister in Tokyo.
            "I have to instruct you to convey a friendly message from Her Majesty's Government to the Japanese Government, warning them of the very grave consequence which may be expected to result from persistence in their present attitude, which cannot fail to lead to a serious quarrel with China, of which Russia alone will reap the advantage.
            I have conveyed a strong warning in this sense to the Japanese Minister here."
(7)
            Intention of British Government was to evoke a phobia about Russia to Japanese Government. However, its warning could not restrain Japanese aggression. On the other hand, British Government recommended Chinese Government to accept Japanese proposals. Although Chinese Government accepted the proposal for the joint administrative to reform Korean Government, it still demanded withdrawal of troops.
            As the second attempt, British Government sought to unite the Powers in a joint intervention in early July. It asked Russia, France, Germany, the United States and later Italy to participate in the joint intervention. However, the joint intervention was a total failure. Although Italy agreed on the proposal, other countries replied negatively. Firstly, Germany agreed on the necessity of peaceful arrangement between Japan and China but was reluctant to participate in the joint intervention actively because it feared to be involved in conflict between Russia and Britain about the Far Eastern problem. The United States expressed her negative opinion about the joint intervention and desired not to go further than to offer Japan the good offices. Revealing her indifference in the current crisis in Korea, the French Foreign Minister stated that it would join "as all the other Powers may decide to take in concert." Unlike other Powers, Russia was much concerned about negotiations between China and Japan. Russia was requested separately by Chinese Government to mediate the dispute between China and Japan. In late June, Russia warned that "if the troops were not withdrawn, Japan would be responsible for the serious consequences." (10) However, on July 10th Nicholas de Giers, the Russian Foreign Minister, gave instructions to Mr. Cassini, the Russian Minister in Peking, not to force withdrawal of the Japanese troops but to encourage the negotiations between China and Korea. Moreover, Giers ordered Cassini to reveal that Russian Government would not participate in the joint administrative system. Sudden change in reaction proved that Russia did not have any consistent policy in Far East yet. (11)
            On the other hand, Russia demonstrated a positive attitude toward the joint intervention when Russia was asked by Great Britain. In his dispatch to Sir Francis Lascelles, the British Ambassador to Russia, the Earl of Kimberley, the British Foreign Secretary, said that the Russian Ambassador to Britain informed him that
            "instructions (from the Russian Foreign Office) had been given to the Russian Ministers at Peking and Tokyo to cooperate with their British colleagues in endeavoring to prevent the outbreak of war between China and Japan." (12)
            However, the cooperation between Russia and Britain did not work well because of mutual antagonism between Russia and Great Britain. Both countries worried that a counterpart country would take advantage in process of the intervention.
            Although her attempts to prevent the war were ineffective, Britain refused to use any direct or forceful intervention. Britain even refused to use direct or forceful intervention when Mr. Gardner, the British Consul in Seoul, was attacked by Japanese soldiers and when Kow-Shing, a steamer under the British flag under charter to the Chinese as transport, was sunk by Japanese Navy. As it was mentioned above, China was a very important partner of Great Britain in geopolitical and economic perspectives. Although the importance of relationship with Japan had increased for the last few years, still China was much more important for Britain than Japan. Thus, a question about the British attitude in prewar days arises.
            Unlike some scholars¡¯ assertion, British Government already knew that the Japanese Army and Navy were superior to those of China (13). Also British Government had recognized Japanese intention of provoking war since Japan attacked Kow-Shing which brought Chinese soldiers a week before the declaration of the war. The reason of passivity of Great Britain was that British Government could not afford to use such bold measures. First of all, Great Britain was isolated diplomatically in those days. In Europe, Franco-Russian Alliance was newly formed in January 1894. This newly formed alliance menaced the security and interests of Great Britain both in Europe and in abroad. Furthermore, an amicable relationship between Great Britain and Triple Alliance had declined since Germany competed with Great Britain about acquisition of colony. Secondly, China Squadron had lost its supremacy in Far East since the Russian, German, American, French and Japanese naval forces were reinforced (14). Although the British Navy was strong enough to restrain Japan from provoking the war, such assertive action might irritate the naval forces of Western countries. It was evident that China Squadron would have been seriously challenged if the joint military action had been formed by other naval forces in Far East. Additionally, Lord Rosebery, the new Prime Minister, was a ¡®peaceful man¡¯. He did not want to enter a war unless one might seriously threaten the security of the British Empire. Thus, it was natural for Lord Rosebery to avoid any possible conflict in Far East. (15) Indeed, problems in Far East were sensitive enough to cause a conflict between Great Britain and Russia. In this situation, there were few choices for Britain to prevent the war between China and Japan. The most effective method was full cooperation with Russia. However, such action required ¡®diplomatic revolution¡¯ for both countries. Russia and Britain were not willing to change the most significant diplomatic principles. As a result, Japan declared the war as soon as she recognized that there would be no intervention by Western Powers.

V.3 The Development of the First Sino-Japanese War and British Intervention
            When the war broke out, Britain declared neutrality. Her matter of concern was protecting her commerce in China. (16) Her commerce was mostly concentrated around the Yangtze valley. Thus, Britain asked China and Japan not to operate war around Shanghai before the war. Furthermore, British fleet was stationed at Shanghai with orders to prevent the Japanese fleet from entering the Yangtze and British Government resisted all efforts of Tokyo Government to withdraw her guarantee to keep Shanghai neutral. (17) As the war started, Japan won lopsided victories. Although it was already known that Japanese military strength was superior to that of China, Japanese overwhelming victories were hardly expected. Especially, Chinese defeats of the Battle of PyongYang on September 15th and the Battle of Yalu River on September 17th embarrassed Britain. She worried that her commerce would be harmed if Chinese Government collapsed because of defeat of the war. Furthermore, Russia would like to advance Manchuria and Korea. To save China, Great Britain suggested join intervention again on a basis of an indemnity for Japan and an international guarantee of Korea¡¯s independence. Her proposal was very meaningful because it indicated that Britain might not support Chinese suzerainty over Korea any more. She thought that China might not be able to check expansion of Russia. However, the proposal was rejected by the United States and Germany. Also, France was indifference to the situation of the war. Although Russia replied positively to the proposal, she could not participate actively because of serious conditions of Czar Alexander III and Nicholas de Giers. Furthermore, both China and Japan refused to accept the proposal. China did not want to give up her suzerainty over Korea and also to pay indemnity for Japan because Japan had not proceeded to Chinese territory yet. On the other hand, Japan revealed that it was too early to conclude a peace treaty because she thought that more decisive victories were required to get enough spoils of the war. Again, attempt to enforce the joint intervention was failed.
            However, the war situation was not improved and Japan proceeded to Manchuria on October 24th. Afraid to lose her territory, China called for the joint intervention by the Powers. However, the Powers including Britain were indifference to her request. They insisted that they would keep neutrality. Now, there was nothing to stop Japanese advance. Finally China surrendered to Japan and signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17th 1895.

V.4 Change of British Policy on Korea after the First Sino-Japanese War
            The result of the First Sino-Japanese War was very significant. Now, Japan became the most powerful oriental country in East Asia. Although she saved her mainland thanks to Triple Intervention, it was proved that China was not strong enough to restrain expansion of Russia. Indeed, she even was not able to keep her own integrity. After the war, other Western countries began to encroach on China and British supremacy in China was challenged. Furthermore, China felt that she had been betrayed by Britain and began to form friendly relationship with Russia. As a result, Great Britain changed her Far Eastern Policy. Her sympathy shifted to Japan and Japan became the most important partner of her in Far East. Thus, it was natural that Britain changed her policy on Korea. After the First Sino-Japanese War Britain tacitly admitted Japanese suzerainty over Korea.

