The political engineering in West Africa and Its implication on undemocratic regime


Korean Minjok Leadership Academy
BJH



Table of Contents


Second Draft , Nov. 2nd 2011
First Draft , Sept. 5th 2011
References , Sept. 5th 2011
Working Table of Contents , Sept. 5th 2011



Second Draft . . Go to Teacher's Comment

Political Fraud in West Africa and its implication on democratization

Table of contents

I. Introduction
II. Definition: Election Fraud
III. Research Orientation: Election: responsiveness and Contestation
IV. Method of study
IV.1 Selection of regions and subjects
IV.2 Selection of sources
IV.3 Approach and limitation
V. Historical context of West Africa before 1990: Military regime and single party
VI. The elections in Nigeria
VI.1 Historical context before 1990
VI.1.1 The legacy of colonialism and military rule
VI.1.1 Election and ethnic polarization
VI.2 Presidential elections in Nigeria
VI.2.1 The presidential election in 1993
VI.2.2 The presidential election in 1999
VI.2.3 The presidential election in 2003
VI.2.4 The presidential election in 2007
VI.2.5 The presidential election in 2011
VI.3 Analysis
VI.3.1 Types of election fraud in Nigeria
VI.3.2 Responsiveness
VI.3.3 Contestation
VII. The elections in Ivory Coast
VII.1 Historical background
VII.2 Presidential elections in Ivory Coast
VII.2.1 The presidential election in 1990
VII.2.2 The presidential election in 1995
VII.2.3 The presidential election in 2000
VII.2.4 The presidential election in 2010
VII.3 Analysis
VII.3.1 Types of election fraud in Ivory Coast
VII.3.2 Responsiveness
VII.3.3 Contestation
VIII. The elections in Togo
VIII.1 Historical background
VIII.2 Presidential elections in Togo
VIII.2.1 The presidential election in 1993
VIII.2.2 The presidential election in 1998
VIII.2.3 The presidential election in 2003
VIII.2.4 The presidential election in 2005
VIII.2.5 The presidential election in 2010
VIII.3 Analysis
VIII.3.1 Types of election Fraud in Togo
VIII.3.2 Responsiveness
VIII.3.3 Contestation
IX. The elections in Ghana
IX.1 Historical Background
IX.2 Presidential elections in Ghana
IX.2.1 The presidential election in 1990
IX.2.2 The presidential election in 1996
IX.2.3 The presidential election in 2000
IX.2.4 The presidential election in 2004
IX.2.5 The presidential election in 2008
IX.3 Analysis
IX.3.1 Types of election fraud in Ghana
IX.3.2 Responsiveness
IX.3.3 Contestation
X. Analysis of election fraud in West Africa
XI. Implication on democratization
XII. Conclusion
Notes
References

I. Introduction:
            Since its independence from 1960, African continent has suffered from a variety of political upheavals that doomed the sign of transition to democratic regime. Until 1990, though briefly taking apart in Westernized parliamentary or presidential system following their colonial system, the single party often led by military government was majorly stipulated. Even after 1990, in which both domestic and international pressure for democratic transition brought multi-party election, the politics in Western Africa was unstable, repeating military coup d'etat that limited political activism and civil liberty expected as democratic countries.
            In observing the limitation, the failure of practicing free and viable election was notable. The multi-party elections in Africa from 1990 were continuously observed by international NGOs and press as possible indicators of their potential of keeping its democratic regime under their own hands. However, often against this expectation, electing representatives, the basic political process, was unsuccessful, often displaying political instability afterwards due to misrepresentation.
            In view of presidential elections in West Africa, the paper relates election with two primary concepts of democracy, responsiveness and contestation. By measuring the level of responsiveness and contestation of each country through individual analysis of election, the paper will address the problem of fraud and its own implication on the political situation of West Africa. In measuring contestation level, the paper does not limit its definition but expands it by measuring the response of opposition party to the election fraud. How rigorous the responses of opposition parties were to election fraud ? In what way did they take to resist the election results ? By answering these questions, the paper will analyze the contestation level of each country.
            By doing so, the paper seeks to address the problem of undemocratic regime with the consideration of its own history and analyzes the relationship between multi-party election and democratization.

II. Definition: Election Fraud
            The following terminology should be given clear meaning in this paper. Firstly, election fraud will refer to every possible way of intervention that distorts the will of voters and brings about the change in election results. The definition does not limit the scope of being outlawed in electoral legislation (1), considering that electoral fraud can be under law. Several manipulation techniques include intimidation, vote buying, misinformation, misleading or confusing ballot paper, ballot stuffing, misreporting of votes, misuse of proxy votes, destruction or invalidation of ballots, and etc.

III. Research orientation: Election: responsiveness and contestation.
            In this paper, the research orientation is focused on the role of elections in the process of democratization by analyzing empirical evidences presented in West Africa.
            The process of democratization is inevitably connected with the process of election. Hermet (1996:25) defines the term as a transition from authoritarian political system to democratic political system. (2) Under this definition, the process of democratization can refer to the replacement of authoritarian elements in politics to democratic elements. According to Dahl, democratic regime must employ contestation and participation as the fundamental democratic elements to realize true democracy. Contestation basically assumes the competition via multiplicity through multiple participants can make the meaningful decision. Participation, under the condition of contestation, assumes that all adult members of community have the right to take part in the political process, most importantly in electing public officers. (3)
            In all modern democracy, Election is a prerequisite to embody these two principles, which are pre-conditions for democratization. In other words, election which does not qualify these principles is invalid as a sign of true transition to democracy. In this paper, the level of contestation, the prerequisite of participation, in election will be analyzed through the level of response of opposition party to the suspected or alleged election fraud.
            To achieve this aim, the paper assumes that the term contestation is not only achieved by 1) The extent to which institutional conditions are openly available, publicly employed and fully guaranteed to at least some members of the political system (4) but also by 2) The willingness of various political participants to participate, contests, and argues about the results of elections.
            On this basis, the paper measures the responsiveness and contestation in each election. In regard to responsiveness, which basically means the willingness of government to respond the will of citizens, the paper will measure the level of it by the willingness of government to reform the legal and procedural ground to ensure a free and fair election and willingness of government to hand over the power under the election results. Thus, all kinds of alleged fraud to distort the will of citizens will show the low level of responsiveness of government.
            Alongside responsiveness, the paper will also try to observe the level of contestation through the afterwards response of opposition party against election fraud. The method of response will also be subject of analysis.

IV. Method of study

IV.1 Selections of regions and subjects
            The paper limits countries subjected to study to following four countries : Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Ghana. Among all elections including local, parliamentary, presidential election, the paper only limits its interest on presidential multi-party election. Election period, which is subjects to study in investigating election fraud, does not limit itself to the date of candidate promulgation to the announcement of voting turnout. To rightfully ensure that any intimidation existed in the pre-stage can be discerned, the overlapping legislative and local elections are subjected to the observation where preliminary intimidation and violence can possibly danger the presidential election.

Table: 1 Presidential Elections
Nigeria 1993 1999 2003 2007 2011
Ivory Coast 1990 1995 2000 2010
Togo 1993 1998 2003 2005 2010
Ghana 1992 1996 2000 2004


IV.2 Selections of Sources
            The paper utilizes various sources which consist of international press, particularly New York Times, international election monitoring groups, and several NGOs. In researching and analyzing sources, the paper stipulates the basic rules to give as much consistency as possible in sources analysis. Firstly, the paper aims to research on NYT reports in the most basic level while broadening the sources if there is not found sufficient NYT reports. This case especially applies to Togo and Ghana where there are relatively few articles that concerns the presidential elections in each region. In using other sources, the paper primarily utilizes NDI (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs)'s reports, Amnesty International's human right reports on election period to measure that any intimidation and violence exists, and IFES(International Foundation for Electoral Systems) reports to get the holistic picture on election fraud, US department of state's human right report, and etc.

IV.3 Approach and limitation.
            The paper possesses a certain limitation since there is inevitably an irregularity of sources. Thus, the quantifiable measure of election fraud loses its meaning in this paper. For instance, the paper does not analyze whether a certain kinds of election fraud are prevalent in one region due to the irregularity of sources
            However, the paper will analyze the implication that election fraud has on the democratization of each country. By utilizing various political frauds to measure responsiveness and contestation, the paper will try to analyze the role of election in democratization and its implication on the process of democratization.

