A Condensed Account of the History of Chinese and Korean Communism and the United States China Policy in the years 1921-1959

Korean Minjok Leadership Academy
Park, Il Heon
Research Paper, Project Study History Class, November 2008

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Background Information
     1.) China under Imperialism
     2.) Korea under imperialism
III. Period of the Development of the Communist Parties
     1.) The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
          1.) Growth of the Chinese Communist Party
          2.) The First United Front
          3.) CCP-Kuomintang split and the Jiangxi Soviet
          4.) The Long March
     2.) Korea : Unsuccessful Communist Parties
          1.) The Korean People's Socialist Party
          2.) The Two Goryeo Communist Parties
          3.) Communist Activities in Korea
          4.) Nationalist Single Party Movement and Laborers' and Farmers' Movement
     3.) Comparison
IV. World War II (1937-1945)
     1.) China's War against Japan
          1.) The Second United Front
          2.) World War II and the United States in China
          3.) Guomindang Performance vs. CCP Performance
     2.) Korea's War against Japan
          1.) Liberation Organizations and Korean Communist Working under CCP and Comintern
          2.) Kim Il Sung
V. Post World War II
     1.) China
          1.) Post-war Military, Political and Economic Situation
          2.) The United States' Attempt to Mediate Peace
     2.) Korea
          1.) Occupation by the Soviet Union and the United States
          2.) The Establishment of a Southern Separate Government
          3.) The North Korean Communist Regime
VI. Military Confrontations
     1.) The Chinese Civil War (1946-1949)
          1.) Progress of War and Communist Operations
          2.) China's Internal Situations and the United States' Relationship with the Chinese National Government
     2.) The Korean War (1950-1953)
          1.) Social Context of the War
          2.) Progress of the War
          3.) From China's Entrance to the End of the War
          4.) United States in the War and the Conflict Amongst American Leadership
     3.) The Cold War, United States' Domestic politic, and Foreign Relations
          1.) Cold War Policies
          2.) Red Scare and the Rise of the Republicans
          3.) Eisenhower's Policies
VII. People's Republic of China and the Republic of China
     1.) Stabilization and Organization of the People's Republic of China
     2.) US Diplomatic Policies toward Communist China
          1.) Chinese Civil War to Korean War
          2.) During and After the Korean War
     3.) The First Taiwan Crisis
     4.) The Second Taiwan Crisis
VIII. Summary
IX. Conclusion

I. Introduction
            The People's Republic of China, or simply China, is the third largest nation in the world by area, and the largest by population. Traditionally the center of the Asian world, it is today an influential world power, occupying a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. It has nuclear power as well as the world's largest standing army and the fourth largest defense budgets. It is a burgeoning economic power with the fourth largest GDP in nominal terms and the second largest purchasing power. Especially in 2008, this year, it had the honor of holding the Olympics in its capital Beijing. What many people are ignorant of, however, is that China is also the most successful and the most long-living communist state. Although China had liberalized very much since its introduction of market-based economic reforms in 1978, its politics still remain far different from the full-fledged democracy practiced in Western Europe or the United States. The Chinese government still remains authoritarian and communist, with heavy restrictions in areas such as the freedom of speech in mass media, freedom of assembly, rights to reproduction or freedom of religion.
            On the other hand, the Communist regime in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is notorious for its isolationist policy and dictatorship. Unlike their comrades in China, the North Korean communists remained adamant on not adopting market economy or opening up its diplomatic doors to other nations. The regime is far from being successful; it is ravaged by all kinds of domestic problems, including food shortages, economic stagnations, floods as well as droughts. Labeled by the American president as being part of the "Axis of Evil", the DPRK, or North Korea, has openly announced its anti-American sentiments and had created an international controversy with its nuclear weapons program. There has been recent progress in its foreign relationships after it promised to shut down its nuclear facilities and pursue small scale economic cooperation with the United States and the Republic of Korea, the prospects for a permanent peace with South Korea still remain distant.
            The Communist Parties of the two communist states have their roots as far back as late 1910s and early 1920s, only a few years after the Russian Revolution. They have survived through hardship, including the suppression from the Japanese Imperialism and anti-Communist factions, and have managed to rise to power after the World War II. Faced by many problems, the Communists managed to maintain an unchallenged leadership of their states.
            At the present, China has established a reasonably intimate diplomatic relationship with United States, the world power. North Korea's position is also slowly improving after the nuclear programs negotiations have shown progress, and the United States declared that in line with recent negotiations, it will remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. In the past, however, the relationships between the two communist states and the United States have not been favorable. For instance, the hostility between the two sides was so intense that, during the Korean War and the Formosan Crises in the mid 1950s, there were considerations of nuclear warfare within the administrations of both sides.
            This paper takes interest in the topic of the history of the Communist Parties in the Far East and the United States policy towards China and Korea during the period from 1921 to 1959. Beginning with the historical setting in which the Communist Parties were formed, the paper organizes the history of the Chinese and the Korean Communist Parties in chronological order. It first assesses the development of the communist parties, their struggles during World War II, their rise to power, establishment of communist states, and then outright conflict with the United States. After the period of the Chinese War of Resistance against the Japanese, the paper includes the United States policies toward the Nationalist Chinese, Chinese Communists, and the Koreans. The chapters are divided into certain periods so that the shifts in US China policy in response to specific buildups can be observed accordingly. United States' general foreign policies as well as specific economic and military policies toward the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are divided into time periods as well, largely World War II, early Cold War, and after the Korean War. Subsection 3 of chapter XI goes to broadly describe the general domestic political situation of the United States during the late 1940s and early 1950s, which helps to foster a more comprehensive understanding of the domestic forces that influenced the US policy toward China.

II. Background Information

II.1 China under Imperialism
            It is to be noted that the information in the first two paragraphs is based on the book "Modern China", and that information in the following paragraphs of the section is based on "A Short History of Chinese Communism"

            China has traditionally been more culturally sophisticated and technologically advanced in comparison to the West. However, beginning in the 17th century, the scientific and technological knowledge of China gradually fell behind the Western worlds. Political conservatism and excessive focus in education on humanistic studies and classic books in China account largely for China's loss of its lead in the fields. Lack of substantial investment capital and stimulus for technological innovation hampered China's further scientific advancements, and when the European nations were boosted by the Industrial Revolution, China was lagging far behind. For a long time, its international trade was insignificant, and China's domestic demands and purchasing power remained stagnant. Additionally, the Chinese had to suffer from political disorganization and disunity of the Manchu government. When the Age of Imperialism reached its peak, China's powers were no match for those of the European imperialist nations.
            China was eventually forced to open itself to increasing foreign missionary activity and trade, and its international stand was severely weakened after its defeat to Britain in the Opium Wars. In the coming years, China was forced by the Western Powers to cede various rights and territories, and open up its major ports for increasing trade. Britain, France, and Germany took lead in occupying and exploiting various regions of China, and soon, Japan, Portugal and the United States followed. This exploitation by the imperial powers, along with the increase in population, stagnant productivity, political corruption and administrative inefficiency aggravated the destitute situations of the peasants. Mounting discontent led to a chain of revolutions including the Taiping Rebellion, Nien Rebellion, and Panthay Rebellion, which commonly sought freedom from the foreign powers, increased equality, land reforms and economical alleviation, educational and political reforms. Although the Qing government eventually suppressed the rebellions, the conflicts deteriorated the already tormenting situations of the provinces and further frustrated the Chinese people. Political and social disorder was worsened after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and calls for reform and revolution reached their peak. At last, in 1912, the royal family abdicated and the imperial rule of China ended.
            Meanwhile, all the provinces of China were divided among various revolutionary leaders. One noticeable example would be Sun Wen (all Chinese names will be written in modern Pinyin) and his Tongmenhui (later, the Guomindang), a factionalized revolutionary alliance which sought to secure Chinese independence, republican government, and modern economy. When the Qing dynasty fell, such political entities came together to constitute the Parliament and formed the new Republic of China, and elected Yuan Shikai, a former Qing general and a warlord, as the republic's president (1). Yet, this parliament was not recognized; many of the provincial revolutionary regimes refused to cooperated, and the decisions of the parliament could not be enforced. Therefore, the real power of China was with the provincial military dictators. After Yuan's death in 1916, the whole country was divided among warlords, and the president and the prime ministers remained nominally for handling foreign relations.
            At this time, several changes had been taking place. First, China was more vulnerable to foreign encroachments than ever because individual warlords didn't have the power to stand up against the imperial nations. Although certain large cities and ports, like Peking (the name changes to Peiping and then to Beijing; for the sake of understanding, the present name of Beijing will be used in this paper) and Shanghai, experienced great capitalist growth and inflow of the knowledge and technology of the West, most of the provinces were deprived of the benefits, and only exploitation was becoming more and more intense. Secondly, the civil disorganization was at its peak during this Warlord Era. There were no ruling ethics, and the government no longer had the power or will to protect the people. Bandits and revolutionaries rose up everywhere, killing each other and harassing the peasants. Thirdly, a vast majority of China's population was in perils, suffering from extreme destitution and starvation. In egalitarian government, modernization, and national sovereignty was urgently needed, but the prospects for such goals remained distant; democratic reforms could not be accomplished by a few leaders against powerful warlords.
            Such was the historical context in which new political ideas began to spread. Beginning in September 1915, the magazine "New Youth" began to promote a "New Cultural Movement". This new movement was different from previous revolutionary attempts in that it sought to bring change through ideological awakening of the Chinese people and youth. The articles in the magazine laid ruthless attack on the traditional values that led to the country's collapse, and called for the adoption of the dynamic, progressive, utilitarian, and scientific modern Western culture. This radicalism met response by many schools and intellectuals from across the country. Scholars such as Hu Shi, Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Qian Xuantong, and Wu Yu began to give lectures against the old traditions, especially against Confucianism. Students provided enthusiastic support for the movement by organizing Societies of Philosophy and Journalism within the universities, in which they shared their political opinions. This penchant for modernization and awakening was boosted by the May Fourth Movement of 1919; a new form of nationalism, different from xenophobia, was awakened.
            From the various political ideas that were explored in the time, the revolutionary experiences of the Bolsheviks caught the attention of several leading intellectuals. These include Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Mao Zedong, and Zhou Enlai. They believed that methods of reform and political organization could be learned from the Russian forerunners. Although nobody yet became an enthusiastic Marxist or discarded the democratic principles, but debates on socialism continued. In May, a Marxist section was established in the "New Youth" magazine, and by December, the Society for the Study of Socialism, including some 100 professors and students, was founded.

II.2 Korea under Imperialism
            The information in this section is derived largely from the article "the Process of Modern Korean History" (trans) in Naver Encyclopedia, and the final two paragraphs are based on the book "Korean Worker's Party: a Short History".

            The situation in Korea was similar to China if not worse. The late 19th century was marked by extreme political corruption, social and economical turmoil, and a stubborn isolationist policy. Few powerful noble families harassed the weakened monarchy, and dominated the politics; the bureaucracy was filled up with incompetent officers who flattered or bought their positions. Noble status was sold for money or counterfeited, and many rich peasants and merchant classes entered the nobility one way or the other. As a result, the size of the noble class expanded dramatically. Such social instability also worsened the already decadent economic situation because more nobility meant less peasants and merchants who were paying tax to support the national budget. In addition, after Korea's traditional isolationist policy had been broken by Japan in 1875, Korea was unable to fend off foreign encroachments and their interference in domestic affairs. The only solution to save the nation was an independent modern reform in which the errors of traditional feudalism would be corrected and defense against foreign interventions would be secured.
            Three different types of movements took place in pursuit of such a reform. The first were the conservative elites who sought to repel the intervening foreigners via military combat. Their movement ultimately led to a military uprising in 1895, but it was suppressed by Japanese and Russian forces; the movement also failed to gain popular support because it attempted to maintain a rigid feudal state and refused to have land reforms. The second movement was led by a group of young politicians influenced by the western knowledge, also known as the Enlightened Party. The party pushed for westernized reforms, but was met with opposition from the conservative powers and foreign consulates. The last movement consisted of peasant revolutions that were encouraged by discontent with class distinctions and xenophobia. Uprisings ravaged the country, but the forces were especially strong in the Southern regions. These peasant revolutions were suppressed when the incapable government invited Russian and Japanese army to attack its own people. After all effort had been frustrated by 1894, foreign intervention became more intensive, and privileges such as the right to mining or the right to railroad construction were distributed among the imperial powers.
            The most ambitious among the intervening powers were Russia and Japan. After defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Japan secured authority over Korea's foreign affairs by forcing through the 'Eulsa Treaty' of 1905, and gained recognition from the other powers of its sovereignty over Korea. In the meanwhile, Koreans engaged in their last struggles to protect its sovereignty; it included desperate military campaigns, edification programs, public lectures, and patriotic publications. Nonetheless, such movements were brutally repressed by the Japanese government-general, and Japan annexed Korea in 1910. Imperial Japan began its colonial rule, harassing the Korean people with oppressive militarism and economic exploitation. The destitution and misery of the Korean peasants were worse than ever.
            Many intellectuals mourned over the fate of their mother country and sympathized with the atrocious lives of the peasants. They believed that the end of the colonial rule was the only solution to save the Korean people. Domestic independence movements persisted during the early years of the colonial rule, both violent and non-violent. However, all such movements were frustrated by the massive Japanese police organization and military superiority. All Korean political organizations were forcefully dismissed and patriotic intellectuals were placed under strict surveillance. Many patriotic and nationalist intellectuals exiled in China, Manchuria, and Russia, and established revolutionary liberation organizations. Different organizations adopted different political ideals; some decided to remain on the Right, and others turned to the Left and accepted socialism.
            Korean socialism at this point of time was not identical to that of Russia or China, although it received their support. The organizations' primary goal was not the socialization or communization of Korea, but the independence from Japanese imperialism. The early Korean socialists were not genuine converts and did not share the ideological fervor of its comrades in Russia or China. Instead, they adopted communism to take several advantages; communist international solidarity and anti-imperialism was a great psychological support, and the Russians had promised financial support for the Korean communist organizations as will be explained in detail in the following chapters.

III. Period of the Development of Communist Parties

III.1 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
            Information in this section and its subsections is also based on the books "Modern China", "A Short History of Chinese Communism", and "The Search for Modern China". Other sources of information will be indicated in endnotes

III.1.1 Growth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
            The Chinese Communist Party was officially founded in 1921 with the advice and assistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union (the Bolsheviks) had promised to return its previous privileges, to make economic concessions, and to support China in its struggle for independence in the Karakhan Declaration of 1919. As a result, the unequal treaties that had been imposed on China during the Tsar's reign were annulled. The Bolsheviks had several reasons to have sought allies; the newly empowered Bolsheviks were still carrying on their civil war with the Whites, especially intensively in southern and eastern Russia, and they needed a substantial ally nearby. The expected Bolshevik revolutions in Germany, Hungary, and Turkey were frustrated, and the Soviet Union was diplomatically isolated. Additionally, the power of Imperial Japan was growing in East Asia and the Soviet Union found solution for checking Japanese power in helping China. In 1920, Lenin established the Far Eastern Department of the Communist International, and authorized it to help the formation of the communist parties in China and Korea
            In 1920, the Soviet Union sent two Comintern representatives, Gregory Voitinsky and Yang Mingzai, to China in order to survey the political situation establish networks for pulling together a Communist Party. Voitinsky was able to meet influential intellectuals in Beijing University, and was introduced to Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. Chen Duxiu, one of the leading scholars of socialism and Marxism, was largely influenced by Voitinsky and the Soviets' suggestions and successfully brought together a group of potential communist party members. In May, 1920, the group formed a provisional committee, placed Chen as the chairman, and began their program to establish communist networks. A Sino-Russian news agency and a foreign language school was built in Shanghai and functioned as a center of communist propaganda and training young communists. Communist magazines were published, and the Socialist Youth Corps was pulled together. This inspired communist nuclei to appear in other regions as well; Mao Zedong started a communist group in Changsha, Dong Biwu in Wuhan, and Chen in Canton. Additional support came from leftist revolutionaries in Canton, Hangchow, Tsinan, and even from among students who were studying in France and Japan. Finally, the First National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Shanghai in July 1921 and the CCP was formally declared.
            The First National Congress was attended by 13 Chinese delegates representing 60 party members, including Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Chen Gongbo, Tan Pingshan, and Zhang Guotao. Two Comintern advisors were also present, one of them being Maring, a successor of Voitinsky. The Congress decided that the CCP would be structurally organized according to the Bolshevik system, and that the party's future programs should follow the principles of Marxism-Leninism; most notably, it would rely on the broad masses for the revolution. Chen Duxiu became the general secretary, and the party received advises and funding from the Comintern through its representative Maring. The most important party platforms are as follows :

- The formal title of the party would be the Chinese Communist Party
- Proletarian struggle will proceed until class distinction is absent in the society
- Capitalists' private properties will be eliminated and all means of production will be confiscated and publicly owned (2)

            Initial goals of the CCP were to establish labor unions, to expand the Socialist Youth Corps, and to spread socialism by publishing translated versions of books on Leninism and Marxism. In 1922, the goals were fairly successfully fulfilled. By then, China's industries were beginning to change, and mining, iron refining, railroad building, and textile industries were all growing large. As a consequence, the labor force began to grow, and various labor unions and laborers' guilds began to appear in the major industrial cities. Employers were mostly foreigners; between 1912 and 1923, 77% of the marine industries and 45% of the textile industries were run by foreign capital, and the mining industry was almost monopolized. Also, there was a lot of corruption and mistreatment of the workers because provincial warlords often interfered in the businesses. As a result, the laborers' organizations went on constant strikes in early 1920s and the communist party helped to instigate them. Meanwhile, the Socialist Youth Corps grew large - about three times the size of the CCP which had around 200 members - and successfully recruited young people into the communist bulk. Promising youth of the Youth Corps were sent to Soviet Russia and given chances to study Bolshevik doctrines and military/political strategies. Some of these young people would later play important roles in the Chinese Civil War and the ascension of the Communist Party. Additionally, the People's Printing Office was set up in Shanghai, and books on communism were published and distributed; over 36,000 copies of translated books were printed.

III.1.2 The First United Front
            From 1922 to 1926, the Communists and the Guomindang formed the First United Front and collaborated. Even from the beginning, the party was aware that the time was not ripe for engagement in direct Proletarian Revolution. Since 1920, the Second Congress of the Comintern had decided that China was not yet a full-fledged capitalist society but a half-feudal and half-colonial society. Adhering to the principles of Marxism, the Russian advisors hinted that the Proletarian Revolution should take place only after the capitalist class has established mass literacy, basic industrialization, and national unity; for now, a national revolution was more compulsory. Also, the infant party was still weak to do anything on its own; thus, it turned to a policy of combining power with Sun Wen
            In the Second National Congress, which met on May 22nd 1922 in Shanghai, the delegates produced the Constitution of the party, a manifesto, and a resolution to join the Comintern. In the Congress, the party outlined its "maximum", or long term goals and the "minimum", or short term goals. Ultimately, the party's aim was to "organize the proletariat to struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the workers and peasants, the abolition of private property, and the gradual attainment of a communist society", but the immediate goal of the time was to secure a democratic united front of the proletariat, poor peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie against imperialism and warlordism (3). On June, the Central Committee issued the "First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation" and decided to build a united front. There were opposition to collaborating with Sun; people like Li Dazhao, Cai Heshen and Gao Yuhan disagreed with it, but ultimately, Maring and the Comintern was able to drive it through.
            Meanwhile, Sun was moving back and forth between Shanghai and Guangzhou and putting painstaking effort to organize political power. Although the Beijing parliament had collapsed and Sun had been in exile until 1917, he was able to reorganize Guomindang in Guangdong in 1919. However, he had conflicts with the regional warlords, and his government in Guangdong was not recognized by foreigners. When CCP and the Comintern envoys approached Sun, he was interested in collaboration. Although he initially rejected the offer of alliance, Sun knew that he urgently needed the Russian support. He agreed that he would permit individual Communists to join Guomindang, and the CCP soon adopted the "bloc within" approach. Thus, the two parties, along with the Russians, formed a three-way joint revolutionary force to repel foreign influence and to settle domestic political stability by overthrowing the warlords. United Front was officially launched by the Sun-Joffe Declaration, an agreement between the Soviet representative Adolph Joffe and Sun that assured cooperation among the three groups.
            All sides had benefited from the coalition. CCP targeted in getting an easier access to the masses through GMD's institutions (since GMD had 150,000 members by 1922 (4)) and using GMD's loose construction to engage in subterranean communist propaganda. The GMD, on the other hand, knew that holding hands with the communists will promise them Russian support, a foreign aid which it urgently needed. In fact, the Russians played a crucial role in the historical scene because it not only funded the parties, but it also sent advisors to guide party organization and military training. The Russian interest in setting up the United Front was to check Imperial Japan's encroachments into China. Designating anti-communist Japan as its most threatening opponent in East Asia, the Soviet Union wanted to make China strong enough to withstand Japan. Among the many warlords and political factions, the Soviet Union had decided that the Guomindang was the most influential and decided to use it to achieve their purpose.
            The new Comintern advisor Michael Borodin played an important role in supervising the United Front. The United Front upheld Sun's "San-min" principle of Anti-Imperialism, Democracy, and Socialism, and GMD structure was reorganized with Sun as the supreme party leader. With its power base in Guangzhou, GMD organizations expanded to China's major cities, and new party members were rapidly recruited. Regional departments were organized under the central committee's supervision. Such party organization was done according to Bolshevik principles with guidance from Borodin. The advisor was also crucial in the establishment of the Chinese army because he brought funds from the Soviet Union for weapons and ammunitions, and for building military schools. Whampoa military academy and Huangpu military academy were established at this time, and Huangpu academy was especially important because Jiang Jieshi had been its first principal. The graduates of this academy played an important role in Jiang's Northern Campaign, and in GMD's future war against CCP. Students at these academies were intensively trained by Russian military officers and were provided with advanced modern equipment.
            Sun died suddenly of liver cancer in 1925. Although Wang Jingwei was appointed as Sun's successor, the young and ambitious Jiang became the most prominent party leader and inherited the nationalist movement. Jiang and his army led by Huangpu graduates were on their way to wage war against the warlords, and by the summer of 1925, he had determined to set on his "Northern Campaign". However, Jiang and some of his fellow right-wing GMD members were worried about the increasing number of left-wing party members and communists within the GMD. In fact, CCP had been fairly successful in the early years of the United Front. Communists had occupied important positions in the GMD party organization; by 1924, communists had occupied nearly one half of GMD's central executive committee, and on third of the standing committee seats (the statistics are based on communist account, and may not be accurate). Important CCP leaders had served as Department heads of the United Front; Tang Pingshan, Lin Zuhan, and Mao Zedong served as the heads of the Department of Organization, the Department of Peasant Movement, and the Department of Propaganda. These were all very advantageous positions when considering CCP's underlying purpose of the United Front. Under CCP supervision, large numbers of labor unions and workers' organizations were set up all over the country; strikes and protests conducted by students and workers against foreign powers (mostly against Britain and the United States, but also included France and Japan), capitalists and industrialists were held throughout the summer of 1925. Communist networks among peasants were established in the poverty-stricken regions of Guangzhou and northern China, and peasant unions were established to enflame the peasants' dissatisfaction. Whereas the early CCP success had been possible due to Sun's tendency to avoid friction, its situation after Sun's death and Jiang's rise to power was severely altered. The rightist orthodox Guomindang members, also known as the Western Hills Group, wanted to purge the party of left-wing elements, and Jiang, the party's new leader, was also a strict rightist who trusted neither the CCP nor the Comintern. Additionally, many industrialists and capitalists, who had been the main supporters of GMD, had left Guangzhou because of the spreading leftist ideals and laborers' strike, and agitated the right-wings. The agitation was further exacerbated when the Chungshan gunboat affair broke out. Although Jiang still needed Soviet support to carry on the nationalist revolution, he knew that the left-wing power had to be curbed.
            By 1926, Jiang and his fellow party members decided that it was time to restrict the authority of the communists and the Russian advisors. Restrictions included that no member of the GMD could join the CCP, and that all information about communist party members should be provided to the GMD executive committee by the Comintern. The Comintern, on the other hand, had also decided to maintain the United Front. The Soviet consul in Canton adopted a conciliatory attitude, and also decided to back Jiang in his Northern Campaign. The Chinese communists were convinced by the Russians, and agreed to accept Jiang's demands.
            The Northern Campaign began in July of 1926, with Jiang's National Revolutionary Army of 100,000 men. Their enemies were the warlords of the North, especially Zhang Zuolin, Wu Peifu, and Sun Chuanfang (5). Beginning in Guangzhou and Canton, the National Revolutionary Army had pushed in as far as Hupei and had occupied almost half of China within only 9 months. Several reasons could be attributed to the relatively rapid success of the Northern Campaign. The Communist underground network had already done a lot of propaganda for the United Front in the regions to be conquered, and advertised the virtues of the National Revolutionary Army. Where as the National Revolutionary Army showed incredible organization and received great peasant support, the Northern Warlords were horribly disorganized and divided. Many of the warlords' army surrendered to Jiang's army, and some warlords switched sides and joined the GMD; as the war progressed, the size of the National Revolutionary Army and its weapons stock grew larger and larger.
            However, in the progress of the Northern Expedition, the CCP and the left-wings were further split from Jiang. While Jiang was out on the battlefield, the communists tried to establish their political leadership in the conquered regions by setting up labor unions and peasant association, and to strengthen the position of the leftwing GMD members in the National Government Council. The Spring of Shanghai was a famous case in which left wing-supported labor unions unleashed their anti-foreigner and anti-capitalist dissatisfaction. In January 1927, these leftwing leaders decided to move the center of the National Government to Wuhan where the situations looked most auspicious for future communist party growth. Jiang, on the other hand, wanted Nanchang to be the center for further northward campaign. The friction was enlarged until the government in Wuhan decided to stop funds to Jiang's army in Nanchang and to enable communists to enter the councils of GMD. At the Third Plenum of the GMD central executive committee held in March 1927, the left and the communist elements formally confiscated Jiang's authority as the Commander-in-Chief, and replaced him with Wang Jingwei as the head of the Guomindang Organization Department. However, Jiang entered Shanghai by March, and decided to take a much more firm stance towards the communists and the GMD leftists; he disarmed all the laborers and communist elements and executed many of them. In April, Jiang and his supporters had set up a rival National Government in Nanjing and declared that the Wuhan regime was no longer legitimate.
            The Wuhan regime had problems on its own: most of the leftist GMD leaders in Wuhan were not communists; rather, they were simply GMD members who were in personal discord with Jiang and his policies. When the communists in Wuhan began violent land reform and labor control of industries, such GMD members were alarmed and dissatisfied. The problem for CCP was different; they resolved to set up peasant organization and rural areas and attempted to enhance the already emerging peasant and labor revolutions, but the orders from Stalin demanded preservation of the alliance with the GMD left wing and to check the excessive peasant movements. The CCP leaders debated heatedly about the degree to which the peasant revolutions should be elevated, but it could not come up with a solution. The party leaders were wavering and financially broke. Meanwhile, the GMD leaders in Wuhan decided that the communists had to be expelled, and reconciliation with Jiang had to be attempted. On July 15th, the GMD political council in Wuhan formally ordered the expulsion of the communists.

III.1.3 The CCP-Guomindang Split and the Jiangxi Soviet
            Pushed to the corner, CCP and the Russian advisors had to change their policy. Blamed for the failure to develop the agrarian revolution, Chen Duxiu was dismissed and replaced by Qu Qiubai. Party leaders decided to instigate armed insurrections in both rural and urban areas, and pushed themselves into risky attempts in the cities. (6)
            Ultimately, all of their attempts ended in a debacle. The first uprising in Nanchang, conducted by Ho Lung and Ye Ting and supported by Zhou Enlai, seemed to be successful at first, but was soon forced to flee by GMD forces. The groups of Russian advisors were also held under Jiang's jurisdiction, and sent back to the Soviet Union in 1928. In eastern Canton, the evacuating communists were crushed and the remnants were dispersed. Mao's 'Autumn Harvest Uprising' in Hunan province was also suppressed by the GMD forces. Mao fled southward and took refuge in Jinggangshan, a mountain stronghold in the Hunan-Jiangxi border. For this failure, the central committee had dismissed Mao from the politburo and the party front committee. Other uprisings in cities like Shantou were also shattered. The CCP central committee, despite the failures, pushed for another revolution in Canton in December, but ended with heavy losses. By December, the CCP membership had fallen by 80%, and most of the surviving communists had retreated to the countryside.
            Jiang was apparently having continual success, and his national revolutionary army was growing stronger. By the autumn of 1928, Jiang had defeated his greatest enemy Zhang Zuolin, and reached north of Beijing. His new national government began in Nanjing on October 10th, and GMD flags were flying from Guangzhou to Beijing. Yet, the success was only superficial. There was widespread disloyalty among the regional generals of GMD, especially among the newly admitted party members consisting of absorbed warlords, and landowners. Seeing the growing power of the GMD, these warlords and landowners wanted to secure personal interest by joining GMD, but believed neither in the political ideology nor did they have any loyalty for Jiang. The generals of Guangxi left him in 1929, Hu Hanmin in 1931, and generals in Fujian in 1933. Jiang himself believed little in democracy and was more influenced by his fascist readings; in fact, he was similar to the other warlords, except that he was the most powerful among them. The GMD detached itself from the peasants by expelling the communists, but was never able to eliminate the CCP. His government organizations could not penetrate into the provinces, and most of the rural areas and southern cities remained under the control of regional powers. Life for peasants was as worse as it was during the Qing dynasty, and economic bipolarization continued to grow. Foreigners were initially hostile to Jiang's government, and it was only after long and strenuous negotiations that it acquired its right to tax foreign industries. To make situations worse, warlords Yen Hishan and Feng Yuxiang revolted against Jiang and waged a bloody war in 1930, giving time for communist reorganization.
            The CCP managed to hold the Sixth National Congress in Moscow, under Soviet supervision. The Congress decided in July that the CCP should stress the importance of gaining leadership over the peasantry, of establishing soviets, and of expanding peasant uprisings to urban insurrections. Li Lisan emerged as the dominant head of the Politburo, and commanded in 1930 to begin a new revolutionary upsurge. The "Li Lisan Line" called for insurrections beginning in the cities which would spread to the regions; the Comintern and the CCP heads still thought that the revolutions had to begin with the proletariat. Communist armies from Jangsi, Hunan, and Hubei were deployed to capture the cities of Nanchang, Changsha, and Wuhan, but were unsuccessful. In the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, held in January 1931, Li Lisan was condemned, and the "Returned Students Clique" - or the "28 Bolsheviks" - who had been trained in Russia by the Soviets, was introduced as the new central leadership of the party. Adhering to a new Comintern instruction, the Returned Students Clique decided to shift to rural, peasant insurrection, and to strengthen the Red Army.
            Meanwhile, Mao Zedong was growing his own powers after he was broken in the Autumn Harvest Uprisings. Badly broken and left with only a few hundred men, he fled to Jinggangshan. Mao was desperate enough to recruit local bandits, discontented peasants, and homeless wanders to build a new revolutionary force; these so-called 'Lumpenproletariat', however, were extensively indoctrinated and became a strong fighting force. Mao realized the importance of the peasants in China's communist revolution before anybody else, and began to organize peasant based soviets in the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi. In cooperation with Zhu De, he acquired a sizable territory, and grew his powers. Although the people initially distrusted the torn-down communist forces, Mao forced as well as convinced people to cooperate with the Soviets. Similar Soviets ruled by other red armies began to appear elsewhere.
            The central party leadership initially regarded these soviets as only a minor movement, but they changed their points of view after the urban revolutions had failed. Determined to move their scene to the rural areas and gain power, the Returned Students Clique and other party leaders moved from Shanghai to Jiangxi, and organized the Central Bureau of Soviet Areas. On December 7, 1931, 610 delegates from the various soviets, red armies, and unions met in Ruijin, Jiangxi, to proclaim a Central Soviet Government and the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. When the heads of the CCP moved to Jiangxi, they assumed the major seats, and reduced the authority of Mao.
            The collision between Mao and the central party leadership was on matters of party doctrine. The RSC were very orthodox and inflexible, and insisted that violent land reform and redistribution be carried on. Along with the Comintern advisor Otto Braun, the central leadership followed a policy of extremism and leftism. They divided the people into five groups - landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and agricultural laborers - and wanted to indiscriminately get rid of the landlords and rich peasants, not only confiscating the property, but also taking their lives. The middle peasants, who gained wealth through hard work and not from exploitation, also occasionally became targets of the purge. On the contrary, Mao knew the importance of the landlords and rich peasants in rural communities; they had traditionally been the center of rural production, and had played a crucial role in bringing the people together. Instead of killing them, Mao wanted to incorporate those who acquiesced to the land reforms into the party and use them to propel the functioning of peasant organizations. Mao also found problems with the "Land Reform of the Chinese Revolutionary Military Council" which decided to distribute equal amounts of land to everybody; after years of experience on the field, Mao new that such drastic redistribution can cause disruptions in the productions. For the purpose of maintaining productions, Mao also decided to overlook small industrialists and businessmen. Mao's policies worked better and his organizations have demonstrated through the years that it can run local administrations to benefit all the peasants. Thus, the peasants supported Mao, and a substantial number of peasants signed up to join Mao's Red Army.
            Another conflict was about the military strategy against the constant GMD invasion. Mao's tactics were in guerilla style, waiting for the enemy to march deep into the communist stronghold, and to strike at the most appropriate time. By doing so, Mao was able to defeat larger GMD invading army with a smaller Red Army and capture GMD weapons. The RSC and Braun, however, argued that the red army must meet the enemies face to face. Instead of pulling together the whole power and unleashing it at a single moment on the enemy's weakest point, Braun and Bo Gu ordered the Red Army to defend the entire borderline. Jiang's first 3 anti-communist campaigns were unsuccessful, due to the rebellions in the North and Mao's defensive strategy. However, his fourth campaign in 1932 caused considerable damage for the Jiangxi Soviet, displacing a large portion of the Red Army. The fifth campaign of November 1933 was successful in displacing the CCP from Jiangxi for good. This time, the GMD army had launched a more careful approach, surrounding the Chinese Soviet District, cutting off all supplies, and slowly tightening the blockade. Braun's strategy of border defense made the GMD strategy more effective; the communist army suffered a terrible loss due to Braun's bad advising, and the Soviet's existence became extremely precarious. (7)
            In 1934, the threatened communists decided to leave Jiangxi, to locate a different base. By summer, the size of the Soviet District was reduced to merely 1600 square miles, and casualties were mounting in all battlefields. CCP's fate had become very precarious. In fear of complete elimination of communists, the Comintern permitted the CCP to evacuate from Jiangxi and the surviving Red forces began their "Long March".

III.1.4 The Long March
            The Long March was the forced relocation of CCP base from Jiangxi to Ya'nan, Shaanxi. Although small party organizations were left behind to continue to direct the struggles of the guerilla armies behind enemy lines, most of the CCP organs were relocated. The journey extended 6000 miles across 13 provinces, 18 mountain ranges, and 24 rivers, lasting 368 days of trekking across rugged terrain (8). The groups of Red Army and its supporters suffered continuous casualty as they were attacked by pursuing GMD army, and native populations. The communists began initially as three separate units, and their trails are shown on map 2 below. Mao's First Red Army arrived in Shaanxi in October 1935, but it took another year until the last Red Army arrived to join forces. The Fourth Red Army, led by Zhang Guotao, decided to set up a separate soviet on the border to the Soviet Union, but was shattered by GMD and its allied forces. The survivors eventually returned to Mao's camp. When the Second Red Army arrived in October 1936, the reunion was complete. A new headquarter was set up in Ya'nan.
            The impact of the Long March on CCP can be evaluated in two separate spheres; the losses and the gains.
            There were definite losses. Statistics show that during the retreat, party membership fell from 300,000 to 40,000 and only 7000 soldiers from the initial 100,000 remained (although joined by 22,000 recruits) (9). The Soviets that had been established in southern and eastern China through 15 years of hard work had been destroyed. Many important party leaders and generals had been sacrificed, and weapons and supplies were lost.
            However, the CCP seems to have successfully used the crisis for the best; the party's political course was redirected to nationalist revolution, and overall party morale was greatly increased. In December 1935, Mao declared

            The Red Army has been considerably weakened in the process. From this aspect of the over-all situation, we can see that the enemy has won a temporary and partial victory, while we have suffered a temporary and partial defeat. Is this statement correct ? I think it is. For it is a statement of fact. However, some people say that the Central Red Army has failed. Is that correct ? No. For it is not a statement of fact. In approaching a problem a Marxist should see the whole as well as the parts. A frog in a well says, "The sky is no bigger than the mouth of the well." That is untrue, for the sky is not just the size of the mouth of the well. If it said, "A part of the sky is the size of the mouth of a well", that would be true, for it tallies with the facts. What we say is that in one respect the Red Army has failed, but in another respect it has won a victory. In one respect the enemy won a victory, but in another respect he has failed. That is the only appropriate formulation, for we have completed the Long March.