Notes
(1)      Choi pp.207-221
(2)      Park, Il-keun. Anglo-American Chinese Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea. Memorandum by Mr. Gubbins, F.O. June 16 1894
(3)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 521 - P. 529
(4)      Choi p.235
(5)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 536
(6)      Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894-1900. P. 100 - P. 101
(7)      Park, Il-keun. Anglo-American Chinese diplomatic materials relating to Korea. The Earl of Kimberly to Mr. Paget, NO 21 F.O. June 28 1894
(8)      Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894-1900. P. 82
(9)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs Vol. 4: Sino-Japanese War, 1894. Doc. 75 , P. 47
(10)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs Vol. 4: Sino-Japanese War, 1894. Doc. 74 , P. 47
(11)      Choi pp.240-245
(12)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs Vol. 4: Sino-Japanese War, 1894. Doc. 136 , P. 70
(13)      Cyprian A.G. Bridge, the Director of Naval Intelligence Department, reported on July 16th 1894, that "the Japanese organization, discipline, and training are so superior that Japan may reasonably be considered the stronger Power on the sea.¡± Also, according to memorandum on the relative Values of the Armies of China and Japan, it said ¡°how much or how little the superiority of Japan in the organization of her land forces would be modified by China¡¯s supremacy in the numbers on composition of her fleet is a matter which would call for opinion from the Department more directly concerned with naval details."
(14)      Phillips P. O¡¯Brien. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 1902-1922. P. 27
(15)      Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894 - 1900. P. 112 - P. 113
(16)      Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894 - 1900. P. 106
(17)      Robert Stanley McCordock. British Far Eastern Policy, 1894 - 1900. P. 107



Chapter 4 (as of July 21st 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

IV. Occupation of Port Hamilton 1885 - 1887

IV.1 British Interest in Port Hamilton Before 1885
            In 1845, during the expedition to the near sea of Korea, Sir Edward Belcher in HMS Samarang surveyed a small group of islands, Komun-do (1). He named it after the then Secretary of the Admiralty, Captain W.A.B. Hamilton. In those days, the British navy already recognized the strategic importance of Port Hamilton. However, Great Britain did not openly express its interest in Port Hamilton until 1875.
            In 1875, Harry Parkes and the Vice-Admiral A.P. Ryder strongly urged Edward Henry Stanley, the then Foreign Secretary, to occupy Port Hamilton. They informed him that the situation around Korea became unstable. On July 20th, Harry Parkes recommended that British navy should immediately occupy Port Hamilton if this had not been done by another Power (2). Also, in his telegram to the Secretary of Admiralty, the Vice-Admiral Ryder noted

            "Russia is rapidly encroaching. A German vessel is surveying west coast of Korea; Japanese vessel, the east coast; both with a view to occupation ... I submit that ¡®Sylvia¡¯ should be directed to survey south-west coast, and that if as Minister suggests, I am directed to take possession of or occupy Port Hamilton." (3)

            However, their suggestion to occupy Port Hamilton was not accepted by British Government. The Foreign Secretary replied

            "... Her Majesty's Government does not think it desirable to set to other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain has no title." (4)

            Furthermore, the Governments of Germany and Russia instructed that they had no designs on Korea and her territory. Although the plan of occupation of Port Hamilton was not practiced, the expedition to Chosan Harbour (Korea), Tsusima, and Port Hamilton by Sir Francis Plunkett provided detailed information on them.
            Seven years later, the Admiral Willes requested to lease of Port Hamilton when he negotiated the Willes Treaty with Korean Government. However, he just gave up because of the opposition of a Chinese officer (5). Introduced incidents show us that British interest in Port Hamilton was not sudden but it had lasted for several decades. Actually, Russian Government already knew that Great Britain had a secret plan to occupy Port Hamilton in 1882.

IV.2 The Causes for Occupation of Port Hamilton
            In 1884, the tension between Great Britain and Russia increased significantly since Russia seized Merv Oasis, near to Afghanistan. Violating an agreement with Britain, Russian army advanced on Panjdeh Oasis in March 1885. British Government worried that farther approach of Russian forces might threaten British interests and rights in India. At the moment, Great Britain confronted with another serious problem since Bismarck, the German Prime Minister, tried to prevent Turkey from entering into an anti-Russian alliance. Finally, British Government made plans for war with Russia over the Afghan boundary question (6). The occupation of Port Hamilton was part of preparation for a war which was expected to break out soon. British Government thought that Port Hamilton would be necessary if its navy were to attack Vladivostok, recently fortified Russian port on the coast of Pacific Ocean. Although British navy had its base in Hong Kong, Vladivostok was too far from Hong Kong. Port Hamilton was a perfect place as a coaling station or a naval base. The then Governors-General and Viceroy of India D.A. Blackwood (the Earl of Dufferin) later confessed that the occupation of Port Hamilton was British strategy attacking weakest part of Russian territory to decentralize Russian attention from the Afghan boundary (7). Also, a memorandum by Mr. Francis Berite on June 8th 1894 said "In 1885, in view of possible hostilities with Russia, we occupied Port Hamilton." (8)
            On the other hand, it is believed that Britain seized Port Hamilton because of rumors on a secret treaty between Korea and Russia (9). However, it seemed that Great Britain did not know about rumors on a secret treaty between Korea and Russia when it decided to occupy Port Hamilton. Sir Nicholas-Roderick O'Conor, the then British Legation Secretary at Peking sent dispatch to William G. Aston, the then British Consul in Korea regarding rumors on Möllendorff and his negotiations on June 4th, 1885. (10) Also, on June 7th 1885, he informed the Foreign Secretary Earl Granville that he "... learnt from the Viceroy Li HongZhang that Russia had already applied to Korean (Corean) Government for permission to occupy Port Lazareff ..." (11) late yesterday afternoon. His dispatch indicates that O'Conor even did not know about Möllendorff's negotiations until June, 1885. Thus, it is less likely that rumors on a secret treaty made Britain occupy Port Hamilton.
            It is assumed that the occupation of Port Hamilton had complicated reasons. Interest in its strategic importance over forty years, consistent wariness about Russian ambition for territory in Korea, and preparedness for war against Russia caused the occupation of Port Hamilton altogether.
IV.3 The Occupation of Port Hamilton
            On April 11th 1885, the British Cabinet headed by William E. Gladstone decided to occupy Port Hamilton and informed Queen Victoria of its plan. Three days later, the Vice-Admiral Sir William Dowell was ordered to "occupy Port Hamilton and report proceedings". (12) Chinese Government and Japanese Government became aware of a British Government¡¯s intention to occupy Port Hamilton and examined the truth of a rumor. However, British Foreign Office refused to admit the occupation of Port Hamilton. On April 17th 1885, three British vessels officially occupied Port Hamilton. The next day, the Foreign Secretary informed Marquis Tseng, the Chinese minister at London, that British naval force held Port Hamilton. In his response, Marquis Tseng claimed that the occupation of Port Hamilton "could not be viewed without concern at Peking". (13) British Government agreed on Chinese suzerainty over Korea and prepared to negotiate with Chinese Government instead of Korean Government. British Government neglected sovereignty of Korean Government. Indeed, Korean Government was formally informed about the occupation of Port Hamilton on May 19th, while Chinese Government was officially notified on May 10th. Furthermore Granville sent a draft of agreement on the occupation of Port Hamilton not to Korean Government but to Marquis Tseng. In the draft British Government insisted that the occupation would be temporary, recognized the vassalage of Korea to China which was neglected in Treaties between Korea and foreign countries including the United Kingdom, and promised to pay an annual rent not only to Korean Government but also to China as tribute for Port Hamilton.