V. Historical context: Decolonization and democratization in Africa
            After the decolonization in Africa, political instability was common throughout the continent. In many postcolonial states, dictators and one-party regimes seized power, and successive revolts and coups became common. The dictators who took power then subverted the constitutional provisions and representative institutions bequeathed to them by independence movements and colonial powers. (5)
            In the early 1990, when multi-party elections began to emerge in African continent, various factors were suggested by scholars that brought about the change in Africa. Both internal and external factors were considered to be critical in bringing the democratization in 1990. Those who emphasize highly on internal factors underscored that domestic political protests and prodemocracy movement begot by the failures of development, the economic crisis of 1980s and 1990s, thus disintegration of the postcolonial state's legitimacy and capacity. Those who emphasize external forces point to the decisive impact of the end of the Cold War, the demonstration effects of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the imposition of structural adjustment programs and political conditionality by Western bilateral and multilateral financial institution. (6)

VI. The election in Nigeria

VI.1 Historical context before 1990

VI.1.1 The legacy of colonialism and military rule
            From 1861 to 1900, the expansion of Britain to the inland of Nigeria happened with the support of the United Africa Company which wanted to earn lucrative Nigeria. It was not until 1900 when British government officially assumed control of Nigeria which divided it into two separate protectorates, one in the North and the other in the south. It provided the foundation of repeating contemporary federal arrangement in the country, according to the ethnic division. (7)
            The division of Nigeria into North and South soon expanded to provincial division into three regions based on their economy, which also corresponded to ethnic division of Hausa-Fulani in the North, Yoruba, in the west, and Igbo in the East. Until its independence, each region was granted with limited self-government and also federal government comprising of members elected from each region, which gradually expanded to greater degree of local autonomy and self-rule. (8)
            Compared to the long history of British parliamentary system, Nigeria held little tradition of democracy and repeatedly alternated between the system of military ruling and civilian ruling. Like many African countries, which adapted multiparty system yet consolidated the power of governing party without embracing different political entity, it failed to establish the democratic tradition with continuing military rule from 1960 to 1990. (9)

VI.1.2 Election and ethnic polarization
            The diversification of political idea was scarce yet the institutionalization of ethnic and religious group was widespread. The political party and other political institutions were activated with each regional and ethnical support that even once put jeopardy of federal system in return.
            The ethnic and religious conflicts have explicitly shaped from the election happened in December 1964/January 1965. Largely criticized for suspected vote-rigging, political violence, and boycott, ethnic identity, the election accompanied ethnic identity which emerged quickly as the primary organizing principle in Nigeria: the Northern People’s congress was dominated by Hausa-Fulani from the north, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens represented Igbo, and the action Group predominately for Yoruba. (10)
            Ethnic polarization during the leadership of military rulers worsened the conflict that even caused disruptive civil war from 1967 to 70 that threatened to disintegrate Nigeria. After the rise and fall of many military rulers from different regions rampant with corruption and conflicts, Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian Yoruba from west, rose to the power as a military ruler who executed many reforms to prevent the further disintegration of country due to ethnicity. The adoption of an American presidential system was practiced in belief that parliamentary system was the root cause of ethnic-based political party, increased the number of states also expected to reduce the ethnic conflict, set the constitution requiring presidential candidates to get at least 25 percent of the vote in 12 out of 19 states. However, despite its ceaseless efforts, the democratic election in 1979 continuously exhibited the saliency of political party to certain ethnicity. (11)

VI.2 Elections after 1990

VI.2.1 The presidential election in 1993
            On the presidential election happened June and July in 1993, NYT articles reported a set of comprehensive and direct interventions by military government in the process of election, which was annulled at the end. In reviewing the NYT report released in June 11, 1993, it was found that high court ruled the delay of election responding to the call of a group of associations which want the military government to maintain its governorship. (12) On NYT report released in June 11, it says the reasoning of high court was "the association's claims that the electoral process had been compromised by numerous irregularities and vote-rigging must be given a hearing before the balloting can continue." (13) In the report, it says, the suspension of the election results came in response to a suit filed by the Association for a Better Nigeria "a lobbying group of wealthy business executives, politicians and military officers who have led a highly visible campaign urging General Babangida to remain in office at least four more years." (14)
            On the report released in June 14, 1993, it said the leading position of the candidate Moshood Abiola of the Social Democratic Party in nine states while other states followed the National electoral commission's rule which banned states to release the results until total from all 30 states would gain their final results. (15) In reviewing the report, it was found out that two candidates, the only candidates nominated by the government, were also largely financed and supported by the government. (16) In regard to election fraud, it said "Despite scattered complaints about intimidation and manipulation, however, the election took place in an atmosphere of order and calm" (17) In the report, some noticeable result was indicated such as the winning of Abiola, the candidate from South, in the Northern state. The government officer argued this justifiability to prevent the expected conflicts when different results from media could have on their own people. In beforehand, political activity was inhibited except for those which are affiliated with the military government. (18)
            Having these indications, however, the report released in June 26, 1993, accounted the decision of president, Gen, Ibrahim Babangida, to annul the election, arguing the candidates, "flagrant abuse of Nigeria's election laws." (19) On the article, it was reported that he made a claim that "one candidate was disqualified by a new requirement that a candidate must have belonged to a political party for at least a year and the other, 46, was eliminated because a new rule requires candidates to be at least 50 years of age." (20) However, on the report, it said that none of the evidence actually supported the claim of the president, which argued for the comprehensive vote-tempering. (21) In reviewing the report released in June 26, 1993, it was found that military authorities involved in making all the election rules by limiting the number of political parties to two, creating their names, writing their platforms, appointing senior party officials, providing funds and even building party offices. (22) On June 26, 1993, NYT report said that Abiola declared himself as the 'president-elect' and said that he would resist any efforts by the authorities to nullify his triumph at the polls. 2 New Rules for Candidates (23)
            On July 7, 1993 NYT report, it speculated of his decision of annulment. On the report its says that "In the most optimistic level, he was acting in his sincere belief that the election was so totally comprised by fraud and vote-buying that he had no choice but to cancel it. (24) But, other theories exists as Mr.Aviola was the member of Yoruba ethnic group, whose ascension would end nearly 33 years of dominance by the northern Hausa and Fulani groups over Nigeria's political life. (25) In the most skeptical perspective, it is speculated that he was protecting his military coterie whose political life would be intimidated by the ascending power of Mr.Abiola who was widely rumored to launch an investigation into the corruption of military government during Babangida years." (26)
            On August 11, 1993 NYT report, it accounted the response of Nigerian people and government in return. In reviewing the report, it was found that there existed a comprehensive violence and intimidation followed that reflected the anger of Nigerian people. In response, on the report, it says the decision of government to ban all the publications that deemed the government adversaries, which included the publication institutions owned by Mr. Abiola. In reviewing the report, it was found that there existed urgent calls from NGOs such as The Campaign for Democracy to Western governments of imposing sanctions against Nigeria, including a ban of oil import. (27)

VI.2.2 The presidential election in 1999
            Before practicing the second multiparty election, the military government announced its plan to promote the free and fair elections. On the NYT report released in July 20, 1998, the military ruler, Abudulsalam Abubakar, promulgated that he would dissolve his cabinet, all existing 5 parties of the government and allows new parties to organize themselves without any military intervention. (28) He also announced his plan to release all political prisoners, reinforce judiciary, permit international monitoring of election, and hand over the power to civilian government. In reviewing the report released in July 3 and 20 in 1998, it was found that there existed international pressure of helping out the government execute such decisions. (29)
            The military government kept the promise by successfully practicing the municipal government election held in December. On the NYT report released in December 7, 1998, the international monitors of election reported it as the fair election only with some minor problems. Although the shortage of voting materials and mix-ups of voter registration lists were indicated as problems, monitors says that they does not significantly affect the election, providing a positive glimpse of the fair presidential election in 1999. (30)
            Having these positive indications, the presidential election in 1999 was held with the expectations of citizens in trust of election procedure. Although the former military ruler Olusegun Obasanjo won the election with the large gap with his contender, the opposition party and monitoring organizations said that there existed several election irregularities. On the report released in March 1, 1999, it was found out that his challenger, Olu Falae, a former finance minister, immediately disputed the fairness of the vote, and International election monitors also indicated that some supporters of both candidates committed fraud in some regions, including ballot boxes that were stuffed, vote tallies that were inflated and results that were manipulated. (31) However, on the report, monitors said that these cheatings does not signify the important change in results. (32)