            We answer that the Long March is the first of its kind in the annals of history, that it is a manifesto, a propaganda force, a seeding-machine. Since Pan Ku divided the heavens from the earth and the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors reigned, has history ever witnessed a long march such as ours ? For twelve months we were under daily reconnaissance and bombing from the skies by scores of planes, while on land we were encircled and pursued, obstructed and intercepted by a huge force of several hundred thousand men, and we encountered untold difficulties and dangers on the way; yet by using our two legs we swept across a distance of more than twenty thousand li through the length and breadth of eleven provinces. Let us ask, has history ever known a long march to equal ours ? No, never. The Long March is a manifesto. It has proclaimed to the world that the Red Army is an army of heroes while the imperialists and their running dogs, Jiang Jieshi and his like, are impotent. It has proclaimed their utter failure to encircle, pursue, obstruct and intercept us. The Long March is also a propaganda force. It has announced to some 200 million people in eleven provinces that the road of the Red Army is their only road to liberation. Without the Long March, how could the broad masses have learned so quickly about the existence of the great truth which the Red Army embodies ? The Long March is also a seeding-machine. In the eleven provinces it has sown many seeds which will sprout, leaf, blossom, and bear fruit, and will yield a harvest in the future. In a word, the Long March has ended with victory for us and defeat for the enemy. Who brought the Long March to victory ? The Communist Party. Without the Communist Party, a long march of this kind would have been inconceivable. The Chinese Communist Party, its leadership, its cadres and its members fear no difficulties or hardship. Whoever questions our ability to lead the revolutionary war will fall into the morass of opportunism. A new situation arose as soon as the Long March was over. In the battle of Chihlochen the Central Red Army and the Northwestern Red Army, fighting in fraternal solidarity, shattered the traitor Jiang Jieshi's campaign of "encirclement and suppression" against the Shensi-Kansu border area and thus laid the cornerstone for the task undertaken by the Central Committee of the Party, the task of setting up the national headquarters of the revolution in northwestern China."

            Indeed, the CCP successfully outflanked Jiang Jieshi who deployed an army that was 10 times the size of the Red Army and armed with advanced weapons provided by Jiang's foreign allies. Despite the challenges of nature and lack of supply, the Communists managed to relocate and rebuild in northern China. In addition to this valuable experience, the CCP also earned a good reputation among the peasants of the provinces they passed through. Mao did not allow his armies to harm the peasants or to take away the peasants' properties as the GMD army had done; in the Eight Points of Attention, Mao "instructed his army to avoid harm to or disrespect for the peasants, in spite of the desperate need for food and supplies." (11) Also, communism was widely advertised by the Red Army's mass meetings, inflammatory speeches, revolutionary songs, propagandistic plays, and the moderate land reforms and redistribution policies won the favor of the peasants. Modern historians often evaluate the Long March as the time when Mao spread the seed for future activity in the rural areas
            The most important aspect of the Long March, however, is that Mao Zedong gained party leadership. In January 1935, when the First Red Army was still in Guizhou, the party politburo was reorganized to throw out the previous party leaders. Mao held the Returned Student Clique responsible for the failure to protect the Soviet in Jiangxi, for failure to take advantage of GMD's inner conflicts and begin a communist revolution, and for refusing to cooperate with GMD leftist insurgents. Mao was then promoted to the five-person secretariat and joined Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Bo Gu, and became one of the chief decision-makers, along with Zhou Enlai. In reality, Mao became the most influential among them all by the end of the Long March. (12)

III.2 Korea : Unsuccessful Communist Parties

III.2.1 The Korean People's Socialist Party
            Koreans found communism supportive of the independence movement, but the early Korean communists and the majority of the Korean communist organizations before 1945 were not strictly indoctrinated. The majority of the Korean communists and their organizations did not engage actively in class struggle or proletarian revolution, but instead, actively participated in the independence movements and anti-Japan struggle.
            Yi Donghwi was the founder of Korea's first communist organization, the Korean People's Socialist Party. Since Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, a lot of diehard nationalists and resisters fled to the North and settled in Manchuria and Siberia. Soon, Korean communities of considerable sizes were established in the regions, notably in the Chientao of Southern Manchuria, and Vladivostok. As reformists, educators, and Christian leaders were also suppressed under the Japanese rule, many fled abroad to these Korean communities. One of them was Yi Donghwi, who moved to Chientao in 1911 to train anti-Japanese fighting forces. He had been a teacher at a military academy, and had participated in organizing independence organizations, and had been arrested for subversive acts before moving to Chientao. (13)
            The communist encroachments came from the Russian Bolsheviks who had been operating in Siberia at the time. They were in the middle of a civil war against the Whites, and were in a precarious position in the East. Apparently, the Bolsheviks wanted to cooperate with the organized Koreans in the region to fight to "liberate the oppressed". For Koreans, the suggestion sounded fine; they were in urgent need for foreign aid as well. Judging that the alliance with the Bolsheviks would facilitate the independence movement, the Koreans in Siberia adopted Communism. As a result, the Korean People's Socialist Party was born in Khabarovsk in June 1918, with Yi Donghwi as the chairman. Next year, representatives from the party were sent to Moscow to pledge that the party would work for both the communist cause and the liberation of Korea. They were warmly welcomed by Lenin, and given a small sum of fund in returning (14). However, the party ended in failure as the Japanese army was deployed to Siberia in 1920. Korean Committees were the main target of their attack, and many members of the Korean People's Socialist Party were killed. The party function was stopped until it was reorganized as the Goryeo Communist Party in 1921. (15)

III.2.2 The Two Goryeo Communist Parties
            Meanwhile, the Shanghai Provisional Government (15a) was organized in 1919 under the leadership of many nationalist figures. Yi Donghwi had been a member of the provisional government, and when the Korean People's Socialist Party was shattered from Japanese plunder, he moved to Shanghai and became the premier. However, the provisional government was a mixture of rightist and leftist elements. Thus, Yi supervised the reorganization of the surviving members of the Korean members of the Korean People's Socialist Party in Shanghai, and the establishment of the Goryeo Communist Party. Many leftists of the provisional government joined the Goryeo Communist Party (16). Then, there was an incident involving funds from Russia; previously, Lenin had sent a total of 200 million rubles to the provisional government, but Yi was accused for having spent a large portion of the fund to precipitate the organization of the KCP. As a result, many of the leftists and members of the KCP left the provisional government. In 1921, Yi held a party meeting, and decided on the future programs of the Goryeo Communist Party. The funds from Russia were to be used to activate the party by printing propaganda material, beginning military training, and establishing regional connections.
            Meanwhile, another Goryeo Communist Party was organized in Irkutsk in September 1919. Led by Boris Shumiatsky, this all Russian Goryeo Communist Party comprised Koreans who had moved to Siberia a long time ago, and identified themselves with the Russians. Instead of being an independent party, this Goryeo Communist Party was more like a tool for Comintern's Far Eastern Department and received commands. The party implemented military training and communist indoctrination on Korean youth from Irkutsk and the surrounding Korean settlements, and advertised communism and Bolshevik policies through magazines.
            These two parties are called the Shanghai Goryeo Communist Party and the Irkutsk Communist Party, respectively. The Comintern gave orders to unite the two parties, but there were political differences between the two that could not be reconciled. Yi Donghwi's Shanghai group was not a strict communist party; the members saw the party as a diplomatic tool to receive Russian support. They cared less about communist doctrine, and sought to incorporate the party activities into the entire liberation movement in cooperation with the nationalists. On the other hand, the Irkutsk group was a strict Bolshevik party which cared less about the liberation movement (18). In general, the Comintern and Shumiatsky preferred the Irkutsk group and mistrusted the Shanghai group. The Irkutsk group sent damaging files about the Shanghai faction; Voitinsky, who was Comintern's representative in China, reported that the Shanghai party was facing lack of success and international dissension.
            Unable to compromise, the two parties collided at last in June 1921 and caused several hundreds of casualties on both sides. The Comintern ordered both parties to be dissolved and to be united under the Comintern's Far East Area Committee's Korea Bureau, also known as the Korburo. Voitinsky was placed as its head, and other 5 prominent Korean leaders from the previous two parties were placed as the head representatives. However, this Korburo did not function too well. The leadership was broken as Voitinsky was busy with matters in China, and a few representatives left for Shanghai. Additionally, the Russian government became less friendly to the Koreans in Siberia because the Japanese troops withdrew from Siberia and the Russian Civil War was almost over. The Koreans were no longer useful, so they disarmed all anti-Japanese Korean organizations in Siberia and banished them. Purely Korean movements disappeared, and the remaining communists were absorbed by the Russian party. This was the end of the first phase of Korean Communism. (19)

III.2.3 Communist Activities in Korea
            In Korea, between 1919 and 1921 was a period in which mass nationalist movements and public demonstrations began to take place. Then, in early 1921, communism was introduced into Korea by students who had been studying abroad in Japan. Since 1921, socialist movements began to split from the main nationalist movements, and began to shape as a separate sphere. Political societies with leftist tendency began to appear like wildfire, with the Korea Labor Mutual Aid Society being the first among them. Other societies such as Bookpoonghoe, Hwayohoe, Joseon laborer's Aliance, and Joseon Youth's Alliance emerged in both Seoul and Tokyo, and precipitated the dissemination of socialist ideology. One important aspect of the early 1920s was that the intellectuals, most notably young students, were beginning to arouse the public into mass activity via public speeches, open debates, and magazine editorials.
            In 1923, the Korburo deployed few individuals into Korea with orders to organize full-scale communist party within Korea. These individuals included Kim Yaksoo and Kim Jaebong. By June, they had organized a domestic department of the Korburo, and by 1924, the Joseon Laborers' Alliance and the Joseon Youth Alliance. Based on the new and the preexisting socialist societies, the Joseon Communist Party was founded in 1925. Kim Jaebong and Park Honyoung became the heads of the Party and the Party's Youth Corps. However, the Joseon Communist Party was too overwhelmed by organization tasks and failed to conduct party activities properly; it couldn't even train new party cadres due to an insufficient number of indoctrinated party members. The party was also exposed to the vigilance of the Japanese police; in November 1925, Kim Jae-bong and Park Hon-young was arrested by the police while attempting to send communist youth league members to Moscow for Bolshevik education. Continuous exposures led to mass arrests and the party collapsed soon.
            Few members avoided being discovered by the Japanese police, and reorganized the second Joseon Communist Party. The Second Joseon Communist Party was ordered by the Comintern to set up a United Front, and to convert many aroused individuals into the party. However, the organization was discovered while preparing pamphlets for the 6.10 strikes; a hundred party members were arrested, and 80 were convicted. The party was again shattered. The Third CCP was organized again by the remnants of the second party and new recruits from the surviving leftist societies. The third party was also known as the ML communist party because it was mainly constituted of members of the ML faction of the Bookpoonghoe. It decided to engage in total political struggle, not just a narrow economic struggle or public demonstration. However, the Japanese police soon found out and, again, the party members were taken into police custody. All the subsequent communist movements ended in failure (20). The most critical factor was that Korea was a small country and that the Japanese police system was too experienced and effective. The communists had nowhere to hide or to fall back to.
            As a response to the disintegration of the fourth Joseon Communist Party, the Comintern announced the "December Theses", blaming the failure on the party's factionalism and unoriginality. So far, the main body of the communist revolution had been students and intellectuals who themselves hadn't suffered the plight under the capitalists or landlords; according to Comintern's standards, they were not genuine communists. It declared that a new party should be organized with laborers and peasants as the central participants. Only then would the Korean communists be able to develop cadres having genuine communist conceptions and truly scientific Marxist-Leninist modes of thought. (21)

III.2.4 Nationalist Single Party Movement and Laborers' and Farmers' movements
            After the continuous failure to revive the Joseon Communist Party, active communist movement decreased until it almost came to an end. However, there was an overall nationalist movement which included both the leftists and the rightists. Socialists in late 1920s felt that their primary goal was a nationalist revolution against Japan, and that class struggle and proletarian revolution should follow later; in line with the Comintern's policy, they decided to reconcile the differences with the rightists. The rightists, on the other hand, found a hard time trying to reach the laborers and the peasants because they were often wealthy intellectuals; by allying with the leftists, they attempted to become more affiliated to the masses
            Shinganhoe was the organization that was at the center of this new United Front. Established in February 1927, Shinganhoe included leftist nationalists, socialists, and later on, rightist nationalists. Nationalist Medias such as the Joseon Ilbo, and the Donga Ilbo agreed to do propaganda work and publish entries written by members of the Shinganhoe. By 1928, the organization established over 123 regional branches and gained over 40,000 members. Its main programs included establishing educational centers and preparing organized resistance against the exploitation of the Japanese East Colonization Corporation.
            However, the unity did not last long; soon, there were internal disputes between the rightist and the leftist elements. The fundamental problem was that the political aims of both sides were in conflict; the rightists worked to gain Korean autonomy under Japanese rule while the leftists desired outright independence. Additionally, the rightist nationalists were often wealthy intellectuals and landlords; their interests were divergent from those of the peasants and the laborers. The socialists in Shinganhoe could not manage to carry out many programs for the peasants and laborers because of the resistance from the rightists. Tensions heightened, and Shinganhoe remained divided and inactive. The failure of the United Front in China and the "December Theses" from Comintern convinced the socialists and the leftists that the alliance with the rightists would no longer work. Finally, the Shinganhoe was dissolved in May, 1931. (22)
            Another bulk of the socialist activities in the late 1920s involved laborer and peasant movements. The Joseon Communist Party, although destroyed by the Japanese police, had succeeded in setting up labor unions and farmer's organizations. These organizations displayed determined resistance against the Japanese employers and landlords. Laborers held strikes against the Japanese employers, complaining about long work hours, bad work environment, low salary, and mistreatment. In the city of Gwangju alone, there were 153 laborers' alliances that went on strike between 1924 and 1927 (23). One of the largest strikes took place in Wonsan by over 3,000 workers in resistance to Japanese supervisors' physical abuse of Korean laborers in the factory. Other massive strikes were conducted by miners, and rubber factory workers. Meanwhile, Peasants were in conflict with tenancy. In the 1910s and 20s, the number of tenant farmers increased dramatically as a result of the Land Survey Program of the East Colonization Corporation. Most of the farmland was sold at cheap prices to Japanese and pro-Japanese Korean landlords. The problem was that the rent for tenancy was too high, often over 70-80 per cent. In case of Jeollanamdo, the largest farming province of Korea, landlords who consisted 1.2 per cent of the population exploited the remaining population by controlling over 50 % of all the farming land. Demonstrations against and attacks on landlords increased until they reached the peak in 1927 when Joseon Farmer's Alliance was formed. In 1927 alone, 726 cases of peasants' attacks on landlords were reported. (24)
            These strikes were, in the end, brutally suppressed by the Japanese army and police. However, the movements were significant proof that the masses of people identified with socialism and that the laborers and peasants should play the central role in future communist activities. Although communists in Korea largely remained dormant throughout the 1930s, farmer and labor movements persisted, especially in northern Korea.

III.3 Comparison
            Communism in both China and Korea was organized into party movement in the early 1920s. Supervision from the Soviet Union was critical to the growth of communist movements in both China and Korea. Although the Chinese and the Koreans were new to the concept of a political party, experienced Russian advisors helped train party cadres, teach communist principles, organize administrative structure and conduct class struggle and land reform. As a result, the communists had a better party organization and indoctrination than most other political entities. For example, the Guomindang, which did not have a tangible role model or any direct guidance, remained a large, unorganized entity; the members of GMD did not identify with each other, there was no party loyalty, and there was no clear governing party principle or doctrine
            Although communism became a large bulk of the political movements in the Far East, the communist parties of China and Korea took different courses in several aspects.
            First, the Chinese Communist Party grew into a large, strong revolutionary party when the Communist Parties in Korea were disintegrated before they could begin any genuine communist activity. As described in the preceding chapters, the Chinese Communist Party was properly organized, had the Red Army to fight for the revolution, possessed well disciplined and indoctrinated cadres, and had made regional connections and underground organizations. They had initiated class struggle, redistributed land, and even set up communist ruled soviet districts. On the contrary, the Korean Communist Parties were torn by factionalism, and were under surveillance by the Japanese police; before they even began to grow, the parties were disintegrated from internal conflict, or the members were arrested by the police. According to Lee Chong-sik, the author of the 'Korean Worker's Party: a short history', this was largely because of geographical factors. China has a vast territory, providing hinterland for hideout as well as covert operation; despite GMD pursuit, the CCP was able to survive because it could keep running away, and into the rural areas. The Koreans, however, had nowhere to flee because the country was simply too small; whenever any feat was discovered, the participants were hunted down in no time. The effectiveness of the Japanese colonization program and the police system may have added to the failure of communist party in Korea. In any case, the Korean communists had failed to engage to peasants and laborers into the mainstream of the communist activities and party organizations.
            Second, the level of communist discipline and indoctrination was different; by far, the Chinese Communist Party had much more trained and strictly indoctrinated party cadres, and was better supported by the guidance from Russian supervisors. For CCP, defeating Jiang was as important as national liberation from foreign powers. Genuine communist activities, such as political propaganda, class struggle, and land redistribution was conducted by the CCP, wherever it went. On the other hand, Koreans took communism for a tool in the course of independence movements; the first communist partisans had not even read Marx's publications. As mentioned above, the Korean communists could not proceed with education on communist ideology, nor carry out propaganda, class struggle, nor land redistribution.
            Third, the CCP enjoyed a certain limited autonomy, but the actions of the Korean communist parties were either directly governed by orders from the Comintern, or dependent on the mainstream policies set forth by the Comintern. Although the Russian advisors played a critical role in initiating the CCP and guiding its approaches, they were recalled to their home country in time. The Returned Students Clique, which identified with the Soviet Union very much, was gradually pushed out from the central power of the party. The CCP and the Comintern interacted to influence each others' policies, and CCP participated in Comintern to decide on future policies, but the execution was independent and party leadership was with Mao. However, the Koreans relied heavily on guidance from the Soviet Union. The First domestic communist party, the Joseon Communist Party, began as a branch of the Korburo, a department within the Comintern. Additionally, the Korean communists in Manchuria and Siberia were under either the CCP or the Comintern, as it will be further discussed in section IV. 2 Korea's war against Japan.

IV. World War II

IV.1 China's War against Japan

IV.1.1 Second United Front
            The Second Sino-Japanese War, or the War of Resistance Against Japan for the Chinese, lasted from July 1937 to September 1945. During this period, the Communist Party of China sought to create a Second United Front with Guomindang in order to secure a common defense against the Japanese invaders and to protect China's independence. Although the CCP made apparent concessions to GMD and promised to cooperate in united action against the Japanese, they maintained their long run goals of defeating Jiang and uniting China under the red flag.
            Japanese ambition to invade China was displayed in the Mukden Incident of 1931. The Mukden Incident, also known as the Manchurian Crisis, was Japan's invasion of Manchuria after a designed plot. By setting up an explosion of their own railroad tracks and blaming it on the Chinese, the Japanese provided themselves with a reason to initiate their invasion. The Japanese Army soon ran over the Chinese garrisoning army, which was led by warlord Zhang Xueliang; in addition to military inferiority, Zhang's army was held back by Jiang's order not to resist the invading Japanese. The local resistance was easily suppressed and Japanese rapidly occupied the provinces of Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Qilin. In 1932, Manchukuo, Japan's puppet state of Manchuria, was set up (25). Since then, there had been continuous conflict between Japan and China. In 1932, Jiang was forced to accept the demilitarization of Shanghai after the Japanese sector had been attacked by Chinese subversives. In 1933, Japanese troops attacked the Great Wall, occupied Rehe, demilitarized the Great Wall, and secured the region from Beijing to Tianjin. In 1935, GMD was forced to cede party activities in Inner Mongolia (26). However, Jiang's policy was to avoid confrontation with Japan until all of China could rally behind him. In other words, he wanted to get rid of the communists first.
            Meanwhile, CCP was planning another united front, a cooperative action against the Japanese threat. In August 1st, 1935, the CCP leaders met in the Maoerhkai Conference and came upon the agreement. The decision was also correspondent with Comintern's decision during the Seventh Congress of Comintern to adopt a global united front policy against Fascism. CCP sent message to Jiang that they would cooperate with him to form a 'National Defense Government' if Jiang would stop attacking the communist district, and Zhou Enlai was dispatched to Hong Kong to convince GMD. Soon, CCP's propaganda for united front was spread throughout the country; slogans such as "Chinese must not fight Chinese" were widely sung by crowds, creating a popular sentiment to stop internal conflict and concentrate power in blocking foreign enemy encroachments. Popular demand for United Front was expressed on several occasions. In September of 1935, Shanghai's leaders in culture and education gathered to form the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Grand Alliance, and demanded that the government do something about the impending national crisis. Similar organizations sprouted elsewhere, instigating mass demonstrations and strikes. Despite the popular opinion for cooperation with the CCP, Jiang remained stubborn about first securing his sovereignty over China. For the time being, he tried to promote peace with Japan through nonresistance and diplomatic negotiations.
            In 1935, Jiang had ordered the Northeastern Army to attack the communists in Shaanxi. However, Guomindang generals of the Northeastern Army Chang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng came into secret contact with the communists, and agreed to cede civil war for joint resistance against Japan (27). According to accounts by Edgar Snow, Chang's Guomindang army and Mao's Red Army had ceased fighting each other and had permitted free passage in the Baoan-Xian front. Important communist officials had been going back and forth to Chang's headquarters to discuss peace and joint resistance against Japanese; moreover, it was Chang who provided Snow the transportation necessary to reach Baoan (28). When Jiang Jieshi arrived in Xian in early December 1936, the two generals tried to convince him of people's growing dissatisfaction and the growing demand for unified anti-Japanese action; however, Jiang Jieshi insisted on a rapid prosecution of the anti-communist extermination campaign. Left with no other choice, the two generals seized Jiang and took him hostage in Xian. After continuous persuasion, understanding was finally met by Christmas. In February 1937, the Third Plenum of GMD Fifth Central Executive Committee came into contact with CCP and officially agreed that hostilities from both sides should come to a halt. Throughout 1937, CCP and GMD were making compromises; CCP demanded from GMD the necessary funds to run anti-Japanese military operations, and the guarantee of freedom of speech, assembly, and association. The GMD, on the other hand, stipulated that the CCP should abandon all forms of armed insurrection against the government, stop land confiscation and class struggle, and become a subordinate organ of the republic. In September, the resolutions were accepted by both sides. The Red Army had agreed to operate under the command of the National Revolutionary Army as 3 divisions of the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. The Soviet was renamed the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Area Government. Both party agreed that when the war against Japan was over, a single national government would be elected via democratic means and universal suffrage. (29)
            The Second Sino-Japanese War was not declared until later, but open warfare began in July 1937 after Japanese troops had attacked Chinese garrison at Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing. Overwhelmed by Japanese military superiority and suffering a large casualty, the Chinese troops in Beijing evacuated. The attackers immediately occupied Beijing and Tianjin, and proceeded with more violent and cruel invasion southward (30). To prevent further Japanese advancement, Jiang finally decided to deploy his best trained soldiers and German advisors on a counterattack against Japanese garrisons and navy in Shanghai. However, the attack had failed due to information leakage, and the Guomindang army in Shanghai had to suffer heavy retaliation and bombardment. Although Shanghai resisted for about three months, defense soon broke down and Jiang had lost 60 per cent of his best army. The Japanese had occupied Shanghai by November, and marched on for Nanjing. Nanjing fell in December, and Japanese ransacked the city, killing civilians indiscriminately in the infamous "Nanjing Massacre". Japanese reports count 100,000 civilian casualties in the Nanjing Massacre, and Chinese statistics report up to 300,000 civilian casualties. The survivors of the GMD government had retreated to Wuhan in early 1938 and further back to Chongqing when Wuhan was destroyed in October (31). The fall of Wuhan and the earlier fall of Guangzhou together marked that most urban areas in central and eastern China were in the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese had also occupied most of Northern China, where many communist activities had been taking place. Although communists had engaged in guerilla warfare and had plagued the Japanese supply lines and outposts, they were no match for the larger, better armed and better trained Japanese Army. By November of 1937, Japanese arrived in Taiyuan and occupied the major cities of Huabei (Northern China). Neither the progress nor the prospect of the war seemed auspicious for the Chinese.
            The alliance of GMD and CCP was never very resolute in the Second United Front. Cooperation deteriorated continually since late 1938 despite steady Japanese territorial gains and Chinese defeats. One of the major breakpoint was the New Fourth Army Incident of late 1940 in which a large Guomindang army surrounded and destroyed a large portion of CCP's New Fourth Army, killing many important officers (32). One of the reasons for the internal dispute may have been that the GMD felt that they were the ones making all the large military confrontations and suffering large losses while the CCP was only engaging in guerilla style warfare. In reality, the Eighth Route Army grew from 30,000 men at the beginning of the war to 180,000 by 1942. Because both parties were also concerned about the situation when the war was over, the conflict was unavoidable.
            Japan's most important goal in invasion was to secure a production center with enough resources for future military and civilian industrialization. But the Japanese knew that their army was insufficient to occupy all of China; one solution that they came up with was to set up numerous collaborationist governments that would fight against the communists, and provide economic benefits to Japan. Manchukuo, which underwent rapid industrial and military expansion, was the first among these collaborationist governments. Another was the Chinese provisional government in Beijing which the Japanese had set up; this government would cooperate with Japanese businesses and develop social infrastructure. Other collaborators included the Reform government of Nanjing, and Inner Mongolia (the 'Japanized' Taiwan had been a Japanese colony since 1895). This strategy restrained Guomindang in two ways. First, these puppet governments would prevent the Guomindang government from collecting the taxes in Eastern China where most of the industrial production and overseas trade took place. As a result, Guomindang would suffer from insufficient revenue. Secondly, the Japanese army left the defense in rural, peripheral regions up to the collaborating Chinese armies, and focused on penetrating through the regions governed by Guomindang. Although it left vacuum in the rural areas for the communists to penetrate, the Japanese army was able to defeat the Guomindang at a rapid pace, employing a heavy, violent modern warfare. (33)
            By 1940, the war reached a stalemate. Although the Japanese had occupied most of the eastern coastal regions and the main centers of industry and trade, both communists and the Guomindang troops launched guerilla attacks in the conquered areas. The Chinese did not have the power to launch an offensive, but Japan had also suffered large casualties during the seizure of Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuhan. No substantial advancement had been made by either side. (34)
            Japanese anti-communist campaigns, however, seem to have gotten more and more intensive with time. Although the Japanese army had initially conquered most of Huabei, it could not establish a secure rule over all the conquered territory; strong resistance in the conquered areas coupled with communist activity continued to pester the Japanese. The communist cadres mixed anti-Japanese propaganda with party propaganda and conducted various tax and land reforms; these increased peasants' support for CCP and fostered a more favorable environment for further guerilla activities. By the end of 1940, Japan designated the CCP as its main enemy in Huabei and deployed a total of 400,000 Japanese and collaborator soldiers on an anti-communist campaign. Annoyed by the strong resistance from the villagers, the Japanese opened the "three-alls" campaign: to kill all, destroy all, and burn all. Japan's Huabei-Fangmian Army was ordered to 'kill everyone in enemy territory regardless of age and sex, to burn all buildings, food and hay, and to destroy all property and poison the wells' in order to make the region uninhabitable. Roads, barricades and watch towers were built for the purpose of cutting connections among separate communist bases. In 1941, the Guandong Army of Japan was increased to 700,000 and continuous heavy extermination campaigns were launched. (35)
            The vehemence reached its peak in late 1941 and early 1942. Additionally, serious famine struck in 1941, 42, and 43, depleting food supplies and making situations worse for the communists and the peasants. In the summer of 1942, massive extermination armies attacked the headquarters of the Eighth Route army, and other communist bases; elsewhere, peasants were robbed and killed. To deal with the mounting crisis, the CCP Central Committee proclaimed a set of administrative and military reform. The reforms discarded unnecessary organizations and reduced the preexisting ones, establishing a more compact and efficient governing system. To increase regional defenses, the central army was reduced and incorporated into regional defensive forces to train local militias. Programs to educate the peasants and instruct farm management were also implemented to increase the agricultural production. Thus, the CCP was able to survive the attacks despite casualties, loss of territory, and economic difficulty. (36)

IV.1.2 World War II and the United States in China
            Japan's attack of Pearl Harbor initiated the Pacific War, and brought in active allied support for the Chinese. The Second Sino-Japanese War became a part of the Asian scene of the World War II, and the Chinese were able to achieve victory due to allied assault against Japan.
            In the early phase of the war, not many imperial powers sympathized with China. Although many of them were aware of Japan's ambitions of the "Greater East Asia" plan, they did not want to offend Japan and make their colonial possessions precarious in Southeast Asia. Germany was a western power that had initially provided support through weapons export, but it withdrew its support in 1938 when it allied with Japan. The Soviet Union had also helped China in order to keep Japanese influence out of Siberia; but this support had ended when Hitler's German army invaded Russia and the Soviet Union had to fight the Great Patriotic War. The West's opinion, however, swayed when news about Japanese expansion in China and the cruelty of their invasion were reported. The allies signed contracts to provide war supplies to China. In December 1938, the British began the first supply drives to the Guomindang government via the Burma Road. The Americans traded military equipments with Chinese silver. When Jiang sent his advisor Chennault to America to ask for military support, Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to provide China a hundred vehicles of P-40 fighter planes. Additionally, Chennault was given secret permission to recruit US pilots and raise a volunteer American army. This American volunteer air force became known as the "Flying Tigers" by mid-1941, and afflicted critical damage on the Japanese. British and Dutch trading companies on the Chinese eastern coasts had to suffer large financial injuries due to Japanese restrictions; to take revenge and to hamper Japanese operations in China, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands began steel and oil embargo on Japan. (37)
            In 1939, the United States gave notice to Japan about its desire to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between US and Japan. Thus, beginning in 1940, the United States put up a series of economic measures against Japan. On July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order to freeze all Japanese assets in the United States and cut off all trade with Japan. However, the United States at this point of time did not want to strike up a war; it attempted to produce a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the problems regarding Japan's expansion in the Far East. However, neither side was willing to make any compromises. Throughout conversations held in 1941, the United States demanded that all Japanese forces in China be withdrawn; if not, it will not reestablish normal trade relations. On the other hand, Japan wanted the United States to accept Japanese supremacy in the Far East, and to stop supporting the Republic of China. (38 Such economic sanctions, also enacted by the Netherlands and Britain, gave critical damage to the management of Japan's colonial empire and probably led to Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor.
            The unwarranted attack on Pearl Harbor as well as bombardment of British territory in Hong Kong and Singapore immediately pulled the allies into the war. When the news of the attacks was heard in China, Jiang immediately called upon the American Ambassador, Gauss, and suggested collaborated resistance against the Japanese expansion. Soon, an international joint military conference was held in Chungking to discuss about taking common action against Japan. After some controversy, the conference agreed upon Roosevelt's suggestion to design an allied force of the American, Dutch, Australian and British forces in the Southwest Pacific for coordinated action, and to assign Jiang Jieshi as the supreme commander of all the forces of the united powers that would operate in China. In response to the Japanese offensive, the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands declared war against Japan, and began to fight alongside the Chinese. (39)
            The United States had already been giving assistance to China, but the assistance was increased as the United States began the Pacific War. The increased assistance included the lend-lease program, and military and financial support.
            After the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941, the aid began through the Burma Road; supplies including trucks, spare parts and fuel. The quantity of passing materials increased from 4000 tons at January 1941 to 15,000 tons in November. The Burma Road, however, was lost in early 1942 due to Japanese military operations and left air transport as the single effective means of delivering supplies to China. Effort were made to develop new land routes, such as the Ledo Road, but the Americans decided that flying airplanes over the Himalayas, or the "Hump", was the most preferable method. Although the program was less successful temporarily in 1942, great progress was made and by January of 1944, 14,472 tons of cargo was delivered to China. At the end of 1943, the total value of lend-lease supplies reached 201 million dollars. (40)
            American military aid had begun in 1941, as was stated earlier in this section. The American Volunteer Group, the Flying Tigers, under the command of General Chennault, provided an effective air defense for bases in southwest China and for transportations passing through the Burma Road. In 1942, the Flying Tigers were officially incorporated into the United States Tenth Air Force and were expanded as the Fourteenth United States Air Force in 1943. Also, the United States had begun in 1941 programs to train Chinese pilots and mechanics, and Chinese students were sent to America to receive the training. In November 1943, the Chinese-American Composite Wing of the Chinese Air Force was formed; throughout the rest of the war, the air force played an important role in maintaining China's military position and morale. When putting Jiang Jieshi on the position of supreme commander, the United States also sent Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell as Jiang's chief of staff. Although Stilwell later fell into a dispute with Jiang, he conducted an extensive program in India for equipping and training Chinese ground forces; beginning in April, 1943, training centers for Chinese officers were also run in China. Other than those, the American officers in general were on the battlefield alongside Chinese Army to serve as instructors, advisors, and observers. (41)
            Financial aid from the US also dates back to the earlier days of the Sino-Japanese War. From 1937 to 1941, the Secretary of the Treasury entered stabilization agreements to enhance the monetary and financial cooperation of the two governments and to stabilize the exchange rate between dollar and Chinese Yuan. A series of agreements also led to the US's purchase of Chinese Yuan for dollars, up to 48 million dollars by 1938 and another 50 million dollars in April 1941. At the same time, similar stabilization agreements had been adopted by the United Kingdom. On July 1941, the Stabilizations board froze Chinese assets in America, as well as Japanese assets, at the request of Jiang; the control helped to facilitate the operations of the Stabilization Board and to strengthen the Chinese government's foreign trade and exchange position. Shortly after the United States declared War against Japan, President Roosevelt asked the Congress to extend financial aid to China and sent a draft approving the loan or credit extension or other financial aid to China in an amount not to exceed in the aggregate 500,000,000 dollars; the bill was agreed upon on March, 1942. It is believed that such funds were mostly used to purchase gold which would then be sold in China as anti-inflationary measure, or to back up the war bonds that the Chinese government had issued. However, the Chinese refused to officially consult the United States regarding the use of the credit. (42)
            The Chief of Joint Staff and also the military administrator of the lend-lease equipments in Asia, Stilwell played an important role in the war; he would not only train the Chinese army, but also decided which supplies should be allocated where, and provided the incompetent Chinese generals a sound strategy to defeat the Japanese. However, the cooperation received from Jiang was not up US expectations; there was collision between Stilwell on the issue of weapons allocation, and recapturing Burma. British bases in Burma had been captured by Japanese military operations in early 1942, and Stilwell repeatedly tried to convince Jiang that the lend-lease cargo should be used in the Burma front to push off the Japanese into Indochina and recapture allied supremacy on the Southeast Asian theater. The Burma Front was especially important because it was the passage through which most of the allied aid, as discussed above, came to China, was the final allied defense line before India, and was the allied base for land operations against China. However, Jiang refused to this, arguing that not enough allied supplies is being allocated to his National Revolutionary Army back in China. Even after the loss of the Burma Road, Jiang continued to demand that China be given a seat in the Munitions Assignment Board. Additionally, General Chennault of the air forces challenged Stilwell's programs and strategies which restricted most of the airborne activities to transporting land-lease items over the 'hump' instead of launching bombing campaigns over Japanese territory, and argued that the Chinese army would have performed better against Japan if they had been given the proper equipments and supplies. However, evidence from reports of military liaisons and State Department employees proves that a lot of the given supplies were not usefully allocated among the Chinese army and that most of them were used to conduct operations against the Chinese communists. (43) In fact, Jiang's attitude in the war had changed since United States' entry into the war. He must have expected that the United States would defeat the Japanese with its massive economic and military power, whether or not the Chinese army was involved. Since 1942, Jiang tried more and more to preserve his army rather than to engage in large battles against the Japanese; instead, he would pay more attention to checking communist expansions to preparing for the final showdown against the communists.
            Disputes between Jiang and Stilwell continued, and they collided on several other matters such as command over the Chinese army or the use of air forces. Stilwell respected the Chinese army, but believed that the problem was with its leadership; instead of leaving the operations to Jiang, who was the chief commander of the Chinese army, he wanted to take the job himself and command the Chinese regiments that were trained and equipped by him. Jiang, obviously, would not accept such interference. Jiang had several advantages over Stilwell; as the head of state of China, Jiang could communicate directly with president Roosevelt, or Prime Minister Churchill and play a much effective card. On the other hand, Stilwell had to appeal his position via Marshall who in turn had to talk to the Secretary of War Stimson first. General Claire Chennault, who gained a very high reputation as the commander of the 'Flying Tigers', also advocated Jiang and criticized Jiang. Additionally, Jiang had the card to threaten to pull out of the allied collaboration. Jiang would've done anything to deprive Stilwell of his position; on the contrary, Stilwell sent reports criticizing Jiang's corruption and inefficiency. Because Jiang would not adopt Stilwell's strategies, the war was less successful than it could have been. For instance, the Chinese regiments in Yunnan were well trained in larger in number than the enemies in the region. Stilwell wanted to equip the regiments with his weapons, and engage an offensive; however, Jiang refused to the plan because if Stilwell had succeeded, it might become evidence against his military leadership. Stilwell was growing tired of his position, and Jiang's lobbying in the United States was becoming more influential. (44)
            In 1943, however, a successful Japanese offensive had threatened the position of the Chinese Army in China. President Roosevelt, who had always had faith in Stilwell and Marshall, found Stilwell's opinion more convincing. He sent a telegram to Jiang that said "drastic measures must be taken immediately if the situation is to be saved; the critical situation which now exists - calls for the delegation to one individual of the power to coordinate all the allied military resources in China, including the communist forces". This issue of incorporating the communists was also a matter of conflict between Jiang and Stilwell. Stilwell, after receiving reports from John Davies, a Foreign Service Officer, was convinced that the northern region where the communists had been operating was of strategic importance, and that utilizing communists effectively would be a great contribution to the allied war effort in China. As discussed in the previous section, the discord between the Guomindang and the communists had reduced the Chinese effort against Japan. Shortly, a mission led by Colonel David Barrette and John Service was deployed to Ya'nan to meet the leaders of CCP and to "evaluate the potential contribution of Communists to the war effort." (44a) The reactions from the communists were welcoming and cooperative; Colonel Barrette admitted that the "Communists were capable of fighting and they want to fight under [Stilwell]", and Zhou Enlai publicly declared that "I would serve under General Stilwell, and I would Obey." (44b) However, Jiang strongly opposed any cooperation with the communists in fear of their ascension. This proved that Jiang's main concern was not the victory in the war, but restricting communist expansion in preparation for the expected civil war. Tension kept rising until Marshall decided that an intermediary was needed between Jiang and Stilwell. He suggested to the president about sending another American general, and soon, General Hurley was dispatched as Jiang's liaison officer. However, Hurley was soon inclined to support Jiang over Stilwell and the tension was further intensified. (45)
            Jiang continued to adhere to his own policies, and refused to cooperate fully with the allied effort. When Stilwell suggested in summer of 1944 to help the British renew an offensive in Burma, Jiang threatened to pull his Yunnan forces out of the operation. On this action, FDR sent another personal notice to Jiang, warning that Jiang would have to take personal responsibility for the losing the chance to reopen the Burma Front, and demanding the placement of Stilwell as the 'unrestricted commander' of all of the Chinese forces. Meanwhile, the Chinese Army under Stilwell's command was quite successful in the second Battle of Burma. As Jiang Jieshi vehemently opposed to FDR's ultimatum and threatened to withdraw from the allied coalition, tension ensued in the following months until the United States finally gave in. As a result, Stilwell left China in August, and was replaced by General Albert Wedemeyer (46). The United States found Jiang's cooperation necessary; if China was lost to Japan, the United States would have lost the most important land base in Asia. Therefore, it was important to keep the minimum of intimacy with Jiang. In order to maintain the good heart of the Chinese, the United States had given up American extraterritoriality in China, repealed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, and acknowledged China as a great power by inviting Jiang to the Cairo Conference. (47)
            Albert Wedemeyer, after being appointed, changed the entire program that had been pursued by Stilwell. He did not acknowledge the importance of the Ledo Road through which the supplies would be carried into China. Moreover, Wedemeyer staunchly opposed communists, and expelled the views of any Guomindang-CCP cooperation. He improved the US's relationship with Jiang, but Wedemeyer lacked the strategic acumen for the successful completion of military campaigns. (48) In fact, the allied forces failed to make any improvements of the situation until the Japanese surrendered after the dropping of the atomic bombs. Wedemeyer and Hurley had been planning an offensive named "Carbonado", which was expected to be launched in late 1945, but it was never realized as Japan surrendered beforehand.
            By late 1944, the entire World War was going bad for the Axis powers. Italy had already been taken by the Allied Forces, and the landing in Normandy was successfully accomplished. The "Island Hopping" of the Pacific Navy was quite successful, and Japan was being pushed further into the corner. The United States' air forces received a further boost when Chennault's air base was expanded and equipped with B-29 Bomber planes. In June 1944, these bombers began their first air raid on Japanese encampments and industrial facilities in Kyushu, Manchuria, Sumatra, and Taiwan. Japan's final offensive campaign, also known as the Operation Ichigo, began in 1944 with strong power. Following the major transportation lines, the Japanese army moved to Henan to secure the Beijing-Wuhan line, then moved southward to Changsha. Despite Chinese resistance, the Japanese moved with rapid speed, conquered the cities, and destroyed Chinese military facilities. In autumn, the Japanese pushed further into Guangxi, and even threatened Chungking. The Operation Ichigo inflicted a heavy damage on Jiang's government, and loss of large territory. Moreover, the Japanese victory dropped Chinese morale as well as US confidence in the Chinese leadership. In the Sixth Guomindang National congress held in April 1945, Jiang Jieshi failed to solidify his position as the leader of the Chinese, and the delegates showered heavy criticism about corruption; party unity was shattered, and loyalty for Jiang was almost non-existent. Guomindang's international influence was weakened as well; Churchill refused to accept China as one of the four powerful nations (which included Britain, the USSR, and the US), and the Yalta conference refused to invite Jiang. Because these powers did not have faith in Chinese fighting ability, they decided to take more direct action in the Yalta conference; the Soviet Union would engage in war, retrieve all territory lost to Japan, to lease territory in Manchuria and Dalian, and to share the economic profits. Guomindang was able to revive the offensive only by August of 1945 when it recovered Guilin. Japan surrendered abruptly when the atomic bombs were dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (49)