IV.4 Reactions of China, Russia and Japan to Occupation of Port Hamilton
            Before its naval force occupied Port Hamilton, British Government expected that China would be on its side. Both China and Great Britain were afraid of expanding of Russian influence in Far East. However, Tsungli Yamen (14), the department of foreign relation of China, was reluctant to arrange the agreement proposed by the British Government. Although it promised to Chinese suzerainty over Korea, Chinese Government was afraid that Russia and Japan would claim for territory in Korea. Chinese Government was even opposed to laying of a cable from North Saddle Island (15) to Port Hamilton. However, it reluctantly allowed lying cable on condition that cable would be removed if it became unnecessary. At the moment, Sir Francis Plunkett raised doubt about Chinese Government. He suspected Chinese Government that it tried to disturb Britain to occupy Port Hamilton by inspiring resentment of Korean Government. However, O'Conor denied that Chinese Government did not have any intention to disturb British occupation of Port Hamilton. However, he admitted that Chinese Government would not arrange any formal agreement to recognize the occupation of Prot Hamilton. (16)
            On the other hand, Russia was not directly opposed to the occupation of Port Hamilton although a Russian vessel, 'Vladivostok' once visited Port Hamilton on May 10th. (17) Instead, it reacted in indirect way. It made pressure on Chinese Government that it would occupy any territory of Korea if Chinese Government did not oppose the occupation. Japan also reacted sensitively to the occupation of Port Hamilton. However, Japanese Government also expressed its position indirectly. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Kaoru Inouye, did not show any direct opposition to the occupation of Port Hamilton but replied that Japan "... can not view without concern occupation of place so adjacent ..." and wanted to know "what arrangement had been made with Korea." (18) However, the Japanese Minister at Peking strongly forced Chinese Government to oppose the occupation. Ultimately Japanese Government was afraid that the occupation might cause conflict between Great Britain and Russia in Far East and such conflict would harm the safety of Japan and its interest in Korea.

IV.5 Reaction of Korea to Occupation of Port Hamilton
            Until May 19th, Korean Government did not receive any official note from Great Britain about the occupation of Port Hamilton. However, it already got the information on the occupation of Port Hamilton from other foreign institutions. At the moment, Li HongZhang sent the Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang (19) with a message which advised King of Korea that Korean Government should not permit concession of Port Hamilton nor sell it. The Chinese admiral brought Om, Si-young, the Chief Secretary of Council of State and Paul Georg von Möllendorff the Vice-President of Korean Foreign Office to Port Hamilton. When they arrived at Port Hamilton, there were one British gunboat and two British commercial ships. Unexpectedly, British flag was hoisted. They asked J.P. Maclear, the Captain of the ship about intention of the occupation but he denied replying to the question. Instead, he recommended them to visit Vice-Admiral Dowell who was in Nagasaki, Japan. They moved to Nagasaki and presented a note of protest to Sir Dowell. (20)
            On the other hand, Kim Yun-sik, the President of Korean Foreign Office sent a letter to the British Vice-Consul Carles regarding British official note on 19th May. In the letter, he revealed that Korean Government dispatched Korean Officials, Om, Si-young and M?llendorff to ascertain rumors about Port Hamilton. Also, he strongly warned that British naval force should withdraw from Port Hamilton or Korean Government would appeal to the Treaty Powers. (21) The letter of Kim was transmitted to O'Conor. After he read the letter, he decided to send Aston back to Seoul because he had full knowledge of Korean people and language. At the moment, he was in Japan because of his illness. On June 27th, Kim reasserted that British occupation of Port Hamilton could not be justified by international law and also revealed that Korea would keep neutrality when conflict among foreign countries was broken out. On July 8th, British Government was reported that Korean Government prepared to appeal to the Treaty Powers. The Marques Salisbury, the new Prime Minster, ordered O¡¯Conor to recommend Chinese Government that it should prevent Korean Government from appealing to the Treaty Powers. After then, Korean Government repealed its plan to appeal and showed mild attitude toward Britain.
            Since the first phase of the occupation, British Government had prepared to pay Korea at a cost of the occupation. Firstly, it planed to pay not exceedingly 5,000 pounds annually, while it guaranteed Korean sovereignty over Port Hamilton. British Government fully understood financial difficulties of Korean Government in those days. British Government knew that lump sum money would allow it to gain right over Port Hamilton. However, the plan to lend or purchase Port Hamilton was postponed because of general election in Britain. In July, Aston privately suggested the purchase of Port Hamilton but Kim refused his suggestion. In September, Aston suggested the purchase of Port Hamilton again. In this time, Korean Government showed its interest in Aston¡¯s suggestion because it had to pay its debt from Jardine, Matheson, and Co. Aston sent telegram to O¡¯Conor immediately that Port Hamilton might be purchased for 500,000 dollars. O¡¯Conor reported it to the Prime Minister. However, British Government did not reply to the issue.

IV.6 Reconsideration of British Government about Occupation of Port Hamilton
            In early 1886, British Government reconsidered the occupation of Port Hamilton. The main reason was that Afghan border crisis between Great Britain and Russia was settled down in September 1885. Both Great Britain and Russia recognized that war might harm the interests of both countries. Because the main reason of the occupation of Port Hamilton was the Russo-British Rivalry in Afghanistan, the necessity of the occupation of Port Hamilton decreased. Furthermore, the Vice-Admiralty Dowell and his successor Hamilton claimed that retaining the possession of Port Hamilton was not beneficial. According to their claim, Port Hamilton was not easily defensible and thus it should be fortified with great expense. They also believed that it would be a source of weakness of British navy in a war because the naval force would have to be detached for its defense (22). Furthermore, using it as coaling station or trade center was not profitable enough.

IV.7 Negotiations for Withdrawal from Port Hamilton
            In early 1886, Korea and China expressed their complaints about the continued occupation of Port Hamilton again. At the moment, British Government seriously considered withdrawal. However, Britain wanted to secure the integrity of Korean territory and her own dignity in the Far East. British Government worried about that Russian Government would take possession of Port Hamilton when British navy left it or take possession of Port Lazareff in which Russia was deeply interested over thirty years. Thus, British Government asked Chinese Government to take responsibility for integrity of Korea. However, China refused to take responsibility alone. From September 1886, the negotiation between Russia and China about integrity of Korea started. At the moment, rumor that Korean Government had requested Russia to become its protector was spread. However, Nikolai Fedorovich Ladygenskii denied Korean overtures and assured that Russia would not occupy any territory in Korea. In sequent negotiations, China demanded Russia a written agreement but it was not successful. Finally in October 1886, the oral pledge by Ladygenskii that Russia would not seize upon any portion of Korea was made. (23) On October 31st the Tsungli Yamen informed Walsham, the successor of O¡¯Conor of the oral pledge by Ladygenskii. Walsham required the formal note from the Tsungli Yamen about the oral pledge. British Government was greatly gratified with the note and on November 19th, Iddeseleigh, the new Foreign Secretary stated that Great Britain was prepared to leave Port Hamilton. Arrangement for the evacuation was telegraphed on December 11th 1886, to the Chinese Admiral and the message was sent to Korea on December 23rd. Although Walsham suggested that Port Hamilton should be handed over to a Korean official but the Vice-Admiralty Hamilton refused to do this. On February 27th 1887, all British naval force withdrew from Port Hamilton.