VI.2.3 The presidential election in 2003
            The presidential election which was expected to transit one elected government to another was reported to be politically unstable from the beginning with many indications exhibited in overlapping elections. On the NYT report released in April 17, 2003, it was observed that the opposition party called for parliamentary-reelection, arguing the election to be highly fraudulent. (33) Following this announcement, president Olusegun Obasanjo’s challenger, Gen Muhammadu Buhari, warned the possibility of mass election if the presidential election is taken place with fraud. (34) On the NYT reports released in April 19, 2003, it said that the parliamentary election in Delta regions was most extensively fraudulent and violent with rich in oil revenue that was supposed to cause such fiercest contest. On the report, in Warri area of Delta State, it said that in some parts of regions, "polls never opened and election workers never materialized, yet the election commission declared nearly 100 percent and an overwhelming victory for the governing party." Other several cases include violence, the exceeding rate of earned votes to that of registered voters. (35)
            The presidential election held in April 19, which was monitored by international election groups, also exhibited the problem of election fraud in many regions. In reviewing the NYT report released in April 20, 2003, it was found out that "ballot boxes were stuffed to the brim in some places and the violence groups seized the ballot boxes in others". (36) The tumultuous violence was also widespread, causing six people killed in the South. The troubles reported in legislative election, especially in Delta regions, were similarly reported in presidential elections that theft, violence and rigging highly intimidated many voters in side with opposition party. In reviewing the report released in April 20, 2003, while there existed no underpinning ideological campaign, yet buying voters near the polling centers with party leader handing out money was observed as the problem by several NGOs and election monitor groups. (37) On the report, the monitor revealed "that in Southern River states, polls had not opened as late as 1: pm, with only two hours before balloting was scheduled to stop. In another polling center, ballot boxes were packed to the brim by 10: am, two hours after voting officially started." (38) On the same report, it was found out that in nearby Delta regions, "election monitor reported the theft of votes by gangs of youths entering a polling station in an opposition candidate's hometown and stealing every ballot less than an hour before polls were slated to close". (39)
            Having these negative indications, in reviewing NYT report on April 14, 2003, it was reported that the opposition presidential candidates called fresh election, rejecting legal action and requesting other countries' to refuse to acknowledge the government. International monitoring groups, including two from United States and others representing the European Union and Commonwealth, have cited instances of ballot-stuffing, theft, intimidation, and fraudulent tallying of votes in part of the countries. (40) Under this notice, Both Nigerian and international monitors urged opposition groups to pursue complains through electoral tribunals and called on government to build confidence in the impartial nonpartisan adjudication of cases. (41)
            In reviewing the report released in April 24, 2003, it was found out that the "chief opposition candidate called today for fresh elections, rejected redress through legal action and called on other nations to refuse to recognize a government that he said had rigged its return to rule." (42)
            In reviewing the report released in April 24, 2003, it was observed that in the level of criticism, there existed difference between election groups. While the former asked the government to consider extra steps, including new elections, in six states where they believed there existed severe irregularities, the African Union was less critical in its assessment. (43)

VI.2.4 The presidential election in 2007
            In reviewing the NYT reported released in 2007, the presidential election in 2007 was revealed to be highly fraudulent with many indications that made it impossible become a democratic election.
            The sign of election fraud was observed from the beginning of the election period. In reviewing the NYT reports released in March 15, it was observed that a leading opposition candidate in presidential election was omitted from the official lists of candidates with the corruption charges. While the government argued that Nigerian election law noted that the candidate indicted for crime is not allowed to participate in election, the opposition candidate, Atiku Abubakar, dismissed the charges as politically motivated and called for the judgment of court to regain his name on the ballot. Though Nigeria’s highest court ruled that officials illegally excluded candidate a few days before the election started, it was unclear whether he run the election successfully during a short period of time. (44)
            In reviewing the report released in April 24, 2007, the ballot problem was also noted as a possible sign of the fraud. The ballots showed only party-symbols, not the names of candidates, and lacked serial numbers that help reduce fraud. Other problems included the lack of organization by the nation’s Independent National Electoral Commission, vote rigging by party officials and the violence and intimidation that kept many voters from the polls. With these problems, defeated candidates called for legal challenges concerning the presidential election. (45)
            The assessment of international press and election organization was also unfavorable to the verity of election procedures and results. The election observer mission of the European Union criticized the conduct of the election and questioned the legitimacy of the results. Max ven den berg, chief observer for the European Union Mission said at a news conference that the elections "have fallen far short of basic international regional standard for election."(46) (April 24, 2007) National Democratic Institute also concluded that "the 2007 polls represent a step backward in the conduct of elections in Nigeria." (April 24, 2007) (47)
            In reviewing the report released in April 24, 2007, it was found out that the chief rival of elected candidate rejected the result and prepared legal challenges, arguing that the "lack of organization by the Nation's Independent National Electoral Commission, vote rigging by part officials and the violence and intimidation that kept many voters from the polls were enough to annul the results in many races, including the presidential contest." (48)

VI.2.5 The presidential election in 2011
            The presidential election in 2011 was relatively successful with few signs of fraud throughout election period. On the NYT report released in April 16, 2011, it cited monitors opinions' that "Nigerians have never voted before in such favorable conditions with indications that ballot materials appear to have arrived on time, there were few reports of violence and the registration process before the voting appeared to have gone smoothly." (49) Most importantly, in the report, Mr. Jonathan's main opponent, Muhammadu Buhari announced that he would not contest the election result. (50)
            To ensure the credibility of the election, several rules were majorly stipulated. In the report, it was found out that electoral officials asked voters to remain near the polling places, the simple presence of which deter the possible election fraud. In the report, analysts say that such an uncomplicated method that a number of voters in watchful eyes remain in the place was supposed to contribute the legitimacy of election. (51)
            The leading candidate's effort to call on his supporters to refrain from intimidation and acts of violence was reported as the factor of secure election process. (52)

VI.3 Analysis of elections in Nigeria

VI.3.1 Types of election fraud in Nigeria



VI.3.2 Responsiveness
            In many elections, the responsiveness of Nigerian government was estimated to be low with many indications such that distorted the actual voting turnouts, blocked out citizens from voting polls, harmed multiplicity through disqualification of candidates, and annulled the election without the approval of citizens or electoral commission. However, there have been also a few positive changes to note.
            First, the interim government before the 1999 presidential elections legal reform and efforts to secure the passage of voting process in municipal election in 1998 could be view to embody a certain level of responsiveness. Such political decisions include dissolution of all existing 5 parties under military government, while creating National Independent Election Commission and allowing new parties to organize themselves freely without any intervention.
            Secondly, in 2011 election, the government was responsive to the will of citizens by practicing relatively free and fair election. It can be said to be first legitimate election that earned the recognition both by international observer groups and opposition party.

VI.3.3 Contestation





            It was observed that there was high willingness to contest elections against suspected fraud; however, the willingness to redress the problem through judiciary system was relatively low. The only case that accepted the method of legal address was 2007 election, in which Atiku Abubakar, the opposition candidate, appealed to high court by arguing for intimidation, vote-rigging, and lack of organization in National Electoral commission. It is reasonably speculated that the confidence on judiciary grew from high court order to rule the cancelation of disqualification of opposition candidate against government charge of corruption. From the incident, it can be known that judiciary system of Nigeria in 2007 secured a certain level of independence from government party.
            When rejecting redress through legal method, the opposition party employed various methods to achieve their aims. The major contestation techniques include appeal to international sanction against government and mass protest of citizens against governmental decision. In often, the identity of ethnicity of opposition candidate was a critical factor in provoking massive protest as can be seen in the 1993 election in which Abiola's identity of Yoruba was largely suspected to provide a cause of disqualification and nullification, the fact that caused many Yoruba ethnicity to engage in political action.
            It was observed that contestation and successive governmental action often caused political turmoil that resulted in political rift, weak legitimacy of elected government, and coup d'etat.

VII. The election in Ivory Coast

VII.1 Historical background
            Since its independence in August 1960, Ivory Coast enjoyed a relatively stable political history with the historical figure, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, president of the republic and leader of the Parti Democratique de la Cote d’ivore until his death on December 7, 1993. Before 1999 coup, Ivory Coast showed an established political stability under his rule which maintained a close political allegiance to the West while many countries underwent political turmoil tainted with military coups. (53)
            However, after the coup happened in 1999, Ivory Coast has continuously undergone a series of political turmoil, including two times of civil wars (2002, 2010) On September 19, 2002 a rebellion in the North and the West came up and the country became divided in three parts. Although the fighting ceased in 2004, the division between North under the rule of rebellion and South under the rule of government continued. Although peace agreement in 2007 was expected to end the conflict with the election held in 2010, the fighting resumed in 2011 over the controversy of election. (54)

VII.2 Presidential elections in Ivory Coast

VII.2.1 Election in 1990
            The 1990 presidential election in Ivory Coast, which earned the interest as the first free election, was ended with the victory of incumbent, Felix Houphouet-Boigny over his challenger Laurent Gbabgo, a history professor and leader of the Ivorian People's Front. In reviewing the NYT report released in October 28, 1990, it was observed that there existed a rising tension in regard to the possible fraud that would happen in election. (55) Before the election started, the opposition party candidates hinted the possible action whenever the hint of fraud it observed through vote-rigging or vote buying. (56)
            In reviewing the NYT reported released in October 28, 1990, one notable feature was observed with the qualification of voters in the election. While having no reliable polls to expect the result, there existed a prediction that the incumbent would win the election. As one of the main factors, they indicated that the governing party, which allowed African foreign nationals to vote as well as their citizens, would earn the most vote of countries Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea. (57)
            Having these indications, the election in 1990 was argued as to be fraudulent by the opposition candidate. On NYT report released in October 31, 1990, the opposition candidates in the Ivory Coast appealed to West African nation’s Supreme Court to overturn election results, arguing that the election was rigged by president Felix Houphouet-Boigney. (58) He argued for a wide-spread intimidation with 100 opposition members being arrested and destruction of dozens of ballot boxes to halt the elections at numerous polling places. They charged that the boxes had been stuffed with votes for Houphouet-Boigny. (59)