IV.1.3 Guomindang Performance vs. CCP Performance
            From the beginning of the War of Resistance against Japan, CCP and GMD took a very different path of resistance at a different level of engagement. It is difficult to tell whose performances were more significant, and historians have different views regarding this issue. The historians of the People's Republic of China argue that the Guomindang army fought only indecisive and costly battles, and that it could not make full use of the support from the allies and its own military power due to corruption and inefficient organization. They also point out that it was Guomindang forces which shattered the united effort against Japan and began a domestic assault against the CCP. It was the communist armies that engaged the enemy behind battle lines and maintained rigorous resistance. On the other hand, many third persons' views (mostly historical sources from the Soviet Union and Japan) and the Guomindang accounts describe the Guomindang forces as the most important fighting power in China. According to them, communists had not been the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving over 100,000 troops on both the Chinese and the Japanese side; indeed, the only large battles that the communists engaged in was the battle of Pingxingguan and the Hundred Regiments Campaign. Documentation by Peter Vladimirov, the Soviet liaison to the CCP does not contain a single account of the Chinese Communists and the Japanese engaged in battle from 1942 to 1945 (although this may have been because he was never given permission to be on the battlefield alongside the red army). Taiwanese scholars (Guomindang scholars) criticize the communists for having avoided open warfare and preferring guerilla strategy which was ineffective in stopping enemy infiltration. Contrastingly, the Nationalists sent in large armies armed with great equipments right from the beginning of the war, although the enthusiasm died out as the allies entered the war. Additionally, all international powers regarded Guomindang and Jiang Jieshi as the main political body of China and the head of state. Also, there are records about the Communist Party having engaged in illegal activities such as growing and selling opium in order to finance the party activities and run the Soviet. (50
            Views among historians contrast so much that it is difficult to determine which party contributed most to the war. However, we can analyze who ended up most successful by the end of the War. There is a general agreement on the view that the Guomindang's power decreased during the War of Resistance against Japan while the CCP expanded in both military power and influence. However, the evaluations of the Communist Party differ among scholars; therefore, in this section, I would like to contrast the views on CCP from Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's famous biography of Mao, 'Mao: The Unknown Story', Benjamin Yang's 'Deng: A Political Biography', and Franklin W. Houn's 'Short History of Chinese Communism'.
            Chang and Halliday are critical of the Communist Party's activities, especially those of Mao Zedong. Accusations include Mao's struggle for party leadership and opportunism at the face of war. For example, the book states that the initiation of the Sin-Japanese War, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, was triggered by communists who had been under cover within the GMD structure, and in charge of the stationed army of Shanghai. It is argued by the two authors that this under-cover communist intentionally began the attack on Japanese forces in Shanghai arbitrarily and forced Jiang to give an attack order, even when neither Japan nor Jiang wanted a full-fledged war. Heavy GMD losses (measured over 400,000 men) are alleged to have been all planned out by the communists. The communists are also blamed to have used the war for their own benefits; Mao, especially, is accused for having ordered his men to refrain from attacking the Japanese or joining Guomindang in co-action against Japan but conduct take-over operations within the Japanese-conquered territories. His rivals, including Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai, as well as the Comintern opposed to this policy, demanding to 'battle the Japanese first', but Mao refused. Additionally, Mao was even accused in this book for having had connections to the Japanese: "Comintern intelligence chief Osip Pianitsky was one of them, and in April 1938, he named Mao as a conspirator in an alleged 'Bukharin Group'. Bukharin, the former head of the Comintern, was alleged to have spied for Japan." (51)
            The authors also attribute internal disunity and power struggle to the characteristics of the Communist Party. Mao is described as a person who opportunistically gained party leadership via false accusations. Mao is portrayed as having purposely designated Zhang Guotao, one of his party rivals, to an undesirable land. Zhang Guotao's army was soon destroyed by conflict with the local powers, and the remaining soldiers who returned to Ya'nan are accused to have been mass murdered under Mao's command. (According to the Short History of Chinese Communism, Zhang disobeyed Mao and located his base on the Soviet border on purpose; there was no account of the mass murder) (51b) Wang Ming, who had been at the party leadership at the time, became Mao's next target; by partially quoting the contemporary Comintern leader Dimitrov, Mao argued at the Central Committee that he should presume the party leadership. Ultimately, Mao was able to impose his own policies of Red expansion and war on Guomindang if necessary; he planted his own agents in Moscow to maintain Russian confidence in him. Mao is also accused for having used terrorizing methods to maintain his dominance and to conduct party expansion - public self-criticism, strict party doctrines, and purges. (52)
            However, most opponents of Chang and Halliday criticize them for being over speculative and for citing unconfirmed information. Indeed, some of the key reprobation of the CCP and Mao are not backed up by reliable evidence. Additionally, the interpretation of events seems to be largely influenced by personal tendencies of the authors; for example, the book blames Mao for having begun the war and used it to 'stab the nationalists at the back'. Although it is impossible to confirm whether or not this is true, but statistics show that the CCP continued to penetrate behind the enemy lines. The authors accuse the CCP for not engaging in full scale warfare and points out that, by doing so, the CCP saved themselves and pushed the GMD into heavy losses. However, in most other sources, the communists are described as having resorted to Guerilla warfare suitable to their small regiments and military inferiority, and having aroused persistent anti-Japanese sentiment within their boundary of activities. Matters regarding the GMD-CCP split are in discord with other sources; Chang and Halliday accuse Mao for having set up the New Fourth Army Incident; however, the New International Yearbook 1943, report that it was the Guomindang that ensued communist forces that had been helping them out, and destroyed a large portion of them, precipitating the split.
            The biography of Deng Xiaoping, written by Benjamin Yang, is a rather detailed account of Deng's life than an integrated account of the CCP activities. It maintains objectivity, but it appears critical of the CCP and Mao Zedong on certain aspects. It describes Mao as a "political entrepreneur, astutely interested in the party's internal management and external competition in order to take the state power". On the occasion of Peng Dehuai's Hundred Regiments Campaign, for example, Mao congratulated him but was at the same time dissatisfied with Peng's attacks on the Japanese; Mao interpreted as an action that would threaten the CCP, but help the GMD. Even Deng commented that the campaign " [established] solid foundation ... in the border area ... but it also exposed our weakness. The most urgent task is to consolidate our liberated area ... the enemy-occupied area is expanding and our liberated area is shrinking". (53) Yet, such policies seem to make sense. For the communists, who were at logistic weakness against the Japanese, beginning a large offensive is extremely risky and the chances of being crushed are high. It was much wiser to keep less than fully involved in the anti-Japanese campaign, as Mao did. If the communists had engaged in direct combat against a stronger enemy, as the Jiangxi Soviet did during Guomindang's fifth Anti-communist Campaign (in Chapter III), it would have been crushed. Indeed, in the Hundred Regiments Campaign, the Eighth Route Army had suffered a heavier loss than the Japanese. Yang's criticism on Mao's personal power-lust is acceptable; apparently, he did conduct party purges and the 'Rectification Movement' in which party members who disagreed with Mao were punished or ousted. It is also true that under Mao's command, the communist forces did not help out the Guomindang army during Japan's Operation Ichigo, but instead took over the small cities and cleansed them of non-communist troops. However, in the view point of the communists, such actions are understandable; at that point, the GMD-CCP split was evident; in addition to the victory against Japan, one of their largest concerns would've been the victory over Guomindang once the War of Resistance against Japan was over. The best strategy for the CCP would have been to preserve party power, and to expand its influence as far as possible; there would be no reason to help the Guomindang forces - a potential enemy - and to provoke their own extermination (the Guomindang army, who engaged in direct combat, suffered losses over 200,000 men in just a few months). Even Yang admits that the Sino-Japanese War had generally been a great triumph for the Communist Party. (54)
            Franklin W. Houn appears to give the most unbiased account of the situation of the Chinese Communists, without giving much personal interpretation. The book clearly states that the "Chinese Communists' call for an early war against Japan was primarily a stratagem to weaken the GMD and to give their own party and opportunity to recuperate and expand'. Zhou Enlai is accounted to have said that "the first day of the anti-Japanese War will mean the beginning of the end for Jiang Jieshi". (54a) Initially, both the communists and Guomindang participated enthusiastically in the United Front; 3 communists participated in the National Defense Advisory Council, and 7 communists, including Mao, became members of the People's Political Council. However, as the war escalated and the Guomindang army suffered continuous defeats, the communists slowly shifted to develop its own independent military forces, establish guerilla bases, and agitate the public for communist mass movements. When Shanghai and Taiyuan fell, they began a full-fledged program of party expansion. CCP forces refused to have GMD officers within its regiments, and even conducted CCP party activities within GMD territory, without fighting enthusiastically against the Chinese. What agitated the Guomindang the most was that the Chinese Communist Party was penetrating behind the enemies, taking over north and east Shaanxi, Chahar, Hebei, etc. By attacking the Japanese puppet armies with guerilla tactics, the CCP armies easily captured weapons and equipments, and armed local peasants. As a result, the Eighth Route Army expanded largely, from 40,000 to 180,000 in just a year. The communist forces often came into conflict with the Guomindang forces in Shandong and Jiangsu, and the CCP became more and more intransigent. In order to check communists' expansion, the GMD generals ordered attack on the Communists in the "New Fourth Incident." Although such CCP policy gave good reasons for the GMD to criticize the communists, they eventually turned out to be successful as the Communists, by the end of the war, had occupied 19 liberated areas in 19 provinces, governed over 100 million people, and commanded 1 million soldiers (55). Houn records the issue of internal power struggle differently; it was simply that Zhang Guotao's political path was different in that he wanted 'to cooperate in sincere alliance' with the GMD so that the CCP can follow a progressive path. Mao did not banish him, but Zhang went his own path; he later betrayed the communists by joining the Guomindang. Mao Zedong did have a personal lust for power, as the other books have uniformly reported. He worked to banish the Returned Students Clique fully from the party, and he purged a lot of his rivals during the Rectification campaign. Mao gained virtually unlimited authority at the Seventh National Congress of 1945. However, Mao's leadership was beneficial because it restored unity and consolidated the party.
            The CCP also made other great achievements during the war. The Communists gained the public support - something the Guomindang did not have - by initiating a moderate land policy to spare the cooperative landlords and reduce rents. The 'Three-Thirds Policy' which sought to incorporate noncommunist support by having one third of elective regional government posts be filled with communists, another one-third with non-communist leftist progressives, and the other one-third with locals, and was successful. Party apparatus was expanded and party discipline became more rigid as educated youth from Japanese-conquered territories flocked to Ya'nan, and numerous youth training centers were established. The students who underwent rigid disciplining and intensive political indoctrination in the training centers became dedicated communists; from 1937 to 1945, the CCP grew from 40,000 members to 1,210,000 (56). On the contrary, the Guomindang lost most of its well trained army; it managed to rebuild a big army, but its quality deteriorated due to depletion of morale and lack of equipments and training. Economic troubles as well as party disunity were a disease suffered by the Guomindang, as discussed.
            Conclusively, the Guomindang seems to have put in more effort into fighting the Japanese, but it was the CCP that succeeded in making its party stronger through the war; the Guomindang, on the other hand, made itself weaker.

IV.2 Korea's War against Japan

IV.2.1 Liberation Organizations and Korean communist working under CCP and Comintern
            The continuous effort to establish the Korean Communist Party in the 1920s had failed due to extensive Japanese police organization and lack of unity within the parties, as have been seen in chapter III, section two. Additionally, there were not enough rigidly disciplined and well training party cadres within Korea to conduct any developed revolutionary programs or arouse class struggle, as the Chinese have done. The Shinganhoe, designed to be a united front similar to that of the Chinese, failed to function properly due to internal disputes and collision between the leftists and the rightists. The socialists however, were successful in organizing anti-Japanese mass movements such as students', farmers', or worker's demonstrations, and in organizing laborers' and peasants' unions. Although the other socialist activities had been thwarted, the laborers' and peasants' movements remained active. This section will discuss Japan's harsh colonial policies during 1930s and 40s, continuous but unsuccessful attempts to reorganize domestic communist movements, farmers' and laborers' movements, and Korean communists who had been operating in China and Manchuria.
            The Japanese control over its Korean colony became stricter in the 1930s. At the beginning of the decade, military figures ascended to political power in Japan, and they had launched a much more aggressive policy. As Japan began to prepare for expansion in East Asia and as it enlarged its conflict with China, it mobilized Korea as supply camp for the war. Throughout 1932 to 1936, Japan forced Korean farmers to export its rice to Japan; as a result, Korean per capita rice consumption dropped. The police rule became much harsher, and by the end of the 1930s, many Koreans gave up the hope of liberation and turned over to the Japanese as collaborators. Culturally, the Japanese suppressed all Korean National consciousness and forced Korean schools to teach in Japanese language, wear Japanese traditional clothing, and to go believe in Shinto, a Japanese native religion. Since 1938, as Japan went to war with China, young Korean men were forcefully conscripted into the Japanese army fighting in China, young women were rounded up as sex slaves of the Japanese army, and laborers were sent to mining camps where they were often worked to death. (57)
            It was in this unpromising environment that the communists tried to reorganize the communist party. After the failures in 1920s, the communists in Korea faced the problems of factionalism and heightened police inspections. In the early 1930s, the socialists decided on the policy of arousing socialism from "bottom up", beginning in mass movements and propaganda first and then organizing it into a party, so that party factionalism can be prevented. Different socialist groups, however, emerged because some kind of an organization was necessary to conduct any activity at all; they were the 'Bolsheviks' group, the 'Leninist' group, and the 'Communist' group. They were the remaining bodies of the previous factions, such as the M-L Factions or the Hwayohoe, and the names were given according to the magazines published by each group. The 'Bolsheviks' were the previous members of the M-L faction; the 'Leninists' were a new group of intellectuals who stressed the importance of communist propaganda publications, and attempted to plant communists in factories to arouse struggle and form unions; the 'Communists', led by Park Honyong, sought to establish similar underground connections. However, among the three groups, the Comintern acknowledged only the 'Communists' as the orthodox, even though all three groups adhered to the policies set out by the Comintern. Additionally, the groups came into conflict because their boundaries had not been separated and their magazines were different. Again, factionalism was aroused, and the movements failed to unify. Under the heightening police surveillance, the group members were arrested and the groups ultimately disintegrated. Revolutionaries had been depleted, and suppression was intensified. Although Park pulled together the remaining communists to set up the "Kyongseong Com Group", the organization remained dormant until 1945 when Korea became independent. (58
            While the party activities had failed, the farmers' and laborers' movements had been comparatively successful. The plights of the peasants and laborers became even worse as Japanese exploitation was intensified due to its expansionist policy. For the peasants, rents were extremely high; the average rent would be about 50 to 60 per cent of the harvest, and other government-imposed taxes had to be paid from the remaining. A Japanese study conducted in 1940 reported that in Gangwon province, the average tenant received only 18 per cent of his productions. For the laborers, they were deprived of their rights to strike or organize, and were forced into long work hours in dangerous environments under low salary. Under communist assistance, farmers' and workers' movements gained power throughout the 1930s. Some of the Major Farmers' movements include Yi Munhong's Red Farm Unions, Hongwon Farmers' Union, and Hyun Chun Bong's Farmers' Unions' Movements in Myongchon. Yi Mun Hong, in 1931, turned the farmers' unions in Wonsan and Hamheung into Red Farm Unions, established reading circles, and published propaganda materials. Despite continuous arrest, the Unions were reorganized with persistence and tenacity. Hongwon Farmers' Union was led by communist-inclined local figures, and expanded rapidly into local branches; it slowly engaged in mass action and some of its members resorted to violent resistance, but was ultimately suppressed by the police. Hyun Chunbong, an experienced communist educated at the University of Moscow, had recruited comrades from Unggi, Najin, Chongjin, and Kyongseong since 1932, and had organized the Farmers' Unions' Movement in Myongchon. This organization also underwent an alternating series of arrest and reorganization, but gradually enlarged into more action; local cells and committees, reading circles, and public lectures were held, and resistance was organized so as to arm the members with basic members to combat the Japanese and to build hideouts. This movement lasted until 1938. Other farmers' movements went under similar phases, suffering brutal suppression but tenaciously reorganizing and resisting. Laborers' movements of the 1930s included Pacific Labor Union of Heungnam, Lee Jaeyoo's union movements in Seoul, Revolutionary Labor Unions of Wonsan, etc. By the end of the 1930s, Japanese war mobilization was even more intensified and the suppression of the movements became more brutal than before. The number of strikes and demonstrations declined rapidly since the 1941. (59)
            Communists in China and Manchuria, on the other hand, were comparatively successful. Resistance fighters in Manchuria maintained active warfare against the Japanese, and many Korean communists were in Ya'nan, some of them in the ranks of the CCP. Fighting against the Japanese since the early 1920s, these Korean communists operated as a part of Chinese Forces fighting against the Japanese. Many Koreans who had been forced into exile went to Ya'nan, and an increasing number of Koreans joined the CCP since 1937. From 1939, they even formed small regiments of a few hundred which were consisted entirely of Koreans. In 1941, the Koreans organized the North China Korean Youth Federation (later renamed the Korean Independence League); although some of them were not genuine ideological communists, they learned from the CCP while working under CCP leadership to perform propaganda and organizational tasks. In Manchuria, Koreans, rather than the Chinese, were the core of the communist movements. In regions like Chientao or southern Manchuria, Koreans constituted the majority of the population, and it was the Korean communists who were able to conduct propaganda activities, arouse anti-Japanese resistance, and form cooperative organizations and connections. As small regiments under the Chinese Communist Army, the Koreans played a critical role in fighting the Japanese. The historians of DPRK and ROK argue over the importance of these guerilla fighters; the North Korean historians describe the guerillas of Manchuria as legendary fighters who achieved victory over victory against the Japanese Army, in order to laud the founders of the nation; on the contrary, the South Korean historians argue that they never had any significant achievements, somewhat in order to belittle the communist opponents. One way or the other, the surviving communists of these guerilla forces returned to Korea after liberation in 1945, and became the core members of the communist leadership. (60)

IV.2.2 Kim Il Sung
            Kim Il Sung, the future leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was the most famous figure amongst the Korean guerilla fighters in Manchuria. His family had moved to Manchuria during the 1920s - fled to Manchuria after participating in resistance movements, according to some - and Kim had had membership in underground Marxist organizations from youth, participated in various anti-Japanese guerilla activities in Manchuria and Northern China. He later became a leader of a regiment of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, and his great performances in battle led to his ascendancy as a leader amongst the Korean communists.
            Kim Il Sung joined the Chinese Communist Party in October 1931, after the Comintern's order in 1930 for all Korean communists in Manchuria to join the CCP. His anti-Japanese movements began after the Manchurian Incident when the CCP had ordered the establishment of an anti-Japanese guerilla force. Kim was elected as a political delegate after organizing a guerilla troop in 1932 in Ando. Later on in 1935, the separate guerilla forces of Eastern Manchuria were united as the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army and Kim became the political commissar for the third detachment of the second division, although he was only 23 years old. In 1936 and 1937, he was continuously promoted and was leading a group of several hundred men, most of which were Koreans. In June 1937, he executed his famous 'raid on Pochonbo', which was among one of the earliest military success; as the news of Kim's attack spread, he became well known among both the Koreans and the Chinese. At the same time, Kim worked to expand the Korean Independence League in the Chinese province of Jilin, and the Korean province of Northern Hamkyoung; by doing so, he made some important connections with prominent communist leaders within Korea. From 1938 to 1940, the guerilla fighters had to suffer from intensified Japanese assault, and many of the guerilla leaders had been killed. The communists regiments were reorganized, Kim rose to higher ranks as he was among the few surviving leaders. In 1938, he was appointed the commander of the 2nd operational region for the First Route Army.
            Kim Il Sung had made important accomplishments, attacking and destroying various small Japanese dispatches. However, his troops had also suffered from the heightened Japanese assault, and had to fall back. In November 1940, he retreated across the Amur River into the Soviet Union, abandoning further anti-Japanese guerilla warfare in fear of the annihilation of his army. In the Soviet Union, he was sent to a camp in Khabarovsk, and was placed as the captain of a small Soviet Red Army which consisted of Korean Communist guerillas. From then until the independence in 1945, Kim stayed in the Soviet Union, training his men and communicating with the Comintern. When the war was over, he was one of the most influential, and one of the few surviving communist figures; when Kim returned to Korea with the Soviet forces, he was placed by the Soviets as the head of the Provisional People's Committee. (61)
            Establishing a strict communist dictatorship, Kim Il Sung became the supreme leader of the North Koreans in the years following the Korean Independence.

V. Post World War II

V.1 China

V.1.1 Postwar Military, Political, and Economic Situation
            Postwar CCP policy was double-faceted. On the diplomatic table, Mao Zedong appeared to promote a unified, peaceful government in coalition with the Guomindang; however, on the battlefield, his troops waged war against the GMD forces.
            At the time of Japan's surrender, as we have seen in chapter IV, section 1.3, the Communist Party had expanded greatly, had been well disciplined, organized efficiently, and had occupied strategic territory. The Guomindang, although recognize internationally as the legitimate government of China, had lost its power and influence in comparison to the CCP, which underwent a rapid growth during the war. One of the most important aspects that led to the communists' further rise was the location of the communists' bases comparatively closer to the surrendering Japanese bases. In order to capture the weapons and equipments abandoned by the defeated army, both the CCP and the GMD forces struggled to arrive first and disarm the Japanese troops. As the main Guomindang forces had been garrisoned in the south and the west, they were unable to reach the surrendering Japanese bases as fast as the communists who had their bases mostly in the Northern provinces. As a result, the CCP moved in to the Japanese-occupied territory, disarmed many of the Japanese troops, and captured many weapons and ammunitions. Although the Japanese soldiers were to surrender only to the Guomindang forces, under the terms of the Japanese Unconditional Surrender, the communist guerilla forces ignored the fact and captured many of the Japanese troops. According to the statistics, the GMD had disarmed about 30,000 Japanese soldiers, but the Reds had disarmed 1,283,200 Japanese and puppet government soldiers, taking over their arms and supplies (62). The Guomindang forces caught up later, trying to retake the areas that had been liberated by the Reds, and fierce battles were fought between the CCP and GMD troops in central and northern China. The communists occupied Manchuria, the most industrialized region under Japanese occupation, most extensively.
            The Russians had played a critical role in handing over a large portion of the war booty to the communists. On the diplomatic table at Yalta, the Russians had agreed to enter the war against Japan at the last moment; it had some intentions of its own. The Russians seemed to have primarily two goals: first is to gain benefits in northern China, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and the second is to secretly help the communists occupy the industrial facilities and equipments left behind by the evacuating Japanese army. The Soviet Army, numbering over 1.5 million, crossed the Sino-Soviet border in August 9, 1945. Signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in August 14, 1945, the Russians recognized Jiang's regime as the justified government of China and received extraterritorial rights in return. Capturing large war booty from the Japanese surrender, the Russians had also carried off much of the industrial equipments and weapons back to Russia. Meanwhile, as the Soviet Army had occupied a large portion of North China and Manchuria, it gave advantages to the communists by handing over important facilities to the hands of the CCP forces. Japanese arms depots were opened up to the communists and large quantities of guns, ammunitions, and artilleries were handed over; additionally, the Manchukuo puppet army, numbering over 200,000 was disarmed and absorbed by the Red Army, boosting the military power of the communists. (63) Additionally, when the Russians had fully evacuated from Manchuria in May, 1946, they hadn't informed the GMD of their schedules and time plans; on the contrary, the CCP headquarters had received all the important information, and was able to perform coordinated action with the Russians so that the CCP could take over the vacuum. The initial situation appeared auspicious for the communists; however, the Guomindang forces advanced rapidly with American support. Jiang's American-trained best troops arrived in Tianjin and Beijing via American ferry; as they began to move out, they defeated communists in large battles, deposing them from the large cities. From the South, the Guomindang armies marched northward, defeating the less experienced communist battalions and securing most of the territory up till the Yangtze River. Although the communists fought back in the attempt to recapture the large cities, they were defeated by the better trained, better equipped Guomindang army. Using American-supplied planes and heavy weapons, the Guomindang armies engaged the Reds, destroyed a large portion of their army, and chased them out. By early 1946, the Guomindang armies had pushed the communists out of most of the large cities of the Northern provinces, and pushed them to the corner. Many of the communist troops had been badly broken, and were on the retreat to the rural areas; the retreating forces established bases near the Soviet border, and attempted to reorganize themselves. However, the Guomindang forces had a hard time finding support among the locals of Manchuria and northern China because they had, for long time, abandoned the region in the hands of the Japanese invaders. (64)
            While the military confrontations were taking place on the field, negotiations and peace conferences were being held in Chongqing. Even before the end of the War against Japan, there were attempts for peace between the communists and the Guomindang, facilitated by the American ambassador and diplomats. After the Japanese surrender, the first peace talk was held in August 27th, 1945, and was attended by Mao Zedong, the communist representative, General Patrick Hurley, the American ambassador, Jiang, and other Guomindang leaders. After forty five days of negotiation, they had pledged to make concerted effort to avoid civil war, and to ensure peace, democracy, and unity; however, both sides had ordered the elevation of battle effort against the Guomindang armies, behind the backs. (65) There were persistent military clashes until General Marshall arrived from America to resume peace talks. Both the Guomindang and the Communist Party wanted to appear peace-loving and conciliatory for two reasons; first, to earn the favorable opinion of the Chinese people, and second, to appear more cooperative to the Americans. The Chinese people had been suffering from an eight-year-long war, and they wanted freedom, stability, and improvement of living standards; the last thing that they had wanted was a civil war. Therefore, both sides aimed at presenting their party as the reasonable, peace-loving, and cooperating faction and earn people's sympathy and support. Appearing reasonable and conciliatory was also important because the United States' policy in China was to promote unity, peace, and democracy. For Jiang, appeasing the Americans was important because he depended heavily on America's financial and military support, and American cooperation in transporting the Guomindang troops to strategic locations in northern China. The Communists were also fully aware of the United States' influence on the fate of China; by pretending conciliation, they wanted to make the Guomindang appear as the aggressors and minimize the United States' support for the Nationalist Regime. As expected by the both parties, the United States' policies in China greatly influence the performances of both parties, and ultimately influence the outcome of the civil war.
            China's economy was severely damaged at the end of the war. Although many factories and industrial infrastructure had been built under the Japanese occupation, especially in the coastal regions, the wealth and the resources in China had been completely depleted by the war. The economy was unable to hold up against the long, costly military demands, internal strife, inflation, and Nationalist profiteering, speculation and hoarding. Starvation existed since the beginning of the war as the fighting disturbed the average farm work everywhere. Millions of people were driven away by flood and destruction of towns and cities, and the prospects for post-war reconstruction was far from being auspicious.
            When the Japanese had capitulated, the industry was basically paralyzed; in the industrial center of Shanghai, all the factories were closed down and many power plants suspended their operations. After years of exploitation under both the Japanese and the various Chinese leaders, workers refused any longer to tolerate the exploitation and misery; as a result, workers went on national strikes throughout the months from November 1945 to March 1946. This added to the aggravation of the already-serious problem of the paucity of resources. This scarcity of resources was accompanied by a soaring hyperflation and further economic deterioration. The value of the Chinese Yuan constantly depreciated; for instance, the exchange rate which was 1 US Dollar to 2,020 Chinese Yuan on March 1946 changed to 3,350 Yuan for a US Dollar by August. At the year's end, the rate of exchange was 1 US Dollar to 5000 to 7000 Yuan, depending on the cities. The general price index was 4,000 times that of the prewar level, and the monthly rate of note issue in 1946 numbered in the billions. The worst hyperflation was in 1948-49. In 1948, the highest currency denomination was 180,000,000 Yuan; the 1948 currency reform replaced the Yuan by the gold Yuan at an exchange rate of 1 gold Yuan to 3,000,000 Yuan. In less than 1 year, the highest denomination was 10,000,000 gold Yuan. (66) The rapidly increasing currency, printed for government budget, led to the uncontrollable inflation which ravaged China everywhere. Despite American economic and financial aids of 2 billion dollars in both grants and credits, the Chinese National Government failed to utilize it to alleviate the economic situations. In 1946 trade deficit was so high that the imports passing through Shanghai was valued at 781,855,000,000 Yuan while the exports totaled only 161,763,000,000 Yuan. For the peasants in the rural areas, Jiang Jieshi proclaimed a tax moratorium from 1945 to 1946 and a 25 per cent decrease in land rents. However, the peasants could not reap the benefits because the regional administration was extremely corrupt and the tax was collected at inflated rates. Additionally, famine struck Hubei and Hunan, the granaries of China, and the scarcity of food sources became worse. Such depressing economic scene added to the Chinese people's dissatisfaction with the Guomindang government.