IV.8 Aftermath of Occupation of Port Hamilton
            During the occupation of Port Hamilton, British Government did not show any respect to Korean Government. Instead, it fully recognized Chinese suzerainty over Korea. For example, when the occupation was executed, Great British Government notified Chinese Government before they notified Korean Government. Also it did not seriously consider protest by Korea but paid attentions to Chinese acquiesce for the occupation. During the negotiation for the withdrawal, Great Britain supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea to prevent Russia from taking possession a warm-water port. Although it superficially guaranteed independence of Korea in the Parkes Treaty, it practically recognized Chinese suzerainty. Even in the process of withdrawal, the authority of Korean Government over Port Hamilton was not regarded. Thus, it is not strange that Chinese influence over Korea was strengthened after the withdrawal of British navy. Indeed, it is true that Great Britain paid much attention to integrity of Korea. However it was not that Great Britain regarded Korea as its important partner but that it was afraid of expansion of Russia to Pacific Ocean. Because Great Britain thought that Korea was not worthy enough, it once refused to share the responsibility for integrity of Korea with China. (24)
            On the other hand, the occupation of Port Hamilton affected Russian Far Eastern Policy. Russia realized that its naval force in Vladivostok could be easily checked by British navy. Thus, it decided to construct Trans?Siberian Railroad to rely more on its army rather than on its naval force in Far East. Furthermore, Russia restrained from supporting independence of Korea and regarded that acquisition of territory in Korea was not beneficial in many aspects. Thus, its diplomatic policy on Korea became passive for several years. (25)


(1)      Also pronounced as 'Geomun-do'; It is a small group of island in the Jeju Strait and consists of three islands. It is in l at. 34 N. and long. 127.25 E. It is located in strategic place which is 300 miles from entrance to the Yangtze River, 300miles from Shangtung, 200 miles from Nagasaki, 1100 miles from Hong Kong, and 700 miles from Vladivostok.
(2)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 2, p. 39
(3)      ibid. Doc. 4, p. 40
(4)      ibid. Doc. 7 P. 40
(5)      Association of Korean History Research. Korean-Anglo Relationship for A Hundred Years. P. 76
(6)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p. 451
(7)      Choi p.197
(8)      Park, Il-keun. Anglo-American Chinese diplomatic materials relating to Korea. Memorandum by Mr. Francis Berite, Foreign Office, June 8, 1894.
(9)      In early 1885, Paul Georg von Möllendorff secretly negotiated independence of Korea and Russian protection with Alexis de Speyer, the Secretary of Russian Legation in Tokyo. Möllendorff suggested concession of islands or ports. He also requested Russian military advisers. However, all these negotiations were not authorized by Korean Government but those were Möllendorff¡¯s personal plan. Furthermore, Russia did not accept his suggestion. This incident enraged Japan, China and Great Britain. As a result, Möllendorff lost his position although Korean King still trusted in him.
(10)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 213, p. 289
(11)      ibid. p.190
(12)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p.450
(13)      The Marquis Tseng to Earl Granville, Chinese Legation, April 27, 1885
(14)      also spelled Zongli Yamen
(15)      North Saddle Island is located in Shensi county, Zhousan city, off the estuary of the Yangtze River; called as Huaniao Island in Chinese.
(16)      Kim Hyun-soo. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East, 1876-1905. pp.198-200 (17)      ibid. p.152
(18)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 137, p. 243
(19)      also pronounced as Ding Ruchang
(20)      Chu p.60
(21)      Kim Hyun-soo,. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East, 1876-1905 P. 162
(22)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 471
(23)      ibid. p.474
(24)      Chu p.71
(25)      ibid.
(26)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p. 479



Working Table of Contents, 1st Update (as of July 15th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

I. Introduction
II. Brief Overall View on British Diplomatic Policy in 19th Century.
III. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea
     1.) Background and Development of Relations between Great Britain and Korea
     2.) Willes Treaty & Parkes Treaty
     3.) Aftermath of the Treaties between Great Britain and Korea
IV. Occupation of Port Hamilton 1885-1887
     1.) British Interest in Port Hamilton Before 1885
     2.) Occupation of Port Hamilton
     3.) Reactions of China, Russia and Japan to Occupation of Port Hamilton
     4.) Reaction of Korea to Occupation of Port Hamilton
     5.) Reconsideration of British Government about Occupation of Port Hamilton
     6.) Negotiations for Withdrawal from Port Hamilton
     7.) Aftermath of Occupation of Port Hamilton
V. British Policy on Korea Before and After the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895
     1.) The Sino-Japanese War and Reaction of Great Britain
     2.) Change of the British Policy on Korea after the Sino-Japanese War
VI. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Collapse of Korea
     1.) Forming of Anglo-Japanese Alliance
     2.) Influence of Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Collapse of Korea
VII. Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography



Chapter 2 (as of July 15th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

IV. Occupation of Port Hamilton 1885 - 1887

IV.1 British Interest in Port Hamilton Before 1885
            Sir Edward Belcher in HMS Samarang surveyed a small group of islands in 1845 during the expedition to the near sea of Korea. He named it after the then Secretary of Admiralty, Captain W.A.B. Hamilton. In those days, British navy already recognized the strategic importance of Port Hamilton (1). However, Great Britain did not openly express its interest in Port Hamilton until 1875.
            In 1875, Harry Parkes and the Vice-Admiral A.P. Ryder strongly urged Edward Henry Stanley, the then Foreign Secretary, to occupy Port Hamilton. They informed him that the situation around Korea became unstable. On July 20th, Harry Parkes recommended that British navy should immediately occupy Port Hamilton if this had not been done by another Power (2). Also, in his telegram to the Secretary of Admiralty, Vice-Admiral Ryder noted

            "Russia is rapidly encroaching. A German vessel is surveying west coast of Korea; Japanese vessel, the east coast; both with a view to occupation ... I submit that ¡®Sylvia¡¯ should be directed to survey south-west coast, and that if as Minister suggests, I am directed to take possession of or occupy Port Hamilton." (3)

            However, their suggestion to occupy Port Hamilton was not accepted by British Government. The Foreign Secretary replied

            "... Her Majesty's Government does not think it desirable to set to other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain has no title." (4)

            Furthermore, the Governments of Germany and Russia instructed that they had no designs on Korea and her territory. Although the plan of occupation of Port Hamilton was not practiced, the expedition to Chosan Harbour (Korea), Tsusima, and Port Hamilton by Sir Francis Plunkett provided detailed information on them.
            Seven years later, the Admiral Willes requested to lease of Port Hamilton when he negotiated the Willes Treaty with Korean Government. However, he just gave up because of the opposition of a Chinese officer (5). Introduced incidents show us that British interest in Port Hamilton was not sudden but it had lasted for several decades. Actually, the Russian Government already knew that Great Britain had a secret plan to occupy Port Hamilton in 1882.