VII.2.2 Elections in 1995
            The election with incumbent Henri Konan Bedie, who succeeded the country's founding father Felix Houphouet-Boigny, was reported to be highly intimidating from the very start of election. In reviewing the reported released in March 12, 1995, it was observed that the governing party with the incumbent introduced the strict nationality requirements aimed at banning an expected candidate for president. In responding to this rule, conversely, the opposition newspaper swiftly argued for the nationality of the incumbent which was also revealed to be not pure Ivorian. (60) As soon as the report was released, the government began to arrest journalists who questioned the ancestry of incumbents and sentenced two of them to terms of one year in prison for insulting the president. (61) On NYT report released in October 23, 1995, it was found out that this electoral code eliminated the major contestant, Alassane D. Ouattara, who served as Prime Minister under Mr. Houphouet-Boigny. (62) As a response, on NYT report released in October 13, 1995, it was observed that countries leading opposition groups would engage in boycott against the election. (63)
            Another observable phenomenon in 1995 election was that international groups withdrew from monitoring and assessing the election. In reviewing the NYT report released in October 24, 1995, it was found that Experts from the National Democratic Institute for International affairs, a nongovernmental group in Washington, canceled its election observer mission and United States Embassy declined to comment on elections. (64) On October 24, 1995 NYT report, it was found out that French Minister for Cooperation revealed its countries opinion as approving of president. (65)
            Having these weak bases approving the election, the other major opposition candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, urged a boycott that would extend to the parliamentary election. In reviewing the NYT report released in October 23, 1995, it was found out that citizens in opposition burned ballot boxes, ripped up voter lists or cut down trees to block roads to their towns in order to delay or prevent voting. (66) On NYT report, released in October 26, 1995, it was observed that the main opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo, "pulled out of the race in protest over the elements of the electoral code". (67) The protest against election fraud was widespread, and it was observed that the government outlawed all the demonstrations to secure the voting process. (68) It was reported that the violence caused at least three deaths in the region. (69) On the Election Day, it was reported that opposition side argued rigged the voter lists and refused to allow independent supervision of the election process. (70)

VII.2.3 Elections in 2000
            A first attempt to restore the civilian rule into governing in 2000 exhibited a sign of serious fraud from the beginning. In reviewing the report released in October, 24, 2000, it was found out that a court controlled by General Guei, who was in power of controlling junta in interim, ruled that "the candidates of the countries' two main parties, Democratic Party of Ivory Coast and Rally of the Republicans, were not qualified to run for president." (71) The cancellation yielded the opposition candidate, Mr. Gbagbo, as the only candidate in the election. (72)
            Generally, in reviewing the report released in October 23, 2000, the Election Day was peaceful except the voter turnouts were low with the boycott of two major opposition parties. The article reported that major international observation groups withdrew from the election as the government blocked out two major candidates from participating. (74)
            In reviewing the report released in October 24, it was found out that the election result was delayed without explanation, which soon spread growing concerns that the military government was trying to manipulate the result. (75) In the article, it reported that soldiers took over the office of National electoral commission, Before the action by military government, the electoral commission released its partial results, which reported Mr.Gbagbo winning over the head of military government, General Guei. (76)
            The cancellation of the president soon grew the fury of citizens which made him out of office and prevalent protests in the street. In reviewing the report released in October 26, 2000, it was found out that president escaped from his presiding office, while massive protests occurred on streets that showed a clear discontent on the election. (77) The actions of military group was observed to be divisive as some were remained faithful to their military leader while the others rejected to take further actions on preventing protests from proceeding. (78) While these protests called for new election, Mr Gbagbo, the major opponent of General Geui, announced himself to be the president of Ivory Coast (79)

VII.2.4 Elections in 2010
            The presidential election in 2010 was annulled by Laurent Gabgbo who denied the result of election which ended with the victory of his opponent's candidate, Alssane Quattera. From the start, both candidates exchanged accusations that their supporters and party representatives were blocked out from some polling stations and highly chased and intimidated by its opposition. The election violence by each other's rivalry factions was also widespread throughout the election, causing high death tolls within countries.
            On the report released in December 2, 2010, the top electoral officials pronounced opposition candidates as a winner while this was immediately disputed by the incumbent as fraudulent, who argued that there was massive fraud in Northern region, the place of which is highly regarded by him as his fundamental political supporting ground. (80) With the president’s announcement, there came the immediate response of institution in charge of constitutional judgment on election. In reviewing the report, "it was observed that constitutional council, the ally and appointee of Mr.Gbagbo, in charge of signing off the election, said that election commission was not capable of declaring the outcome for missing day to promulgate the result." (81)
            After the election result announcement, in the report, it was found out that the security force immediately took action of blocking out the foreign media from reporting the result while the opposition supporters were killed in president parties headquarter. (82)
            Although the tally was recognized by United Nation’s local office, the incumbent president in the end refused to recognize the result, which caused his opponent to call his supporters to engage in massive action. In reviewing the NYT report released in December 15, it was found out that spokesman from opposition party called for his supporters to deny the unjustifiable decision by president by engaging in massive action. (83)

VII.3 Analysis

VII.3.1 Types: of election fraud in Nigeria



VII.3.2 Responsiveness
            Responsiveness of Ivory Coast has been turned out to be very low as can be seen in two times of annulment by governing party. (2000, 2010) From the start, the government showed low level of responsiveness by introducing voters of foreign nationalities such as those from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea to win over the election. Several cases that disqualified some opposition candidates also harmed the multiplicity.
            It was not found out that government took any legal action or procedural change to ensure the secure passage of free and fair elections. Rather, the change and abuse of constitution was prevailed throughout the election to make it advantageous governing party’s candidate.
            Following this low level of responsiveness, two times of disruptive civil wars marred the political situation in Ivory Coast. Especially, the second civil war had a direct linkage with election as the opposition candidate engaged in massive action that caused hundreds of death within countries.

VII.3.3 Contestation





            The level of contestation was high as none of elections passed without the opposition's contest against election fraud. Except 1990 election, opposition candidates in all elections in Ivory Coast rejected legal redress and engaged in boycott, mass protest, and Coup d'etat.
            It can be assumed that the distrust on judiciary system to remedy the situation caused opposition side to take another measure since many incidents noted the low level of independence of judiciary as can be shown in ruling of constitutional council against election commission’s declaration of outcome and court ruling (2010) of disqualification of candidates (2000). The massive boycott in 1995 and 2000 significantly diminished the meaning of multi-party elections as the major opposition parties withdrew from elections, and as a result, voter turn-out was very low. Engagement into mass protest yielded into disruptive civil war, which weakened the stability of political situation and legitimacy of government.

VIII. The election in Togo

VIII.1 Historical background
            After the World War 2, current republic of Togo gained its statue of autonomous republic from French Union, and legislative assembly elected by universal adult began to hold a considerable power over internal affairs, with prime minister as a head of legislature. The 1956 referendum approved a constitution, which enables these changes, and Togo took smooth transition through election in 1960. (84)
            A new constitution in 1961 established an executive president, who was empowered to appoint ministers and dissolve the assembly, holding a monopoly of executive power. In 1961 election, Sylvanus Olympio was elected as the first president of Togo. Although there existed four principal political parties within Togo, the reign of Olympio dissolved opposition party and was marked by the terror of his militia, the Ablode Sodjas. (85)
            In 1963, the unstable reign of Olympio finally ended with coup d’etat and successive coup by Lt. Col Etienne ousted the interim government between Coup d’etat. In late 1979, Eyadema declared a third republic and a transition to greater civilian rule with a mixed civilian and military cabinet. However, the presidential election was uncontested, and he continued to rule the country until 1992. In 1989 and 1990, like many other countries, Togo was affected by democratization movement that swept Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. As protests began to worsen and opposition began to congregate, the president negotiated with them and decided to hold a multi-party election in 1993. (86)