V.1.2 United State's Attempt to Mediate Peace
            United States' goal in China was to establish a "united, peace-loving China", and it had been the policy of both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. From the early days of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the United States looked forward to reconciling the Nationalists and the Communists in order to focus on the war effort against Japan. To do so, President Roosevelt had put consistent pressure on Jiang that further supplies and aids would not be given unless the Communist-GMD conflict is put to a halt. There was at least nominal alliance during most of the war time; but when the war was over, even the nominal alliance was precarious. The goal for the United States was to put up a coalition government, which mainly consisted of the Guomindang regime, joined by the communists, regional powers, and other minority factions. American officials in China at the time generally agreed that the prospects for the success of a coalition government were great.
            In the first peace talk which began in August 27th, the American ambassador General Patrick Hurley attended as the mediator between the Communists and the Nationalists. In this talk, both the Nationalists and the Communists appeared more cooperative than any other war-time peace talks. 'The government offered more place and chance to the Communists, and the Communists seemed less arrogant and unyielding. Hurley led the talks, trying hard to mediate the differences in the opinions of both sides and helping them come to agreements on essential principles; he would not allow conclusion on any issue without coming to an agreement. Although conflicts to take over territory had been ravaging all over central and eastern provinces, rapprochement seemed to be progressing and expectations for a civil seemed to recede as the peace conference was in process. Observing that the procedures of the conference were favorable to the US cause, Hurley sent a report back to US that the internal division of China might be settled by peaceful means. Both parties issued a joint summary of their conversations at the end of the conference, delivering impressions of hope for peaceful cooperation between the two parties (67). However, the final agreements were vague and immaterial; the Guomindang and the Communists were still far apart in terms of the actual programs of cooperation, and adjustment of political and military power. To quickly summarize the situation during the peace talk after the V-J day (Victory over Japan), there was joint affirmation by the government and the Communists that they were moving toward a settlement by peace. On the other hand, fighting continued in central and eastern China, and the disarmament of Japanese troops in Manchuria and northern China was not complete. Another concern for the United States was Jiang's request for more support and aid in reoccupying north China and Manchuria.
            The problem of post-war American aid for the Chinese government required an answer to how much aid was to be given. Secretaries of War, State, and Navy talked for an extended period of time to find an answer, but they had a hard time finding the best solution in accordance with their overall policy. On October 22nd, after continuous talks, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued a guideline of further military aid for China which had the ultimate goal of establishing a friendly, unified, independent China: that further American programs should include the adequate support for the National Government of China in development along lines which are compatible with basic United States' objectives in the Far East; that United States would assist China in developing a modern armed forces - ground, sea, and air - for the purposes of internal peace and security, but that aid would be stopped if the government raises any army that is not in conformity with US general policies. Additionally, the guideline included the termination of direct military activity and of help in transport and supply of government forces, the return of marines, and limited provision for a certain number of divisions. It agreed to allow China to recruit and organize an US military advisor group (68). The guideline showed that the United States would not be actively participating in the domestic politics of China, but would rather be providing limited aid to the government, and avoiding countering the Communists. In fact, in August 1946, the United States had put an embargo on the sales of American weapons to Jiang for ten months and withdrew the military advisors. However, some degree of aid was provided - grants, for example, other than sales - and some US marine troops protected certain crucial locations in the National Government's territory.
            However, such policies did not seem to be effective in meeting the United States' ultimate goal. Fighting was becoming bitterer, and involved larger numbers of soldiers. The communists appeared more confident about their victory in the northern regions; their high morale was due to their belief that the Guomindang army must have been tired from the long war and had longed for their homes in southern China. The Russian armies that had occupied a large area in Manchuria and northern China were also another obstacle. Despite the deal made in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, the Red Army did not keep promises on its evacuation and the entrance of Guomindang armies; a diplomatic conflict ensued, but the United States did not bother to intrude, leaving the matter to be solved between the Chinese and the Russians. Additionally, the Russians allowed the Chinese Communists to enter Manchuria, take over territories, and establish their own local governments and organizations. For example, when the US navy ships carrying Guomindang government army arrived in the ports of Manchuria, the regiments of the Eighth Route Army had already occupied the cities, built trenches, and prepared for defense against the landings; they rejected the government army, and the Russians did not help the Guomindang army land. The United States also had no desire to force any military action and attack the communists. As a result, Jiang's troops had to land at a far away port, and had to march on foot to Manchuria. The Guomindang performance in the claimed territories were also not satisfactory as the loose party had a hard time in restoring orderly, decent living for the people, and in creating a competent government organization (69). As this was the situation, the US lost confidence in its policy, worrying that the whole plan in China might fail. Officials who had been deployed to China by the three secretaries reported that the Guomindang might fail completely if there is no further active participation by the United States.
            To deal with the impending situation, Wedemeyer and Hurley advised Jiang to consolidate his control of the areas south of the Great Wall and north of the Yangtze River, before stepping further into Manchuria. At the same time, they sent reports to Washington describing the hardship faced by Jiang's regime. Other American officials also sent reports about the chaotic fighting, the deficiencies of the government, and the still remaining Japanese troops. Both Hurley and Wedemeyer seem to have advocated America's further and larger support for Jiang's regime so that it could extend its power over the territories, curbing the communist encroachments and establishing a united national government. On the contrary, other career men in China reported on the corruption, disorganization and inefficiency of the Guomindang government and at the same time emphasized the importance of incorporating the Communist Party in the unified national government. Eager to believe that the policy of rapprochement was the effective solution, the secretaries continued to discuss the matter until they concluded the conference with a few policies; according to the summary of the discussion, made by Acheson on November 27th, the secretaries agreed with keeping marines in China, preparing for and supporting the movements of the Chinese Army to the North, but to seek truce in disputed areas and to make political settlement under Jiang's supremacy, but with communists participation and more concessions for them. Dissatisfied with the results, Ambassador Hurley, the representative of the United States in China, resigned; General George C. Marshall was appointed as the next American representative in China, and was deployed to China. (70)
            When General Marshall arrived in China in December, another peace talk had been going on between the government and the communists. This time, the situations seemed a lot better for the government; they had made major military advances by occupying many of the large cities of Manchuria and northern China. The communists also appeared less belligerent, as they retreated to the rural areas rather than engage the government troops. Zhou Enlai, the communist representative at the talk, announced that the communists would not block government troops' advances, that it agreed to peace, and that it wished for a cordial relationship with the United States. Considering such circumstances, Marshall was given a basic program; the main aims were, as had been in the past, to develop a united and democratic China, and to assure that the Chinese government would be able to gain its full sovereignty. Marshall's immediate goals were to secure a cessation of military conflicts, particularly in the north, and to hold a national conference of representatives of the major political elements in order to set up a coalition government. Marshall was also authorized to play larger military cards in the persuasion of the two big parties. If the CCP were not cooperative in the negotiations, Marshall would increase the aid for the government troops and help them recover areas in the North; if the CCP were very cooperative and if Jiang was making a problem, Marshall would threaten to decrease or stop the essential aid which Jiang needed so much. (71)
            After Marshall came to China, he organized the Political Consultative Conference in January as the Chairman, inviting the minority parties as well as the Chinese Communists. Beginning on the January 10th, the conference began with a good prospect for peace; Mao and Jiang agreed to cease military hostilities and halt all movements of troops by ordering a cease-fire. Both sides agreed to respect each others' communication lines. Throughout January, the Political Consulative Conference discussed and came up with resolutions for a coalition government, relating to government organization, peaceful reconstruction, solution to military problems, and agreement on National Assembly. The resolutions included provisions for the election of National Assembly members, the formation of a Supreme Council in which half the members would be Guomindang, and the other half would be non-Guomindang members. Jiang would be given authority as the president of unified China. Although there were issues of small disputes, both the Nationalists and the Communists appeared cooperative and peaceful. Other agreements included the guarantee of the equality and legality of all political parties, the maintenance of the status quo (of territories) until future decisions by the National Assembly, and the reduction and reorganization of the Army. Marshall did not turn in resolutions during the sessions, but simply overlooked the process as the chairman. A Military Subcommittee of the conference was established in February to solve military issues. Zhou Enlai was the Communists' representative, Jiang was the Guomindang's' representative, and Marshall was the advisor of the committee. On February 14, the committee came up with the document "Basis for the Military Reorganization and for the Integration of the Communist Forces into the National Army"; the paper included agreements on how many divisions of the GMD and CCP forces would occupy the different regions of China. On February 27th, the subcommittee came up with the basic plan for the integration of Communist Army into Nationalist Army, and the establishment of an Executive Headquarter that would overlook military affairs (72). Such agreements and the cooperative attitude of both parties laid the ground work for a peaceful atmosphere.
            All seemed to be going well, but problems surfaced by the late spring. One problem was about the reoccupation of Manchuria by the National Government Troops, and their conflict with the Russians. Because of the delay of the evacuation of the Russian army, the reoccupation of Manchuria couldn't proceed as was planned in the agreement. Other cases of military conflicts between the communists and the nationalists were reported; it was often reported that the government armies were surrounding and attacking the communist forces in various places despite the terms in the agreement. On the other hand, the Communists spread their influence in the rural areas unoccupied any force, and conducted anti-Nationalist propaganda attacks. Additionally, when the Russians evacuated in May, they violated the agreement by rushing into occupy cities and towns which were supposed to have been taken by the nationalists. As such, both sides violated the agreements, and Marshall's dissatisfaction grew since then. Various attempts for peace, including talks and conferences, had gone on continuously, but both sides were becoming more and more stubborn and uncompromising (73). Marshall's views seem to have been more critical about Jiang and his nationalist government. Guomindang military movements were mostly systematic, massive offensives, and this made them appear as the aggressors. The communists managed to appear more peaceful, cooperative, and more disposed to conduct the necessary reforms to reconstruct the nation.
            By late May or early June, Marshall managed to force upon Jiang an arrangement for a truce. The truce, originally an order for 15 days respite, was turned into an order for 4 month long cessation of aggression. Meanwhile, continuous effort for negotiation was made, but neither side was enthusiastic. The diplomatic conflict was further intensified in July; instead of compromising, they even began to attack the United States' China policy. The Nationalist Government argued that the United States were thwarting an anti-communist campaign which would have otherwise succeeded. The Communists accused the United States for giving aid to GMD military aggressions, and for forcing agreements that are advantageous to the Nationalists. Most of the conflict surrounded the issues of offices in the central and local administrations, of authorization to occupy territories, and of the establishment of communication lines. The truce was, in reality, discarded by both sides, with the military situations continuing to deteriorate and each side blaming the other for offensive actions. Concerned with the situation and bad prospects for the accomplishment of America's Far Eastern objective, President Truman had sent personal messages to Jiang that asked for cooperation in building peace; however, no changes in the government attitude was observed. In October, the Truce was ended and the military challenges were intensified even further. (74)
            Marshall tried hard to mediate the conflict, despite the growing conflict and distrust; he made various attempts to arrange peace conferences until the end of November. However, his effort had no success. The parties would throw obvious accusations on each other, and the government army continued to elevate its offensives. Negotiations no longer seemed possible. Marshall finally left in January 1947, marking the end of United States' mediation effort. The United States' goal of establishing a coalition government failed, because it did not take into account Jiang's stubborn desire to maintain the one-party dictatorship of the Guomindang, and Mao's firm determination to establish a Communist dictatorship. Since nothing could be done further, President Truman announced that the United States would continue to recognize the national government and to hope for a peaceful settlement, but that it would no longer interfere in China's internal politics. (75)

V.2 Korea

V.2.1 Occupation by the Soviet Union and the United States
            The occupation of Korea by the United States and the Soviet Union was planned very abruptly and arbitrarily, without consulting the Korean political organizations or taking the public opinion into consideration. The division, which was supposed to have been only temporary until the establishment of a unified government, became established by 1948, and became permanent by the Korean War.
            The Korean issue had been first brought up to the table during the Cairo Conference in 1943. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Jiang Jieshi discussed what to do with the Japanese colonies that had been forcefully occupied by Imperial Japan, after the war was over; the settlement was that Japan should loose all territories that had been acquired by force. Korea would, like all the other colonies, meet its independence by 'due course'. However, there was not a consensus between the major powers on the exact policies to restore Korean sovereignty. The Korean politicians, in the meanwhile, had their own plans, which did not include any further foreign occupation. The Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence had been established by the Korean political figures in Seoul by mid-August. Led by Yeo Woonhyoung, the leading middle-of-the-path politician, the Committee had been authorized by the Japanese Colonial Government to organize the Korean government after the war. Additionally, other Korean politicians who had been in exile in China, Manchuria and the United States, the Shanghai provisional government officials for example, returned to participate in the rebuilding of Korea. However, the occupying powers did not consult the Korean political figures when deciding on the fate of Korea; the decision to divide Korea was made abruptly, and the settling of the issue of establishing a government in Korea was left to be concluded later after persistent conflicts and negotiations.
            Apparently, the United States was pushed to make a quick decision on the occupation of Korea after the Russians began to move into Korea. In the Potsdam Conference, the USSR was given permission to enter the war and occupy China and Manchuria; however, the United States had worries about how far the Russians may occupy. Because the United States forces remained caught up in the Pacific and Japan, they couldn't move into Korea as quickly as the Russians. A few days before August 15th, when the Russians began to move into Korea, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee decided that a line marking the boundaries of Russian and American occupation had to be drawn up in order to prevent further advancement of the Soviet army. After a thirty minutes discussion, the Americans came up with the 38th parallel, and the Russians accepted the offer. The decision to divide Korea into north and south was included in the 'General Order Number One', declared by General MacArthur after the victory over Japan. There were no consultations with any experts on Korea, or Korean politicians. The United States decided to establish order in Korea by following FDR's 'Tutelage' policy, and planned for military occupation in Korea. Bruce Cumings, an expert scholar of Korean History, hints that the United States decided on the joint administration of Korea in order to satisfy the Russians by giving them something, but also to contain their ambitions (76). In the mean time, the Korean politicians who gathered in Seoul were divided into the lefts and the rights. Amongst the Korean representatives in the Congress of Representatives held on September 6th, the left-wings were predominant. Many of them, who had been anti-Japanese resistance fighters, were influenced by the Chinese and Russian comrades to a certain degree, and many shared the communists' views on imperialism and colonialism. The populace was largely influenced by the leftist ideals as well because socialism adequately met the desires of the peasants who suffered from economic hardship. At the same time, there were also conservative right-wings who had their power bases on land, and wealth. The temporary fate of Korea was decided by December of 1945 at the Foreign Ministers' Conference, so that the plan included the divided occupation of Soviet Union and the United States. At this time, both countries agreed that the occupation would last no longer than five years, and that Korea would ultimately be ruled by a unified government. (77)

V.2.2 The Establishment of a Southern Separate Government
            In the South, occupation by the United States began when the 24th Corps of the US 10th Army arrived in Korea, and landed at Incheon on September 8th, 1945. Lead by General John R. Hodge, the United States troops soon decided that the Koreans were prepared for neither democracy nor independence; they decided to set up a military government ruled by the US army, also known as USAMGIK (78). The US government refused to recognize both the People's Republic of Korea established by Yeo, and the Provisional Government; it decided to have its own way of ruling. However, the USAMGIK was ignorant of Korea's domestic situations. Unaware of the Koreans' deep anti-Japanese tendencies, the American military government decided to keep most of the officers from the Japanese Colonial Government in their places; it did not make attempts to reform the colonial remains which the Koreans detested. Facing popular discontent, the USAMGIK hurried to take control of the socio-political situation and organize a Korean advisory board.
            However, the political scene was ravaged by the continuous conflict between the Rights and the Lefts. The United States favored the Rights, who were mostly colonial officers, landlords, or the colonial police. The Lefts had put up an effective resistance by establishing regional people's committees and organizing strikes and demonstrations. The Rights, however, had the upper hand because they had the support from the United States; the American policy in South Korea was to raise a South Korean defensive army, to use the Korean National Police as a primary political weapon, to strengthen the Rightists, and to suppress all opposition to USAMGIK. By 1947, the Rights had firmly established their power, formed various youth corps against leftist opposition, and created a "police Regime" inflicting "private terror", as an American Civil Liberties Union member commented after touring Korea (79). The situation in the Northern half was very different.
            In the North, the Soviet Union did not enforce its direct control over the Koreans, at least on the surface. Withdrawing its army and leaving only a few Russian advisors back, the Soviet Union gave the authority over the temporary government to Koreans, mostly communists. Enjoying the autonomy, Koreans conducted the reconstruction programs with their own hands. Sweeping land reform programs were conducted, colonial collaborators had been rounded up and persecuted, key industries were nationalized, and political power was consolidated without as much blood-shedding as in the South
            The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union had not been going very well either; although negotiations were held throughout 1946 and 1947, they could not reconcile over how the unification of the divided territories and the establishment of an independent Korean government should be done. An issue of conflict was how to decide which Korean political groups should get the right to participate in the conference to decide the future of Korea. Unable to settle this and many other arguments, the two superpowers grew more suspicious of each other, and failed to come up with a settlement. In the meantime, the consolidation of power of the Lefts and the Rights each progressed in the North and South. (80)
            Confronting a stalemate on the negotiation table, the United States submitted the issue to the United Nations early in 1947. By November, the UN passed the resolutions for free elections, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the dispatch of a special UN commission. The United Nations decided that a nation-wide election should be held in both the South and the North so that a unified government could be established; however, the Soviet Union and North Korea boycotted the UN decision, and the general election could not be held. Despite the boycott, The UN Temporary Commission on Korea was deployed to Korea and was authorized to survey the political situation in South Korea. It was decided that if the North was to continue to resist a general election, there would be a separate election only in the South. In March 1948, the Australian delegate of the Commission reported that "the elections are now under the control of a single party," and submitted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Commission. The resolution, however, was rejected, and the election of a separate Southern Government was finally held in May (81). The turn out of the elections was consummate to what many of the Commission members had worried about; the rightist politicians and their youth organizations had taken control of the voting booths, and forced voters to vote for their party. Essential rules such as the free voting and secret voting had been flagrantly violated, and in some cases, the ballots were replaced with counterfeits. Many leftist and nationalist politicians also boycotted against this election because they refused to accept the idea of a separate election. As a result, Rhee and the rightist politicians triumphed. After the formation of the separate South Korean government, the United States set up the Korean Military Advisory Group - which set up its own control over the Korean police and military - and the Economic Cooperation Administration. On August 13th 1948, Rhee Syngman and his administration replaced the US military government as the sovereign authority of South Korea.

V.2.3 The North Korean Communist Regime
            The Leftist politicians, mostly communists, took power in the North with the help of the Soviet Union. Important Russian officials were planted in North Korea to cooperate with the Korean Leftist Leaders in deciding future political maneuvers. A Soviet advisory political administration was placed to help establish a Korean political organization, deliver supplies, and settle social order. Shorty after its occupation, the USSR had also decided that there was no time to wait for the conclusion of the negotiations with the United States; the North Korea had to be consolidated under a single command, one that is friendly to the Soviet Union and has popular support. The Soviet Union facilitated the organization of the North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party on October 13th.
            Meanwhile, in the South, the Leftist and communist organizations were suffering badly. Yeo Woonhyoung had established the Preparation Committee for the Construction of the Nation, dominated by the Left-wing. In cooperation with People's Committees and Public Security Units which sprang up everywhere, the Preparation Committee declared the Korean People's Republic in September 6th. However, the American Forces refused to recognize this government as a legitimate authority, and made its own preparations for reorganization of Korea. The Soviet Union did not make any overt attempts to help the southern leftists; instead, they focused on bringing the Communists to power in the North. (82)
            At first, the Soviet Union pretended to advocate a coalition government of communists and non-communists, but later, it purged non-communist parties including the large Christian Party (Chonju-Party). A Korean People's Committee was made to create governmental mechanisms in Korea under indirect Soviet supervision; a coalition United Front was first favored to make it seem like it had full support from the people. Meanwhile, Kim used the help of Soviet organization and power to deploy his comrades to the regions and strengthen the provincial committees and party organizations, which had initially been broken by lack of popular support and party unity. Because the communists of North Korea originated from a diverse pool of different organizations, they did not have a single leadership; some provincial committees ignored the central orders and did not support the central committee. To provide a firm leadership, the Soviet Union decided to consolidate the Korean Communists under Kim Il Sung. On December's executive committee meeting of the North Korean Bureau, Kim was elected as the secretary of the bureau, and also the chairman of the Provisional People's Committee. At this time, other political leaders were included, but the non-cooperative politicians were excluded. In February 8th, 1946, the representatives from North Korean Democratic parties, Social Organizations, and the People's Political Committee met in an enlarged conference in Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung called for the creation of a North Korean Provisional People's Committee to serve as the central power in North Korea until Unification (83). By early 1946, most of the non-communist political leaders disappeared, or converted to communism; the United Front was maintained only externally. For example, the North Korean Democratic National United Front of June 1946 which held authority over the reconstruction of Northern Democratic Korea consisted of only organizations that were subservient to the Communist Party
            Disregarding the situation on the negotiation table, the North Koreans continued to complete its 'bourgeois democratic revolution'. The Provisional People's Committee soon began to conduct various reforms, including the dissolution of all Japanese colonial bequests, abolition of land tenancy, land reform, labor ordinance, and public education. The Land Reform Act of March declared that all the possessions of the landlords and the colonial collaborators would be confiscated by the People's Committee and equally distributed to everyone. Over 53% of the arable land was reported to have been redistributed. The Labor Ordinance of June enacted work hour restrictions, minimum wage regulations, gender equality decree, safety insurances, etc. Other resolutions passed by the Committee included the election of another People's Committee, the establishment of a justice system, a taxation policy, and the nationalization of key industries, transportation, and the banks. One of the most important aspects of the reforms was the education program; the Committee decided that the most important purpose of education was to raise nationalist officials, indoctrinated and disciplined intellectuals who were loyal to the party and the nation, and experts in specific fields. The Communists held many campaigns against indolence, corruption, formalism, bureaucracy, and colonial and feudal customs. Such reforms had two effects. First, they raised the public support for the Communist Party, especially amongst the peasants and the laborers. A country peasant's testimony that

is recorded in the 'North Korea: a travelog', a report by a female American reporter Anna Louis Strong (84). The populace welcomed the land reforms, education, electricity and radio, voting rights, and equality. With popular support, the party membership rose to 680,000 by August 1947. Secondly, many of the non-communist politicians, previous colonial collaborators, and wealthy people evacuated to the south in fear of the reforms and attacks; non-communist politicians fled for their political freedom, the collaborators fled for their lives, and the wealthy people fled to preserve their possessions. These refugees would be transformed into 'anti-communist fighters' in the South, pretend to be patriots, and take on important police and security offices.
            When the Communists were established as a firm political power, Kim Il Sung began his competition for party leadership, and publicly declared his political programs. When the Korean communists from Ya'nan returned in August, they merged with the North Korean Bureau and formed the North Korean Workers' party which had a much higher reputation and influence. This symbolized the North's essential break from the Southern KCP. After the formation of the NKWP, Kim was elected as the vice chairman, and potentially became the most influential figure in North Korea. In his inaugural speech as the vice-chairman of NKWP, he proclaimed that the political goal of the party was "to establish a unified, democratic, independent Korea", to purge "pro-Japanese, fascist, and reactionary forces", to conduct "fundamental democratic reforms", and ultimately the "liberation of South Korea." Additional goals included creating a mass party and uniting the workers, farmers, and the intelligentsia. In November 1946, an election was held for selecting the representatives of the municipal and provincial people's committees, and many subsidiary organizations were built to mobilize and indoctrinate the population for a socialist revolution. By February 1947, a permanent central People's Committee and its 237 delegates were elected; it became the North Korean People's Committee, and became the official governing body of North Korea. Finally, in August 1948, after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in the South, the North had an election for the Supreme People's Assembly; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was declared in September, and Kim Il Sung was elected as the premier. By June 1949, the North and South Workers' Parties were unified with its headquarters in Pyongyang, and Kim Il Sung became the chairman of the new Korean Workers' Party. (85)

VI. Military Confrontations

VI.1 Chinese Civil War

VI.1.1 Progress of War and Communist Operations
            During General Marshall's stay in China, the cease-fire had existed at least nominally. However, when the general returned to America, there was no longer the pretension of reconciliation from either sides; open breakouts of military hostilities took place in the various areas of Manchuria. Further attempts for peaceful negotiations were frustrated when the Communist delegation was banished from Nanjing in February, 1947. An open civil war, also called the "War of Liberation" by the communists, had been resumed.
            In the early phase of open civil war - from July 1946 to July 1947 - the government army, or the Guomindang army, seemed to be at an advantage over the communists. By late 1946, the government army had defeated many communist troops, forcing them out of the large cities like Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) or Changde, and into the countryside. By March of 1947, the Nationalist forces had captured the communist capital of Ya'nan (86). Mobilizing most of its best trained army and stretching it out to the fullest, the Nationalist armies concentrated on capturing the large cities, and expanding the territory under the government control. On the contrary, the communists were continuously defeated and pushed further and further into the rural regions.
            The communists, however, were not being defeated; rather, they had simply been employing their guerilla tactics which they perfected while battling the Japanese. When the government army unleashed systematic, organized, large offensives, the red army did not fight back, but simply retreated further and further into the countryside. When the time was most right, the CCP put their effort into annihilating a smaller, separated body of Nationalist troops through concentrated surprise attacks, causing a heavy damage on the enemy manpower. Especially, the communists concentrated on attacking the enemy communication lines and supply troops. During the Guomindang's attack on Ya'nan, for example, all the organs of the Communist Party had evacuated beforehand and the communists did not suffer any reduction of fighting power; it was the Nationalist army which suffered heavier losses due to raids by communist guerillas from the back. At the same time, the Communist Party also worked to expand its influence in the rural areas by establishing local party organizations, conducting reforms, and recruiting new party members and soldiers; unlike their southern Guomindang counterparts, the communists had established good relationships with the people of Manchuria and north China. Especially during the cease-fire, when the superior Nationalist army did not pursue the communists into their hinterlands and eliminated them, the Communist Party underwent a phase of dramatic expansion and rehabilitation. It equipped peasants with captured arms and recruited them into the Red Army, indoctrinated prisoners of war and merged them with the Red Army, and reorganized the overall structure of the Red Army. By July of 1947, the Chinese cadres had penetrated deeply into the rural areas of northern China, won the allegiance of the peasants, reformed the village politics and economy, and had built powerful organizational bases. The Communist Party heightened its offensive in July, 1947, when the government forces had been stretched to their limit; each Guomindang garrison had been isolated from one another, and surrounded by communist-controlled villages. The communication lines had been cut off, and the government troops had to spend most of their time defending their positions and their communication lines. (87) Meanwhile, the CCP had expanded greatly.
            Having reorganized its Red Army as the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the CCP launched a massive nationwide military and propaganda offense in the autumn of 1948 against the National Government. The Communists stirred up anti-government popular sentiment by accusing the government as a despotic group of politicians who worked alongside the bureaucratic capitalists, the self-enriching feudalists, and the American foreign imperialists to exploit the Chinese people. They also instigated anti-US, anti-starvation, and anti-war mass demonstrations which led to the demoralization of the GMD forces. On October 10th, 1947, the Chinese Communist Party produced a formal declaration of the revolution to overthrow Jiang and to establish a 'democratic coalition government' in China. There was very little resistance against the communists' takeover because the Red Army, unlike the Guomindang counterparts, occupied territory in a benevolent manner. The Red Army was well disciplined, polite, and its regional regiments had incorporated a lot of locals; they did not loot nor pillage. By the end of the year, the Communists had occupied most of the rural areas north of the Yangtze River, and began more extensive reforms in their territories. (88)
            In late 1947, the CCP produced two documents, the Directive on the Land Question, and the Outline of Agrarian Law; in these documents, the communists outlined its policy of land reforms and egalitarian principles. Since V-J Day, the CCP had revived the violent class struggles against landlords and the rich peasants. During the 1946, the CCP increased its radical attacks on them, arresting landlords who levied heavy rents on land, or received high interests for loans. By attacking the landlords and rich peasants, the CCP was also able to eliminate large landholdings and distribute it among the peasants. In 1947, the struggles became extremely radical; this created a certain degree of trouble for the Communist Party. Sometimes, the attacks were targeted on middle, or below-average peasants. This drive toward radical attacks was largely precipitated by the insufficiency of land and wealth to be distributed. The party leaders had very high expectations on the land reform, and believed that the land possessions confiscated from landlords would be enough for everyone; however, the actual amount of confiscated wealth was not enough to provide for everyone. The solution was to find additional people from whom land and wealth could be confiscated. As a result, the middle peasants who acquired their wealth from hard work and thrift also became the targets of confiscation; in other cases, the situation was so serious that even the possessions of the poorer peasants had to be confiscated and then redistributed, making the economic situations of everyone much worse off. Additionally, the party leaders who believed too deeply on the reform and redistribution became suspicious of their own party members; instead of accepting the fact that there was a scarcity of the absolute amount of land and wealth, the party leaders accused its cadres of corruption. Blames usually fell on those members who managed the local reform programs, and such members were purged. The radical policy reached its peak during late 1947; everything had to uphold the principle of 'full equality' - landholding, agricultural tools, animals, and grain had to be distributed absolutely equally amongst the people. This stubborn adherence to the principles substantially curbed the productivity of the peasants, and reduced their will to work harder. (89)
            Other problems also plagued the Communist Party. One problem was the traditional leadership role which the wealthy exercised in the village community. The peasants had a habit of obeying to the landlords and some of them worried that, if the CCP were to be defeated in the civil war, they had to suffer the reprisals by the landlords and the wealthy. Because of such worries, some peasants wanted to give certain benefits to traditional village leaders by allotting more, better land to them during distribution. On the contrary, in regions where the peasants' hatred of the landlords was extremely high, the landlords were not only stripped from all of their belongings, but also killed. Additionally, the suspicions on corruption reached a climax when the party leaders ordered the formation of local peasants' organizations to watch observe and report on the conduct of the communist cadres during the reform and redistribution procedures. In 1948, the party leaders finally realized that such extremist policies could dishearten the peasants and party members, and that absolute equalization may direct the attacks on anyone who owned even a little bit more than the average. (90) During 1948, the communist policies became progressively less radical; however, it would continue to check against the local party apparatus, and called for the destruction of traditional leadership.
            Beginning in the summer of 1947, the CCP slowly made political and economic preparations for the establishment of the new regime; they were sure that they would soon be victorious. Their intention was to create a government which appeared to be a coalition of various political parties, but was actually dominated by the communist party members. In May 1948, the Communists issued a call for the creation of a new government, which permitted all political parties to participate. In November, a preparatory committee was organized which invited 134 delegates from 23 organizations; they came up with a plan to organize the "Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference", and produced the three documents: the Common Program of CPPCC, the Organic Law of the CPPCC, and the Organic Law of the Central People's Govt. In these documents, the future government structure, construction of the state organs, and the political, military, economic policies until the election of the National People's Congress, were planned and outlined. Additionally, on July 1st, Mao proclaimed his political concepts that it was time for the alliance of the four classes, laborers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, and regulation of capitalism. Following the Marxist lines, he argued that there still remained various degrees of imperialism, domestic reactionaries, and class systems in China, and that the state apparatus such as the army, police, and justice system was temporarily needed. The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was finally held in September 1949, representing 662 delegates in total. Of the 585 voting delegates, 102 were representatives from all the regions, 60 were PLA, 142 were from 14 various non-communist parties, 75 were specially invited personnel, and the remaining 206 were representatives of the newly founded people's organizations. It apparently had a mixed representation, but most of the figures were communists who dropped out of the party on purpose; as a result, the CPPCC accepted the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Central People's Government Council and the National Committee, headed by Chairman Mao, were also organized in order to make decisions and execute various government programs while the CPPCC was out of session. (91)
            The People's Liberation Army, in the meanwhile, had surrounded most of the Guomindang-dominated cities of northern China and Manchuria, and had cut off the communication and supply lines. Although trapped within the communist net, Jiang refused to pull his army out of the cities; the government troops were rapidly demoralized and beset by a wide spread defeatist sentiment. When the communist offensives began, the PLA attacked individual garrisons one by one, destroying each one of them and capturing large stores of weapons and ammunition. The resistance from the government army was close to nonexistent; many of the garrisons surrendered at the beginning of sieges, and some of them defected out right. The communist army, instead of becoming smaller, expanded its manpower and equipment in the process of war, by making enormous captures of soldiers and weaponry. By April 22, 1948, Peng Dehuai's regiment had recovered Ya'nan, the previous communist capital, and the Communist Party headquarter was again moved from north Shaanxi to Hubei. The PLA continued to effectively destroy the government army and fully recovered Manchuria by November of 1948. When the conquest of Manchuria was over, the PLA turned its gunpoint toward the North-China Plains where they shattered more and more government armies. In January 1949, cities of Beijing, Tianjin and Kalgan were recovered; in central China, over half a million government troops were wiped out in the Battle of Xuzhou. President Jiang had resigned from office and the new president Li Zongren offered peace negotiations, but the CCP demanded virtual surrender. On April 21st, the PLA crossed the Yangtze River, and occupied the Republic's capital of Nanjing on the 23rd. The National Government moved to Canton, to Chongqing, and then to Chengdu. The Liberation Army reached Guangzhou by October, and on October 1st, the People's Republic of China was declared in Beijing. In December, the remaining organs of the Nationalist Government fled to Taipei, and the Communists' conquest of mainland China was completed by 1951. (92)>A>

VI.1.2 China's Internal Situation and the United States' Relationship with the Chinese National Government
            After the withdrawal of General Marshall, the United States kept a very ambiguous China policy, which changed according to situations. Overall, the United States maintained a friendly relationship with the Chinese Nationalist Government, but limited its economic and military aid.
            When Marshall returned to America, Ambassador J. L. Stuart was left to make further effort of mediating the negotiations. However, in Feb. 1947, the communist delegates had been banished from Nanjing. Subsequently, there was a reversal of the communist policy, and statements made by Zhou Enlai accused the National Government of having begun a civil war, and the US of having backed the National Government. Soon, offensives from both sides increased to the scale of a full-blown civil war. According to Ambassador Stuart's summary of situations during February and early March, "the Generalissimo [was] determined to embark on an all-out military campaign to free as much of China proper from Communist control as possible ... he [was] now increasingly concerned about the rate of financial deterioration and the ability of Communists to prolong the struggle and create havoc ... that China must stand on its own feet and face the future without American assistance." (93)This report indicated the determination of the government to elevate the war effort and to fight for the extermination of the communists. Stuart's additional documents reported on the enlargement of the scope of the war, heavier casualties, and extensive destruction.
            Meanwhile, the National Government faced a deterioration of its position in China as time passed. On the battlefield, the government army had lost its will to fight. Military attaches in the ambassador's report of March 12th describe the dramatic fall in the Nationalist morale; they failed to achieve any major military victory, and many of the Guomindang soldiers were disillusioned with the reality of having to fight their own kinsmen. In March, the government army did capture Ya'nan, the communist capital, but it had attacked an empty city from which the communists had already evacuated; rather than damaging the communists, the government had extended itself too dangerously, encroaching too deep into regions where the general opinion might be very hostile towards them. Additional American reports from Manchuria described the military debacle in Manchuria in June. In the cities, the support for the government was falling; the third parties did not cooperate with the government's reorganizations, and repressive police activities From May to June, growing popular discontent with the National Government was expressed through the widespread mass demonstrations described in the previous section, especially student demonstrations which became very violent. The growing disillusionment of the Chinese people is attributed from the government's failure to meet the peasants' demand for land redistribution, inability to control inflation, Jiang's dictatorial tendency, and corruption. On the contrary, the communists conducted various economic and political reforms, redistributed land, and enforced strict discipline and training to put an end to corruption. Telegrams from the US Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai in March 1949 reported that people didn't like the idea of 'communism', but they liked it better than the National Government because the communists conducted the military, civil, and economic reforms. Public opinion further swayed against the government as the demonstrations were violently suppressed by the Guomindang police. In May, the Ambassador reported on the demonstrations that "there are strong indications that the student movement will ... eventually come under the leadership of anti-government groups ... if not the Communists". The report also mentioned the increase of "general unrest and disillusionment." With the deterioration of the government's position, the public sentiment for a peace settlement; although the Nationalists suggested resolutions for peace, the Communists rejected them. (94)
            In response to the deteriorating situations, the Nationalist Government made attempts to reorganize the political structure by reforming the executive branch and the state council in April 17, 1947. Following the American advice, other drastic reforms were to be introduced in order to deal with the threatening obstacles. On July 7th, Jiang announced that "Unless drastic reforms are introduced, China may not be able to exist in the family of nations. Therefore, political, educational, economic and social reforms ... shall not be delayed ... to effect an overall reform and remove all obstacles in the way of national reconstruction that national general mobilization was ordered." (95) However, the reorganizations and reforms were less than effective. According Ambassador Stuart's reports, the government's reorganization procedures were overwhelmed by intraparty struggle for power; as a result, the prestige and the position of the government deteriorated. The reorganization of the state council, for example, was supposed to have been an effective systematic political reform, but it failed due to widespread corruption and Jiang's favor for the personally loyal ones. The inefficiency and corruption within the government was so severe that the ambassador additionally observed that "much of the apparent strength of the Chinese Communists [was] due chiefly to the inefficiency and corruption of the Guomindang." (96) The government army was also weighed down by intraparty struggle and mistakes in conduct on the battlefield; there were open rivalries between the Guomindang generals in north China and Manchuria. As a result, the government troops failed to conduct any closely integrated military or economic programs. Additionally, the American consul general reported that the government army behaved like conquerors to the local populace, and not as fellow countrymen; they had established a "carpet-bag regime of unbridled exploitation on the areas under their control." The locals became increasingly antagonistic to these non Manchurian units, and the local hostilities were, in turn, causing the demoralization of the government army. American advisors suggested conducting drastic revolutionary reforms and providing charismatic, progressive leadership in order to win back local support. Nonetheless, the National Government had failed to conduct the necessary economic and political reforms, and fell to corruption and intraparty power struggle.
            In response to Government failures, Americans seem to have kept a partial hands-off policy. General Marshall, who had been the secretary of defense at the time, delivered on July 4th his message that the Chinese should help themselves by conducting basic reforms through constitutional measures, and that there would not be any direct interference of the United States. Additionally, the President stated to the Congress in February that the United States should "assist in retarding rapid economic deterioration [of the Chinese government] and thus give the Chinese Government a further opportunity to initiate the measures necessary to the establishment of more stable economic conditions. But it is ... clear that only the Chinese Government itself can undertake the vital measures necessary to provide the framework within which effort toward peace and true economic recovery may be effective." (97) From the American point of view, there was no reason to give further support to the government. All the various reports flying into Washington from American officials in China pointed out the problems that led to the corrosion of the general position of the Nationalist Government, such as the widespread defeatist sentiment or the lack of popular support for the government. Jiang Jieshi continuously stuck to his traditional policy of employing his closest confidants, and failed to conduct the basic reforms suggested by the American Advisors. Although the general policy put up by President Truman and Secretary Marshall was a policy of conditional and indirect aid, other people like General Wedemeyer believed that only a program of military and economic aid of at least five years would make the reconstruction and currency stabilization in China possible. The US stuck to the policy of conditional and indirect aid.
            Guomindang's hegemony of the government and the intraparty struggles became more intensive in the later half of 1947 for several reasons. First, the democratic league was outlawed in October 28th, 1947. Due to a combination of complex reasons, the government accused the Social Democratic Party for having been subservient to the communists ordered the dissolution of Democratic League. The outlawing of the democratic league resulted in the Guomindang monopoly of the government. Second, peace negotiation with the communists became a point of conflict. During the winter of 47 to 48, there were elements within the government who wanted to make peace negotiations. Rumors about Russian mediation and actual responses from the Russians hinted a possibility of resumption of the peace negotiations. The Government leadership was determined to carry on the civil war, but it faced strong opposition by civil and military officials. Some officials even declared out loud that they would surrender rather than fight if the CCP was to invade. Third, the election of a new National Assembly instigated an uptight struggle for power within the Guomindang. Because of the dissolution of the Democratic League, there was virtually no other party comparable to Guomindang; an extensive competition ensued, and the extreme right-wing faction of the Guomindang took won most of the offices. However, other factions also remained and further divided the fragmented government. (98)
            In March 1948, the elections were finally held. After another harsh party struggle for the allocation of seats in the National Assembly and for the election of the president, Jiang Jieshi was elected as the president, and Li Zongren became the vice president. There were conflicts between Jiang and Li, although Jiang was the dominant one, and the representatives in the National Assembly were also divided. The struggle for power within the Guomindang was even extended to the search for a new Prime Minister and the Executive Yuan. According to the Ambassador's report in June, Jiang allocated his loyal followers in the most important seats, no matter how incompetent they may have been; such party disunity and corruption continued to hamper the performances of the government in carrying out its reconstruction and recovery programs. The Economic Reform decrees of August 1948 ended as a failure because of the imposition of forceful police measures rather than any genuine currency reform. (99) Such failures in policies further dropped the morale of the Guomindang and discontented the public.
            Meanwhile, in the United States, the Department of State and the National Advisory Council had been receiving and analyzing the reports on the situations in China. They were looking forward to come up with the most effective method of providing aid to the National Government. The group recognized that the solution to the problems must largely be a task for the Chinese themselves, and that the American aid programs should not reach the level of direct responsibility in the conduct of the fighting or in Chinese economy. They preferred to give guidelines and advices which the Chinese government could follow and help themselves. In the Congress, the opinions had been divided between the Liberals and the Conservatives. The right-wing Republicans supported funding the anti-communist Chinese government. They believed that the CCP were hard-lined communists who cooperated with the Soviet Union to threaten the free nations with international communism. They insisted that the Truman Doctrine could also be applied to the China theatre, and that the active economic and reconstruction aid should be given to China. Republican senators such as Senator McCarran or Senator Knowland proposed bills for the aid of China. On the contrary, the Truman administration and the Liberals of the Congress wanted to disengage from the China scene as much as possible. Instead of looking at the Chinese Communist Party members as Soviet-trained strict communists, the Liberals took them for agrarian reformers who were simply disaffected by the plights during the long war in China. This point of view, although it had not been the complete truth, made some sense for the time because the CCP based its power not on urban proletariats, but on the peasantry; additionally, Mao's followed his independent lines which were sometimes incongruent with the Soviet policies. The members of the Congress soon debated over whether or not to increase support for China; conclusively, they came up with the China Aid Act in April 1948. The Act would gradually provide up to 570 million dollars funding during a 15-month period, in the forms of expendable commodities and capitals goods for reconstruction projects (100). Along with the financial aid, the United States also provided the Chinese government with specific guides and recommendations for the economic and social reconstruction measures.
            The main reasons for the decision of such a policy was due to the situations in Europe, the public opinion of the Chinese public, military and political failures of the National Government. In Europe, the economic aid for the post-war reconstruction and recovery of the democratic nations was being provided under the Marshall Plan. A large portion of American funds was allocated to the European scene, and the majority opinion was that Europe's guard against communist encroachments was more important than China. Dean Acheson, who became the secretary of state in 1948, also agreed with the primacy of Europe and the undesirability of active intervention in Asia. Additionally, public opinion surveyed by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1948 reported that 44% favored a 'hands-off' Chinese policy, and only 25% favored a policy of assistance. There was also a widespread anti-US sentiment among the Chinese public; a large portion of the May to June student protests were anti-American. They believed that the Americans were provoking the Chinese to enter a civil war and to damage themselves. Secretary Marshall pointed out that if the United States was to militarily intervene in the civil war, it would have to take on the responsibilities of the outcome and be blamed for damaging Chinese sovereignty and prolonging the plight of the Chinese (101). More importantly, the military and economic circumstances of the National Government were only getting worse and worse. Official reports from China between May and October 1948 criticized the government for its inability to stop the communist advances, its lack of popular support, Jiang's greed for power, failure of the reorganization and reforms, internal power struggle, defeatist sentiment, and lack of leadership. As discussed in the previous chapter, the military situation of the government was getting worse and worse in the later half of 1948. Despite ample food, supplies and ammunition, the government units had lost their will to fight, and either gave up their defenses or defected to the enemy. The situation was so bad that secretaries Marshall and Acheson considered China to have fallen to the hands of the communists. The American military aid, which reached up to 125 million dollars at the time, had not produced any promising results in the hands of the Guomindang party. In response to continuous Chinese request for further military assistance, President Truman sent a note to Jiang in November saying that the United States was doing everything it could, considering the current situations. He also warned that the United States would not design direct involvement under any circumstances.
            As the Communists kept on expanding and the situations seemed out of control, Chinese President Jiang and Prime Minister Sun Fo issued a New Year's Message, indicating the desires for a peace negotiation with the communists and retirement. Jiang declared that as long as China's peace was ensured, his position was not of concern. On January 8th 1949, the Chinese foreign minister requested the American, British, French and Soviet governments to act as intermediaries in the peace negotiations. However, the United States replied that it would not accept the request because General Marshall's attempts to make peace throughout 1946 did not produce any results; further attempts would not make any difference now. Other countries all refused the request for the same reasons. The Generalissimo finally announced his retirement on January 21st, and Vice President Li Zongren assumed the responsibilities. The new president called again for renewed American assistance, and at the same time, tried to work out peace negotiations. Communists continued to march southward, refusing any peace terms other than unconditional surrender; by February, most government offices had evacuated to Canton. The situation was exacerbated by factionalism; Jiang, although officially retired, continued to influence the political decisions via his loyal subordinates and conflicted with Li. Party members continued to fight over whether to surrender, attempt more negotiations, or continue the war. Li's attempts at reorganization of the army and emergency reforms were hindered by opposition from the other factions. By that time, the CCP forces had occupied most of the regions north of the Yangtze River, and threatened to cross the cross the river. (102
            The position of the Guomindang grew precarious by the day. Files from the American consul general in Tientsin, March 1949, reported that communist forces armed almost entirely with American arms and other military equipments handed over by Nationalist armies in Manchuria. The report also added that further military aid to the government would be immediately transferred to the hands of the communists. The US embassy office at Canton commented that the only measure which could save China would be the use of large US military forces in actual combat. Even this, they observed, might only prolong the civil war, inflicting severe losses on both sides and making the Chinese people suffer more. The final peace negotiations between the Chinese Communists and the National Government broke down on April 20th when the Guomindang rejected the draft agreement proposed by Mao Zedong and requested for a cease-fire. The People's Liberation Army poured down. According to accounts from Americans in Nanjing, the "ridiculously easy Communist crossing of the Yangtze was made possible by defections at key points, disagreements in the high command, and the failure of the air force to give effective support." (103) As stated in the previous section, the PLA swept through the rest of the mainland China, ultimately defeating the Guomindang and banishing them to Formosa. In July 1st 1949, the CCP issued the document 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', making clear that the CCP was in line with the Communist International. The People's Republic of China was declared in October 1st, 1949.
            When the situation reached this point, the tide was turned. The Americans who had been unwilling to directly help the Chinese were shocked, especially at the fact that the Chinese Communists had been operating under directions from the Soviet Union; the already-pervasive obsession with the threat of international communism was further spread. The American public who were concerned on the China issue came to believe that the People's Republic of China was another 'Soviet Regime' in China, or a puppet government. They considered the Chinese outcome as nothing less than a calculated offensive move from the Kremlin. The growing popular concerns were reflected in the letters flying to the White House which commented on the current foreign policies; some letters suggested reconciling and establishing a diplomatic relationship with the People's Republic of China, and others suggested radical moves such as using the Atomic Bomb. Under such a situation, Dean Acheson felt a need to explain why any more aid to the National Government would not have made any difference in the outcome, and why the disengagement policy was the right choice. In the White Papers, he outlined the United States' China policy so far. The document contained information on how the United States had put effort in averting the Chinese Civil War, and how much supplies and credits had been granted to the National Government. It pointed out that, despite such enthusiastic assistance, the Chinese government had proven themselves unworthy and that if the United Sates had opened a full-scale military intervention, it would have won deep Chinese resentment and suffered heavy American casualties (104). Ultimately, the document was a justification of the Truman administration's disengagement policy. The failure of the American policy in China became a target of the Red Scare attacks during the following years.
            As the Chinese Communist Party triumphed, the United States was left to handle the issues of whether or not to diplomatically recognize the People's Republic of China and the admission of PRC into the United Nations.