IV.2 Occupation of Port Hamilton
            In 1884, the tension between Great Britain and Russia increased significantly since Russia seized Merv Oasis, near to Afghanistan. Violating an agreement with Britain, Russian army advanced on Panjdeh Oasis in March 1885. British Government worried that farther approachment of Russian forces might threaten British interests and rights in India. At the moment, Great Britain was confronted with another serious problem since Bismarck, the German Prime Minister, tried to prevent Turkey from joining the United Kingdom. Finally, British Government decided on war with Russia over the Afghan boundary question (6). However, British army was not strong enough to fight against Russian army. Thus, it was necessary for British Government to decentralize the power of Russian Army. Contrary to its army, British navy was the strongest in those days. British ministers decided to use its navy to attack Vladivostok, fortified Russian port on the coast of Pacific Ocean. Still, Vladivostok was too far from Hong Kong, in which the base of British navy located. Port Hamilton was a great place as a coaling station or a naval base. The purpose of occupation of Port Hamilton was not restraining Russia from influencing Korea but attacking Russian territory if a war between Great Britain and Russia had broken out. The main concern of Great Britain was India while Korea including Port Hamilton was a tool for restraining Russia from India
            On April 11th 1885, the British Cabinet headed by William E. Gladstone decided to occupy Port Hamilton and informed Queen Victoria of its plan. Three days later, the Vice-Admiral Sir William Dowell was ordered to "occupy Port Hamilton and report proceedings" (7). Chinese Government and Japanese Government became aware of a British Government's intention to occupy Port Hamilton and examined the truth of a rumor. However, British Foreign Office refused to admit the occupation of Port Hamilton. On April 15th 1885, three British vessels arrived in Port Hamilton. The next day, the Foreign Secretary Granville informed Marquis Tseng, the Chinese minister at London, that British naval force held Port Hamilton. In his response, Marquis Tseng claimed that the occupation of Port Hamilton "could not be viewed without concern at Peking" (8). British Government agreed on Chinese suzerainty over Korea and prepared to negotiate with Chinese Government instead of Korean Government. British Government neglected sovereignty of Korean Government. Indeed, Korean Government was formally informed about the occupation of Port Hamilton on May 19th, while Chinese Government was officially notified on May 10th. Furthermore Granville sent a draft of agreement on the occupation of Port Hamilton not to Korean Government but to Marquis Tseng. In the draft British Government insisted that the occupation would be temporary, recognized the vassalage of Korea to China which was neglected in Treaties between Korea and foreign countries including the United Kingdom, and promised to pay an annual rent not only to Korean Government but also to China as tribute for Port Hamilton.

IV.3 Reactions of China, Russia and Japan to Occupation of Port Hamilton
            Before its naval force occupied Port Hamilton, British Government expected that China would be on its side. Both China and Great Britain were afraid of expanding of Russian influence in the Far East. However, Tsungli Yamen (9), the department of foreign relation of China, was reluctant to arrange the agreement proposed by British Government. Although it promised to Chinese suzerainty over Korea, Chinese Government was afraid that Russia and Japan would claim for territory in Korea. Chinese Government was even opposed to laying of a cable from the Saddle islands to Port Hamilton. However, it reluctantly allowed lying cable on condition that cable would be removed if it became unnecessary. At the moment, Sir Francis Plunkett raised doubt about Chinese Government. He suspected Chinese Government that it tried to disturb Britain to occupy Port Hamilton by inspiring resentment of Korean Government. However, Sir Nicholas-Roderick O'Conor, the then British Legation Secretary at Peking, denied that Chinese Government did not have any intention to disturb British occupation of Port Hamilton. However, he admitted that Chinese Government would not arrange any formal agreement to recognize the occupation of Port Hamilton (10).
            On the other hand, Russia was not directly opposed to the occupation of Port Hamilton although a Russian vessel, 'Vladivostok' once visited Port Hamilton on May 10th (11). Instead, it reacted in indirect way. It made pressure on Chinese Government that it would occupy any territory of Korea if Chinese Government did not oppose the occupation. Japan also reacted sensitively to the occupation of Port Hamilton. However, Japanese Government also expressed its position passively. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Kaoru Inouye, said that it "... can not view without concern occupation of place so adjacent ..." and wanted to know "what arrangement had been made with Korea." However, the Japanese Government showed a contradictory reaction at Peking. The Japanese Minister at Peking strongly pushed the Chinese Government to oppose the occupation. Ultimately Japanese Government was afraid that the occupation might cause conflict between Great Britain and Russia in Far East and such conflict would harm the safety of Japan and its interest in Korea.

IV.4 Reaction of Korea to Occupation of Port Hamilton
            Until May 19th, Korean Government did not receive any official note from Great Britain about the occupation of Port Hamilton. However, it already got the information on the occupation of Port Hamilton from other foreign institutions. At the moment, Li Hong Zhang sent the Admiral Ting Ju-ch'ang (12) with a message which advised King of Korea that Korean Government should not permit concession of Port Hamilton nor sell it. The Chinese admiral brought Om, Si-young, the Chief Secretary of Council of State and Paul Georg von Möllendorff the Vice-President of Korean Foreign Office to Port Hamilton. When they arrived at Port Hamilton, there were one British gunboat and two British commercial ships. Unexpectedly, British flag was hoisted. They asked J.P. Maclear, the Captain of the ship about the intention of the occupation but he denied replying to the question. Instead, he recommended them to visit Vice-Admiral Dowell who was in Nagasaki, Japan. They moved to Nagasaki and presented a note of protest to Sir Dowell (13).
            On the other hand, Kim Yun-sik, the President of Korean Foreign Office sent a letter to the British Vice-Consul Carles regarding British official note on 19th May. In the letter, he revealed that Korean Government dispatched Korean Officials, Om, Si-young and Möllendorff to ascertain rumors about Port Hamilton. Also, he strongly warned that British naval force should withdraw from Port Hamilton or Korean Government would appeal to the Treaty Powers (14). The letter of Kim was transmitted to O'Conor. After he read the letter, he decided to send William G. Aston, then British Consul in Korea back to Seoul because he had full knowledge of Korean people and language. At the moment, he was in Japan because of his illness. On June 27th, Kim reasserted that British occupation of Port Hamilton could not be justified by international law and also revealed that Korea would keep neutrality when conflict among foreign countries was broken out. On July 8th, British Government was reported that Korean Government prepared to appeal to the Treaty Powers. The Marquess Salisbury, the new Prime Minster, ordered O'Conor to recommend Chinese Government that it should prevent Korean Government from appealing to the Treaty Powers. After then, Korean Government repealed its plan to appeal and showed mild attitude toward Britain.
            Since the first phase of the occupation, the British Government had prepared to pay Korea at a cost of the occupation. Firstly, it planned to pay not exceedingly 5,000 Pounds annually, while it guaranteed Korean sovereignty over Port Hamilton. The British Government fully understood the financial difficulties of the Korean Government in those days. The British Government knew that lump sum money would allow it to gain right over Port Hamilton. However, the plan to lend or purchase Port Hamilton was postponed because of general election in Britain. In July, Aston privately suggested the purchase of Port Hamilton but Kim refused his suggestion. In September, Aston suggested the purchase of Port Hamilton again. In this time, Korean Government showed its interest in Aston's suggestion because it had to pay its debt from Jardine, Matheson, and Co. Aston sent telegram to O'Conor immediately that Port Hamilton might be purchased for 500,000 Dollars. O'Conor reported it to the Prime Minister. However, the British Government did not reply to the issue.