VIII.2 Presidential elections in Togo

VIII.2.1 1993 Election
            In reviewing the Human Right Report: Togo released by U.S Department of State, the people of Togo did not enjoy the right to change their government through elections. According to the report, incumbent president Gnassingbe Eydema dominated the government during the election period, not keeping its promise of expiring the president government by appointing joseph Koffigoh as prime minister of crisis government. According to the report, this decision received the criticism of opposition since only interim constitution has the power to name or change the prime minister. (87)
            Under this government with ambiguous legal status, the originally intended legislative branch, High Council of the Republic, did not function in 1993 since most HCR members fled Togo after January 30 shootings in Lome, making it difficult or impossible for them to gather a quorum. (88)
            Under the governorship of this uncertain and illegal government, the first presidential election in 1993 was reported to be seriously flawed. The disqualification of opposition party's candidate by the Supreme Court on essentially technical grounds happened, and other two major opposition candidates, Edem Kodjo and Yaovi Agboyibor, ultimately boycotted the elections, calling supporters to participate in their actions against flawed electoral preparations. After their decisions, the four opposition members of the independent National Electoral Commission withdrew from the commission, which made the absence of meaningful opposition and administration. (89)
            With these indications, the election in 1993 ended with reelection of incumbent president Eyadema with many signs of irregularities reported: inflated and inaccurate electoral lists, double voting, intimidation, and destruction of polling stations. (90)
            The IFES' report on the presidential election in 1993 indicated many problems which deter Togo from practicing democratic elections. On the report, it was discovered that the government manipulated the election procedures without considering the constitution and reinterpreted election law according to need. In regard to the observation by monitoring group, it was reported that "no local observers would be permitted in the polling stations, and less than a dozen countries were invited to provide international observers." (91) In regard to organization of the election process, the report notified a serious defect of National Election Commission with indications that "registration lists were suspected to be inflated, yet were not made public two weeks before the election." (92) In regard to the response of opposition party, it reported that "two main opposition candidates withdrew in protest, and the withdrawals were followed by the resignations of opposition representatives on the National Election Commission." (93)
            In its summary of evaluation, the report concluded that the chance of Togo to become legitimate regime through this election would be scarce. The problems were comprehensively reported from administrative problem to that of inherent defect in electoral code. The significant problem of all was found to be the manipulation of elections laws and procedure against constitution, the system for the delivery of registration cards, and illegal abrogation of the electoral code. (94)
            The human right report by US department of State in 1993 also released many cases which exhibited high intimidation against opposition during the presidential election period. It evaluated the presidential election in 1993 significantly "deteriorated human rights situations and turned back the clock on democratic progress." (95) It was reported that government security forces engaged in intimidation against opposition supporters. On January 25, it was reported that the security forces fired on unarmed opposition demonstrators. (96)
            The NDI report released in 1998 also comprehensively covered the indications of election fraud in its assessment: "allegations that the opposition political parties were being blocked from campaigning in some parts of the country, especially in the north; alleged politically-motivated violence and intimidation; disqualification of the candidacy of Gilchrist Olympio on the technicality that he filed medical certificates from non-Togolese physicians; allegations that the voter lists were inflated by large numbers, particularly in areas where the ruling party was traditionally strong; problems in distribution of voter cards that resulted in a large percentage of the cards not being received by voters and large numbers of cards for which there was no account; strong bias in the state-controlled news media, which favored the incumbent and his party; and lack of government cooperation with the National Election Commission (CEN), especially refusing its recommendation to postpone the elections to complete electoral preparations." (97)

VIII.2.2 1998 Election
            Not enough data to draw an analysis

VIII.2.3 2003 Election
            In reviewing 'The Declaration of 8 NGOs on the presidential elections in Togo', it was noted that there existed a series of manipulations that made international organizations hard to accept the election results. The declaration reported serious intimidation and ballot stuffing that caused the election very unlikely to be accepted (98)
            On February, 2003, according to the observation of report, there were numerous arrests of members of the opposition. During the presidential campaign, the opposition candidates were constrained in traveling freely over the country, and violence, arrests and arbitrary detention, torture, menace and intimidation were widespread. The report says that arrests of those who were suspected of having voted for the opposition also occurred the day after election. The clashes between supporters of opposition and security forces also put the legitimacy of election into jeopardy. Under these circumstances, in reviewing the report released by Amnesty international, it was observed that two major opposition candidates announced themselves to be presidents, indicating that the election was not reliable and highly fraudulent. (99)
            During the campaign, the access to media was also unfairly distributed to candidates. According to the report, the "State media accepted only the RPT in power, in violation of the Togo electoral code, which provides for free access to all candidates to the public media and equal time for all." (100) In reviewing the report released by Amnesty international, it was also observed that the authorities allowed only Commission electorale nationale independence (CENI) to be reported by journalists. (101)
            Having these circumstances, it was reported that international observers such as the European Union and the United Nations decided not to delegate observers to Togo.

VIII.2.4 2005 Election (Declaration of EU, Declaration by ACU)
            The NYT report released in April 25, 2005 showed many signs of being deeply flawed. In reviewing the report, it was found out "that the opposition accused the government of voter registration fraud, and a radio station critical of Mr. Gnassingbe's administration was shut down." (102)
            Two available documents about the results of 2005 election by EU and ACP reported the election in 2005 as with the existence of violence and intimidation. In its declaration, ACP "deplored the violence that followed the announcement of the election results and which resulted in injury and death; it also condemned the acts of intimidation and aggression committed against Togolese citizens, West Africans and foreigners." (103) The declaration released by EU was not much different from that of ACP in that it released its announcement that "Parliament firmly condemns both the brutal repression perpetrated by the police against people disputing the regularity of the elections and the abusive treatment of foreigners, as well as the arson attack which completely destroyed the Goethe Institute in Lome." (104)

VIII.2.5 2010 Election
            In reviewing the 2010 Human Rights Report: Togo released by US department of State, it was found out that president and ruling RPT candidate Faure Gnassingbe was reelected with 61 percent of vote cast. Although, the opposition party called for legal action to Constitutional Court, it rejected the opposition claims of fraud and vote buying, citing lack of evidence. In the report, it was observed that international and national observers monitoring the election declared it generally free, fair, transparent and peaceful. (105)
            A peaceful vote was strongly desired by the government and the RPT, which sought to avoid opprobrium associated with perceptions of a flawed election and repression of the opposition. Togo had suffered from international isolation during the latter phase of president Eyademia’s rule due to the widespread belief that he had rigged elections and employed violence against the opposition. (106) (Wikipedia: Togolese election 2010)
            The creation of an independent electoral commission was also noted by Western media, as was the fair coverage given by the government’s news website to opposition candidates. (107)
            The manipulation of voting results arose in surface since the means of transmitting results to CENI (Commission Electorale Nationale Independante) underwent a sudden change. While the use of satellite system alongside text messaging and faxing was supposed to be official means of transmission, it was reported that machines had failed, therefore requiring all 35 electoral district directors to bring physical proof of the results to Lome. This was unacceptable to opposition party. The opposition party also announced the alleged claims that supporters tha their fingerprints on the ballots could be traced and that they could therefore be hunted down and punished for their votes. The opposition's claim also included vote-buying and massive fraud. (108)
            However, EU observer mission released a report that noted the accusations of vote-buying by the RPT, but also suggested there was no evidence to support opposition claims of outright fraud. Under these circumstances, it was observed that opposition candidate, Fabre, engaged in led his group of UFC supporters in a protest on 7 March. (109)

VIII.3 Analysis

VIII.3.1 Types of reported election fraud (alleged) in Togo



VIII.3.2 Responsiveness
            From the beginning, the effort of dissolving presiding government and creating interim government before the first multi-party election turned out to be only disguise. In 1993 election, the responsiveness of government can be said to be low with the disregard of constitution in constructing interim cabinet, disqualification of candidates, intimidation, vote-tampering, and destruction of polling stations.
            The alleged claims both by domestic opposition parties shown in NYT report and international observation mission group suggested that the willingness of government to respond the will of citizens through election was estimated to be low in presidential elections.
            However, the presidential election in 2010 is supposed to be relatively fair and free, though not recognized by opposition party, since it is partly recognized by international observation. The reason is largely speculated that the efforts of government to be recognized by international society as the one holding democratic election at least prepared itself in the procedural ground to get the recognition. For instance, for the first time, it created independent election commission in 2010 that got the approval of Western media.