VI.2 The Korean War

VI.2.1 Social Context of the War
            There were largely three reasons for the outbreak of the Korean War: First, the North Korean governments' aim was to reclaim the south through military action as fast as possible. Second, the South Korean government also had an aggressive attitude toward the North, and brutally suppressed all leftist activities in the South. Third, the US foreign policy indirectly facilitated the North Korean attack.
            As it has been observed in the previous chapter of 'North Korean Communist Regime', the "Liberation of South Korea" was one of the North Korean government''s main policies. Kim had a determination for 'total unification of the peninsula under his leadership.' He secured Soviet equipments, mostly heavy weapons, tanks, and airplanes, and conducted aggressive military training programs. As a result, the People's Army of the North was at an advantage in comparison to the weak, ill-trained, and ill equipped South Korean National Army. Also, by early 1950, Kim played his diplomatic cards well against China and the Soviet Union to secure a back up from both communist powers. For example, in Kim's meeting with Stalin in April 1950, the leader of USSR said that "due to the changing international situation, he would agree to the Koreans moving toward Reunification." (105) Mao Zedong also declared his support for North Korea; he said that China was no longer caught up in its civil war, and that it would lend help once the Japanese or the Americans got involved in the war.
            The chaotic political and social situations in the South also contributed in triggering the Korean War. The unsound policies of the USAMGIK, and the incapability and corruption of Rhee Syngman's conservative government engendered continuous conflicts between the Rightists and the Leftists, and popular discontent. The fundamental mistake of the US military government was the use of colonial collaborators and officers in the new government without punishing them and its favor for the conservatives of the wealthy, landed classes. After 30 years of oppressive Japanese rule, the Korean public's hatred for the collaborators and colonial officers and police were extremely deep. Yet, the Americans refused to punish the traitors who exploited their own countrymen, and turned the nationalist liberation activists into the Japanese prisons; instead, the traitors maintained their colonial positions, and exercised even greater authorities over the people. The public was deeply dissatisfied. The United States, in fear of expanding communist and leftist threats, also refused to answer to the demands for liberal reforms, including land redistribution and punish the colonial collaborators. In addition, the corruption and violence of the new government provoked further public discontent, and resistance from the Leftists. According to a CIA report from 1947, every aspect of Korea's domestic politics was characterized by the Left-Right contest (106). The Leftists launched effective opposition through peasant protests, organized labor unions, and armed guerilla resistance; the resistance reached its peak in the Jeju and Yeosu Rebellions in early 1948. However, the government and the US Army launched counter attacks and brutal suppression and extermination campaigns against the revolts. Taking such circumstances into consideration, and worrying that a prolonged stalemate might exterminate the remaining undercover leftist organization and public support, the North Koreans were convinced that military action should be taken as fast as possible.
            The US foreign policies also provoked the North Koreans into War. First, the United States declared that it would not protect South Korea. In June 1949, the US forces withdrew from Korea, and both General MacArthur and the Secretary of State Acheson declared that Korea was outside the East Asian defense line, also known as the Acheson Line (107). In January 1950, the high officials of the United States had publicly declared that the United States would not defend South Korea. In addition, the limited American support for Guomindang in the Chinese Civil War convinced the North Koreans that the United States would not get fully engaged in Korea's civil war if it broke out. Secondly, the United States was making aid drives to strengthen the South Korean National Army. In March 1950, the US Congress appropriated 10,970,000 dollars for training and equipment; the North Koreans, who were at a definite military advantage at the time, thought that time would work against them. (108)
            The War did not break out abruptly; from 1948 to 1950, the countries were embroiled in a series of bloody border conflicts along the 38th parallel. Despite the weakness of its National Army, the Southern government put out a policy of Northern Military Campaign, the pursuit of reunification through military measures. In the North, veteran soldiers who had been experienced and well-trained in the battles in Chinese Civil War returned in large numbers; from 1948 to 1950, the number of returned veterans numbered roughly around 75,000 to 100,000. Both sides became increasingly aggressive, and made small military infiltrations across the border. This border fighting was most intensive in the 9 months of 1949 from early May to late December (109). Each side wanted to provoke the other into launching an initial offensive. For Kim Il Sung, an invasion from the South would decrease the chances of United States getting involved in the conflict, or providing an increased back up for the Southern government. Rhee waited for the North's invasion for the opposite reason. The War finally began on June 25th 1950, when the Korean People's Army launched an unwarranted full-scale offensive at dawn.

VI.2.2 Progress of the War
            The North Korean People's Army initiated the attack by crossing the 38th parallel at 4:00 AM on June 25th behind a heavy artillery bombardment. Their main effort was concentrated toward capturing the capital of Seoul, and other attacks were directed through Kaesong toward Munsan and Chunchon. North Korean land and sea detachments invaded the South in both the east and the west coasts. The People's Army was well prepared for battle; when they invaded, their military equipments included 150 Soviet-made tanks, 40 YAK fighters, 70 attack bombers, 60 YAK trainers, and several small warships. They also had a carefully designed offensive plan and 415,000 well trained troops, including 7 infantry divisions and one mechanized division, who were instructed to make rapid advances and quickly occupy southern territory. On the contrary, the South Korean Army numbered only 150,000 soldiers, and even this army was badly trained and deficient in armor and artillery. The South Korean military only had 40 tanks, 14 attack planes, and few anti-tank weapons. It was defeated by the invaders within days. The South's capital of Seoul fell on June 28th, only 3 days after the beginning of the war; Suwon, Wonju, and Samchok also fell after a few days. (110)
            The United States, betraying North Korean expectations, took immediate action to deal with the situation. On the day the war began, June 25th, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for an "immediate cessation of hostilities" (111a) and demanding the "authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel." (111b) A second resolution was passed requesting the member nations to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore the international peace and security in the area". (111c) On the 28th, President Truman authorized the Far Eastern Commander in Chief to deploy certain ground units to Korea; two days later, the Commander in Chief was commanded to use all forces available to him to repel the invasion, and ordered a naval blockade on all the coasts of Korea. On July 8th, General Douglas MacArthur was appointed the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Army, and a week later, all ROK security forces were also placed under MacArthur's command.
            The first foreign intervention came from the United States 24th Infantry Division, Task Force Smith based in Japan. It fought for the first time on July 5th in Osan, and was critically defeated with heavy losses. Task Force Smith was light infantry division, with weapons like rifles, carbines, small mortars and bazooka - they didn't have the weapons strong enough to fight against the North Korean Army equipped with heavy artillery and tanks. The 24th Division had to retreat to Daejeon, but was broken in Daejeon as well. Additional US and UN forces including the US Eighth Army arrived in Korea in July, but they also did not have heavy weapons, and were not able to defend effectively. In the final days of July, fierce battles were fought on the defense line connecting the cities of Yeongdeok, Andong, and Hwanggan to Keumchon. By August, the UN and Korean Army were pushed back to the Southeastern corner of the peninsula around the city of Busan. Fortunately for the South Koreans, the final defense line at the Nakdong River firmly resisted the North Korean attacks, and defended the perimeter. North's advances toward Gwangju, Masan and Pohang were hampered by desperate holding actions from the defenders, and the North Koreans failed to capture Busan. (112)
            Defense of the Busan Perimeter was the turning point in the early phase of the war. The North Korean strategy depended heavily on 'Surprise and Speed', and the UN and the South Korean forces succeeded in blocking rapid takeover by the North. In the meanwhile American reinforcements including strategic bombers and fighter planes arrived through the port of Busan. US 2nd Division, the 1st Marine Brigade, four battalions of medium tanks, 5th RCT, and the British 27th Brigade arrived through Busan, augmenting the resistance power and turning the tide for the beginning of an UN offensive. By early September, the UN forces had over 500 medium tanks, and outnumbered the North Korean forces by 180,000 to 100,000. Now, the North Koreans were on the disadvantage, finding themselves undermanned and weakly supported logistically. As the North Korean supply line was stretched out, the US air force made critical bombardments on North's important traffic roots and seaports, and cut off North Korean delivery of war supplies to their forces in the South; over 32 critical bridges were destroyed and most railways and roads were closed during the day (113). A boost for the UN offensive came with the well-known Amphibious Landing at Inchon far behind the enemy lines. The Landing, planned in order to ease the pressure on the Busan perimeter, ordered roughly 80,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division to land at Inchon, recapture the city, and block North Korean troop movements and supply roots there. It was accompanied by the Eighth Army's offensive on the southeast to break through the Busan perimeter and to trap the North Koreans between the two UN forces from the North and the South. Due to misinformation and extensive bombardment before landing, the North Koreans had only a few soldiers stationed in Inchon when the US forces landed. The landing was a decisive victory as Seoul was quickly recaptured and the North Koreans rapidly retreated, suffering heavy casualties. By the end of September, no more organized North Korean troops remained below the 38th parallel.
            In October, the ROK Corps and other combined UN troops began to cross the 38th parallel into the North. North Korea's major seaport on the east coast of Wonsan was captured on the first day of the month, and remaining forces from Seoul crossed the parallel on the 9th to march toward Pyongyang. By the 15th, the UN forces had penetrated 20 miles into the North Korean territory. The advances accelerated during the later half of October as enemy resistance weakened and thousands surrendered. The Eighth US Army and the ROK Corps drove up through the west of the peninsula and finally captured Pyongyang on October 19th. Heavy artillery and air bombings accompanied the advances, and destroyed the remaining communist divisions and important North Korean cities. The North Korean forces were dissolved, and the survivors had retreated into the mountains adjacent to Manchuria and the Soviet Union. The Yalu River was reached by the end of the month, and victory seemed to be secured. With great confidence, MacArthur announced that the troops will certainly be back "home for Christmas." (114)
            However, the tides changed once again as the People's Republic of China entered the Korean War.

VI.2.3 From China's Entrance to the End of the War
            The entrance of the People's Republic of China had a critical impact on the progress of the war. The UN army and the ROK Corps which had pushed as far north as the Yalu River and destroyed most of the organized North Korean troops were again forced to retreat southward. The UN's grasp on victory was lost, and the war stagnated for three years until a cease-fire was agreed on. UN pilots were opposed by Russian made MIG-15 jets for the first time, and the UN forces suffered heavy casualties inflicted by the powerful Chinese attacks
            In the early phase of the war, the general conclusion of most American intelligence agencies was that China would not participate in the Korean War. However, on November 1st, the director of the CIA noted that the Chinese probably feared an invasion of Manchuria and that they would protect the border with military firmness even if it increased the risk of war. The Indian ambassador to the People's Republic of China warned about the Chinese aggression against the UN army marching to the Yalu; Zhou Enlai and the Polish ambassador to Beijing also said similar things. Indeed, Chinese elements had been first sited on the battle field on November 1st. While the UN forces reported at the end of October that the North Korean People's Army was no longer capable of putting up any organized defense, they were faced by fresh, newly equipped North Korean troops only a few days later. Within 10 days, 10 identified Chinese divisions had been sited (115). However, the opinions on far-fledged Chinese intervention were varied; some people argued that the Chinese troops would not dare to engage in all-out assault while others thought that the Chinese troops were taking up defensive positions.
            Massive attacks suddenly came from the North Korean Army on November 27th, after the 8th Army and the ROK Corps launched an offensive on 24th November. This North Korean force was later identified as Chinese units fighting in coordination with the remaining Korean People's Army units. The X Corps, US 1st Marine Division, and 10th Division were attacked, and several cities in the northeast were besieged. Large numbers of Chinese units from the west attacked ROK Corps, which they destroyed, defeated reserve units of the 8th Army, and made rapid advances to break the UN line. On the east as well, UN troops were surrounded by large enemy regiments, and escaped after suffering heavy casualties; the US 7th Infantry Division and the Marine Corps, for example, lost 15,000 men out of 30,000 while escaping enemy attacks. Order was given to the UN troops to begin a retreat, but the process was slowed down by the terrible condition of the roads and large numbers of trucks, tanks, soldiers and refugees; this resulted in even larger casualties. The communist forces had occupied Pyongyang by December 5th and had reached the 38th parallel by the middle of the month. A temporary defensive perimeter had been established near the port of Hungnam on the east coast, but the defenders suffered complete defeat. Late December, a desperate evacuation was conducted in which 193 shiploads, over 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies had been shipped back to Busan to avoid obliteration. (116) Indeed the speed of the retreat was faster than the advances made during the two months prior to the Chinese intervention.
            The original plan of General MacArthur was to have the 8th Army and the X Corps attack toward the Manchurian border, and secure peace in the peninsula before winter. However, the plan was delayed due to difficulties in delivering war supplies through the terrible roads. Because the UN forces failed to achieve the goal, it allowed Chinese troops to enter the war. Now, the Chinese intervention posed a new threat, and all plans for the war had to be seriously reconsidered.
            The Chinese Red Army entered North Korea very stealthily and succeeded in escaping American detection, although they moved in large numbers. The Red Army marched during the night and hid during the day, concealing everything, to prevent detection. As a result, when large Chinese troops appeared on the battlefield suddenly, UN forces were surprised and unprepared. The Red Army was composed of veterans from the War of Resistance against Japan, and the Chinese Civil War; they were skilled night fighters and masters of camouflage, and the UN troops had a hard time putting up resistance. The Red Army's tactics largely composed of two attack strategies. The first strategy utilized the high mobility of their infantry divisions; large forces were divided into small teams which dispersed to surround the enemies from all sides, slowly closed in, attacked the surrounded army from the front, and surprise attacked them as they retreated. V-formations which lured the enemy in between the two rays and surrounded them were also often used. The second strategy is the deployment of large number of soldiers, also known as the "Waves of Men" strategy. Large number of troops would stealthily approach the enemy perimeter and suddenly make a rush of overwhelming numbers, waving red flags and playing gongs and trumpets. This strategy often intimidated and scattered the ROK and UN forces, preventing them from making effective counterattack.
            In January of the following month, the Chinese and the North Koreans launched their first full-offensive, also known as the Chinese Winter Offensive. The attacks were directed on strategic positions in the central and western sectors, in order to secure path to Seoul. 7 Chinese divisions and 2 North Korean divisions penetrated the UN lines toward Wonju and Seoul, and they finally captured Seoul again on the 4th, after the capital had been abandoned by UN forces in retreat. They also crossed the Han River, captured Wonju, and reached Andong by middle of the month. It was only then that the front line became stabilized in the Suwon-Wonju-Samcheok line. The Chinese supply and communication lines were stretched to the limit, and they could not advance further as rapidly. After all, Chinese war supplies had to be transported from the Yalu River either by bikes, or by hand carriages. It was during this brief niche that the UN forces recoiled itself to launch a counteroffensive (117). In the meanwhile, the commander of the 8th Army, General Walker was killed in battle, and General Ridgway replaced him. MacArthur gave Ridgway full authority to plan and execute operations, granting him command over all UN ground forces in Korea. Ridgway managed to find measures to raise the morale and fighting spirit which had deteriorated due to a series of defeats and retreats. As the enemy made no further advancements, the UN forces were ready to launch a counteroffensive.
            The first UN counteroffensive, the Operation Roundup, was launched in late January. It was characterized by the maximum utilization of UN superiority in firepower and air forces. UN air supports destroyed enemy's resistance points and lines of communication and supply. By February 10th, the UN forces secured Inchon and Kimpo, and US Corps occupied the southern banks of the Han River. In mid February, the communist troops laid their fourth offensive toward areas near Wonju and Suwon, attacking the US 2nd Infantry Division and the French Battalion; fierce fighting ensued for several days, and the UN forces succeeded in holding the enemy back. By 18th, the enemies were reported to have been retreating, and Ridgway took the initiative to destroy them before they could rest and reorganize; late February, Ridgway launched the Operation Killer to destroy as many enemy troops as can be found. Using the reorganized 8th Army and heavy fire power, all territory to the South of the Han River was restored. In early March, Operation Ripper was launched, recapturing Seoul on the 14th, and pushing the enemy further to the North. By the end of March, Ridgway's forces had fought their way up to the 38th parallel and secured Line Kansas, a little north of the 38th line. In April, Ridgway became the new supreme commander of the UN Army in Korea as MacArthur was relieved of his position. During April and May, both sides launched a series of fierce attacks to drive their enemies further back, but the front line was generally held around the Line Kansas. (118)
            There were little territory changes from then to the end of the war in 1953. There were large scale bombings on the North Korean territory by the UN air forces, and a lengthy peace negotiation. Although peace negotiations had been going on, heavy combat continued as both sides attempted to secure more territory before a peace agreement was settled. In 1951, there were heavy fighting in Bloody Ridge and the Heartbreak Ridge. In 1952, battles for the control of Old Baldy and the Hook, and the Battle of Hill Eerie led to heavy casualties on both sides, and in 1953, the Battle of the Pork Chop Hill was one of the most fiercely fought battles of the war. (119)
            Peace negotiations had actually started during the earlier days of the war in December 1950, when the Three-man Group on Cease Fire was installed by the United Nations. However, the initial attempts had been frustrated by the Chinese refusal to negotiate. It was only in June 23rd, 1951, that the representative of the Soviet Union in the United Nations notified the will of the aggressors to settle a peace agreement. The request was accepted and the peace talks began in Kaesong, July 1951. However, the peace talks did not go very smoothly as both sides were stubborn about making concessions to show their firm stands in the international Cold War sphere. Discord was most intensive on the issue of the repatriation of the prisoners of war; thousands of North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war did not want to return to their home countries, but the communists demanded their return. The United Nations demanded patriation according to the free will of the individuals which the communists aggressively refused. As a result, the talks had come to a halt twice for a period totaling 9 months. On July 23rd 1953, the truce agreement was finally settled in Panmunjom, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, evacuation of foreign powers, and further political conferences for peace. A Demilitarized Zone was established in proximity to the 38th parallel, and an armistice was signed by the North Koreans and the Americans, while President Rhee of the ROK refused to sign (120). The War was over, leaving behind heavy casualties. Accurate statistics regarding the losses of the war are impossible to have, and the UN records and the Chinese records differ greatly. According to accounts from the UN, the total casualties on its side were over 474,000, of which the South Koreans counted for over 300,000, including the dead, the wounded and the captured; communist casualties were told to have been over 1,200,000 of which over half were North Koreans. The Chinese report, on the other hand, says that they had destroyed over 1.1 million enemy forces and that their losses were no more than 900,000 (121). Civilian losses were much larger. No matter what the actual numbers have been, it is certain that the war left the Korean peninsula completely destroyed; at the end of the war, not a single modern building left standing in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. Millions of lives were lost, economies were absolutely destroyed, and all social infrastructures had been devastated.
            It is interesting to note the position of the United Nations during the Korean War. A few hours after the first North Korean strike on June 25th, the UN held a Security Council meeting and passed the UNSC Resolution 82 blaming North Korea for the aggression. Soon UN troops were authorized to take part in the fighting in the Korean peninsula against the North Korean aggressors; the United States was the largest power in the area that could mobilize its army, so the American forces made up the largest percentage of the UN Army, excluding the South Korean Army. An important aspect of the UN decision to fight against the North Koreans was that all information on the resolution was submitted by the US delegate, based on the South Korean reports. The USSR, one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, was missing, and important actions could not have been taken unless the Russians gave consent; nonetheless, the UN decided to intervene. As a result, armies from 16 member countries - UK, Australia, New Zealand, France, Canada, South Africa, Turkey, Thailand, Greece, Netherlands, Colombia, Ethiopia, Belgium and Luxembourg - were deployed to the peninsula. It is also important to note that the countries were capitalist, democratic nations; it is probable that they led the UN into intervention, in order to join the international effort of the democratic world to contain the spreading of communist influences. When China intervened in the Korean War and refused to talk for peace, the United Nations, in turn, designated the People's Republic of China as the main aggressor of the War during the General Assembly held on February 1st, 1951. In May 1951, a resolution was passed requesting all member nations to stop the delivery of any forms of supply and materials for the aggressors, the People's Republic of China and North Korea. (122) The USSR did not adhere to the agreement and made deliveries of weapons, war supplies, and vehicles to the Korean front despite its position as the permanent SC member. This was a crisis for the UN because if the other countries condemned the Soviet Union for not adhering to their decision, the subsistence of the organization of the United Nations might have been at stake. Other nations knew that, so they did not try to enforce the Soviet Union to stop the aid. Ultimately, the United Nations passed a resolution for a cease fire, and the War ended as an armistice. In the truce agreement, the UN left articles for the conferences to plan a free election across the peninsula for a unified nation with the hope of establishing a democracy, but no agreements were made and the country was left divided.

VI.2.4 United States in the Korean War and the Conflict amongst American Leadership
            The United States was the third largest and the most influential fighting force in the Korean War and this section will discuss about the position of the United States and its goals in the Korean War. First, the United States' position in entering the Korean War will be discussed; second, the consideration of the use of atomic bombs will be discussed; third, the conflict between President Truman and General MacArthur on the conduct of the war will be discussed; lastly, the repercussions of the Korean War will be discussed.
            The NSC68 documents describe the Cold War sphere which dominated the international relationships of nations in the post-World War II era. Although the situation will be described in detail in the following chapters, the American Cold War foreign policy was that of "containment" of communist influences. Generally, the United States took an international position as the leader of the democratic, capitalist nations in opposition to the communist sphere of influence headed by the USSR, and sought to prevent the expansion of communism in the world. In military terms, it meant fighting against any communist aggression on the democratic world. More specifically, the US government assumed that any future war against the Red world would be a total war waged largely with nuclear weapons. Based on such assumption, the US military establishments had been drastically reduced in size; additionally, the Joint Chief of Staff decided in 1947 that Korea was not vital to the American security. Additionally, in January, the Secretary of State Acheson announced that South Korea was excluded from the defense perimeter in the Far East. The Americans probably had been unable to foresee the full-fledged attack of from the North Koreans. Although unprepared, the president of the US Harry S. Truman decided that action had to be taken. The attack was viewed as an integral part of the Soviet global strategy, and the United States had to show that it would not tolerate communist imperialism. The Department of State also decided that inaction on the crisis would have far-reaching consequences. Although South Korea may not have been strategically crucial, its fall may have dangerous consequences; if the Americans condoned one communist aggression over a 'Free' state, similar conflicts can break out in other places as well. The United States request the United Nations to call upon the North Koreans to cease their attack and withdraw, but met no success; in response, President Harry S. Truman authorized American forces to aid the South Koreans. On June 28th, the date of the first fall of Seoul, the president televised his statement on the Korean War: "I have ordered the United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support. The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." (122a) He also said that he commanded the American forces in the Philippines and Indochina to strengthen its forces and guard against communist aggressions. Such were the American thoughts in entering the Korean War (123). The outbreak of the Korean War influenced the United States' military policy and attitude in general, as can be seen in the passage of the NSC-68 (also to be explained in the following chapter).
            However, American intervention and the military assistance from the United Nations did not end the Korean War; rather, it enlarged the war. As was seen in the previous chapter, the initial advances of the United Nations were nullified when the Chinese Red Army entered the front. By Late November, the UN forces were being pushed back, forced to retreat. Facing this crisis, the Americans seriously considered the utilization of the nuclear bomb in order to prevent the loss of American lives and to secure a swift victory.
            As the Sino-Korean offensive began, prospects for a complete involvement in total war seemed clear. President Truman wrote that "We are faced with an all-out situation with 'total mobilization' and the declaration of national emergency under consideration." (124) The leaders in Washington sought to reverse the crushing retreat by considering the use of all weapons, the atomic bomb being one of them. On November 30, Truman held a news conference mentioning the use of the atomic bomb, and reported that the Air Force headquarters in the Far East were willing to deliver the atomic bomb to the enemies. General MacArthur also said on December 9th that he desired the commander's discretion to use atomic weapons: on December 24th, MacArthur submitted a plan for the use of 26 atomic bombs against specific targets, with 8 additional bomb plans to be detonated on the 'invasion forces and the critical concentrations of enemy air power'. The United States came closest to using atomic weapons in early April 1951, after the Soviet Union had stationed 13 air divisions and 200 bombers in the vicinity of the Korean Border. At this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that immediate atomic retaliation be made once these Soviet forces decide to enter the war; the bombs had actually been delivered to the air bases, ready to be shipped and dropped. Luckily, the Chinese and the Russians did not escalate the war. A second plan to use the atomic bombs was considered in June 1951 for tactical purposes, and many more similar suggestions appeared until the end of the war. In fact, a project called the Operation Hudson Harbor actually delivered 'dummy' bombs over North Korea on simulated atomic bombing runs during September and October 1951. The project called for "actual functioning of all activities which would be involved in an atomic strike, including weapons assembly and testing, leading, [and] ground control of bomb aiming." (124a) The actual dropping of the bomb did not take place due to pressure from the other UN allies and the technical reason that "timely identification of large masses of enemy troops was extremely rare." (125
            Although the Americans did not make use of their nuclear arsenal, it certainly employed other weapons of destruction. One of such was the new weapon, napalm. Napalm, along with other big conventional bombs, was dropped on the North Korean territories, killing thousands and destroying everything. From early November General MacArthur gave orders to create a wasteland between the front and the Chinese border by destroying every installation, factory, city, and village. Although the total amount of bombs used in the Korean War are not accounted for, specific incidents show that 550 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on November 8th during the attack on Sinuiju and that seven hundred 500 pound bombs and napalm, 175 tons of delayed-fuse demolition bombs were dropped on Pyongyang on December 15th and 16th. This reveals the enormous amount of bombs that must have been used in total; some scholars predict that the total amount of explosives used during the Korean War may actually exceed that During World War II. Nearly everything in northern and central Korea had been completely leveled by 1952. Villages were burned, cities were destroyed, and the surviving North Korean populations had to sustain their lives in caves or underground networks. The intensity of the bombing reached its apex when a planned air strike in 1952 destroyed a huge irrigation dam which provided for 75 per cent of the North's food production. Not to mention the shortage of water supplies, the plunging flood wiped off everything within 27 miles of the valley below. Many villages were inundated, and even Pyongyang was badly flooded. (126) Such attacks resulted in indiscriminate killing and the loss of millions of civilian lives; nuclear bombing could have had worse results, but such aerial bombings were certainly the most destructive and depressing aspect of the Korean War.
            The conflict between President Truman and General MacArthur is also a notable scene in the Korean War. The conflict began in the post-World War II dealings in Japan, regarding the punishment of the Japanese Emperor as a war criminal. During the Korean War, the conflict was escalated as the two American leaders had a differing point of view and strategy on conducting the war. Moreover, MacArthur's tendency to do as he pleased whether authorized or not.
            The first collision was on the issue of involving the Chinese Nationalist Government into the Korean War. On July 31st, General MacArthur and his aids flew to Formosa and conferred with Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi. The next day, Jiang issued a communique which said that he looked forward to collaboration with the American forces in Korea, and announced that the Republic of China was looking forward to fighting alongside the Americans against the communist forces of North Korea and the People's Republic of China. President Truman, on the other hand, feared that the acceptance of Jiang's troops may lure the Chinese Communists into the Korean War as well (the Chinese Communists had not yet been engaged in the war) (127). Although the Republic of China did not get to participate in the War, General MacArthur heightened the tension by crossing the 38th parallel with his American forces. After making a successful amphibious landing on Inchon and turning the tides of the battle, he felt overly confident about his victory in Korea. Inclined to believe that the Chinese would not intervene, he discarded the Joint Chiefs of Staff's message to 'use only Korean troops in the zone that stretched approximately half-way between the 38th parallel and the Yalu' arguing that the Korean army was simply unfit to do the job, MacArthur ordered all of his commanders to drive for the Yalu. By doing so, the general stimulated the Chinese intervention in the Korean War and soon, over 300,000 Red soldiers were reported on the battlefield (128). Although he was noted for authorizing himself, MacArthur still had the credence of the President and the other Chiefs of Staff until then.
            Other points of conflict, however, continued to emerge between the general and the president. General MacArthur was too daring in his tactics, and he tried to wage war against the Chinese and the Russians; this attitude worried the president very much. While the president had desired a limited war in Korea, MacArthur continuously tried to enlarge the war by incorporating the two Chinas and even threatening the Soviet Union. In October, after entering the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, he requested that he be authorized to attack across the Chinese border where the North Koreans seem to be receiving their supplies from. The suggestion included the bombardment of tactical locations in Manchuria and the destruction of roads and bridges across the China-North Korea border. He also requested for the permission of the use of the nuclear bombs, especially to create a line of radiation by dropping cobalt bombs across North Korea and the Yellow Sea. When considering the fact that the Cold War was in its full swing at the time, it would have been difficult to avoid a Third World War involving the entire communist and the democratic world if MacArthur's strategies had been adopted. Having been very confident of his victory in Korea, MacArthur had said that "[t]he war is over. The Chinese are not coming... The Third Division will be back in Fort Benning for Christmas dinner." (129) However, he failed to achieve conclusive victory and was soon retreating back across the 38th parallel. Such military grievances also led to the president's mistrust in the general.
            General MacArthur's challenge against the Truman administration grew bolder with time. On December 6th, the president sent a message to message to his Joint Chiefs of Staff to be delivered to the general, demanding that all public statements made by the general be submitted as documents. However, MacArthur did not yield to the command and made public announcements threatening an attack on the Chinese mainland and the use of nuclear weapons. On December 29th, the administration ordered MacArthur to maintain his hold on South Korea if this was possible without heavy losses: "A successful resistance to the Chinese-North Korean aggression on some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interest." (130) On the next day, however, MacArthur sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposing a policy of his own which the government might like to adopt. He says, "should a policy determination be reached by our government or through it by the United Nations to recognize the state of war which has been forced upon us by the Chinese authorities and to take retaliatory measures within our capabilities, we could: (1) blockade the coast of China; (2) destroy through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial capacity to wage war; (3) secure reinforcements from the Nationalist garrison on Formosa to strengthen our position in Korea if we decide to continue the fight for that peninsula; and (4) release existing restrictions upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action, possibly leading to counter-invasion against vulnerable areas of the Chinese mainland. ... Whether defending ourselves by way of military retaliation would bring in Soviet military intervention or not is a matter of speculation." (131) Such statements conflicted directly with the policies of the president and other high officials. Especially at this time, the president was eager to prevent the USSR's entrance into the Korean War and was attempting to design a peace settlement. However, MacArthur continued to disregard his superiors. In March, President Truman and the United Nations collectively began pursuing a peace settlement based upon the prewar border of the 38th parallel; General MacArthur was instructed not to take any action that might thwart the peace talks. However, the general rejected the idea of a negotiated settlement; he continued to plan for war, and had sent a letter to the House Minority Leader, disagreeing with President Truman's policy of limiting the war. Moreover, he sent a critical demand for a cease-fire on his own decision: "Even under the inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces ... Red China ... has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea. The enemy, therefore, must now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. ... The Korean nation and its people ... must not be sacrificed. ... I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander-in-chief of the enemy forces in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea ... might be accomplished without further bloodshed." (132) By doing so, MacArthur had transformed a cease-fire intended as an offer to negotiate into an ultimatum demanding surrender. The president's effort at peace settlement had been sabotaged. Appalled at the complete disregard General MacArthur continued to display, President Truman announced that "By this act MacArthur left me no choice - I could no longer tolerate his insubordination." He informed his decision to relieve the general from his position to the nation: "A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have, therefore, considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy." (133) The general was officially relieved from office on April 11th, 1951.
            The Korean War meant something very significant for the Americans: the fact that the war was fought at all demonstrated that the Americans had a deep concern over the Soviet expansion and were determined to prevent the expansion breaking out in secondary theaters. In simple words, Truman had 'transformed containment from a selective European policy into a general global policy.' The War also influenced American China policy; only three days after the breakout of the war, Truman recalled the policy of neutrality and declared that any communist attempt to seize Taiwan would threaten American security. National defense expenditures were also rapidly increased as a result of the Korean War. After the passage of the NSC68, military spending which consisted 4 percent of the GNP in 1948 rose to above 13 percent by 1953 (134). The Korean War also had a large impact on American domestic situation. The high defense spending revived inflation, and workers' discontents erupted. 1952 April's nationwide steel strike was an example of the eruption of such discontents. Also, many Americans began to believe that the Communist conspiracy was an explanation for the hardship and troubles faced during the Korean War and elsewhere.