IV.5 Reconsideration of British Government about Occupation of Port Hamilton
            In early 1886, British Government reconsidered the occupation of Port Hamilton. The main reason was that Afghan border crisis between Great Britain and Russia was settled down in September 1885. Both Great Britain and Russia recognized that war might harm the interests of both countries. Because the main reason of the occupation of Port Hamilton was the Russo-British Rivalry in Afghanistan, the necessity of the occupation of Port Hamilton decreased. Furthermore, the Vice-Admiralty Dowell and his successor Hamilton claimed that retaining the possession of Port Hamilton was not beneficial. According to their claim, Port Hamilton was not easily defensible and thus it should be fortified with great expense. They also believed that it would be a source of weakness of British navy in a war because the naval force would have to be detached for its defense. Furthermore, using it as coaling station or trade center was not profitable enough.

IV.6 Negotiations for Withdrawal from Port Hamilton
            In early 1886, Korea and China expressed their complaints about the continued occupation of Port Hamilton again. At the moment, British Government seriously considered withdrawal. However, Britain wanted to secure the integrity of Korean territory and her own dignity in the Far East. Since Great Britain occupied Port Hamilton, the suspicion that Russia would take Port Lazareff had arisen. Such suspicion greatly increased when it was revealed that Möllendorff secretly negotiated independence of Korea and concession of islands with Alexis de Speyer in 1885. He also requested Russian military advisers. However, all these negotiations were not authorized by Korean Government but those were Möllendorff's personal plan. This incident enraged Japan, China and Great Britain. As a result, Möllendorff lost his position although the Korean King still trusted in him. Such incident made British Government worry about that the Russian Government would take possession of Port Hamilton when British navy left it or take possession of Port Lazareff in which Russia was deeply interested over thirty years. Thus, British Government asked Chinese Government to take responsibility for integrity of Korea. However, China refused to take responsibility alone. From September 1886, the negotiation between Russia and China about integrity of Korea started. At the moment, rumor that Korean Government had requested Russia to become its protector was spread. However, Nikolai Fedorovich Ladygenskii denied Korean overtures and assured that Russia would not occupy any territory in Korea. In sequent negotiations, China demanded Russia a written agreement but it was not successful. Finally in October 1886, the oral pledge by Ladygenskii that Russia would not seize upon any portion of Korea was made (16). On October 31st the Tsungli Yamen informed Walsham, the successor of O'Conor of the oral pledge by Ladygenskii. Walsham required the formal note from the Tsungli Yamen about the oral pledge. British Government was greatly gratified with the note and on November 19th, Iddeseleigh, the new Foreign Secretary stated that Great Britain was prepared to leave Port Hamilton. Arrangement for the evacuation was telegraphed on December 11th 1886, to the Chinese Admiral and the message was sent to Korea on December 23rd. Although Walsham suggested that Port Hamilton should be handed over to a Korean official but the Vice-Admiralty Hamilton refused to do this. On February 27th 1887, all British naval force withdrew from Port Hamilton.

IV.7 Aftermath of Occupation of Port Hamilton
            During the occupation of Port Hamilton, British Government did not show any respect to Korean Government. Instead, it fully recognized Chinese suzerainty over Korea. For example, when the occupation was executed, Great British Government notified Chinese Government before they notified Korean Government. Also it did not seriously consider protest by Korea but paid attentions to Chinese acquiesce for the occupation. During the negotiation for the withdrawal, Great Britain supported Chinese suzerainty over Korea to prevent Russia from taking possession a warm-water port. Although it superficially guaranteed independence of Korea in the Parkes Treaty, it practically recognized Chinese suzerainty. Even in the process of withdrawal, the authority of Korean Government over Port Hamilton was not regarded. Thus, it is not strange that Chinese influence over Korea was strengthened after the withdrawal of British navy. Indeed, it is true that Great Britain paid much attention to integrity of Korea. However it was not that Great Britain regarded Korea as its important partner but that it was afraid of expansion of Russia to Pacific Ocean. Because Great Britain thought that Korea was not worthy enough, it once refused to share the responsibility for integrity of Korea with China. (17)
            On the other hand, the occupation of Port Hamilton affected Russian Far Eastern Policy. Russia realized that its naval force in Vladivostok could be easily checked by British navy. Thus, it decided to construct Trans-Siberian Railroad to rely more on its army rather than on its naval force in Far East (18). Furthermore, Russia restrained from supporting independence of Korea and regarded that acquisition of territory in Korea was not beneficial in many aspects. Thus, its diplomatic policy on Korea became passive for several years. (19)


Notes

(1)      Port Hamilton is called as 'Geomun-do' or 'Komun-do' in Korean.
(2)      Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Doc. 2, p. 39
(3)      ibid. Doc. 4, p. 40
(4)      ibid. Doc. 7 P. 40
(5)      Association of Korean History Research. Korean-Anglo Relationship for A Hundred Years. P. 76
(6)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p. 451
(7)      ibid. p.450 (8)      The Marquis Tseng to Earl Granville, Chinese Legation, April 27, 1885
(9)      also spelled Zongli Yamen
(10)      Kim Hyun-soo. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East, 1876-1905. pp.198-200 (11)      ibid. p.152
(12)      also pronounced as Ding Ruchang
(13)      Chu p.60
(14)      Kim Hyun-soo,. The Port Hamilton Affair And Russo-British Rivalry In The Far East, 1876-1905 P. 162
(15)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. P. 471
(16)      ibid. p.474
(17)      Chu p.71
(18)      ibid.
(19)      F.C. Jones. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea. p. 479



Chapter 2 (as of June 3rd 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

II. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea

II.1 Background and Development of Relations between Great Britain and Korea
            The first historical contact between Great Britain and Korea was held in 1797. The Providence, a British sloop (expedition W.R. Broughton), which had surveyed the Korean East Sea coast, anchored in Busan and stayed for 10 days. Sailors recorded Korean language and collected specimens of some plants. In 1816, the Alceste (expedition B. Hall) and the Lyra visited Korea to survey the Korean Yellow sea coast and contacted with some Koreans. To begin trade with Korea the East India Company sent the Lord Amherst, a British merchant ship, to Korea in 1832. Karl Gützlaff, the first Protestant missionary to reach Korea, embarked on the ship as a missionary, doctor and translator. Representatives of the Lord Amherst demanded the Korean government to trade but the government refused stubbornly. In the end, they just departed. However, Karl Gützlaff introduced the Bible and things Western to Koreans. Emergence of British ships increased greatly after Great Britain signed and sealed the Treaty of Nanjing with the Qing Empire (1842). Also ships from other European countries began to appear in the sea near Korea.
            The British government had a skeptical view of opening the doors of Korea until the 1880s although Great Britain was the first Western country which demanded a treaty and commerce. It is true that some British diplomats in the Far East consistently recommended the British government to conclude a treaty with Korea and also requested Qing Empire to act as an intermediary. However, the British government was not active in regard to the openning of Korea. It is assumed that there were two reasons why the British government did not pay much attention to Korea. Firstly, Korea was backward in industry and commerce. Thus, it was hard to expect any economic profit from trade with Korea. Instead British merchants were greatly interested in China. Secondly, approach to Korea would like to provoke tension between Great Britain and Russia. The location of Korea was geopolitically important in East Asia. Russia was greatly interested in Korea as an object in its policy of southward expansion . The British government also recognized geopolitical importance of Korea in East Asia, but it did not want to provoke the tension in East Asia in any way. At the moment, the British government focused on resolving problems of Irish autonomy, appeasement following the Egyptian affair and defending India against a perceived threat exercized by Russia ("The Great Game"). It did not have enough energy to spare for further conflicts in East Asia. For example, when a Russian fleet appeared in the Bay of Youngheung (so-called Port Lazareff), in 1857, the British government commissioned Sir John Bowring to open Korea to prevent the expansion of Russia. However, Sir Bowring gave up the idea of opening Korea after he recognized that Russia, at that time, had no intention to invade or occupy Korean territory. Such performance reflected the policy of the British government on Korea very well. Rather than a direct approach to Korea, it tried to prevent advance of Russia and other Western countries to Korea by supporting suzerainty of the Qing Empire over Korea. Not only Great Britain but also Russia adopted a policy of 'restraint' and 'prudence' to avoid conflict.
            When 'balance of power' between United Kingdom and Russia was formed in the Far East, a military conflict between Qing Empire and Russia in Xinjiang occurred. A power vacuum appeared in the Far East temporarily. It was the reason why Japan succeeded to open Korea without any interference by Russia, Qing and Great Britain. The conflict in Xinjiang and the opening of Korea by Japan affected the British policy on the Far East. The change of the policy was also caused by emergence of imperialism in Great Britain. As military power and interest of foreign territories of other European nations increased, it was inevitable for Great Britain to choose strong foreign policy. Furthermore, the British government recognized that the Qing Empire was not strong enough to stop Russian southward expansion policy. Finally, United Kingdom accepted that forming a friendly relationship with Korea was necessary to repress the expansion of Russia. Nevertheless, it showed inactive attitude to sign and seal a treaty with Korea to the last. It thought that making a treaty with Korea was against its fundamental diplomatic principle that was "no intervention unless an affair harms the interest of the Kingdom." As a result, British government waited until the United States and Korea concluded the Shufeldt Treaty. Stopping the expansion of Russia without any conflict was its primary purpose. In other words, Korea was not worth enough to make the United Kingdom submit to a conflict willingly. Indeed, the United Kingdom had the strongest naval in East Asia at the moment and its naval power was strong enough to open Korea directly. Nevertheless the British government was never concerned about using forces to make a treaty with Korea.