VIII.3.3 Contestation





            Not enough data to analyze

IX. The election in Ghana

IX.1 Historical Background
            From the year of independence, republic of Ghana repeated several coups and republics as well in the years before 1990. The first president, Kwame Nkrumah, started his first republic in 1960, but was overthrown by military coup due to his authoritarian rule combined with collapse in national economy. Several republics were established and overthrown again with the last coup d’etat emerging in 1981. After the third republic, military government led by Jerry Rawlings ruled through a Provisional National Defense Council which had the specific brief to organize a renewal of the nation’s political and economic life down to village level. (110)
            During his years of ruling, there was wide international support for his economic policies that demonstrated his popular approval in country. Following the prevailing fashion for multiparty democracy, Ghana held an election in 1992 in preparation for forth republic. (111)

IX.2 Presidential Elections in Ghana

IX.2.1 1992 election
            The 1992 election in Ghana, first multi-party presidential election, exhibited in NYT report, was alleged to be fraudulent by the opposition party. The incumbent, Jerry Rawlings, who seized the power in 1981 through coup, agreed to hold multi-party elections with five candidates running. However, in reviewing the report released in November 4, 1992, it was found out that the opposition argued for "the evidence of cheating and intimidation by supporters of the National Democratic Congress, which is effectively the Government party, run by Mr. Rawling." (112)
            On the report, it said that "The campaign coordinator for the New Patriotic Party, reported that people were caught in two separate incidents in the central town of Kumasi, a New patriotic stronghold, trying to plant rigged ballot boxes containing voting slips for the National Democratic Congress." (113) on the report, the opposition alleged that there existed wide-spread intimidation across the Northern regions. However, on the report, it was also observed that there existed no independent confirmation on such reports. (114)
            On the report released in November 6, 1992, such claims repeated as "the accusations included the stuffing of ballot boxes and altering of results after they were certified locally." However, on the report, it was said that the international observers said that polling was mostly fair. (115)
            In reviewing the report released in November 6, 1992, it was observed that protests against the outcome clashed with the security forces, yielding several deaths. (116)

IX.2.2 1996 election
            The 1996 election, in which the incumbent president Jerry Rawlings won over John Agyekum Kufor, the major opponent who vowed to raise living standards and end corruption, was said to have no serious voter tampering in NYT report. In the report, it was said that the voting marked the first time "that elected Ghanian government had completed its term without being overthrown." (117)

IX.2.3 2000 election
            The 2000 election, which successfully transit from one elected government to another, displayed only alleged fraud by both sides of candidates during the election campaigns. In reviewing the report released in December 29, 2000, the opposition candidate alleged that intimidation and other irregularities existed to keep the incumbent’s party, National Democratic Congress in power. In the report, however, the candidate of NDC, John Atta Mills, argued that the polling was stable and free. As the result announced in December 20, 2000, it was reported to mark the first transition that happened through election from governing party to opposition party. (118)

IX.2.4 2004 election
            The election monitoring report submitted to IFES organization and report by KAS exhibited the acknowledgement of international society to the election of Ghana in that it successfully practiced election without a sign of fraud. Although the intimidation report submitted to IFES reported the preliminary violence before the election, it was not caused by election fraud but more of ethnic clashes during the campaigns. In KAS report, The Head of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Election Monitoring Team evaluated the election "as peaceful, well organized and the electorate as well as the officials conducted themselves in such a manner that is commendable." (119) Although the minor problems such as educational ill that yielded invalid votes, it was reported not to signify the election fraud.

IX.2.5 2008 election
            The report produced by European Union Election Observation Mission to Ghana presented 2008 election as "largely, transparent, competent and professional manner." (120)
            In regard to basic freedoms of assembly and movement, it reported that throughout "the campaign period, political parties could freely campaign across the country." (121)
            In regard to freedom of speech in media, it reported that "there existed no reports of any incidents affecting the media’s freedom to report on the campaign" (122)
            In regard to the transparency of polling station, it reported "that high degree of engagement over 7000 domestic observers were deployed in election days to observe polling and counting and major political parties deployed their party agents to all polling stations. It was reported that civil society performed an important role in observing polling counting and aggregation of results that provided an inclusive environment for the scrutiny of procedure." (123)
            In regard to the challenge of opposition against the election result, it reported no sign of contestation of possible election fraud. (124)

IX.3 Analysis

IX.3.1 Types of reported election fraud (all alleged by domestic party) in Ghana



IX.3.2 Responsiveness
            Responsiveness of Ghana is estimated to be relatively high. The constitution worked in 1993 led the full participation of opposition party’s engagement both in parliamentary and presidential elections. In 2000 election, the transition from one civilian government to another happened peacefully through the election process.
            International society’s recognition of Ghana’s election can be the other indications that the government of Ghana responded to the will of their people quite successfully. In observing the elections in Ghana, not only the transparency of polling stations, but also the free exercise of media, assembly, and movement was notable. The civil society’s active engagement in the process of election increased the notion that the government of Ghana has been successfully transiting to the democratic government.





IX.3.3 Contestation
            The level of contestation can be hardly said because it is not revealed in the report or articles. However, there existed an experience of failure in boycotting the election in 1992 by opposition party that led eventually the full participation of it in 1993. It is reasonably speculated that boycotting the election when the sign of frauds were low did not gain the much popularity from the public.

X. Analysis of election fraud in West Africa
            Through the individual analysis of each country, the paper observes some notable phenomenon that holds certain implications that multi-party elections have on the process of democratization.
            First, in the process of finding various election frauds, the paper observed the high level of intimidation that implicated the constraint civil society’s activity into very limited level in organizing various election campaigns to notify candidate’s ideology and policies.
            Second, in the method of election fraud, the paper observed that the government utilized various governmental institutions with judiciary that possessed low level of independence which caused high biases judgment against opposition party during election period.
            Third, the paper also observed that the method of election fraud happened in the very fundamental level that seriously harmed the meaning of multi-party elections in 1990. The cases of ballot stuffing, inflation, destruction of polling stations, and disenfranchisement were frequently observed as certain indications. The most serious cases include illegal possession of independent election commission and annulment election that is supposedly taken to maintain the residing rule of government.
            Fourth, the paper observed that except the country of Ghana which successfully transit into civilian government through election, the other countries showed a very low level of responsiveness. Countries often abused constitution and electoral code to set the election date in their preferences and harm the candidates on opposition side. Legal reforms or change in election procedure were scarce yet found in some cases to prevent ballot manipulation.
            Fifth, the paper empirically observed that a low level of responsiveness had a high correlation with a high level of contestation against election result by opposition parties as can be seen in Nigeria, Togo, and Ivory Coast. Contestation often brought a low level of legitimacy to government that led the country into further political turmoil with mass civil war or successive coup d'etat.
            Sixth, it is observed that in the method of contestation, there existed relatively less attempts to appeal the case to the domestic judiciary while there were many cases that took different measures including boycotts, mass protests. This showed that the mistrust on judiciary system to remedy the election into fair and viable way is very widespread on the opposition side.
            Lastly, the paper also observed many cases of international monitoring group’s intervention in monitoring and assessment of elections. In many cases, the country invited monitoring groups to be recognized by international society of their elections fairness and their legitimacy in further. The paper also found cases that monitoring group withdrew from the election if there occurred massive boycott of opposition parties due to the serious fraud sings in excluding the candidates of them. In the level of criticism and assessment, there existed different international monitoring groups. For instance, monitoring groups from African continent showed relatively favorable signs while monitoring groups from West often severely criticized the election result.

XI. Implication on democratization
            Through comprehensive analysis of election fraud, the paper analyzed some implications that multi-party elections held in the process of democratization.
            Firstly, the dominant mode of transition from one regime to another regime was happened through election. Though in many cases they were highly fraudulent, the authoritarian regime allowed an electoral contestation in restricted manner during election period. This provided opportunity for opposition parties to coordinate their antigovernment activities and unify behind a single candidate or form a single coalition, which increase the costs for the incumbent to use force and fraud to stay in power.
            This successfully led into the low legitimacy of authoritarian government which initially intended to boost their legitimacy through elections. Although there was high level of political turmoil between government and opposition party due to election fraud, the government gradually, though not radically, took measure to ensure a certain level of transparency in election to keep its legitimacy. The creation of independent election commission, or dissolution of political parties under military government (Nigeria: 1999) can be good examples of these actions.
            Secondly, the all countries that were subjected to this research showed a high level of contestation that was a positive sign of democratization. Though institutionalized multiplicity through the freedom of media or gathering was not guaranteed, opposition parity often actively engaged in the direct protests, boycott, or legal appeals to challenge the decision of governments. With the international supports that sanctioned military government or government that was in charge of fraud, they mobilized citizens to lessen the legitimacy of government to better the situation of democracy. This can be said to bear a certain level of potential that West African Countries possessed in the path of democratization. With these indications, Ghana successfully achieved its transition from one civilian country to another in the early stage of 1990. Other countries, including Nigeria and Togo, in their very last elections, got approval of international monitoring group, while it is uncertain whether they could keep their democracy in the era beyond.