VI.3 The Cold War, United States' Domestic Politics, and Foreign Relations

VI.3.1 Cold War Policies
            In this chapter, the domestic politics and diplomatic policies of the United States during the early Cold War era will be discussed in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the United States' international position at the time and to get a grasp of how it may have influenced the United States' relationships with Communist China and the two Koreas. To do so, this section begins with expositions on the Cold War.
            An important document defining the situation of the Cold War is the "Long Telegram" sent by Ambassador George F. Kennan. Having served a long time as a scholarly Foreign Service officer, Kennan had been stationed for five years in Russia and was a close student of Soviet history. In the Long Telegram, Kennan stated his beliefs that the Soviet leaders saw the world as divided into socialist and capitalist camps separated by irreconcilable differences and that the United States had to deal with a "political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of [the US'] society be disrupted, [it's] traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of [the US] be broken, if the Soviet power is to be secured." (135) Through this report, Kennan officially warned the drift toward the Cold War. In July 1947, Kennan wrote on the Foreign Affairs paper that the best means of dealing with Soviet pressures was a policy of "long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment" based on the "application of counter-force." (136) This set the basis for Americans to believe that the Cold War could be won if America maintained its own strength and convinced the communists that it would resist aggression firmly in any quarter of the globe - in other words, when it implemented the 'Containment'.
            President Truman and his administration gradually adopted this idea of "getting tough with Russia" during 1946, and they found wide support from the American public. The determination for a firm stance against the communists received further boost after the post-war conflict in Europe and the fall of Eastern Europe to the communist influence. The decisive policy shift came in 1947 as a result of the military and political situations in Greece and Turkey. Greece had been suffering from a civil war in 1947 as the Greek communists, with the support of communist Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, waged war against the monarchy. Turkey was also in chaos due to numerous communist activities. In the context of this situation, the well known Truman Doctrine was proclaimed and approved. Truman stated that "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," (137) and proclaimed that the communist victory in Turkey and Greece would be prevented by American military and economic aid. This policy was then extended to the Marshall Plan, also known as the European Recovery Program, which provided funds, materials and technical advice for the post-war reconstruction of the European nations. Under the program, over 13 billion US dollars had been delivered to the European nations, mostly West European democracies, and the program was fairly successful in rebuilding the European economy and preventing the additional spreading of communism. So far, the American Cold War policies remained healthy.
            The containment in the Far East, however, had not been very successful as we have discussed in the previous chapters. Although Japan had been secured decisively and effectively, the goal of reconciling the communists and the nationalists under a coalition government was largely a failure. US refusal to effectively and genuinely support the Nationalist Government and the inefficiency, disunity and corruption of the National Government led to the fall of the Republic of China and the victory of the Chinese Communists in the Chinese Civil War. In Korea, the US failed to unite the divided country and settle out an agreement with the Russians. After the establishment of separate North and South Korean governments, the Korean War erupted, as discussed in the previous chapter.
            Since 1948 the Cold War became somewhat dicey. After the Western democracies announced plans for creating a single West German Republic with autonomy, the Soviet Union retaliated by closing off all land access to Berlin from the West, creating a situation known as the Berlin Blockade. Unwilling to give in to the communists, the Allies began the Berlin airlift in which they delivered the necessary supplies to West Berlin through airplanes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in April 1949 to provide common security for the democracies; after the news of the Soviet's production of an atomic bomb, 1.5 billion US dollars were appropriated for arming the NATO. (138
            Containment was the policy in the Far East as well; unlike the success of the containment in Europe, the effort at containment in Asia exploded into war: the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. Especially after these wars, United States' relationship with the Communist Chinese, North Koreans, and the Communists in general reached an irreversible level; diplomatic connections were severed, and the Far Eastern policy against the communists became extremely rigid. The American policy toward Communist China after the Chinese Civil War will be handled with depth in Chapter Seven.

VI.3.2 The Red Scare and the Rise of the Republicans
            President Truman's second election in 1948 was extremely tough, due to the liberals' disagreement with and opposition to Truman's containment policy. Although he made it to his second presidential term, his second administration with plagued by the strengthening Cold War. Especially after the Russian development of the atomic bomb, the loss of China to the Chinese Communists and the outbreak of the Korean War, the general support for the president plummeted to the ground.
            Internationally, the hegemony and leadership of the United States seemed to be in a decline. Its nuclear monopoly was lost to the Russians; China became communist; new-born independent nations in Asia and Africa that had been former colonial possessions of the western powers selected their own third world 'neutral' alliance. Incidents on communist espionage in Canada, Great Britain, and America itself created angst among the citizens that conspirators were everywhere and were working to undermine American security. President Truman was laid down with criticism for being too soft on communists. To escape the criticism and to show that he was more zealous about preventing spies, Truman administered a Loyalty Review Board to check up on government officials (139). This, in brief, can be seen as the beginning of the Red Scare which became more intense with time. The two trials, the Alger Hiss Case and the nuclear espionage case, critically fed the fire for the communist hunt. The Alger Hiss Case was a court case in which Alger Hiss, the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former State Department official, was charged for having been a communist and having copied and sent classified government documents to Moscow. While the Hiss case aroused fear among those who believed in the undercover communist existence in the United States, there was a disclosure in February 1950 that a British scientist, along with American associates such as Harry Gold, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, had sold atomic secrets to the Russians. After a court trial, the Rosenbergs were executed. (140)
            In the midst of such confusion and apprehension, an irrational but powerfully convincing political figure emerged; Senator Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy made his first appearance in early 1950 by giving a speech, "I Have here in my hand a list of 205 people who were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who, nevertheless, are still working and shaping policy in the state Department." (140a) Claiming to know the traitors working in the government, he insisted that these Communists were still working and making policies. The Korean War helped to create a climate for McCarthy's crusade to be transformed from a radical sideshow into a popular movement, and the so called "Red Hunt" began. In September 1950, the McCarran Internal Security Act was passed in the Congress over Truman's veto to establish a Subversive Activities Control Board to chase Communist activities in the United States, despite the presence of House Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate Internal Securities Committee, and the loyalty review boards. A second McCarran Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, was also passed by the Congress over the presidential veto, which made ideology a criterion for excluding foreigners from the United States. As McCarthyism became popular, citizens across the country turned anxious to prevent communist influences and failed to 'distinguish between disloyalty and traditional American radicalism or mere dissent.' (141) The movement was supported by a number of organizations, including the Christian fundamentalists, the American Legion and other anti-communist groups. Many influential figures were influenced by McCarthyism, and the craze went on during the early and mid 50s until it the attitudes and institutions of McCarthyism gradually weakened.
            McCarthyism preyed on a number of influential people in Truman's administration including the Secretary of State Acheson and other democrats. As the issue of the American support for the Nationalist Government in China became increasingly involved in domestic politics, Acheson was violently attacked by the members of the Republican Party. With regard to the Truman administration's policy of disengagement, the Republicans laid a vicious opposition; on February 24, 1949, fifty one Republican Congressmen sent letters to the President protesting what they described as "inaction in China." For the Republicans, the Nationalists were still battling the Communists and the war had not been lost yet; Acheson]s policy of restraining any action until the course of events in the Chinese Civil War was further clarified seemed quite defeatist for them. The Liberal opinions fully supported the government's policy of standing aside, and they believed in the corruption and incompetence of the Chinese Nationalist Government. However, the backwash from the War in Korea promoted a generally enthusiastic support for the anti-communist sentiment, and the public support for the Democratic Party dropped to the ground. On the contrary, the Republican support increased and the Republicans scored impressive gains in 1950's congressional elections. The Republican strength also grew when corruptions within certain government branches were revealed. In the presidential elections of 1952, the Republicans defeated the Democrats; Dwight D. Eisenhower, a general from the World War II, became the president by 442 to 89 counts in the Electoral College, and Richard M. Nixon, who played an important role in the Alger Hiss Case, was elected vice president. (142)

VI.3.3 Eisenhower's Policies
            Dwight E. Eisenhower was different from Truman in various aspects, but he was popular, most notably for his genial personality and desire to steer clear of controversy. During his campaign, he promised to visit Korea and to bring the war to an end, to run his administration on sound business principles, to call for more local control of government affairs, and to reduce federal spending in order to balance the budget and cut taxes. These things he actually kept after he was elected. With regard to Eisenhower's domestic policies, scholars generally evaluate him as having followed "dynamic conservatism" and then "progressive moderation." The president himself summarized his attitude that he was liberal in dealing with individuals but conservative "when talking about ... the individual's pocketbook." (143) Largely, he had an 'extraordinary popularity.'
            President Eisenhower ended the Korean War in 1953 by effectively using the atomic card and drawing up an armistice; for the future, the American people wanted Eisenhower to find a way of employing the nation's strength constructively through foreign policy. The new president found the way to do so by choosing John Foster Dulles as his secretary of state. Dulles's policy began very broad, economical, and aggressive, although it changed by 1955. His initial policies planned for the United States to put more emphasis on its nuclear arsenal and les on conventional weapons, and for America to make first moves before waiting for communist movements and trying to contain them. Through this policy, America's potential enemies would know that "massive retaliation" would be unleashed as reprisal for any aggression. His more radical plans included the liberation of Eastern Europe and the attack on the Chinese mainland. These plans were, however, dismissed as being too unrealistic and involving great danger. The plan for "massive retaliation" was also somewhat illogical, as the Soviet Union also had nuclear weapons; even the Hydrogen Bomb had been duplicated by the Soviets in 1953. By late 1955, the Secretary realized that the plan was inept to be actually implicated.
            After Stalin's death, changes had taken place in the Soviet Union as well. After a brief period of internal power struggle, Nikita Khrushchev surfaced as Russia's new leader. While conducting worldwide communist propaganda by presenting Soviet accomplishments in science and technology, Khrushchev talked of "peaceful coexistence" of the communist sphere with the United States and the capitalist nations. The European allies were largely convinced by Khrushchev, while Dulles remained suspicious; however, Eisenhower acquiesced to hold a summit conference with the Soviets in Geneva in 1955. Although no significant agreements were made in the conference, the eased atmosphere and talks of peaceful coexistence softened the years-old tensions.
            Eisenhower was reelected in 1956 for his second term with larger margins then his first election. At this point of time, the Americans were generally very sober and chilled after continuous Soviet diplomatic success and technological, scientific progress, although they liked their leader very much. Meanwhile, in 1957, John Dulles underwent a surgery and had to resign in 1959. From 1957, the president had to make decisions and actual conducts in foreign policy himself. Because of his natural inclination against war, he restrained himself to exercise commendable caution in every crisis and attempted to avoid risky new commitments. A more accommodating attitude was adopted by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Vice President Richard Nixon visited the Soviet Union in 1959; his Soviet counterpart Vice Premier Mikoyan visited the United States. In September 1959, Khrushchev himself had come to America. The exchanges were very salutary, and a second summit meeting was scheduled to be convened in 1960. (144)
            So far has been the exposition on United States' domestic situations and its foreign relationships in general during the Cold War period from the late 1940s to 1950s. Based on such background information, the American-Chinese relationship and other materials to be handled in the coming chapters can, hopefully, be considered more comprehensively. Now, this paper will move on to the development and organization of the People's Republic of China and the United States' policy towards China in specific details.

VII. People's Republic of China and the Republic of China

VII.1 Stabilization and Organization of the People's Republic of China
            After the People's Republic of China was declared, Mao Zedong moved the capital to Peiping (Beijing) and adopted a new flag. For the new born nation, there were two main problems to be dealt with: the unification of China in a true sense and the centralization of the government. To have that, Mao needed to put the "Democratic Dictatorship" into practice, in which all four classes - the proletariats, peasants, petite bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie - would be represented - democracy; the government would also suppress and be harsh on the conservative or the counter-revolutionary elements - dictatorship. From the years 1949 to 1954, Mao consolidated his authority and eliminated his political opponents, both communists and non-communists, by undertaking an aggressive campaign. To demand obedience from any ideological and political heretics, Mao Zedong accused and executed over 800,000 individuals as 'class enemies'. Additionally, forced labor camps, numerous and harsh prisons, massive public "re-education" and "self-criticism" programs were conducted in order to eliminate any counter-revolutionary political ideas. This self-criticism and other indoctrination programs were most intensive in 1956, as will be discussed shortly afterwards. Mao also did manage to accomplish the goal of unifying China, a goal which he called the ' 'Mandate of Heaven' of his new government.
            The interesting aspect of this new government was that it did have both democratic and dictatorial aspects. The ruling political power basically had two hierarchies; one was the formal government under Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and the other was the Communist party apparatus which was centralized around the Central Committee of the Party and the Politburo. The formal government was composed of the Central People's Government Council, with all three powers of executive, judicial, and legislative. The Council was composed of a Chairman, who was Mao, six vice chairmen, and 56 other members. When the Central People's Government Council was not in session, its powers were exercised instead by the State Administrative Council headed by Premiere Zhou Enlai. When both bodies of power were not in session, the state powers were exercised by Chairman of the State Mao Zedong - basically, the power was absolutely concentrated in the hands of Mao. In both the party apparatus and the formal government structure, the organizations followed the system of a centralized democracy. Local level assemblies were elected directly by the people; these local assemblies then elected their representatives for a higher level of assembly and so on. Therefore, at the local level, the governing system was democratic. However, the top of the government was dominated by a few people, especially by Mao. The local and other lower level assemblies were obliged to pay absolute obedience to the higher level assemblies. The first election of the assemblies was held in 1954, and the highest level of assembly - the National People's Congress - was elected to approve a new constitution in September. The constitution outlined that all Chinese can enjoy full legal rights unless they disagreed with the government. (145)
            The new government had certain problems. For instance, the communists had a somewhat hard time raising public support and establishing party organizations in large cities like Shanghai or Wuhan where the Communist influence had traditionally been very little or none-existent. Another similar problem was that the members of the Communist Party did not have equal roots in all regions; most were from the North where the party had its base for the previous decade, and not many members were from the southern provinces. Such situations can evoke inter-regional hostilities and cause people to revolt against the communists. This probably was the reason for the pragmatic party policies in the early years of the nation; much of the reforms were initially not very radical, as it will be discussed later. Another obstacle for the new government and the party was the traditional social structure which remained in the rural areas. The traditional feudal system and the influence of the landlords were too strong to destroy the landlords as a class. A substantial size of peasants was reluctant to enthusiastically join in on the revolution because the revolutionary principles were too alien from the tradition. Ironically, some peasant groups were too fearful of the once-powerful landlords that they would not initiate any vigorous attacks on them. Instead, the recruited villagers' organizations would protect the landlords from the Communist Party members. The traditional bureaucratic elitism was also a problem; new peasant recruits who were placed in charge of local administrations tended to behave like the old people of power. In some cases, the new peasants in position would hold hands with the landlords, deceive the party members and other peasants, and appropriate more land and wealth for themselves and the landlords. In other cases, they manipulated the local governments by charging the party cadres for corruption and removing them from power (146). Such were some of the hardship faced by the new government at its early stages.
            A major breakthrough to such problems was prepared by the travelling teams of party cadres. Travelling teams of Communist Party members were organized to supervise the organization of new regional administrations and indoctrinate the locals. They would educate the local peasants, recruit village leaders to cooperate in the organization, and assist the locals in conducting various reforms and overthrowing the traditional ruling system. After several years of supervision under the travelling teams, each village developed an adequate number of core peasant activists who began to convince other people that joining the revolution might really be worth while. Land reforms became more thorough and drastic, and confiscation and redistribution programs were soon launched. Further stabilization of the economy and the social organization were conducted. The self-criticism and indoctrination mentioned previously were also handy in eliminating the political opposition. Intensive indoctrination programs convinced the intellectuals and social elites to destroy their selfishness, arrogance, and contempt to the other peasants, and to think more about the interests of the society overall. In some cases, political opponents were sent to camps where they would be forced under heavy manual labor as political indoctrinating activity.
            Improving the war-torn economy of the nation was one of the most urgent tasks for the new government. As was already explained, eight years of war against the Japanese and the four years of civil war had completely destroyed China's economy. Hyperinflation and scarcity of goods was a nation-wide economic plague; at the initial stage of the new government, the level of industrial production was only one quarter of that of 1937. Stabilization of the economy required a new currency and strict control over it; to prevent the damaging effects of inflation, workers' wages were set to change proportionately to the prices of the five staple products - rice, coal, flour, oil, and cotton. This policy guaranteed the purchasing power of the wages to a certain degree. The two most important aspects of the Chinese economy were the agriculture and the industries. To improve agricultural production, a gradual program of collectivization was designed; for industrial expansion, series of five year plans were designed in imitation of the Russian forerunner. (147)
            According to the communist principles, collectivization was the single method to maximize agricultural production. However, the government refrained from launching a full-fledged program in order not to alienate the peasants. What the peasants really wanted was their own plots of land; forcing them into a communion would destroy the agriculture rather than improving it because the peasants would loose the enthusiasm for work. To prevent such a crisis, a series of transitional reforms were conducted regarding the ownership of the methods of production. Prior to everything, the promised program of land redistribution was carried out. The redistribution was under process in the 'early-liberated areas' of North China and Northeastern China during the civil war. In the rest of the regions, including East China, Central-South China, Northwest China, and Southwest China, land redistribution was conducted under the guideline in the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950. Putting an end to land ownership in China, the Agrarian Reform Law declared that all land should be confiscated, and then equally distributed to all peasants. Using complex criteria, the Chinese people were divided into five categories of landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, and the farmhands; the wealth of the landlords and the rich peasants were confiscated, and redistributed to the other category members. The Slogan was to "rely on the poor peasants and farmhands, ally with the middle peasants, neutralize the rich peasants, and struggle against the landlords." (148) Some landlords who were politically acceptable or very cooperative were given their share of the land distribution, but other landlords were either deprived of all possessions, or executed. The redistribution procedures were directed by peasants' associations composed of members from farmhand class to middle peasant class. As expected, the redistribution did not solve all the economic problems of the People's Republic of China, and it did have certain problems. Most importantly, the size of the land distributed to each individual was very small; the area of land confiscated from the landlords and the rich peasants was not as much as was believed. Tools and draft animals were also in shortage. In other communities, the administrators who were conducting the distribution were corrupt; they appropriated the best plots of land for themselves and for their associates.
            To solve such problems, in the next stage of collectivization, mutual aid teams were organized between 1950 and 1952. These mutual aid teams were a unit of about 10 houses which protected their own private properties, but used certain farm tools and draft animals commonly. This policy was effective because people had the incentive to work hard, they could borrow what they didn't have from their neighbors, and can work together on a difficult or a large task which needs cooperation. The mutual aid teams somewhat increased the agricultural production, but it was still insufficient in providing adequate food supply for the nation and raw materials for the industry. The stage after the mutual aid teams were cooperative farms. Organized in the period from late 1953 to 1954, the cooperative farms were a larger group of households that came together for a unified management of the arable land in the group. It also shared animals and tools. Private property such as household goods, small kitchen gardens, poultry and other small domestic animals were guaranteed. There were several difficulties in maintaining the program of cooperative farms. China was technically behind and it lacked industrialization; thus, the farming methods were not very effective and the production was low. Moreover, the people were generally too poor and they were not wholehearted about cooperative farming. Despite the difficulties, Mao Zedong drove through with the policy, and further advanced collectivization. In the People's Republic of China, joining of the cooperatives was not enforced; the government recommended voluntary joining. The major enticements were the effectiveness of large-scale production, and the governmental provision of tools and seeds. By 1956 almost all Chinese had joined a cooperative, either by coercion or by persuasion, and by 1957 there were over 800,000 collective farms all over China. Collectivization reached its maximum point in 1958 when the idea of Communes was introduced. Communes were a method of accelerating production and innovation, and it was full scale communization. It brought together hundreds of households, and pursued unity in all aspects of life. Each commune had its own educational center, hospital and medical center, welfare system, library, nursery, etc. All the members of the commune worked at the same time and ate at the same commune kitchen. Personal possessions had to be forsaken, and all aspects of life were parts of the commune. (149
            The Commune system ended up in an immediate failure, igniting rural discontent and disrupting the national economy. Each commune was too big and complex to be efficiently managed. The absence of technological assistance, lack of diligence stemming from the elimination of private property and interest, and heavy work load led to the deterioration of the efficacy of the organization. Production levels fell greatly in comparison to the preceding years, and the public dissatisfaction grew. Facing the discontent, Mao made concessions in 1959 to promise some degree of privacy, but it ultimately failed to solve the problem of low production because China did not have the sufficient scientific, industrial, and financial resources.
            Industrialization had more gravity than agriculture in Mao's management of the nation. Mao commented that, "without industry there can be no solid national defense, no well-being for the people, and no prosperity or strength for the nation." (150) To strengthen the industries, Mao believed that central state control and management was necessary for the most rational and efficient resource allocation to the various fields of industry. Thus, the goal was set to coordinate the industries under the leadership of the government. As was the case with rural and agrarian societies, gradual and transitional reforms were also important in transforming the urban communities and industries. Although industrialization was an urgent task, there were reasons for not starting the nationalization of all industries right away. Ideologically, the People's Democracy at its earliest phase of the revolution is meant to allow certain degree of private industry and development as acceptance of the petite and national bourgeoisie. Practically, the governments simply lacked the educated professionals who could run the industries once it was nationalized; there was the danger of aggravating the already war-torn economy. Therefore, the government initially sought to cooperate with the capitalists, intellectuals, and the educated professionals to run the national economy together. This cooperation was especially important in the cities as the Communists had very little experience in running a city government and it needed all the support it could get. The elites of society - the educated people, technicians, industrial capitalists and merchants - made genuine contributions to the society with vital skills, and their cooperation was necessary in order to maintain services and production, and to prevent a breakdown of the urban society. Thus, an opportunity to preserve the elite status was offered to the people with the valuable skills. The heavy industries and transportation industries, on the other hand, was directly transferred to state control, and the enterprises that had been owned by bureaucratic capitalists and Japanese conformists were confiscated as well.
            Until full nationalization was complete, the government policy followed the line of 'using, restricting, then transforming' the capitalists and bourgeoisie. The initial program included providing raw materials for certain core private industries and purchasing a large portion of the goods at state level. Due to intensive nurturing, the industries showed an average growth rate of 54 per cent in the years 1949 to 1952. At the same time, the government put restrictions on the industries by putting a limit to the profit margin, enacting laborer protection regulations, and controlling the pricing and taxation policies. Autonomy and defiance of the bourgeois was further curbed by the 'Five-Anti Campaigns' of 1952, as the campaign authorized party cadres to inspect through the industries and report on speculation, competition, bribery, tax evasion, and fraud. Uncooperative capitalists and enterprise managers were accused of such violations, harassed, intimidated, and forced to confess their misdeeds. Beginning in 1954, the next stage of industrial nationalization was accomplished as many of the private-owned industries were transformed into private-state joint management. At the end of 1954, almost 49.7% of the national industrial production was made by the industries under joint management which numbered over 3000. (151) By 1957, all enterprises had been changed to joint operation. The previous owners were remunerated under the "buying off policy", which promised them their managerial positions and relatively higher salary, and the nationalization process was completed in a rather peaceful way with cooperation from the sides of the capitalists and enterprise owners
            As was said earlier in this section, the Mao's chief economic goal was to develop the heavy industries; light industries, agriculture, and commodities production were only secondary goals. A Five Year Industrial Plan imitating the Russian model was launched in 1953 embarking on an ambitious project of building factories and infrastructure. Under central planning which began in 1955, funds were allocated and yearly production targets were set for different industries, mainly focusing on the expansion of the large industries that produced trucks, aircrafts, penicillin, etc., and establishing transportation and communication lines. Investments of smaller sizes were allocated for developing the agriculture and conserving water, promoting education, health, culture, banking and trade. The production goals were 14.7 per cent growth in the heavy industries, 4.7 per cent growth in agriculture and 8.6 per cent growth in commodity output annually. The First Five Year Plan was quite successful in that the year 1957 actually achieved 120% industrial output growth; new factories, power plants, railroads and highways were built (152). It should be noted, however, that the production of agricultural goods and consumer commodity had to be sacrificed in order to secure the sufficient funds for developing the heavy industries. East European and Russian equipments, technicians, and raw materials were critical for developing the heavy industries, and such assistance had to be purchased either in agricultural products and textiles. The grains and other food supplies, which were already very scarce, were sold off.
            In foreign policy, People's Republic of China(PRC will be used, for convenience)'s main goal was to safeguard its territorial integrity and political independence, and to restore its international reputation. The first goal was achieved as it took a firm stand against any Western and American effort to infringe its territorial rights in both Tibet and elsewhere. Formosa was especially an issue where tension developed between the PRC and the United States, as will be described in detail in later chapters. About Taiwan, PRC refused to make any compromises, and decided to play with time. According to Franklin W. Houn, time played for PRC's advantage because as time passed, PRC's military strength might increase and Chinese fleet would be able to directly challenge the American fleet guarding the Formosan islands; if not, the United States might decide that Formosa was no longer important to them; third, the Taiwanese may grow tired of the situation and voluntarily seek understandings with Beijing; lastly, the expected economic prosperity of PRC may help magnetically pull the political dissidents back from Formosa (153). PRC wanted to restore its international reputation by establishing diplomatic relations with countries that are friendly toward PRC and would treat PRC as equal status. On the other hand, it would sever all connections with countries that recognized the Guomindang government in Taiwan. The treaties and agreements previous settled by the Guomindang would be reviewed, revised, and renegotiated, and all remains of foreign domination and exploitation were destroyed as Western business firms were expropriated, foreigner-owned Newspapers were closed down, and the control of the church was transferred to the government. PRC also demanded equal treatment from the Soviet Union to uphold its national prestige; this may have been one of the reasons, along with ideological disagreement, that PRC's relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated after 1956. Until late 1950s, Mao regarded PRC's relationship with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations as of foremost importance and maintained little or no contact with the previously imperialist powers. However, after its relationships with the Soviet Union deteriorated, it sought to restore a fair association with other countries; it especially wanted to create a United Front with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against the imperialism and colonialism of the Western powers. Countries that restored diplomatic relationship with PRC until 1959 included Afghanistan, Albania, Burma, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, North Korea, North Vietnam, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, the USSR, Yemen and Yugoslavia (154). PRC's diplomatic relationship with the United States was extremely hostile, especially after PRC's participation in the Korean War. US-PRC relationship will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.
            In summary, the People's Republic of China did make moderately successful initial steps at stabilizing and organizing the political and social structure, and made various attempts to improve the economy. The party and the governing structure were centralized and the political opponents had been either eliminated or converted. Both the agriculture and the industries had been transformed to accommodate the communist principles; farms were collectivized and the industries had been put under state management. Although China's relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated and the hostility with the United States maximized, it successfully restored diplomatic association with the countries listed above.

VII.2 US Policies toward Communist China

VII.2.1 From the Chinese Civil War to the Korean War
            While the Chinese Civil War was still going on, attempts were made by the Republican Party members to appropriate budgets for loans and supplies for the Nationalist Government. Early 1949, Senator Patrick McCarran, a Democrat but closely associated with the Republicans and a strong opponent of the Truman government, he introduced a bill to the Senate which included plans to provide the Chinese National Government a direct loan of 1.5 billion dollars. Few months later, Senator William F. Knowland introduced an amendment proposal of a foreign aid bill to increase the grants to the Nationalists reaching 125 million dollars and to dispatch a new American military advisory team for Jiang Jieshi. (155)
            The Truman administration was against providing any further military or economic assistance for the failing Nationalist Government. Dean Acheson believed in the "primacy of Europe and the undesirability of active intervention in Asia," and was "convinced in 1949 that any further military assistance to the Nationalists would only prolong a war already lost and arouse among a people desirous for peace a deep resentment against the United States." (156) As was explained in chapter six, the incompetence, corruption, military failures and deteriorating morale of the Guomindang Government also led the Secretary and the President give up on them. When the McCarran Bill was proposed, Truman and Acheson sent a memorandum to the Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to reject this proposal and point out that "to furnish solely military material and advice would only prolong hostilities and the suffering of the Chinese people ... to furnish the military means for bringing about a reversal in the situation would require the use of unpredictably large American armed forces in actual combat, which would be wholly contrary to the national interest. In these circumstances, the extension of as much as 1.5 billion dollars of credits to the Chinese Government ... would embark [the US Government] on an undertaking the eventual cost of which would be unpredictable but of great magnitude, and the outcome of which would almost surely be catastrophic." (157) As a result, no hearing was held on the McCarran bill and it never reached the Senate. However, the government had to make some appeasing gestures to the Republicans, because they needed some support from the Republicans to continue its programs for European economic recovery; so Acheson agreed to a limited increase in funds for the China Aid Act, and added that 54 million dollars of additional supported will be allocated to the non-Communist areas of China.
            In the statement made by Dean Acheson in August 1949 about the United States' position on China, he did not give a plan for its future policy toward the Communist China. Generally, during the period after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Truman administration continued with its policy of disengagement from the Chinese Civil War, while trying to devise a way to contain further spreading of the Communist Imperialism in the Asian continent or in Southeast Asia. Two weeks before Acheson made the speech he set up a new institution to prepare for the future evolution of American policy in the Far East - a special State Department advisory committee - in order to meet the new circumstances. Acheson sent a message to the committee that "it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of Communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the Southeast Asia area." (158) The committee was ordered to investigate the possible plans, costs involved, and necessary forces to implement such policies; it should explore every feasible plan, regardless of practicality. The establishment of this committee was not made public initially; for some time, the Truman government must have seemed very impotent for the Chinese public. As popular concern over the situation in China grew, the fall of the Nationalist Government came to a shock for the Americans. Many were especially stunned to hear Mao's speech of "On The People's Democratic Dictatorship" in which he stressed on the unity of the socialist movement throughout the world and the interdependent relationship of the Communists in China and the Soviet Union. As a result, many people came to believe that the PRC and the Chinese Communists were just puppets of the Russian headquarter in Moscow; public polls and specialists commonly admitted that China had fallen completely under Russian domination.
            One problem that Truman's government initially faced was weather to recognize the PRC or not. The tradition of the American foreign policy was to 'recognize all forms of government that existed on Earth; the premise was that recognition did not always imply approval. However, it did have a history of not having recognized the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1933, as a show of disapproval. Secretary Acheson made a speech in September that "We maintain diplomatic relations with other countries primarily because we are all on the same planet and must do business with each. We do not establish an embassy in a foreign country to show approval of its Government." (159) When the Americans consulted its allies, the British, about whether to recognize the new Communist Government in China, they replied that recognition would better promote their interests; "His Majesty's Government are therefore in favor of de jure recognition." (160) The Truman administration's apparent decision at de facto recognition was faced by rigid repulsions from the Republicans. Many Republicans strongly believed that accepting the Beijing government would imply the unconscionable disregard and repudiation of Jiang's regime. On October 1 1949, when Mao Zedong officially proclaimed the establishment of the PRC and called for international recognition, the US State Department announced that it recognized the national government as the legitimate Chinese government, and consultations with other powers should be had before any changes. In early October the issue was put to a debate in the State Department's committee on China policy, in which a prevailing group promoted the recognition of the Beijing government. However, they also knew that the populace and the Republicans in the Congress would not be willing to accept recognizing the Communist Regime, especially during this period of aggravated hostility toward communism.
            Then the Angus Ward Affair broke out. The Chinese Communists 'not only waged their virulent anti-imperialist campaign against the West, but flagrantly violated foreign nations' established treaty rights in China.' They appeared to be doing 'everything possible to humiliate the United States in expressing their defiance of the established conventions of international law ... these symbolic acts of retribution for all the indignities China had suffered in the past at the hands of the foreigners.' (161) On October 24th, the communist disregard for diplomatic immunity reached its climax when their troops invaded the consulate office, held the consulate general staff in Mukden under house arrest, and jailed Consul General Ward and his associates. Beijing ignored all protests and refused to allow Ward to communicate with his government. This incident aroused a strong anger and indignation amongst the Americans. In this incident and other later actions such as the seizure of US consular properties in Beijing, the Chinese Communists appeared that it did not really want American recognition. As a result, any immediate move toward recognition of the Beijing government went out of the question.
            Some of the American allies, in the meanwhile, drifted toward accepting the Chinese Communists. In December, the ambassador in India sent a message that due to "geographic position and Asian interests, the Government of India must carry out its program for recognition ... although [it] would not act regardless [of the] decision [of the] other members." The Great Britain informed that it would recognize the Communist Government "not to confer a compliment but to secure a convenience." (161a) The other members of the commonwealth generally agreed with the British; "the Canadian Government realized that recognition was inevitable"; Australia and New Zealand thought that it would be difficult to make "immediate recognition", but were willing to do so after obtaining "assurance of respect for international obligations and territorial integrity of neighboring countries" (161b) from the Communists; both Pakistan's and Ceylon's views "generally coincide[d] with those of the United Kingdom." (161c) The other European nations such as the Netherlands and France "wished to delay recognition" until the Chinese agreed to respect the diplomatic protocols of the international community (162). As this was the international atmosphere, the Truman administration received pressure from its allies to recognize the PRC while receiving pressure from the Congress against it.
            It can not be known for certain whether or not the Truman Administration actually was moving toward recognition. While the statements made by Dean Acheson and other pro-Truman politicians sounded like it was for recognition, he did not give a clear position. Later in 1951 during his testimony at the MacArthur hearings, Acheson definitely stated that the United States never considered acceptance of the Beijing regime; ambassador Jessup declared additionally that the State Department never considered recognition. However, they may have made such later statements only in order to escape the vicious attacks that they have been receiving at the time for having supposedly shown sympathies for the Chinese Communists and for having been willing to abandon Jiang Jieshi. No matter what position the government actually took, subsequent developments transformed a wait-and-see attitude into non-recognition as a fixed and undeviating policy both by the Truman Administration and its successors.
            Another debated issue was which government should represent China in the United Nations. Considering that the Republic of China was a permanent member of the UN Security Council, this issue was related to, but distinct from that of diplomatic recognition. The issue aroused heated, divisive, and acrimonious debate at nearly every annual meeting of the UN General Assembly since 1950.
            The issue was first brought up in late September by the Chinese Nationalist Delegation. Describing the Chinese Communists as Russian puppets, the Nationalist delegation called the Assembly to charge the Soviet Union for intervention in China's domestic affairs, to recommend other member states from giving further military or economic assistance to the Communists, and to rule that Mao's government would ne be accorded diplomatic relationship with other member states. The Communists countered this move by cabling the UN Secretary General and challenging the right of the Nationalist Government to represent all of China, and the Russian delegation supported them. The Assembly was given the freedom to debate the anti-Russian charges and the Nationalist Chinese resolutions, but no effective solution was selected. The American position was, however, not totally for the Nationalists; although the US and its allies generally favored the Nationalist resolution, the American resolution sought to acquire crucial support against the Russians and to eliminate the clause about not diplomatically recognizing the Beijing regime.
            The formal resolution calling for the expulsion of the Nationalist China was introduced by the Russian delegate in January's meeting of the Security Council, after the PRC's Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai demanded the immediate ouster of the Nationalist delegate who had been serving as the president of the Security Council. The American Delegate, Ernest A. Gross, argued against the expulsion of the Nationalist delegate, but again, the Americans were not firm in their challenge; the delegate said that the United States would not exercise its veto power, and was willing to accept whatever decision the Security Council reached through an affirmative vote of seven members. The vote numbered 6 to 3 against the Russians, and the Nationalists were not expelled. Only a few days after the vote, the Soviet Union's delegate announced that he would not participate in the Security Council as long as the Nationalist delegate remained as a member, thereby beginning the Russian boycott of the UN. This move by the Russians aroused resentment and strengthened the resolve of those nations that opposed the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalists. As France, the British Commonwealth nations and Egypt took no further action in favor of acceptance of the People's Republic of China in the UN, the trend toward admission to the United Nations slowed down, and the Communist China became more and more isolated from the world community.
            Truman believed that the Chinese Communists should not be admitted to the United Nations simply because they could not be trusted. Secretary supported Truman's position by stating that acceptance of the Chinese Communists would seem like a capitulation to the demands of the Communists. Acheson said that it would "feel free to indulge in similar blackmail whenever it failed to get its way in the future and the entire machinery of the United Nations would be paralyzed." (163) In the meanwhile, John Foster Dulles, a member of the State Department and later secretary of state, was one who favored the principle of universalism in the United Nations membership. Dulles' opinion was that the PRC should be given admission if it has demonstrated its ability to rule without intensive domestic resistance, and that a world organization like the UN should not give preferences. However, the large majority of the Congress - the Republicans moreover - was enthusiastically against any change in the China's UN representation, and heightened their effort too keep it that way. Dean Acheson repeatedly proclaimed that the United States would not be forced to change its policy, and reaffirmed the American support for the Republic of China as the due representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations. "Our position of supporting the Nationalist Government and of opposing the seating of the Chinese Communists continues unchanged. But, we will accept the decision of any organ of the United Nations made by the necessary majority, and we will not walk out." (164) From such statements, it can be construed that the United States was determined to support the Nationalist Chinese, but at the same time attempted to get wide encouragement from other member nations by appearing more conciliatory than the Soviets who walked out of the Assembly in their boycott.
            The future relationship with the Nationalist Government on Formosa (Taiwan) also became an important issue. As was discussed repeatedly, the Truman Administration remained determinedly opposed to extending any military assistance for the Nationalists. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had even barred a military advisory council from being dispatched to aid Jiang. These policy makers foresaw the obvious conclusion of the final stage of the civil war, and did not want to take part in the obvious defeat. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were partially convinced in reversing some of its policies to consider continuing some limited military aid to the Nationalists, but Truman rejected this again. He ruled in an important meeting of the National Security Council on December 9 that while the Nationalists are allowed to use some remaining funds from previous China aid acts, no material support and no mission to Formosa would be affirmed and that the US would keep a hands-off attitude if the Communist China was to attack the Nationalist Government on the island. Immediate responses were critical, but the Administration held its ground and did not make any concessions. Opponents could not convince the majority of the Americans to run the risk of getting their army involved in an Asiatic war; only a few people wanted to send their own soldiers to fix a neighbor's problem. Also, on January 12, Acheson delivered his speech "Crisis in China" where he declared that Formosa was out of the strategic line that the US should be prepared to defend against Communist aggression in the Pacific.
            The main opposition to the Truman Administration's policies came from the Republicans of the Congress, more specifically the China Bloc. The China Bloc was a "varying number of Congressmen who consistently demanded greater support for the Nationalists and ... tenaciously opposed any move toward recognition of the PRC or its admission to the United Nations. ... they were for the most part highly conservative Republicans." (165) As we have observed in the previous chapter on the domestic politics of the United States, the conservative Republicans had been almost obsessed with the suspicion of subversion and fear of international Communism. They were convinced that the government failed to protect the interests of the country in China, and is continuing to move to a wrong direction. Especially with regard to disengagement, they felt that the administration was not doing its best to help the Nationalist Government of China to fight against the communist subversives. The China Bloc was also special in that they favored disengagement from European affairs but intervention in Asia. Their policy was 'Primacy of Asia.' They generally failed to recognize the different circumstances prevailing in China and Europe. The most prominent and outspoken figure of the China Bloc was Senator Knowland. No one more consistently stood up for Jiang Jieshi or opposed strongly any move that might be a least bit beneficial for the Communist China.
            When the President announced in late 1949 that no further military assistance would be delivered to Jiang Jieshi, the Republicans of the Congress refused to abandon China. They believed that to abandon would be going against the respected values of 'anti-communism, tradition, sentiment and loyalty to a war time ally.' The Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson was also for the Republican cause; he agreed that the desertion of Jiang meant the loss of an essential anti-communist foothold off the China coast. General MacArthur favored an aggressive attitude in supporting the Nationalists; he favored direct military intervention in China situation to help the Nationalists recover the mainland and push the communists back. He suggested the "issuance of a ringing declaration that the US will support any and everyone who is opposed to communism; placing 500 fighter planes in the hands of some "war horse" similar to General Chennault; allowing volunteers to join such a fighting force without penalty; and assigning surplus ships to the Chinese Navy sufficient to blockade and destroy China's coastal cities." (166) When the American resolution to adhere to the decision of the UN Assembly, whether in favor of the Nationalists or not, was submitted and the president announced that America would not protect Formosa once the communists launched an attack, the Congressional critics and Republican representatives cried out that such a loose stance would be another 'appeasement' and a 'Far Eastern Munich.' They continued to argue that the loss of Formosa is a loss of a critical strategic position in Asia against the Communists.
            The China Bloc's attacks on the Administration - State Department to be more precise - were intensified in February 1950 after Senator McCarthy appeared on the political scene. With McCarthy, the charges that the administration was pursuing appeasement in east Asia were transformed into charges that the failure to check the expansion of Communist China was the result of pro-communist conspiracy in Washington. In his many speeches in the Senate, McCarthy shouted that the State Department was "thoroughly infested with Communists who were plotting to betray the national interest. ... completely controlled by individuals who are loyal to the ideals and designs of Communism rather than those of the free, God-fearing half of the world." (167) Influential Republicans such as Senator Bridges and Taft also followed McCarthy's lead. Acheson soon became the main target of McCarthy's crusade. President Truman and Dean Acheson denied McCarthy's charges that there are any Communists in the State Department, but the accusations could not be stopped. The disruptive effects of McCarthyism significantly served to paralyze the administration's further actions toward disengagement, and to dismiss or disperse a large number of veteran members of the State Department who had been under attacks. No solid evidence were provided for damning accusations, and rumor and hearsay were accepted as evidence for Communist affiliations; nonetheless, the accused members of the Far Eastern Department had to be moved to other sections of the government or otherwise were forced to resign. As a result, many needed personnel became unavailable, and there was a 'virtual suppression of objective reporting on China.' This was the China Bloc; there was also something called the China Lobby - "composed of officials from the Nationalist embassy in Washington, their paid propaganda agents, and a number of rabid anti-Communists drawn from the ranks of American businessmen, retired army officers, and conservatives." (168) They were the ones who launched a program to build up congressional opposition to the government's disengagement policy, and sought to make available to the China Bloc members the information which undercut the administration's position. Along with other pro-Nationalist public organizations and figures, the China Lobby played an important role in distributing pro-Nationalist propaganda publications.
            Despite so many things that happened rapidly in late 1949 and early 1950 and the challenges brought up by the political opponents, the Truman Administration had not yet succeeded in producing an approach to the China problem that receives popular acceptance and support. After its failure to secure peace in the post-war era, it continued to take a firm stance to either secure peace or unleash aggression. It did seem to be adopting a policy of gradually taking on some form and substance in achieving complete disengagement from the China scene and creating a new military defense line in the western Pacific. Yet, firm resistance form the Republicans and McCarthyism undercut the possibility of the complete disengagement ever being achieved. No overt move was made toward the recognition of the Communist China, but non-recognition was not yet a categorical policy. Although the US opposed the acceptance of the PRC into the UN, it agreed to accept the decision of the Security Council made through voting. President Truman announced that there would be no enlarged military aid or advice to Jiang and to avoid any further involvement in China's conflict