II.2 Willes Treaty & Parkes Treaty
            Great Britain and Korea entered into the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea twice. The first treaty, the Willes Treaty, was concluded on June 6th 1882, only two weeks after the Shufeldt Treaty was signed and sealed. However, the treaty was amended before it was ratified by the British government. The second treaty, the Parkes Treaty, was concluded on November 26th 1883 and the both governments exchanged instruments of ratifications on April 28th 1884. To understand the process of concluding the treaty, it is important to understand a role which Sir Harry Parkes played because the treaty was mainly designed by him.
            Harry Parkes was born in 1828, in Staffordshire, England. When he was 13 years old, he moved to China and experienced the First Opium War (1839-1842). Working as a translator, a consul and a diplomatic minister in East Asia, he managed many diplomatic affairs. While he worked as the British minister in Japan from 1865 to 1883, he paid much attention to working toward the conclusion of a treaty with Korea. After Japan and Korea concluded the Treaty of Ganghwa in 1876, he planned to get some assistance from the Japanese government in establishing a formal British relationship with Korea. Unfortunately, his plan failed since the Japanese government denied such assistance and besides, the British government did not pay much attention to Korea. However, he did not give up on improving relationship between Great Britain and Korea. To appreciate salvage by the Korean government, Parkes sent Ernst Satow, a second secretary at the United Kingdom Embassy in Tokyo, to Busan. While he appreciated the salvage, Satow demanded trade between Britain and Korea but the Korean government refused his demand again. Because of his wife's serious illness he temporarily went back to homeland from October 1879 to January 1882. Kennedy took his place. Kennedy reported diplomatic changes in East Asia and a change of attitude of the Korean government in those days. Reforming its fundamental political and diplomatic policies for imperialism and universal commerce, the British government agreed that signing and sealing a treaty with Korea was necessary. British diplomats in Japan began to search for a method to form a relationship with Korea. At the moment, Parkes responded to the government's request for advice. Satow who was expert at Korean affair suggested using gunboat diplomacy but it was denied. On the other hand, Spence and Lord Genoa tried to negotiate with a Korean deputy delegate of Dong-rae in Busan but the negotiation was not successful. Repeating diplomatic failure, British diplomats realized that Japanese government would not help them to make a treaty. In the end, they planned to get help from the Qing Empire.
            In those days, Li Hongzhang was charged with diplomatic affair in Qing Dynasty. He believed that Russia and Japan threatened Qing's traditional suzerainty over Korea. He thought that Korea should be opened to other Western nations and those nations would check the powers of Russia and Japan. His idea was partially correspondent to the view point of British diplomats. Indeed, Sir Thomas F. Wade, the British Minster in Beijing, requested intermediary to conclude a treaty with Korea in 1881 and the Qing government responded positively. However, the British government was very cautious on the problem. It waited until other western countries except Russia to open Korea. When Robert W. Shufeldt, an American minster plenipotentiary began to negotiate with Korea through the mediation of the Qing Empire, the British government decided to sign and seal a treaty with Korea. Admiral Willes was sent to Korea with William G. Ashton and Maude, and concluded the Willes Treaty only two weeks after the conclusion of the Shufeldt Treaty. Immediate conclusion of the treaty was possible thanks to consistent preparation by British diplomats in East Asia and intermediation of the Qing Empire.
            Concluding the Willes Treaty, Great Britain achieved its first purpose to prevent the expansion of Russia. However, hastiness caused several problems. Although Britain attained permission for hydrographic survey in the sea near Korea, the Willes Treaty and the Shufeldt Treaty were ultimately same. Parkes criticized the Willes Treaty that it did not concern about any economic profits. He pointed out several problems in the treaty. Firstly, the tariff on luxuries and necessities was too high. Secondly, there was no clear statement about open ports and thus free transportation was not fully guaranteed. Thirdly, a right to make a marine chart was not attained. Lastly, the opium trade, which allowed British merchants to gain enormous profits in China, was banned. Actually, many British merchants in East Asia complained that the Willes Treaty was more disadvantageous than the Treaties of Tianjin which were signed in 1858.
            Recognizing the necessity to amend the treaty, Parkes waited for an opportunity to make a new treaty. Fortunately, he found a chance soon. In June 1882, the soldiers of Korea's traditional army mutinied. Taking advantage of chaos in Korea, he negotiated with Park Younghyo and Kim Okgyun who were sent as Korean delegates to Japan to deal with the Japanese losses caused by the mutiny. Both were supporters for opening Korea to Western nations. They wanted to use the power of Great Britain to escape from intervention by the Qing Empire which became greater after the mutiny. However, Parkes fully recognized their intention and made a reverse use of the situation. In the end, the Korean delegates agreed with amending the Willes Treaty. After then, Parkes sent Ashton to grasp the situation of Korea in March 1883. At the same time, Parkes demanded Korean government to delay the ratification of Willes Treaty. Completing preparation to have a new treaty with Korea, he was appointed as a new British minister in the Qing Empire in August 1883. After he moved to China, he was committed to sign a new treaty with Korea by British government. He departed for Korea in October with Edward Zappe, the German consul general in China. In this time, he did not discuss about a new treaty with Li Hongzhang to avoid Chinese intervention. Parkes concluded the Parkes Treaty on November 26th 1883 after one-month negotiation. On April 28th 1884, both Great Britain and Korea exchanged the instruments of ratifications officially.