XII. Conclusion
            Though the democratization efforts of countries in West Africa accompanied multi-party elections, they could be actually hardly called as a clear mark of successful democratization. In reviewing the elections in each country, the paper observed numerous political frauds that actually seriously harmed the meaning of multi-party elections. Political frauds ranged widely from manipulation of vote tallies to the annulment of election.
            However, in observing the level of responsiveness and its correlation with contestation, they paper observed a positive phenomenon that political participants were willing to contest the governmental decisions in various ways. With the support of international society, this often led into mobilization of citizens that weakened the legitimacy of government which committed a fraud in the process of election. The prospects of West African countries into real democratization are thereby not as doomed as the various election fraud committed in their histories. The paper observed that multi-party elections, though in many cases fraudulent, played a certain role in the process of democratization.
            It is undeniable that there is still room to improve for African countries to achieve the real democracy, not only the procedural democracy. However, it is also undeniable that countries that were subjected to study also showed a certain level of potential to lead democratization voluntarily. Although external factors such as international pressure have its own role in improvement, the self-mobilization of political activity was observed to be certainly a great sign of achieving democracy.

Notes

1) Wikipedia Article : Electoral Fraud
2) 아프리카의 민주혁명: 세네갈과 나이지리아의 민주화 과정을 중심으로, 2000/06, 이한규 Africa’s democratic revolution with a focus on Senegal and Nigeria’s democratization
3) Ibid
4) Institutional design and functionality of African Democracies (A comparative analysis of Nigeria and Uganda), Basil O. Nwankwo 2003, 386 page.
5) Severed states: dilemmas of democracy in a divided world, 1993, 273 page(Robert K. Schaeffer)
6) Africa Democracy - Explanations Of Africa's Democratization
(http://science.jrank.org/pages/8962/Democracy-Africa-Explanations-Africa-s-Democratization.html)
7) AP: Comparative government and politics briefing paper: Nigeria
8) Ibid
9) Ibid
10) Ibid
11) Ibid
12) NYT Article: Nigeria Court Ruling Delays Presidential Election, June 11, 1993
13) Ibid
14) Ibid
15) NYT Article: Nigeria Bars News of Presidential Election Results, June 14, 1993
16) Ibid
17) Ibid
18) Ibid
19) NYT Article: Nigerian Military Ruler Announces New Elections, June 26, 1993
20) Ibid
21) Ibid
22) ibid
23) ibid
24) NYT Article: Nigeria’s Ruler a Puzzle to His people, July 7, 1993
25) ibid
26) ibid
27) NYT Article: On Eve of Strike, Nigeria Detains Opponent, August 11, 1993
28) NYT Article: NEW NIGERIA RULER PLEDGES ELECTIONS EARLY NEXT YEAR, July 21, 1998
29) NYT Article: Annan Says Nigeria Plans to Free A Candidate and Other Prisoners, July 3, 20, 1998
30) NYT Article: Monitors Call Nigerian Vote Fair, With Room to Improve, December 7, 1998
31) NYT Article: Former Military Ruler Wins Nigerian Presidential Vote, March 1, 1999
32) ibid
33) NYT Article: Challenger in Nigeria Warns of Protests if Election Is Fraudulent, April 17, 2003
34) ibid
35) NYT Article: Turbulence Stalks Further Nigeria Elections, April 19, 2003
36) NYT Article: Nigerians Go to Polls in Test of Democracy, April 20, 2003
37) ibid
38) ibid
39) ibid
40) NYT Article: Millions Vote in Nigeria, but Intimidation Is Widespread, April 15, 2003
41) ibid
42) NYT Article: Nigerian Opposition Candidate Calls for New Election, April 24, 2003
43) ibid
44) NYT Article: Corruption Charges Keep Opposition Figure Off Nigeria Ballot, March 16, 2007
45) NYT Article: Nigerian Opposition Candidate Calls for New Election, April 24, 2007
46) ibid
47) ibid
48) NYT Article: Nigerian Opposition Candidate Calls for New Election, April 24, 2007
49) NYT Article: Nigeria’s Top Court Says Officials Illegally Excluded Candidate, April 17, 2011
50) ibid
51) ibid
52) ibid
53) Background Note: Cote d'Ivoire by US department of State
54) Wikipedia Article: First Ivorian civil war
55) NYT Article: Ivory Coast Faces First free elections today, October 28, 1990
56) ibid
57) ibid
58) NYT Article: Loser in Ivory coast to challenge election October 31, 1990
59) ibid
60) NYT Article: Uneasily, Ivory Coast Heads for Election, March 12, 1995
61) ibid
62) NYT Article: Police, but few voters, in Ivory coast turnout, October 23, 1995
63) ibid
64) NYT Article: With General Trailing, Ivory Coast vote Tally suddenly dried up, October 24, 1995
65) ibid
66) NYT Article: Police, but few voters, in Ivory coast turnout, October 23, 1995
67) NYT Article: POPULAR UPRISING ENDS JUNTA'S RULE OVER IVORY COAST, October 26, 1995
68) ibid
69) ibid
70) ibid
71) NYT Article: With General Trailing, Ivory Coast vote Tally suddenly dried up, October 24, 2000
72) ibid
73) ibid
74) NYT Article: Police, but few voters, in Ivory coast turnout, October 23, 2000
75) NYT Article: With General Trailing, Ivory Coast vote Tally suddenly dried up, October 24, 2000
76) ibid
77) NYT Article: POPULAR UPRISING ENDS JUNTA'S RULE OVER IVORY COAST October 26, 2000
78) ibid
79) ibid
80) NYT Article: Election Results Challenged in Ivory Coast, December 2, 2010
81) ibid
82) ibid
83) NYT Article: A Widening political Rift in Ivory Coast, December 15, 2010
84) Wikipedia Article: History of Togo
85) ibid
86) ibid
87) 1993 Human right Report: Togo in 1993 released by U.S department of State
88) ibid
89) ibid
90) ibid
91) IFES Election Assistance Project: Togo, Final Activity Report (July 28 - August 23, 1993), September 1993.
92) ibid
93) ibid
94) ibid
95) 1993 Human right Report: Togo released by U.S department of State
96) ibid
97) STATEMENT OF THE NDI PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION TO TOGO'S 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION(Lome, June 11, 1998)
98) The Declaration of 8 NGOs on the presidential elections in Togo’
99) Amnesty International Report 2003-Togo
100) ibid
101) ibid
102) NYT report, Voters Throng polling stations for Togo’s presidential Election, April 25, 2005
103) ACP report
104) EU Presidency declaration on the political situation in Togo (February 23, 2005)
105) 2010 Human right report: Togo released by US department of State
106) Wikipedia: Togolese election 2010
107) ibid
108) ibid
109) ibid
110) Article: HISTORY OF GHANA by Monash college
111) ibid
112) NYT report: As Army Rule Ends, Ghana Votes In First Open Election Since 1979, November 4, 1992
113) ibid
114) ibid
115) NYT report: Ghana’s Leader Wins Election as President, November 6, 1992
116) ibid
117) NYT report: Ghana Votes in Rare Display of Stability in Region December 7, 1996
118) NYT report: December 20, 2000
119) Report on Ghana 2004 election by KAS
120) EU Election Observation Mission, Ghana Presidential and Parliamentary Elections ? 7 December 2008, Final report.
121) ibid
122) ibid
123) ibid
124) ibid

References

A. Primary sources

1. New York Times - Keywords: fraud, presidential election, vote poll (http://www.nytimes.com)
- Refer to appendix below for further information
2. IEFS election guide: Election profile: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory coast (http://www.electionguide.org)
3. African election data base: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory coast (http://africanelections.tripod.com)
4. 1993 Human right Report: Togo in 1993 released by U.S department of State (http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_africa/Togo.html)
5. IFES Election Assistance Project: Togo, Final Activity Report (July 28 - August 23, 1993), September 1993. http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Reports/1993/IFES-Election-Assistance-Project-Togo-Final-Activity-Report-July-28-August-23-1993.aspx
6. STATEMENT OF THE NDI PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION TO TOGO'S 1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION(Lome, June 11, 1998) http://www.ndi.org/files/1176_tg_98preelect.pdf
7. The Declaration of 8 NGOs on the presidential elections in Togo(25, November, 2003) http://www.fidh.org/Declaration-of-8-NGOs-on-the-presidential
8. Amnesty International Report 2003-Togo http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,AMNESTY,,TGO,3edb47e10,0.html
9. EU Presidency declaration on the political situation in Togo(February 23, 2005) http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4383_en.htm
10. DECLARATION ON THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN TOGO(May 13, 2005) http://www.acpsec.org/en/press_releases/togoresultsen.htm
11. Report on Ghana 2004 election by KAS http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_7161-1522-2-30.pdf?050928113914
12. EU Election Observation Mission, Ghana Presidential and Parliamentary Elections - 7 December 2008, Final report. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/human_rights/election_observation/ghana/index_en.htm