VII.2.2 During and After the Korean War
            Everything changed after the outbreak of the Korean War. As discussed in the previous chapters, the North Korean invasion was not a mere threat of possible aggression, but an outright challenge of war. Acheson's proclamation to exclude Korean from the US defense perimeter had been overturned, and the United States did decide to intervene in the war and fight as the fourth largest fighting force in the entire war. Washington was convinced that the North Koreans and ultimately the Russians were challenging the free world and the postwar system of collective security; the United States had to show that it would meet challenges by all possible means. This was important because President Truman took a parallel step in his Formosa policy, completely reversing his previous pledges not to directly interfere in the Chinese issue. Immediately after the armed communist invasion in Korea, it seemed obvious that occupation of Formosa by the Communist forces would be a clear threat to the American interests and security in the Pacific. Seeking to neutralize Formosa and to prevent the Communists from attacking, the Truman Administration reversed its pledge to keep aloof and ordered the Seventh Fleet to move into the Formosan Straits to prevent the Chinese Communists' potential aggression on the Nationalists. The Seventh Fleet was instructed to prevent any attack on the island, and on the reverse, to prevent the Nationalist air and sea forces from conducting any operations against the mainland.
            For the PRC, such moves were considered as a daring aggression from the Americans. Chinese Communists condemned the intervention, and Premier Zhou Enlai of the People's Republic of China declared that "this move constituted armed aggression against the territory of China and total violation of the United Nations charter." (169 For them, the situation seemed that the Americans were hampering their goal of attacking the Nationalists and uniting China. The communists demanded withdrawal of the fleet, and stated their resolve to 'liberate' Formosa.
            Nonetheless, the developments within the US glided rapidly toward considering the defense of Formosa as critical to the national interest. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been strictly opposing any intervention in the Chinese civil strife, were soon advocating a renewal of military assistance to the Nationalists and the formal alliance of the United States and the Nationalist government on Formosa through the passage of a mutual security treaty, which were actually adopted. The US government was convinced that the "Nationalist regime on Taiwan was still the government of all China ... that it had become a vital outpost, [and that] it was to be defended at all costs." (170) The Nationalists were the ones most jolted by this change of phase in the United States' China policy. Jiang took the situation as an opportunity to fuse closer bonds between his government and the United States, and to plan for his return to the mainland. Thus, a theatre of direct confrontation between the United States and Communists China surrounding Formosa began to take a substantial form. Along with the policy decisions of containment policy in eastern Asia at the eruption of the Korean War, Americans took measures to prevent Formosa's loss to the Communists.
            As the specific progress of the Korean War has been already discussed in the previous chapter on the Korean War, this section will focus more on the direct diplomatic confrontation between the PRC and the United States.
            The PRC had various reasons to consider the Americans an "aggressor". Not only did The United States enter the Korean War, but it also dispatched the Seventh Navy in the Formosan Straits, signaling a potential threat to the mainland. Acheson had repeatedly announced that the United States had no ulterior designs in neutralizing Formosa, but unfortunately, the independent acts of General MacArthur showed a different stance. The general paid a visit to Jiang Jieshi, and gave a speech that stressed the importance of defending Formosa and praised Jiang for his firm determination to fight against Communist aggression. These apprehensions were deepened when the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Despite the repeated warnings from the Communist China that it would not tolerate any foreign aggression that may pose a threat to its security, the UN forces pushed to the North and finally arrived near the Yalu River. The Chinese were thus induced to believe that the United States was threatening China with war as it occupied Formosa and invaded North Korea. The apprehensions broke out when the communist leadership called on the Chinese people to protect their homes and defend their country.
            In the meanwhile, an agreement was passed in the UN to invite a representative of the PRC to discuss about the situations in Korea and Formosa. The Beijing regime accepted the invitation, and sent General Wu Hsiu-chuan as the envoy. When Wu arrived in the Security Council in late November, the Chinese had launched a successful offensive in Korea and had pushed the UN forces back across the 38th parallel. However, Wu totally ignored the new developments in Korea and assaulted the United States for its Formosan policy, demanding that no further threat be posed against the territories of China. American representative Austin, on the other hand, refused to answer these charges and turned to criticizing the events in Korea, condemning the "open and notorious" aggression of the Chinese Communists. As such was the case, no productive solution could be brought to the Council. President Truman was convinced that the situation may be extended to a full scale war against China and maybe even Russia, as he and many other Americans believed that the Chinese were puppets playing the Russian game and receiving orders from Moscow. He declared a state of emergency and requested for a mobilization of military resources of appropriations up to a total of 18 billion dollars. American allies, especially Britain, tried to convince the Americans to suggest a cease-fire, along with the withdrawal from Formosa and Korea and the admission of Communist China to the UN, but the United States refused to accept this. The Communists also rejected a UN's suggestion for a cease-fire and a general conference concerning the interrelated problems of East Asia. Zhou Enlai cabled the UN to state that the "only possible basis for peace in the Far East was the unqualified acceptance of China's demands for an immediate withdrawal of US forces from both Formosa and Korea and the admission of the PRC to the United Nations." (171) As both sides took an unbending, firm stance, the standoff became complete. In retaliation of the rejection of peace overtures, the US Government froze Communist China's financial assets, established a total embargo, forbid US ships to enter Communist ports, refused all visas for travelling in China. Subsequently, it introduced a resolution to the UN Assembly calling to declare the PRC an aggressor for its intervention in North Korea.
            In the coming years, until the end of the Korean War, the Truman Administration exerted its best effort to prove to the United Nations that the Communist China was an aggressor nation to politically isolate it. Acheson found his way to do so by playing diplomatic cards. When Britain, Canada, and India made the new peace proposals in the UN, embracing a cease-fire, a withdrawal of all foreign troops, and a four power conference which included the PRC, Acheson agreed to the suggestion despite the vehement domestic opposition. He knew that the apparent display of cordiality would cost nothing in reality as the Communists would obviously reject a cease-fire; and that is what they did. Acheson branded the Chinese refusal to consider negotiations "a contemptuous disregard of a worldwide demand for peace." (172) On the contrary, having made a conciliatory move, the United States earned a stronger ground for demanding the outlawing of Communist China by the UN. The Beijing government continued to show recalcitrance toward peace negotiations and cease-fire, and the US continued to push for the establishment of further economic, military sanctions against it as an aggressor. Some other member nations, such as India, were hesitant about outlawing Communist China, arguing that branding Beijing as an aggressor can isolate it completely when cooperation was necessary to reach a vital peace settlement. The United States did not back down, and the opposition to the American resolution wore out. In February 1951, the resolution calling Beijing to withdraw its forces and the members of the UN to consider additional measures to repel the communist aggression was adopted.
            Having won an advantage on the international level, the Truman Administration wanted to keep the United States at the advantage by continuing to appear as the reasonable, compromising side. This was to be achieved through conducting a 'limited war'. Favoring a negotiated political peace settlement over a complete military victory, the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against extending the war across the 38th parallel again in March. Suggestions for a military blockade of the Chinese coast or air strikes in Manchuria were vetoed. This concept of a limited war also went in parallel with the 'Primacy of Europe' policy. Truman's administration was most concerned with the European theatre and recognized the Soviet Union as the greater communist threat; it believed that the security of Europe was more important in safeguarding the American peace and security. General Omar Bradley clearly stated this policy when he said, "Taking on Red China is not a decisive move, does not guarantee the end of the war in Korea ... it would increase the risk we are taking by engaging too much of our power in an area that is not the critical strategic prize. Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world, [Soviet Russia is.]" (173) Public opinions were half and half; the war had become very unpopular and Americans desperately wanted the war to end, but they believed that it was morally and strategically justified. However, the Republicans and General MacArthur were infuriated by the policy of limited war, considering it to be defeatist. From their point of view, the Communist China was a new, dominant, and aggressively imperialistic power in Asia and the United States should not restrict itself in defeating the impending threat in Asia. MacArthur especially went out of the line to lay open challenge to the administration's policy in his speech "there is no substitute for victory."
            Despite the heavy opposition, the administration continued with its own policy and relieved the none-subordinating MacArthur from his position. At the testimonies during May and June 1951, General MacArthur revamped his arguments for the priority of fighting communists in Asia, and the Administration spokespersons defended the policy of fighting a limited war. The administration emphasized the necessity to conform to the policy of its allies - which was for a limited war - for effective cooperation in Europe, and warned the possibility of the war being extended as a world-wide confrontation involving the Soviet Union once the war is brought to China. This persuaded the public that they would not want another war much more destructive and costly than the present one. The situations in Korea were also advantageous for the administration as General Ridgway successfully defended against renewed Chinese offensives. Finally, suggestion of peace-agreement came from the Soviet delegate in the United Nations Security Council in late June, and the Communists accepted the offer. Talks began in Gaeseong in July, and a dangerous more direct clash between the United States and the PRC was temporarily averted.
            Though an open outbreak of war between the United States and the PRC was avoided, America's general China policy became more and more rigid. Chinese invasion on Tibet and their support for the insurgent communist forces of the Vietminh in Indo-China heightened the American mistrust of Communist China. Whatever friendly sentiments that had remained between the mainland Chinese and the Americans dissolved. The Chinese considered the Americans as invaders threatening their territorial security, and the Americans viewed the Chinese as ruthless aggressors. The United States progressively grew more hostile in its attitude toward the People's Republic and consolidated its ties with the Nationalist government. On May 24th, Truman made a speech on the new determination to "support the [Nationalist] armies on Formosa to help keep that island out of Communist hands." (174) United States was resolved to continue to block Beijing's admission to the UN, and to refuse any official relationship. The limited war by no means embodied any intent to appease the Chinese, and the United States was more than ever devoted to containing Communism in Asia.
            In 1953 when the Republican candidate Dwight Eisenhower became president, the China policy became more firm. The first thing he did was to publicly declare that the Seventh Fleet which had been stationed in the Formosan straits would no longer be employed to prevent the Nationalist aggressions toward the mainland. The action, not representing any change in the basic policy, served to warn the Communist China that the days of stalemate were numbered unless they negotiate seriously for an armistice in Korea. The action, however, also had far-reaching psychological consequences. Jiang Jieshi felt more strongly determined to prepare for a possible mainland invasion, and Mao Zedong felt reconfirmed that the United States were supporting the Nationalists as the implacable enemy of the PRC.
            During Eisenhower's term of office, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was the "prime mover", although the President retained the ultimate authority and occasionally exercised his powers. Dulles was a stern anti-communist who believed that no compromise or accommodation was possible with communism. He was also skillful and diplomatic in dealing with Congress, though he was tough-minded and determined. He was not an Asia-firster and had a global outlook to accept the necessity of strengthening American defenses against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he also stated that "it is in Asia that Russian imperialism finds its most powerful expression." After coming into office he said that he intended to develop a "new order of priority and urgency ... to the Far East." (175) However, some of his shortcomings included his personal resentment against the Chinese Communists and sincere sympathy for Jiang Jieshi, derived from his upbringing. Along with the Assistant Secretary Robertson and Ambassador Rankin, Secretary Dulles governed the Eisenhower Administration's China policy.
            The first task left upon the Eisenhower Administration was to bring an end to the Korean dispute, and it began by accepting the basic conditions underlying the Truman-Acheson strategy. The United States would be willing to accept a negotiation settlement less than the unification of Korea, but there would be no retreat or appeasement of Communist China. The Administration succeeded in achieving task due to two factors; its firm standpoint, and the death of Stalin. Washington had announced several times that it felt compelled to adopt measures to bring the war directly to China unless the Chinese Communists were willing to negotiate in good faith. The measures may include a naval blockade of the coast or the bombing of the industrial installations. There were also discussions relating to the use of atomic bombs. In the meanwhile, Stalin died in March 5, 1953, and the new Russian leaders adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the West. With the Russian emphasis on peaceful coexistence, continued Russian became uncertain for the Beijing government and the possibility of a military victory of the UN forces in Korea seemed thinner and thinner. As a result, Communist China agreed to resume the peace negotiations and agreed on an armistice on July 27, 1953. The Korean War was finally over.
            Despite the agreement, Eisenhower's administration had no intention of accepting the PRC. Adopting the tough policy to which the Truman Administration had swung during the Korean War, the new administration sought to invigorate it rather than soften it. Seeking the political isolation of the Chinese PRC, it was firmly determined not to make any concessions and to continue assistance to the Nationalists. Although it accepted a five-power conference on the post-war Korean and the Indochinese situation to be held in Geneva with Beijing's participation, it had no intentions of diplomatically recognizing the PRC. In the UN as well, Dulles made sure that whatsoever move be taken to prevent the acceptance of the People's Republic.
            The second problem for the Eisenhower Administration was the growing power of the communist Vietminh in Indochina. In late 1953, after the Korean armistice, the war in Vietnam reached a climax and Chinese Communists troops were reported to have been observed during several occasions of conflict. The reports were never confirmed and Ho Chi Minh repeatedly affirmed that the Vietnamese communists had no intention of using any foreign reinforcements, but the Americans remained firm on this issue. Dulles identified the Vietnamese communists with the Chinese communists, labeling them as a single communist threat extending from North Korea to Indochina. He conducted his policies on the proposition that the aggressive powers of the PRC stood behind the Vietminh. Stating the 'Domino Theory', Dulles took up that the free world should not stand idle at the face of the French collapse in Indochina, but should adopt active measures to meet the common danger. Dulles and Radford, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commonly proposed that the Congress adopt a resolution empowering the president to employ air and naval forces to support the French position. This determination, however, was opposed by the Congressional and presidential opinion.
            The Congress was skeptical about the risks concerned with running such an aggressive measure. It believed that before anything was done, the allies had to be consulted. President Eisenhower agreed with the Congressmen's position that the United States should not take unilateral action, no matter how serious the crisis in Vietnam was. He believed that the United States should consider the necessity of striking directly at Red China if the Beijing Government decides to actively come to the support of the Vietminh. However, with the direct participation of Red China in the Indochina conflict never confirmed, Eisenhower felt that there was no need for such drastic actions. The allies in the meanwhile, were not very enthusiastic about putting up a fight. France had almost given up the fight and promised the Indochinese states full independence, taking a skeptical and defeatist attitude. Great Britain also wanted no belligerent action to be taken until the Geneva Conference, where matters could be talked out. Without allied support, the administration gave up the idea of intervention in Indochina.
            The Geneva Conference came at the close of April 1954. The atmosphere of the conference was not very cordial, as the Communist China was represented by Zhou Enlai and the United States represented by John Foster Dulles. There seemed to be little hope of breaking through the cold barriers between them, and reaching a general accord. The two representatives neither looked at each other during the sessions nor had any effort to make conversations. Dulles tried to make Communist China accept the UN solution to the Korean problem. On the contrary, Zhou Enlai argued that Asian countries had the right to settle their own matters, without interference from the United States or the United Nations. Without any results, Dulles left Geneva on May 5th. In the next portion of the conference on the Indochina issue, Undersecretary Smith was the American delegate, but he withdrew from taking an active part in the negotiations. Further negotiations made in the Geneva Conference by the other countries, including France and Vietnam, confirmed results such as the independence of the Indochinese states, armistice in Vietnam, and plans for a unified election. These procedures will not be discussed in this chapter because they had not been directly related to the topic of this paper.
            As the developments in Southeast Asia were taking place, the United States and the PRC entered an even more deteriorating relationship with direct and more threatening clashes over Formosa. 'The Chinese continued to consider Formosa a province of China temporarily in the hands of a rebel clique; the United States not only still recognized the Nationalist government as that of all China but now included Formosa within its defensive perimeter in the western Pacific.' (176)

VII.3 The First Taiwan Crisis
            After the Korean War and the War in Indochina, the next challenge for the United States was the Formosan crises. The crises did not lead to an outbreak of war, but it did serve to widen still further what was becoming an irreconcilable hostility between the United States and the PRC. The first of the two Formosan Crises (also called the Taiwan Crises) occurred throughout 1954 and 1955.
            Intimations of a dangerous confrontation in the Formosan straits came when Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed on August 11, 1954, that "the liberation of Taiwan is a glorious, historic mission of the Chinese people. Only by liberating Taiwan from the rule of the traitorous Jiang Jieshi group ... can we complete victory in the cause of liberating the Chinese people ... foreign aggressors who might attempt to block the Beijing government from fulfilling this mission would face grave consequences." (177) This was, in fact, to warn the Nationalists after Jiang had moved over 70,000 soldiers to islands near the mainland. Six days later, the President stated during a press conference that if the Chinese were to attack Formosa, the Seventh Fleet which was still stationed there will play their role. In the last week of August, the Communists raided the island of Quemoy; in reprisal, the Nationalists attacked the coastal areas of the mainland, and then the People's Liberation Army of the Communists launched a heavy artillery bombardment of Quemoy.
            With such fights taking place in the islands, the United States-Communist China tension aggravated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that action should be taken not only to defend the islands but also to support the Nationalists in the mainland. Secretary Dulles believed that the matter should be submitted to the United Nations. John Foster Dulles was discussing a mutual security treaty with Jiang Jieshi, promising joint action against either armed attack or subversive activities by the communists. The treaty was signed in early December, giving the United States the right to dispose its forces about Formosa. Chinese Communists, on the other hand, concentrated their forces on the coast opposite of Formosa and continued to attack Quemoy. They criticized Americans, as usual, for intervening in China's internal affairs, demonstrating imperialistic ambitions. On November 22nd, 1954, the Beijing government sentenced several American airmen to long term imprisonment, infuriating the Americans. Furthermore, the heaviest raid was conduct by the People's Liberation Army air forces on the Dachen islands in January 1955, ground forces invaded the island of Yikiang, completely wiping out the stationed Nationalist forces.
            Many of the policy makers and the Congress members demanded immediate action on the daring communists, but President Eisenhower and General Ridgway remained opposed to taking direct action. The President, overruling his bellicose advisers, said that taking a drastic action to this situation may actually lead to a World War III. In the existing circumstances, he believed, it would be extremely risky to intervene to protect the offshore islands or to encourage the Nationalists to invade the mainland. Considering all aspects of the situations, the administration had to come up with a policy to stop further Communist aggression and not to wage full scale war at the same time. Eisenhower knew that the attack on the small off-shore island was a preliminary to the actual attack on the Formosa which the communists had been thinking of, but he did not consider the islands such as Dachen or Yikiang as essential to the security and interests of the United States in Asia. Furthermore, he thought that it would be more effective for the nationalist troops spread out on the various small islands to regroup on more important islands. The suggestion of a "Dunkirk" was adopted, and the American navy was commanded to aid the Nationalists in the evacuation of their 10,000 troops on the Dachen Islands and elsewhere (178). While leaving the status of Formosa to be ultimately decided by the United Nations, Eisenhower decided that he had to show the Chinese Communists where the United States stood and its readiness to fight if necessary. He called on the Congress to grant him the authority to conduct his Far Eastern policy, and with full bipartisan support, he was able to drive through the Formosan Resolution, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist China. The Formosan Resolution "pledged the US to the defense of Taiwan, authorizing the president to employ American forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores Island against armed attack, including other territories as appropriate to defend them." (179) Considerations for defensive means extended to the use of atomic bombs. These policies achieved both goals, to "show the world that the United States was trying to maintain a decent posture ... [and to show that] the United States was [not] prepared to make any concessions with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores." (180) Additionally, the Mutual Defense Treaty gave weight to the idea that in taking up a defensive position, the United States would support the Nationalists in addition to defending it. The administration had taken its position to militarily defend further attacks on Quemoy and Matsu, and the policy was one supported by a large majority.
            In the UN in 1955, the other countries were worried about the developments in the islands, especially about the position the United States was taking. The Security Council thus called for a conference inviting a representative from the PRC to discuss about a cease-fire in the straits. However, the suggestion was flatly rejected by Zhou Enlai who believed that the status was Formosa was an internal Chinese problem that should not be submitted to be discussed with other nations. When the conference did not work, Churchill suggested to the United States that the islands might not be of important in defending Formosa itself. Britain and other allies continued to pressure United States to disengage from the off-shore islands in fear of provoking a war, and requested that it restrain itself form considering the use of atomic bombs. The foreign pressures as well as the deteriorating prospects for a peaceful settlement aroused a renewed debate among the official circles and Congress. Democrats again, pronounced its worries about the enlargement of the conflict. Stevenson, the head of the Democrats, said that he did not consider the status of the offshore islands essential to the security of the United States or even to that of Formosa. A group of Democratic senators introduced in April a resolution calling for the barring of the Presidential powers granted in the Formosan resolutions to employ American forces to defend the islands. Yet, the Republicans stayed firm on their positions and defeated the dissenters.
            On March 10th, Secretary Dulles stated during a National Security Council meeting that the American people were ready to launch a nuclear offensive against any Chinese aggression on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Again on March 15th, Dulles publicly stated that the United States was seriously considering using atomic weapons in the Quemoy-Matsu area. The next day, Eisenhower made a statement during a news conference that the United States was willing to employ atomic weapons against military targets if necessary, saying that "A-bombs can be used ... as you would use a bullet." (180) These public statements sparked a sharp international controversy, and NATO's foreign ministers opposed the atomic attack on China, but Eisenhower and Dulles remained impervious to such influences. On March 25th, US chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carney said that the president was planning to destroy Red China's military potential.
            However, the main goal of Eisenhower's Far Eastern Policy was to secure peace, not to wage war against China. Such aggressive statements was to show that 'if' the Communist Chinese attacked Formosa or the smaller islands, the United States might consider taking such measures to protect its safety and interests. Ultimately, Eisenhower's logic was to continue with a cautious policy, to remain patient until the Communists gave in and came to the negotiation table. The administration had put a lot of effort not to make Jiang Jieshi feel encouraged to launch an offensive on the mainland and to prevent any direct conflicts. Fortunately, the Presidents policy turned out to be effective as Beijing proclaimed its willingness to negotiate in late April.
            In the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, on April 23rd, Zhou Enlai dramatically announced that his government was ready to negotiate on the status of Taiwan and the conflict over it. He said, "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people ... [they] do not want to have war with the United States. The Chinese Government is willing to sit down and ... to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area." (182) This was the first friendly gesture the Chinese Communists took toward America since its establishment. This could have resulted from the influence of contemporary Russian policy of 'peaceful coexistence' or from its apprehensions about the possibility of an American nuclear assault. Despite the unclear reasons, the shift in the Chinese attitude hinted the possibility for a peaceful settlement.
            Yet, at first, the Americans remained suspicious of the Communists' intentions, predicting that they may be playing a strategic propaganda game. Americans demanded three preconditions before any peace talks,
1. The participation of the Chinese Nationalists on terms of equality;
2. The prior release of all American prisoners in China;
3. The Beijing government's acceptance of the earlier UN invitation to take part in the Assembly's discussions over ending hostilities in the Formosan area. (183)

            Feeling rebuffed, Zhou Enlai made another statement announcing that the willingness to negotiate should not be understood in any way as the Communists' reconsideration of their right to exercise sovereign powers in liberating Formosa. Convinced that the PRC may actually want a realistic compromise, Dulles decided that he would modify his stand; not repeating the three conditions, he stated that a cease-fire in the Formosan Straits should be the first step toward negotiations. Both sides giving further grounds, an informal truce was accepted and negotiations began in early August between the Chinese ambassador to Poland and the US ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
            The ambassadorial talks, however, were not as productive. Despite the initial progress in bringing the release of the eleven imprisoned American airmen, other aspects of the negotiations were not very propitious. United States soon complained that the Chinese were still holding back 19 civilian prisoners who had 'offended against Chinese law.' On November 3rd 1955, the US ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Alexis Johnson, reported about the day's ambassadorial meetings. He reported that he "particularly focused on practical situation in Taiwan area and question whether PRC would resort to use of force in Taiwan area except defensively, and whether PRC accepted principles that use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law." (184) The Chinese Communists agreed with the general renunciation of the use of force in Sino-American relationship, but not on its specific application in the Formosan straits. They also answered that with regard to the status of Formosa, the People's Republic "cannot agree to [any foreign power] touching on any Chinese internal affair." (185) Such exchanges were a typical example of the ambassadorial talks that continued from August 1955 to January 1956. Ambassador Johnson presented the general American position in recognizing the Republic of China as a sovereign nation and that the United States had a right and duty to protect Formosa as a result of its legal treaty with the Nationalist government. The Chinese ambassador rebutted Johnson's position claiming that Formosa was Chinese territory and that the Nationalist Government in Formosa was a subversive group without the right to make a treaty regarding the defense of Formosa; the American action was interference in China's domestic affairs. Both sides unwilling to give way, the obstacles to agreement were insurmountable. John K. Fairbank's publication 'China: Time for a Policy' effectively summarizes the situation and the unbending US position of the time: "recognition of Communist China is am ambiguous phrase. ... On our part we certainly will not recognize Beijing as ruling Taiwan. Thus terms acceptable to us will be unacceptable to Beijing and vice versa. ... Negotiation, however, is a different matter. The argument for dealing with Beijing is not that Chinese Communism is such a good thing ... but rather that it is such a great problem that we cannot ignore it. ... A settlement committing us to defend them in the Republic of Taiwan recognizes present realities but surrenders nothing for the future." (186)
            The Chinese suggested a direct negotiation on the foreign minister level, but the United States rejected it by replying that it would be impossible until the Beijing government accepts a sincere official renunciation of force and releases the remaining American prisoners. Secretary Dulles remained firm on this issue, trying not to make any moves that the PRC may receive as those toward American diplomatic recognition. The informal truce had stopped the Communists' bombardments of the offshore islands, but any further agreements on Formosa were not achieved. For both sides, the result could be considered a limited success, as the Nationalist Army evacuated from many of the smaller islands, and the Americans successfully held back Communist aggressions without active hostilities.

VII.4 The Second Taiwan Crisis
            Eisenhower's second presidential term began off with relative calm. The Communist China continued its restrained foreign policy and conciliatory program presented during the previous Bandung Conference. Although the Communist Chinese goal for political dominance over Taiwan and elsewhere remained unaltered, its emphasis shifted from belligerent motives and military intervention to more moderate political pressures. However, during 1957, several factors led to the deterioration of such conciliatory atmosphere. The PRC was facing various domestic problems, including the increasing demand for political liberalization and badly faltering economy. Such domestic problems led to a stiffened foreign policy and new aggressiveness. Additionally, the international developments of apparent Soviet ascendancy, including the launch of Sputnik, and the difficulty of America's allies in the Suez and Lebanon crises encouraged the Communist China to build up its influence and power not only in Asia but throughout the world. Most critically, the Chinese Nationalists, "believing that the internal troubles the Communists were facing made them vulnerable to attack, were threatening invasion. The attitude of the United States and the Nationalist Government also served to provoke the Communists. American refusal to the suggestion of exchange of American and Chinese newsmen upset the Beijing regime. In complete disregard of all American advice, Jiang Jieshi had concentrated more and more of his troops on Quemoy and Matsu until they totaled some 100,000 men, and he was using the offshore islands as a base for commando raids against the Communists." (187) Additionally, the United States provided the Nationalists with weapons including air-to-air missiles, 8-inch Howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells, and Matador missiles. As a result of these various factors, the general attitude of Red China once again turned to a mood of revived belligerency.
            The Chinese Communists opened up a new offensive in August 23rd, 1958, by shelling the island of Quemoy and setting up a naval blockade around it. Aggressive propaganda assaults were laid on the Americans; American naval ships were threatened; the Communist intent to liberate Taiwan was declared. Additionally, on October 5th, Khrushchev wrote that an American attack on China would be construed as an attack on the USSR, demonstrating his support for China.
            In response to the shelling of the islands, the United States made it clear that it would support the Nationalists in defending the islands and President Eisenhower deployed forces to the region. The Nationalist forces on the islands were provided with support from ships protected by US naval vessels. Both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles publicly affirmed the US commitment to defend Taiwan and to counter naval threats in the Taiwan Straits.' Secretary Dulles also declared that the United States would take "timely and effective action to defend Taiwan." (188) American naval aircrafts were supported to the Nationalist air force, which in turn succeeded in taking control of the region's airspace by defeating the Communist aircrafts. As the conflicts ensued, the Joint Chiefs of Staff even came up with plans for nuclear strikes at the Chinese cities of Shanghai, Guangzhou and Nanjing. Such unexpectedly forceful American reaction surprised the Chinese and the Soviets, convincing Zhou Enlai to resume the ambassadorial talks beginning on 15th September 1958.
            The ambassadorial talks were again faced with the traditional controversy of whether the United States had the right to intervene in the matter and whether the Communists would continue to resort to military methods. At the same time, the Communists refused to stop shelling Quemoy. American public opinions started to sway, as could be seen in the letters flying in to the State Department, suggesting a change in the policy to back away from the possibility of war. Secretary Dulles became more conciliatory, trying to come to an agreement with the Chinese Communists; he went so far as to 'suggest that if the communists agreed to a cease-fire, the United States would favor a reduction in the occupations troops [on the off-shore islands].' (189) Faced by such American attitudes, the Communists stepped up their propaganda that the Americans would sooner or later abandon Formosa. With the dispute unresolved, the crisis came to an end when Peng Dehuai, the Chinese Minister of National Defense Marshal, offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement on 6th October. A cease-fire was called, and under American pressure, Jiang Jieshi agreed to follow a peaceful course in the Formosan Straits. Aggression continued in the area through the form of bombardment of each side with shells containing propaganda leaflets on alternate days of the week.

VII.5 The Last Days of Eisenhower's Second Term
            Apart from its position in the Formosan Straits, the United States continued its traditional policy toward China. In terms of diplomatic recognition, Secretary John Foster Dulles tried best to do nothing to contribute to the acceptance of Communist China as a legitimate government. He conducted an unrelenting campaign to block the admission of the Chinese People's Republic into the United Nations, and he insisted on the maintenance of the trade embargo enacted during the Korean War on Red China.
            In late May 1957, the State Department announced that the unilateral embargo on all trade with Communist China will continue to be held, whether or not it involved so-called strategic goods. He said that for the "United States to encourage any trade with the Communists that might strengthen China's industrial base would be to gamble with [its] national security." (190)
            The Americans were also united in their resistance against the Communist China's representation in the UN. Secretary Dulles stated that the People's Republic could not even be considered on the question of admittance until it had completely purged itself of aggressions, since it had been labeled as an aggressor during the Korean War. If the Chinese Communists, he stated, were to continue to encourage war in Indochina and maintain a threatening stance in the Formosan Straits, the United Nations should reject the possibility of their acceptance. Obviously, the American delegation to the UN consequently exercised all its influence in lining up opposition to the Soviet resolutions, asking for the admittance of the Red China while throwing out the nationalists.
            Communist China also continued to appear aggressive, stiffening the American determination to completely isolate it. It continued to strongly back Ho Chi Minh and the Vietcong, and openly supported the Communist movements in Laos. It brutally suppressed the uprisings in Tibet, and entered an acrimonious border dispute with India.
            The Assistant Secretary of State Robertson gave a speech in March 1959, assailing "the fanatical, aggressive, hostile, and threatening International Communist regime of Beijing, an implacable enemy dedicated to the destruction of all the foundations upon which a free society exists." (191) President Eisenhower also backed up this position when he announced in Taipei that "the United States did not accept the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in Beijing to speak for the Chinese people." (192) He assured to the Chinese Nationalists that the United States would stand with them against any aggression.