II.3 Aftermath of Treaties between Great Britain and Korea
            As it is mentioned before, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea was the second treaty which Korea concluded with Western countries. Although Britain already established the first contact with Korea in 1797 and once demanded trade in 1832, it generally pursued the policy of 'restraint' and 'prudence' on Korea. As a result, the United States became the first Western country which signed the treaty with Korea. However, the treaty between Great Britain and Korea was very meaningful. Firstly, the Parkes Treaty became an archetype of other treaties between Western countries and Korea because the Parkes Treaty had much more advantage than the Shufeldt Treaty did. The United State also attained all benefits which Britain gained in the Parkes treaty because of most-favored-nation treatment. Secondly, the Parkes Treaty was marked as the start of incursion of imperialism into Korea. Right after the conclusion of the Parkes treaty, Germany concluded a treaty with Korea. Russia and Italy also followed Britain about seven months later. Lastly, Great Britain undermined the diplomatic status of Korea. After the friendly relationship with Korea was formed, British government ordered the British minster to the Qing Empire to serve concurrently as the British minister to Korea. As a result, it only sent a general consul to Seoul. Other Western countries including Russia and Germany also followed the case of Great Britain.



Chapter 2, in Korean (as of June 3rd 2008)





Working Table of Contents (as of May 22nd 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

I. Introduction
II. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea
     1.) Background and Development of Relations between Great Britain and Korea
     2.) Willes Treaty & Parkes Treaty
     3.) Aftermath of the Treaties between Great Britain and Korea
III. Occupation of Port Hamilton 1885-1887
     1.) Background and Development of Occupation of Port Hamilton
     2.) Aftermath of Occupation of Port Hamilton
IV. British Policy on Korea Before and After the Sino-Japanese War 1894-1895
     1.) The Sino-Japanese War and Reaction of Great Britain
     2.) Change of the British Policy on Korea after the Sino-Japanese War
V. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Collapse of Korea
     1.) Forming of Anglo-Japanese Alliance
     2.) Influence of Anglo-Japanese Alliance on Collapse of Korea
VI. Economic Relationship between Great Britain and Korea from 1883 to 1905
VII. The Anglican Church in Korea
     1.) Introduction and Spread of Anglican Church in Korea
     2.) Influence of Anglican Church on the Relationship between Great Britain and Korea
VIII. Conclusion
IX. Notes
X. Bibliography



Bibliography, 1st Update (as of April 4th 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

I. Books : Bibliographies
1.      Cheong, Sung-hwa and Alexander Ganse Bibliography of Western Language Publications on Korea 1588-1950. Seoul: Myoungji University Publication 2008

II. Books : Primary Sources
2.      Chung, Henry. Korean Treaties. New York: H.S. Nichols. 1919.
3.      Corea : quarterly returns of trade for the ports of Jenchuan, Fusan,and Yuensan.
4.      Great Britain, foreign office and board of trade. Commercial reports received at the foreign office from her Majesty's Consul-General in Corea : 1884. London: Harrison and Sons. 1884.
5.      Great Britain foreign office and board of trade. Commercial reports by her majesty's consul-general in Corea, 1882-83 : and report of a journey from Soul to Songdo in august 1884. London: Harrison and Sons. 1885.
6.      Lo, Hui-min. Foreign Office Confidential Papers Relating to China and Her Neighbouring Countries, 1840-1914: With an Additional List, 1915-1937. Hague & Paris: Mouton. 1969.
7.      Nish, Ian Hill, et al. British documents on foreign affairs--reports and papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part I, from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America. 1989.
8.      Parliamentary Paper. Correspondence respecting the temporary occupation of Port Hamilton by her Majesty's government. London : H.M.S.O., 1887.
9.      The Graphic. Notes at Port Hamilton, our new harbour in the East : With 5 woodcuts Hand ploughing with a large pronged fork. London: Graphic. 1885.
10.      Rockhill, William Woodville. Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904: together with various states papers and documents affecting foreign interests. Washington: [s.n.]. 1904.

III. Books : Secondary Sources
11.      Corfe, C.J. Bishop. The Anglican Church in Corea : being documents, original and translated, issued by authority during the episcopate of the First Bishop of the church of England in Corea between 1889 and 1905, together with an introduction. London: Rivingstons. 1906
12.      Gim, C.I. Eugene. & Gim H.K. Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876 ~ 1910. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1968.
13.      Hoare, J.E. The British Embassy Compound Seoul, 1884-1984. Seoul: Korean British Society. 1984.
14.      Jones, F.C. Foreign Diplomacy in Korea, 1866~1894. Boston: Department of History, Havard University. 1935.
15.      Lensen (ed.)., Korea and Manchuria between Russia and Japan, 1895~1904: The Observations of sir Ernest Satow: British Minister plenipotentiary in Japan (1895~1900) and China (1900~1906). Florida: The Diplomatic Press. 1966.
16.      McCordock, R.S. British Far Eastern Policy 1894~1900. New York: Columbia University Press. 1931.
17.      Monger, G. W. The End of Isolation, British Foreign Policy 1900~1907. Toronto and New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1963.
18.      Pak, Il-Keun. Anglo-American and Chinese diplomatic materials relating to Korea (1887-1897) : [Kundae Hanguk kwangye Yong-Mi-Chung oegyo charyojip]. [Pusan] : Institute of Chinese Studies, Pusan National University. 1984.
19.      Sands, Williams Franklin. Undiplomatic Memories: the Far East 1896-1904. New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. 1930.
20.      S, D. W. European Settlements in the Far East : China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, etc. London: [s.n.] 1900.
21.      Walton, Johnson. China and the present crisis : with notes on a visit to Japan and Korea. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. 1900.
22.      Weiner, Joe H. Great Britain : foreign policy and the span of empire, 1689-1971 : a documentary history. New York : Chelsea House Publishers. 1992.




Bibliography (as of March 23rd 2008) . . . go to Teacher's comment

I. Books
1.      Chung, Henry. Korean Treaties. New York: H.S. Nichols. 1919.
2.      Corfe, C.J. Bishop. The Anglican Church in Corea : being documents, original and translated, issued by authority during the episcopate of the First Bishop of the church of England in Corea between 1889 and 1905, together with an introduction. London: Rivingstons. 1906
3.      Curzon, George N. Problems of the Far East: Japan-Korea-China. Westminster: Archibald Constable and Co. 1896.
4.      Corea : quarterly returns of trade for the ports of Jenchuan, Fusan,and Yuensan.
5.      Great Britain, foreign office and board of trade. Commercial reports received at the foreign office from her Majesty's Consul-General in Corea : 1884. London: Harrison and Sons. 1884.
6.      Great Britain foreign office and board of trade. Commercial reports by her majesty's consul-general in Corea, 1882-83 : and report of a journey from Soul to Songdo in august 1884. London: Harrison and Sons. 1885.
7.      Hoare, J.E. The British Embassy Compound Seoul, 1884-1984. Seoul: Korean British Society. 1984.
8.      Longford, Joseph Henry. The Story of Korea London: T. Fisher Unwin. 1911.
9.      McKenzie, F. A. The Tragedy of Korea. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. 1905.
10.      Rockhill, William Woodville. Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904: together with various states papers and documents affecting foreign interests. Washington: [s.n.]. 1904.
11.      S, D. W. European Settlements in the Far East : China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo, the Philippines, etc. London: [s.n.] 1900.
12.      Walton, Johnson. China and the present crisis : with notes on a visit to Japan and Korea. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. 1900.
13.      Weiner, Joe H. Great Britain : foreign policy and the span of empire, 1689-1971 : a documentary history. New York : Chelsea House Publishers. 1992.