VIII. Summary
            Communism first appeared in China during the late 1910s, in the midst of widespread poverty, political chaos, and imperialistic foreign encroachments, as a method of providing solution to the various internal and external problems that had plagued China. It was embraced by a small group of intellectuals who believed that effective methods of reform and political organization could be learned from the Russian Communists. First founded in 1921 with Bolshevik assistance, the Chinese Communist Party strived to extend their influence by pursuing the goals of establishing labor unions, expanding Socialist Youth Corps, and publishing materials on Communism. At the initial stage, the party was supervised Russian advisors such as Voitinsky, and followed the path of allying itself with the Nationalist Guomindang, which had more popular recognition and political power. In the First United Front, from 1922 to 1926, the CCP was able to approach the masses to conduct subterranean communist propaganda, and its members had penetrated into the central positions of Guomindang.
            The hardship for the CCP came when the First United Front ended. With Jiang Jieshi, suspicious of the causes of the left-wing party members and the Communists, launching attacks on them, the Communists had to flee further into central and west China. Scattered Communist effort to conduct agrarian revolutions and build Soviet districts had foundered due to a series of aggressive campaigns by Guomindang forces and the strategic misjudgments of the party leadership. When the Jiangxi Soviet was shattered, the remaining Communists went on the 'Long March' to relocate themselves to Ya'nan, Shaanxi. Mao Zedong, who followed a more nationalistic path than the contemporary party leaders who had been indoctrinated by Russian Bolsheviks, rose to power during the course of the Long March, and the general party loyalty of the members was heightened.
            After a temporary peace with the Guomindang in the Second United Front during the Chinese War of Resistance Against the Japanese, which was also ravaged by unofficial war between to two rivals, conflict broke out. American effort for reconciliation of the Communists and the Nationalists were frustrated, and Civil War ensued. By 1949, Mao assured his victory over Jiang Jieshi. During the War of Resistance, the Communists had expanded their local party organizations and communications, and had intensively trained the Red Army. Communist power especially expanded after Japan's surrender as the Communist forces swiftly took over much of the surrendered weapons, ammunitions and equipments, and converted large portions of the puppet army. Weakened by economic and political chaos, corruption, inefficiency, lack of leadership, and defeatist sentiment, the Guomindang government failed to withstand the Communists. The Chinese Communist party proclaimed the People's Republic on October 1st, 1949.
            The Chinese Communist Party stabilized the socio-political chaos by establishing a far-reaching hierarchical government. Gradual land reforms, collectivization, and nationalization of industries met adequate success in relieving the desperate economic situation of post-war China, without large resistance from the landlords and the capitalists. With special focus on agriculture and heavy industries, the economy of the People's Republic experienced a rapid growth.
            The Korean Communists, on the other hand, had less success in comparison to their Chinese comrades. Communism was first adopted by the Koreans for purposes similar to those of the Chinese. However, the Korean communist movements were faced by the threatening challenge from the Japanese colonial administration and intense factionalism. Without strict indoctrination, experience nor party loyalty, the Korean communists were critically divided by factional conflicts and were arrested by the colonial polices before they could establish widespread party support basis or conduct reforms. Those who had escaped the Japanese surveillance fled to Manchuria and Ya'nan to conduct guerilla activities under the Chinese Communist Party. It was only after World War II that Kim Il Sung and other Korean Communists rose to power in the Northern half of Korea with Russian assistance.
            The United States became involved in the affairs of the Far East since the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan. Traditionally, the United States policy toward China had been the 'Open Door' policy which upheld the territorial and administrative integrity of China. During World War II, however, the United States went through a shift in its policy as it allied with China. Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor initiated the Pacific War with the United States, which overlapped with the Chinese War of Resistance and brought in active support to China from America. Large budget appropriations were delivered to the Chinese Nationalist Government in the forms of funds or war materials, under the Lend-lease program and other aid legislations. An American volunteer air force and American advisor teams were deployed to China, assisting Jiang Jieshi's struggle for independence. Training institutions had been established by American officers, where the Guomindang army had been trained and equipped. The limitations to the American aids at this point were Jiang's personal ambitions for power. Jiang was in an internal conflict with the Communists, and he opposed to putting full effort into anti-Japanese combats rather than in combats with the Communists. He also opposed to the United States' providing assistance to the Chinese Communists, which may have significantly strengthened the anti-Japanese performances. However disillusioned it may have been with Chinese fighting power, the United States found China an important ally in the Asian front, especially crucial in holding on to Japanese soldiers and preventing them from being deployed to the Pacific War; thus, America provided many forms of assistance, with direct intervention the only exception.
            Immediately after the end of the World War II, the United States put genuine effort in to reconciling the Communists and the Nationalists. Under American pressure, peace talks began in mid-August 1945, immediately after the Japanese surrender. General Marshall was deployed as the American mediator in the peace negotiations. However, the fundamental split could not be overcome. A truce was accepted, but heavy military conflicts continued in central and eastern China. Both sides could not reach an agreement on how to divide their area of influences and how each party would be represented in the government; the mutual suspicion did not melt away. General Marshall's attempts to promote peaceful settlement to the conflict came to an end by January 1947. Having miscalculated Jiang's stubborn desire to maintain the one-party dictatorship of Guomindang and Mao's determination to build a communist state, the United States failed to achieve its goal of establishing a coalition government in China.
            Afterwards, when Chinese Civil War fully broke out, the Truman Administration did its best not to get directly involved in China's internal conflict. Although it maintained its alliance with the Nationalists, it limited its economic and financial aid, and cut off all forms of direct military aid. Three reasons could be attributed for such a stance. First, the Truman Administration had been more occupied with the contemporary matters in Europe; second, it did not want to be responsible for a prolonged civil war, especially as a foreign interferer; third, the Guomindang Government had been doing extremely bad, squandering away its revenues without solving any of the post-war socio-economical problems. Even at the face of heavy Republican opposition, the Truman Administration remained unwavering in its policy.
            A series of communist military aggressions throughout the 1950s and the technological, industrial growth of the Soviet Union and China again reversed the American policy of disengagement from China. After the Soviet development of the nuclear bomb and the fall of China to the Communists, the fear of international communism became widespread amongst the American public. Led by Joseph McCarthy and other party leaders, the Republican Party fed on such apprehension to push forward a "Red Scare" domestic program, and a rigid anti-communist foreign policy. When the North Koreans invaded the South in June 1950, President Truman declared immediate action as a result of such domestic pressures as well as for military strategic reasons. United States armed forces were deployed to the Korean Peninsula, and the American representative at UN pushed through resolutions designating the Chinese and the North Koreans as the aggressors, and isolating them. After the presidential elections, in June 1953, Eisenhower and Dulles were able to bring the Communists to a submission by playing their nuclear cards threateningly. During the Korean War, however, it is interesting to note that the Truman Administration, although engaging itself in a brutal war, wanted to keep it 'limited' - in other words prevent it from becoming a direct war with the entire Red Sphere. This policy of 'limited war in Korea' had been a matter of conflict between the Truman Administration and the Republicans (including McArthur). When Eisenhower entered his presidency and Dulles became the Secretary of State, the policy of 'limited war' shifted to that of 'brinkmanship.'
            Much of the policies outlined during the Korean War were maintained even throughout the later crises in the Formosan Straits. The policy of resisting diplomatic recognition of the PRC and rejecting its admission to the United Nations was already a cemented China Policy. The Eisenhower Administration continued to try to avoid the eruption of a full scale war with Red China or the Soviet Union. It did not enact any policies that might have seemed too offensive or take any steps in provoking aggression. However, the United States used the tactic of 'brinkmanship,' presenting various preconditions for peace, maintaining a rigid position during negotiations, and playing, once again, the nuclear card. Although no steps were taken toward peace, the two Taiwan Straits Crises, which could have developed into a full-scale war, were intercepted by the American policy.

IX. Conclusion
            People nowadays associate "China" with the PRC, rather than the Republic of China on Taiwan. In the competition between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists, the Communists turned out as the victorious ones. They began as the minority and the weaker party, but eventually outran their opponents and rose to power in the mainland China. Even today, the PRC is turning out much more successful and powerful, when considering its military power, international influence, and rapidly growing economy (although the Republic of China, or Taiwan, has a successful economy and democracy). The triumph of the Communists during the conflicts in 1930s and 40s can be ascribed to both the advantages the Communists had over the Nationalists, and the chronic defects that the Nationalist Government had suffered.
            The Communists had two advantages over their counterparts: first, their strong power loyalty and unilateral, hierarchical organization made the administration much more effective and propulsive. The Communist Party and the Government of PRC was organized so that all the powers of government were concentrated in the Central Committee and the Supreme Assembly; when decisions were made by these central powers, orders were given down to lower assemblies and committees which, at the final level, reached the local branches of the party organizations and local administrations where the orders were executed. Due to the austere indoctrination and surveillance, the members of the Communist Party were extremely loyal to the decisions of the party leaders. For instance, when the Central Committee decided on the programs of collectivization during the mid 1950s, the local party cadres immediately executed them and established collective farms and communities within periods less than two to three years. Jiang Jieshi, on the other hand, did not have such an authoritative position; his administration, being a mosaic of provincial powers, lacked unity or party loyalty. Secondly, the programs of Communism were more appealing to the masses. Land reforms, social and economic restructuring, and alleviation from poverty was what the Chinese Public, composed mostly of peasants, desperately wanted. The radical land redistribution programs and social renovation were welcomed by the peasants, and the Communist Party successfully built a wide-spread support base. In the meanwhile, the Guomindang failed to come up with effective solutions to the problems that had plagued China throughout the prolonged days of war and the post-war era.
            The Nationalist Government fell behind the communists as it failed to overcome the chronic defects that it had ever since its foundation: decentralized administration, corruption, and Jiang's personal thirst to maintain power - Jiang's personal ambitions being the most detrimental of all. To maintain his leadership, Jiang Jieshi absorbed other political, military powers into his party, turning the government into a jigsaw puzzle without unity. Unable to maintain full control of the provinces, Guomindang allowed Communist penetrations and military advances into its territory. Many of the Nationalist Government officials sought personal interests ahead of public interests; orders from the central administration and government fund appropriations were mis-delivered. The Nationalists were absurdly corrupt in comparison to their communist counterparts, and collected heavy taxes and cheated on government funds. After the World War II, the Government was even burdened with additional problems of runaway inflation and defeatist sentiment.
            These were the elements that led to a conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, in favor of the Chinese Communist Party. Although the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China proved to be more efficient during the 1960s when it began to develop into a prosperous, technology-oriented industrial nation, it failed to overcome its deficiencies during the time period covered in this paper. The stringent party discipline and unilateral decision making of the Communist Party was maintained until later days. Although such aspects of the Communists are today debated and discouraged on humanitarian basis, they provided the driving force for the rapid industrialization and power expansion of the PRC.
            The purpose of the United States foreign policy was and still is to protect the American interests and security in the world. From late 1930s to the end of 1950s, this was sought in East Asia through effort to contain the expansion of Communism. To do so, the United States allied with the Nationalist Government of China, supporting them militarily and economically. However, as was observed throughout this paper, there were frequent shifts in the degree to which the Americans backed up Jiang Jieshi's regime. These points of shift in US policy coincide with pivotal events that take place either in China and North Korea, or in the United States.
            The first major transition point was the end of the World War II and the Japanese surrender. Even before the conclusion of the war, tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States had been building up regarding on the specific methods of restoring peace. When the war was over, United States main opponent changed from Japan to the Soviet Union. American goal in China changed from 'maintaining an Asian ally against the Japanese Imperialism' to 'establishing a pro-American government in Asia to check against possible Soviet Aggression.' The Americans believed that this goal could be achieved by promoting a coalition government.
            The second shift in policy came in early 1947, for two reasons: first, the negotiations between the Nationalists and Communists for a coalition government did not turn out successful; secondly, the American Government became more cautious about the Soviet ambitions in Europe, thus accepting the "Primacy of Europe." By disregarding the truce agreement and refusing to make any compromises, Jiang Jieshi proved himself to be stubborn and incapable of following the general goal of the US. Furthermore, the Guomindang Nationalist Government proved itself to be incompetent, incapable of managing the domestic post-war problems and defending the communists' military challenges. The cold war tension which was being built up in Europe was also an influential factor. Especially in 1948, the Berlin Blockade was enforced on West Berlin and many of the allied planes were allocated to Europe instead of China. The Truman Administration chose to embark the 'disengagement' policy; the administration opposed to extending any economic aid to Jiang Jieshi and withdrew American military advisors from China. All US programs of aid were limited not to reach the level of direct responsibility in either the conduct of the fighting or in Chinese economy.
            The third pivotal point was in the autumn of 1949 when the Chinese Communists proclaimed the PRC. This time, it was rather the choices that the United States had to make than a shift in policy. Faced with the situation, the United States had to make a choice in whether or not it should diplomatically recognize the PRC and whether or not it the PRC should be admitted into the United Nations. Unclear of its future China policy and somewhat affected by its political opponents, the Truman Administration decided that for the time being, it would continue to recognize the Republic of China as the legitimate government of China. Containment, a policy of containing the expansion of communism in Europe, was also adopted in Asia shortly afterwards.
            The fourth important shift in policy came during the Korean War, the apex of the Cold War tension, as a result of many intertwined factors. First, the American public became extremely cautious of the threats of International Communism. Second, this fear of International Communism was used as a political tool by the Republican Party, most notably by Senator Joseph McCarthy, to stimulate the patriotism of the American public by emphasizing anti-communist sentiment. Third, the Truman Administration had pursued the policy of Containment, and the North Korean aggression provided a challenge to how committed the Americans were in enforcing the policy. Pushed by such factors, President Truman was convinced that the United States had to make direct reaction to demonstrate its willingness to contain the further spread of Communism in Asia through whatever means necessary
            The fifth shift of policy resulted from the election of Dwight D. Eisenhower into office. The Truman Administration, although committed to the Korean War, wanted to keep it a 'limited war', not extending it to a direct conflict with the Chinese Communists and possibly the Russians for the sake of the risks involved in doing so. However, the new Republican Administration was more daring and aggressive in its policies; while adopting the 'Containment' policy from President Truman, President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Dulles added the concept of "Brinkmanship." Unlike the precedent, the new president and his party did not fear pushing the situation to the verge of an enlarged war by playing the nuclear cards.
            The final shift of policy studied in this paper was a result of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis, a.k.a. Formosan Crisis. In 1954, the PRC once again put the commitment of the United States on question by launching a series of raids and bombardments on the islands occupied by the Nationalist forces. Such attacks could not but be construed as preludes to a full-out attack on the island of Formosa. This time, the Eisenhower Administration was convinced not only to continue their policy of "Brinkmanship", but also to provide military and economic aids to the ROC. American navy was deployed to the straits, preventing Communists attacks and evacuating the Nationalist forces from bombardments. American fighter planes were delivered to the ROC air forces to fight against the Communist MIGs. Such an American continued throughout Eisenhower's first and second presidential terms until the Second Formosa Crisis
            Thus, it was shown that the US policy toward China went through frequent shifts, facilitated by combinations of important events that took place in China, influences of various political powers within the United States Governments, and the pressures from countries other than the two Chinas and the United States itself. The United States government endeavored to best protect its various, rapidly changing interests; however, the American China policy as a whole can not be regarded a success.
            Before the end of the World War II, American interest involved in China was to protect the nation from Imperial Japan. However, until the Americans actually dropped the bombs on the two Japanese cities, the prospects of the war in China were not very bright. American supplies, officers, and voluntary fighting forces did contribute to slowing down the Japanese conquering of Chinese land, but it could not push them back effectively. The industrial complexes and the largest cities of the east coast were either occupied or destroyed by the Japanese, and were never recovered until the Japanese surrendered. The supplies and aids provided by the Americans and the allies were never sufficient for the Chinese to set up any major counter-offensives against Japan, and the American commander Stilwell failed to elicit Chinese cooperation and conflicted with Chinese leadership. The Americans were, in simple words, fighting their separate 'Pacific War', and the Chinese front was only a part of the war; therefore, they refused to arm the Chinese further or to throw in more supplies to engage in an counter-offensive, and insisted on protecting only southwest China near the Burma Road to protect the allies' strategic location and communication lines. Toward the end of the war, the Japanese Operation Ichigo was successful in penetrating into the Chinese continent even deeper; if it hadn't been for the nuclear card and American victory in the pacific war, the Chinese would never have been rescued from Japanese imperialism. China had to suffer heavy human casualties, economic destruction, and socio-political chaos.
            After the surrender of Japan, the Soviet Russia emerged as United States' next opponent. Aware of the increasing communist influence, checking the communist expansion became America's most urgent interest. However, the United States failed to curb the Communist expansion and let the continent fall to the hands of the Chinese Communist Party. The Truman administration was stubbornly insisting the "Primacy of Europe" theory, and threw in most of its supplies to the European Recovery Program to revitalize the European economy and thus block the infiltrating communist ideas. As was discussed previously, the Americans were austere toward the communism in Europe as can be seen in the Berlin Airlift. However, the United States abandoned China, refusing to enhance aids or to help out in settling peace. Though it can not be said for certain what would otherwise have happened if more resources and attention were apportioned for China, the United States allocated most of its attention and resources in Europe that it left the Chinese almost on their own. To begin with, the State Department made a mistake in evaluating the Chinese Communist Party to be not an authentic Marxist party but a party of agrarian reformers who were simply discontented with the rampant poverty. The coalition government was destined to fail as the political ideals of the communists and the nationalists were absolutely incompatible. General Marshall's attempts to mediate the conflict were nothing more than a waste of time. When the Chinese entered the Civil War, the Truman Administration set on its "disengagement" policy and tried to pull its feet out of the conflict, instead of fighting alongside the Nationalists. Pleas from Jiang Jieshi were unheard, no significant military or economic aid were delivered to the Nationalists. When the Red People's Army crossed the Yangtze River, when the cities of Nanjing, Wuhan, and Chongqing fell, the Americans stood aloof, excluding the possibility of their involvement in the conflict or stopping the communists' expansion. Ultimately, Western Europe was secured but China was given over - a partial success in terms of America's entire foreign policy, but a complete failure in terms of China policy. It was already too late to regret when the People's Republic of China was established, and they realized that the idea of 'containment' applied to Asia as well. Only when the Korean War broke out did the Americans move to protect their grounds in East Asia.
            The Korean War also proved the inability of the American Administration to protect its interests in East Asia. In the early phase of the war, the American political scene was plagued by Republican anti-communist craze, Administrations' stubborn resolve to keep the war limited, and the conflict between the military leader McArthur and President Truman. By being imprudent, the Americans pushed too far and brought the Chinese into the War; this lengthened the War for two additional years, in which the two sides pushed and pulled with intensive fighting. Both the Koreans and the UN Forces suffered heavy casualties, the Korean peninsula was completed destroyed, and the Cold War animosity became multiple times more intense. Though in 1953, the War ended in an armistice, the United States made the mistake of enlarging and prolonging the war, making the war extremely costly.
            Though some members of the Republican Party abused the anti-communist sentiment and the situations in China to arouse public apprehension and to lay virulent assaults on their political opponents, the Republican Administration led by President Eisenhower deserves a more appreciative evaluation than its predecessor. Since 1952, the United States Began to take a more challenging stance toward the Communists and skillfully played its various diplomatic cards, finishing the Korean War, effectively preventing PRC's attempt to take over Formosa, and diplomatically isolating PRC. It still can not be certain whether President Eisenhower really considered the use of massive destructive weapons like the nuclear bomb (as he personally hated war), but the nuclear card definitely seem to have had effect in restraining the Chinese Communists.
            Though the Truman Administration during the 1940s failed to secure America's best interests in China, the Eisenhower Administration prevented situations from becoming any worse for the United States. The diplomatic stalemate between the PRC and the United States lasted until the 1970s when President Richard Nixon began the process of normalizing the relationship. The tension between the PRC and the ROC remains until today, both governments still refusing to recognize each other. What is ironical is that today, the United States recognizes the PRC as the legitimate government of China. Since the recognition of the PRC in 1979, the United States terminated its official diplomatic relationship with the ROC Government on Taiwan. The PRC has proven itself to be the more economically powerful and internationally influential state, and the United States was probably convinced that its old enemy has become the more enticing partner in seeking the American interests.


(1)      Library of Congress Country Studies: China - Republican China
(2)      Naver Encyclopedia - The Emergence of CCP
(3)      International Socialist Review Issue 01, Summer 1997
(4)      Library of Congress Country Studies - China: Opposing the Warlords
(5)      Wikipedia - Northern Expedition
(6)      Library of Congress Country Studies - China: Opposing the Warlords
(7)      Wikipedia - Otto Braun (Li De)
(8)      Library of Congress Country Studies: China - Rise of the Communists
(9)      Yang 1998
(10)      On Tactics Against Japanese Imperialism - speech by Mao Zedong, in 'Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung', 'Mao Zedong Reference Archive
(11)      Indo-Asian News Service (October 22, 2006): Retracing Mao's Long March, after Wikipedia : Long March:
(12)      Saich n.d.
(13)      Kim (2004) pp. 201-203
(14)      Lee (1978) pp. 5, 6
(15)      Naver Encyclopedia : Korean People's Socialist Party
(15a)      The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was a government in exile based in Shanghai, China and later in Chongqing, while Korea was under Japanese rule. The government did not gain formal recognition from world powers, though modest form of recognition was given from the Nationalist Government of China and a number of other governments, most of whom were in exile themselves. The Government strove for the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule.
(16)      Naver Encyclopedia : Koryo Communist Party
(18)      Naver Encyclopedia : Koryo Communist Party
(19)      Lee (1978) pp.30-32
(20)      Naver Encyclopedia : Choson Communist Party
(21)      The Formation of the National United Front: Shinganhoe
(22)      Ibid.
(23)      Kwangju City Hall Homepage - Modern History of Kwangju : labor movements
(24)      Kwangju City Hall Homepage - Modern History of Kwangju: farmers' organizations
(25)      Wikipedia - Mukden Incident
(26)      Wikipedia - Second Sino-Japanese War
(27)      Houn (1967) pp. 49-52
(28)      Snow (2004) pp. 60-70
(29)      Houn (1967) pp. 52-55
(30)      Library of Congress Country Studies - Japan : Sino-Japanese War
(31)      Spence (1998) pp. 22 -26
(32)      Wikipedia - Second Sino-Japanese War: Japan's Invasion of China
(33)      Spence (1998) pp. 28-32
(34)      Wikipedia - Second Sino-Japanese War: Japan's Invasion of China
(35)      Deng (2004) pp. 533-540
(36)      Deng (2004) pp. 540-551
(37)      Spence (1998) pp. 33-45
(38)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 24-26
(39)      Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Volume IV pp.730-758
(40)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 26-28; FRUS China 1942 pp. 566-590, 624- 631
(41)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 28-30
(42)      ibid.. pp. 31-33
(43)      Feis (1967) pp. 24-44; Schlesinger (1996) pp. 32-34
(44)      Schlesinger (1996) pp. 35-41
(44a)      quoted after Schlesinger (1996) p. 43
(44b)      quoted after Schlesinger (1996) p. 44
(45)      Ibid. pp. 42-45
(46)      Feis (1967) pp. 188-199; Schlesinger (1996) pp. 46-49
(47)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 34-37
(48)      Schlesinger (1996) pp. 50-53
(49)      Spence (1998) pp. 52-62
(50)      Wikipedia - Second Sino-Japanese War - legacy: who fought the war of resistance; Chang, Halliday (2005) pp. 231-233, 246, 286-287
(51)      Chang, Halliday (2005) pp. 207-217
(51b)      Houn (1967) pp. 46,48
(52)      Chang, Halliday (2005) pp. 218 - 227, 245-260
(53)      Deng 2004 - Yang (1998) pp.91
(54)      Deng 2004 - Yang (1998) pp.84-96
(54a)      Houn (1967) p. 54
(55)      Houn (1967) pp.52-60
(56)      Houn (1967) pp.60-62
(57)      Library of Congress Country Studies - South Korea: Korea Under Japanese Rule
(58)      Happy Campus: Korean Socialist Movements in the 1930s (online publication) - written by user ID: rebimok21c
(59)      Lee (1978) pp. 39-46; History of Korean Labor Movements - Korean Grand Alliance of Labor Union
(60)      Lee (1978) pp. 62-70
(61)      Wikipedia - Kim Il Sung: Early Years; Report World: #218423 - Kim Il Sun and the Korean War
(62)      Houn (1967) pp.65, 66
(63)      Chang and Halliday (2005) pp. 292-295, 301, 302
(64)      Ibid. (pp 298-303)
(65)      Houn (1967) pp. 66, 67; Chang and Halliday (2005) pp. 296, 297, 304, 305
(66)      Britannica Book of the Year 1947 - China (p. 208); Wikipedia - Inflation
(67)      Feis (1967) pp. 361-364, 367; FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 577-581
(68)      Feis (1967) pp. 368-375
(69)      Ibid. pp. 377, 378, 380, 384-386, 388, 389
(70)      Ibid. pp. 397 - 400, 404, 405
(71)      Ibid. pp. 415-418, 420, 421
(72)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp.136-141
(73)      ibid. pp. 145-152
(74)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp.155 - 178; Moise (1986) pp. 104, 105
(75)      Dulles (1972) p. 28
(76)      Cumings (2005) pp. 185-188; Wikipedia - Division of Korea 'End of World War II (1939-1945)'
(77)      Cumings (2005) pp. 189 - 190
(78)      Wikipedia - Division of Korea, 'In the South'
(79)      Cumings (2005) p. 208
(80)      Lim (1999) pp. 124-127
(81)      Cumings (2005) pp. 211, 212
(82)      Lee (1978) pp. 75, 76
(83)      Lee (1978) pp. 77, 78; Lim (1999) pp. 68-70
(84)      Lee (1978) pp. 78, 81; Lim (1999) pp. 95, 103-104
(85)      Lee (1978) pp. 81-82
(86)      Houn (1967) p. 69
(87)      Houn (1967) p. 69; Moise (1986) pp. 103, 104, 109
(88)      Houn (1967) pp. 69,70; Moise (1986) p. 110
(89)      Moise (1986) pp. 106-107
(90)      Ibid. pp. 107-108
(91)      Houn (1967) pp. 72-76
(92)      Houn (1967) p. 71; Moise (1986) pp. 111-113
(93)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 230-235
(94)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 236-242; Dulles (1972) pp.28
(95)      Dulles (1972) pp. 29
(96)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 245-250
(97)      ibid.. pp. 251-260, annexes pp. 134-138
(98)      ibid.. pp. 261-269
(99)      ibid. pp. 273-279
(100)      ibid. pp. 269-273, 387-390
(101)      ibid. pp. 280-288; Dulles (1972) p. 37
(102)      FRUS China 1944-1949 pp. 288-299, 379, 380
(103)      ibid. pp. 300-310
(104)      Dulles 1972 pp. 39-47
(105)      Torkunov 1995 (p. 7)
(106)      Cumings (2005) p. 202
(107)      Blum 1993 (p. 801)
(108)      Lee (1978) p. 83
(109)      Cumings (2005) p. 247
(110)      Welcome to the KoreanWar.com - Korean War : History
(111a)      Ibid.
(111b)      Ibid.
(111c)      Ibid.
(112)      Welcome to the Korean War.com - Korean War: Culcullu (2004) pp. 55, 56)
(113)      Welcome to the Korean War.com - Korean War: History; Cucullu (2004) p.57; Wikipedia - Korean War : Escalation of the Korean War
(114)      Welcome to the Korean War.com - Korean War: History
(115)      Cumings (2005) pp.283, 284, 286; Welcome to the Korean War.com - Korean War : History
(116)      Welcome to the Korean War.com - Korean War: History; Wikipedia - Korean War : Chinese Intervention
(117)      Welcome to the Korean War.com - Korean War: History
(118)      Wikipedia - Korean War: Fighting Across the 38th Parallel
(119)      Wikipedia - Korean War: Stalemate
(120)      Naver Encyclopedia: 6.25 [The Progress of the Korean War and the UN measures]; 6.25 [Peace Negotiations]
(121)      Wikipedia - Korean War: Casualties
(122)      Naver Encyclopedia : 6.25 Peace Negotiations
(122a)      Guttmann (1972) p.3
(123)      Guttmann (1972) pp.3, 4
(124)      Cumings (2005) pp. 290
(124a)      ibid. pp. 293
(125)      Ibid. pp. 288-293
(126)      Ibid. pp. 293-297
(127)      Guttmann (1972) p. 6
(128)      Ibid. pp. 14, 15
(129)      Wikipedia - MacArthur : Korean War
(130)      Guttmann (1972) p. 15
(131)      Guttmann (1972) pp. 15-18
(132)      Speech by General McArthur, on March 24th, 1951, quoted after Guttman (1972) p.78
(133)      Ibid. pp. 22, 23
(134)      Blum 1993 pp. 803, 804
(135)      Long Telegram - George F. Kennan
(136)      Garraty (1994) p. 796
(137)      Ibid. p.798
(138)      Ibid. pp. 801, 802
(139)      Ibid. pp. 804, 805
(140)      Ibid. pp. 805, 806
(140a)      Wikipedia - Joseph McCarthy: The Wheeling Speech
(141)      Blum 1993 p. 805
(142)      Ibid. pp. 806, 807
(143)      Garraty (1994) pp. 807, 808
(144)      Ibid. pp. 810, 812, 813
(145)      Modern China - The Chinese Communist Party
(146)      Moise (1986) pp. 116-118
(147)      Modern China - The Chinese Communist Party
(148)      Houn (1967) pp. 157-161
(149)      Ibid. pp. 162-168
(150)      Ibid. p. 177
(151)      Ibid. pp. 173-177
(152)      Ibid. p.179
(153)      Ibid. p. 219
(154)      Ibid. pp. 222-224
(155)      Dulles (1972) pp. 36, 37
(156)      Ibid. p. 37
(157)      Ibid. p. 36
(158)      Ibid. p. 45
(159)      Speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in September 1949, quoted by Dulles 1972 p. 49
(160)      FRUS 1949. The Far East: China Volume IX p. 153
(161)      Dulles (1972) p. 51, 52
(161a)      FRUS 1949. The Far East: China Volume IX p. 200
(161b)      ibid.
(161c)      FRUS 1949. The Far East: China Volume IX p. 201
(162)      ibid.
(163)      Ibid. p. 59
(164)      Ibid. p. 60
(165)      Ibid. pp. 70
(166)      FRUS 1949. The Far East: China Volume IX p. 559
(167)      Dulles (1972) p. 76
(168)      Ibid. p. 85
(169)      Ibid. p. 96
(170)      Ibid. p. 95
(171)      Ibid. p. 108
(172)      Ibid. p. 111
(173)      Bradley's Case - Time. May 28, 1951
(174)      Speech by President Truman on May 24th 1952, quoted by Dulles (1972) p. 122
(175)      Dulles (1972) p. 133
(176)      Ibid. p. 148
(177)      Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai, on August 11th, 1954, quoted by Dulles (1972) p. 148
(178)      Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. China Volume II p. 61
(179)      First Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands - GlobalSecurity.org
(180)      Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. China Volume II p. 74
(181)      First Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands - GlobalSecurity.org
(182)      Dulles (1972) p. 160
(183)      Ibid. p. 161
(184)      Ibid p. 161
(185)      Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. China Volume III p. 155, 156
(186)      "China : Time for a Policy", The Atlantic Online, April 1957 - John K. Fairbank
(187)      Dulles 1972 p. 175
(188)      Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands - GlobalSecurity.org
(189)      Dulles (1972) p. 180
(190)      Ibid. p. 183
(191)      Speech by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, in March 1959, quoted after Dulles 1972 p. 186
(192)      Ibid. p. 187


I. Bibliographies

Cheong 2008      Cheong, Sung Hwa, and Alexander Ganse. Bibliography of Western Language Publications on Korea 1588 - 1950. The Myongji-LG Korean Studies Library. Seoul : Myongji UP 2008

II. Primary Sources, in Print

FRUS CH 44-49      United States. Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs. Department of State. United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49. 1949.
BS Korea 47      United States. Office of Public Affairs. Department of State. Foreign Affairs Background Summary: Korea. 1947.
III. Books

Blum 1993      Blum, Mcfeely, Morgan, Schlesinger, Stampp, and Woodward. The National Experience: A history of the United States. Wadsworth 1993
Chang 2005      Chang, Jung, and Jon Halliday. Mao: the Unknown Story. London: Jonathan Cape, 2005.
Cucullu 2004      Cucullu, Gordon. Separated at Birth: How North Korea became the Evil Twin. The Lyons Press, 2004.
Cumings 2005      Cumings, Bruce. Korea's Place in the Sun. Updated ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 2005.

Dulles 1972      Dulles, Foster R. American Foreign Policy Toward Communist China 1949-1969. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972.
Feis 1967      Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle: the American Effort in China From Pearl Harbor to the Marshal Plan. College ed. New York: Atheneum, 1967. 3-444.

Garraty 1994      Garraty, John A. The American Nation : The History of the United States Since 1865. 8th ed. Vol. 2. New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, Limited, 1994.
Guttmann 1972      Guttmann, Allen. Korea Cold War and Limited War. 2nd ed. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972.
Houn 1967      Houn, Franklin W. A Short History of Chinese Communism. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Lee 1978      Lee, Chong-Sik. Korean Workers' Party: a Short History. Stanford: Hoover Institution P, 1978. 1-167.
Lee 1995      Lee, Steven H. Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949 - 1954. Liverpool UP, 1995. 3-295.

Moise 1986      Moise, Edwin E. Modern China. London: Longman, 1986.
Pratt 1952      Pratt, John M. Revitalizing a Nation: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Chicago: The Heritage Foundation, 1952.
Schlesinger 1996      Schlesinger, Sande J. Misguided Intentions: US Policy in WWII and Chinese Intervention in Korea. Diss. 1996.

Yang 1998      Yang, Benjamin. Deng a Political Biography. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 1998.

III. Online Books

FRUS      University of Wisconsin Digital Collections - Foreign Relations of the United States: http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/
FRUS FE 1931      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1931. The Far East Vol.III
FRUS FE 1932      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1932. The Far East Vol.III
FRUS FE 1933      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1933. The Far East Vol.III
FRUS FE 1935      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1935. The Far East Vol.III
FRUS FE 1936      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1936. The Far East Vol.III
FRUS FE 1937      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1937.(in five volumes) The Far East Vol.IV
FRUS FE 1938      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1938. The Far East Vol.IV
FRUS FE 1939      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1939. The Far East Vol.III
FRUS FE 1940      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1940. The Far East Vol.IV
FRUS CH 1942      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1942. China
FRUS CH 1943      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1943. China
FRUS CH 1944      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, 1944. China: Vol. VI
FRUS FECH 1945      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1945. The Far East, China: Vol. VII
FRUS FECH 1946      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1946. The Far East: China: Vol. IX-X
FRUS FECH 1947      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1947. The Far East: China: Vol. VII
FRUS FECH 1948      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1948. The Far East: China: Vol. VII-VIII
FRUS FECH 1949      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1949. The Far East: China: Vol. VIII-IX
FRUS FEP 1949      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. National security affairs, foreign economic policy: Vol. I
FRUS FEP 1950      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. National security affairs, foreign economic policy: Vol. I
FRUS KOR 1950      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. Korea: Vol. VII
FRUS EAP 1950      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific: Vol. VII
FRUS KCH 1951      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. Korea and China (in two parts): Volume VI, Part 2
FRUS CHJ 5254      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54. China and Japan (in two parts): Volume XIV, Part 1
FRUS KOR 5254      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54. Korea (in two parts): Volume XV, Part 1,2
FRUS CH 5557      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57. China: Volume II, III
FRUS CH 5860      United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-60. China: Volume XIX
LOC CS      Library of Congress - Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/
LOC CS J      Japan
LOC CS CH      China
LOC CS ROK      South Korea (ROK)
LOC CS DPRK      North Korea (DPRK)

IV. Encyclopedia Articles, Yearbooks, Journals

NIYB      The New International Year Book years 1938 - article China (pp. 151-159), 1939 - article China (pp. 131-144), 1941 - article China (pp. 117-123), 1942 - article China (pp. 131-138)
EBBY      Britannica Book of the Year: 1946 - article China (pp. 206-209), 1947 - article China (pp. 205-208)
Wik      Wikipedia wikc      Containment http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment
wiksar      People's Republic of China-United States Relations" : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-American_Relations
wikwpnk      Worker's Party of North Korea http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workers_Party_of_North_Korea
wikwpk      Worker's Party of Korea http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workers_Party_of_Korea
wik2sjw      Second Sino-Japanese War http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sino-Japanese_War
wikdok      Division of Korea http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_Korea
wikne      Northern Expedition (1926-1927)
wikob      Otto Braun http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Braun_(Li_De)
wikmi      Mukden Incident http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mukden_Incident
wikkis      Kim Il Sung http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Il_Sung
wikinfl      Inflation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/InflatioN
wikkw      Korean War http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
wiklm      Long March http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long_March
wikmca      Douglas McArthur http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglas_MacArthur
wikjmcc      Joseph McCarthy http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_McCarthy

Fakiolas 1998      Fakiolas, Efstathios T., "Kennan's Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative Analysis," East European Quarterly, Vol. 31, no. 4, January 1998
Fairbank 1957      China : Time for a Policy - The Atlantic Online April, 1957. http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/flashbks/china/fairbank.htm
Time 1951      Bradley's Case - Time. May 28, 1951. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,890038,00.html
ISR      International Socialist Review Issue 01, Summer 1997 : China: From Mao to Deng http://www.isreview.org/issues/01/mao_to_deng_1.shtml

V. Web Pages

DRAFP CW      Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy - The Cold War: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar.htm
USFP      United States Foreign Policy (University of Michigan Documents Center): http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/frames/forpolfr.html
EA SB      Internet East Asian History Sourcebook: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/eastasia/eastasiasbook.html
IHCPCH      "An Illustrated History of the Communist Party of China." www.china.org.cn. China Internet Information Center. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/45954.htm.
DKW      Documents on the Korean War : http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/korea/korea.htm
DRAFP NATO      Documents relating to American Foreign Policy ? NATO: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nato.htm
CWM      The Cold War Museum - Links to the 50's: http://www.coldwar.org/articles/50s/links.asp
CHCWH      "Chinese Civil War History." The History Department At the United States Military Academy. 1 May 2008 .
SII      Studies in Intelligence. CIA. May .
WSU MC      Modern China, from World Civilizations, by Richard Hooker: http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MODCHINA/COMM.HTM
MZRA      Mao Zedong Reference Archive: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/index.htm
Hickey 2001      Hickey, Michael. "The Korean War - an Overview." BBC: World Wars - the Cold War Aug. 1st 2008 http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml
WKW      Welcome to Koreanwar.com: The Ultimate Resource for the Korean War http://www.koreanwar.com/KoreanWar.htm
HSDU      Eisenhower & the Cold War 1953-61, from Cold War Policies by Steven Schoenherr: http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/20th/coldwarike.html
Torkunov 1995      "History of the Fatherland 'Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the 38th Parallel,'" Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 August 1995 ? Anatoli Torkunov. http://www.kwp.org/html/kdata/zveda.htm
GS FTSC      First Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands - GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/webinator/search/?pr=default&order=r&query=quemoy+and+matsu&submit=Submit
GS STSC      Second Taiwan Strait Crisis Quemoy and Matsu Islands 23 August 1958 - 01 January 1959 - GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/cgi-bin/texis.cgi/webinator/search/?pr=default&order=r&query=quemoy+and+matsu&submit=Submit
KCHH1      Kwangju City Hall Homepage - Modern History of Kwangju: farmersí» organizations: http://www.gwangju.go.kr/index.jsp
KCHH2      Kwangju City Hall Homepage - Modern History of Kwangju : labor movements: http://www.gwangju.go.kr/index.jsp
Shinganhoe      The Formation of the National United Front: Shinganhoe: http://mtcha.com.ne.kr/korea-term/sosun/term223-singanhoi.htm

VI. Other Electronic Sources
Goldstein 2000      Goldstein, Steven M. The United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978: Suspicious Allies. Smith College. 2000. 5-58. http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10125/Goldstein.pdf
Saich n.d.      Saich, Tony, comp. The Chinese Communist Party During the Era of the Comintern (1919 - 1943). Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~asaich/chinese-communisty-party-during-comintern.pdf

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