B. secondary sources

1. Robert I. Rotberg, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, Nigeria elections and continuing challenges, 2007, posted by Google books. http://books.google.com/books?id=0HRMx34lr0EC
2. Victor Oguejiofor Okafor, Nigeria's stumbling democracy and its implications for Africa's democratic movement, 2007, posted by Google books. http://books.google.com/books?id=66aI5Ku9EDEC
3. W. Joseph Campebll, The emergent independent press in Benin and Cote d'Ivoire: from voice of the state to Advocate of democracy , 1998 posted by Google books. http://books.google.com/books?id=pAjZu5xA93kC
4. Web page: The library of Congress: A country study: Ivory Coast http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/citoc.html
5. Web page: The library of Congress: A Country study: Nigeria http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html
6. Web page: The library of Congress: A Country study: Ghana http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ghtoc.html
7. Web page: Election monitoring report compiled by the network of mobile election monitors(NMEM) on the Nigerian presidential elections held on April 21st 2007 http://www.kiwanja.net/miscellaneous/NMEM_Election_Report.pdf
8. 아프리카의 민주혁명: 세네갈과 나이지리아의 민주화 과정을 중심으로, 이한규 Africa’s democratic revolution with a focus on Senegal and Nigeria’s democratization, Lee 2000/06
9. Basil O. Nwankwo, Institutional design and functionality of African Democracies (A comparative analysis of Nigeria and Uganda), 2003, posted by Google books http://books.google.com/books?id=mdm6gX80-34C
10. Robert K. Schaeffer, Severed states: dilemmas of democracy in a divided world, 1993, posted by Google books. http://books.google.com/books?id=Op4n2N3dWiEC
11. Africa Democracy - Explanations of Africa's Democratization (http://science.jrank.org/pages/8962/Democracy-Africa-Explanations-Africa-s-Democratization.html)
12. AP: Comparative government and politics briefing paper: Nigeria (http://www.mvhsmun.org/Documents/APGovernmentUS&Comp/Briefing%20Paper%20Nigeria.pdf)
13. Background Note: Cote d'Ivoire by US department of State (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm)
14. Wikipedia Article: First Ivorian civil war http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Ivorian_Civil_War
15. Wikipedia Article: History of Togo http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_Of_Togo
16. Article: History of Ghana by Monash college http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad43

- Appendix NYT Article

A. Nigeria

1. Nigeria Court Ruling Delays Presidential Election (June 11, 1993)
2. Nigeria’s leader offers concession (November 24, 1993)
3. Nigeria Bars News of Presidential Election Results (June 14, 1993)
4. Nigerian Military Ruler Announces New Elections (June 26, 1993)
5. On Eve of Strike, Nigeria Detains Opponents (August 11, 1993)
6. Nigeria suspends Results of Vote that was to restore democracy (June 17, 1993)
7. Nigeria’s Ruler a Puzzle to His people (July 7, 1993)
8. NEW NIGERIA RULER PLEDGES ELECTIONS EARLY NEXT YEAR, (July 21, 1998)
9. Former Military Ruler Wins Nigerian Presidential Vote (March 1, 1999)
10. Monitors Call Nigerian Vote Fair, With Room to Improve (December 7, 1998)
11. Annan Says Nigeria Plans to Free A Candidate and Other Prisoners (July 3, 1998)
12. In Choosing Nigeria Candidate, an Effort at Parity (February 7, 1999)
13. Former Military Ruler Wins Nigerian Presidential Vote (March 1, 1999)
14. Era Limits Its President to 2 Terms (February 25, 1999)
15. Contenders to Lead Nigeria Face Off in a Bitter Primary (February 15, 1999)
16. Vague on Reforms, Nigeria's President-Elect Woos New York (March 30, 1999)
17. Narrow Edge in Nigerian Legislative Races (February 22, 1999)
18. Nigerian Opposition Candidate Calls for New Election (April 24, 2003)
19. Fraud and Fear Mar Election in Nigeria, Monitors Say (April 22, 2003)
20. Challenger in Nigeria Warns of Protests if Election Is Fradulent (April 17, 2003)
21. Turbulence Stalks Further Nigeria Elections (April 19, 2003)
22. Nigerians Go to Polls in Test of Democracy (April 20, 2003)
23. Nigerian President Declared Winner Amid Cries of Fraud (April 23, 2003)
24. Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud (April 24, 2007)
25. Corruption Charges Keep Opposition Figure Off Nigeria Ballot (March 16, 2007)
26. Opposition Candidates Threaten to Boycott Nigerian Election (April 19, 2007)
27. Nigeria's Top Court Says Officials Illegally Excluded Candidate (April 17, 2007)
28. Nigeria's Imperiled Elections (April 11, 2007)
29. Fears of Fraud Grow Before Nigerian Vote (April 21, 2007)
30. Africa’s Crisis of Democracy (April 23, 2007)
31. Millions Vote in Nigeria, but Intimidation Is Widespread (April 15, 2007)
32. Betraying a Democratic Legacy (April 25, 2007)
33. Nigeria's Flawed Election (June 3, 2007)
34. President Of Nigeria Is Re-elected In Clean Poll (April 19, 2011)
35. Nigerians Vote in Presidential Election (April 16, 2011)
36. Nigeria’s President Wins Election (April 18, 2011)

B. Ivory Coast

1. Loser in Ivory coast to challenge election (October 31, 1990)
2. Ivory Coast president leads in First multiparty election (October 29, 1990)
3. Ivory Coast Faces First free elections today (October 28,1990)
4. Uneasily, Ivory Coast Heads for Election (March 12,1995)
5. Before Africans vote, men in charge rewrite rules (October 24, 1995)
6. Police, but few voters, in Ivory coast turnout (October 23, 1995)
7. An African Nation's path to democracy takes a detour (October 13, 1995)
8. Popular uprising ends junta's rule over Ivory coast (October 26, 2000)
9. With General Trailing, Ivory Coast vote Tally suddenly dried up (October 24, 2000)
10. Ivory Coast Junta Cracks Down, blaming approaching election (October 5, 2000)
11. Silences are eloquent as African Junta Runs an election (October 22, 2000)
12. Many stay away from polls in boycotted Ivory Coast vote (October 23, 2000)
13. Dictator Gone, Violence Erupts in Ivory Coast (October 27, 2000)
14. A Widening political Rift in Ivory Coast (December 10, 2010)
15. Election Results Challenged in Ivory Coast (December 2, 2010)
16. Candidates Charge Voter Intimidation in Ivory Coast Vote (November 28, 2010)
17. Ivory Coast: Opponents calls for Protests (December 15, 2010)
18. Candidates Charge Voter intimidation in Ivory Coast Vote (November 28, 2010)
19. Ivory Coast: Opponent Calls for Protests (December 15, 2010)
20. Many in Ivory Coast May Be Left Out From Vote (February 7, 2010)
21. Ivory Coast: Europeans Press Defeated president

C. Togo

1. World Briefing: Africa: Togo: Post-Vote Unrest (June 4, 2003)
2. World Briefing: Africa: Togo: Leader is a candidate again (April 26, 2003)
3. World Briefing: Africa: Togo: Hanging on to power (June 3, 2003)
4. Voters Throng polling stations for Togo’s presidential Election (April 25, 2005)
D. Ghana

1. Ghana’s Leader Wins Election as President (November 6, 1992)
2. As Army Rule Ends, Ghana Votes In First Open Election Since 1979 (November 4, 1992)
3. Ghana Votes in Rare Display of Stability in Region (December 8, 1996)
4. In Upset, Ghana's opposition is winning National Elections (December 10, 2000)
5. World Briefing | Africa: Ghana: President Is Re-Elected (December 10, 2004)
6. WORLD BRIEFING | AFRICA; Ghana: Runoff Election Is Forced (December 10, 2008)
7. Ghana's Image, Glowing Abroad, Is Beginning to Show a Few Blemishes at Home (December 23, 2008)



First Draft . . Go to Teacher's Comment

I. Introduction:
            Since its independence in 1960, the continent of Africa has undergone a variety of political upheavals that doomed the sign of transition to democratic regime. The single party or authoritarian government by military leaders was majorly stipulated. However, the establishment of political stability was unsuccessful, involving a series of ethnic conflict or military coup d'etat that infringes on civil liberty as well as wears out civil activism in politic. It was not until 1990 that the first multi-party system was introduced as the footstep to democratization. However, it also possessed limits as the phenomenon was largely influenced by the wave of democratization in outer Africa and by the call of international bank or IMF in exchange of economic growth which was expected to strengthen political stability of present authoritarian government. Accordingly, as it happened under the will of present authority, election was monitored by government in forms of highly biased election commission or judged by branches of government in coalition with executive branch. The involuntary transition involved rare political activism and even the prevalent election frauds, though under the guise of multi-party, which were consistently reported to go against the basic principal of faire and viable elections.
            This paper aims at researching the transparency of presidential elections since 1990 and categorizing various forms of election fraud. Through the report of international press, this paper will try to sort out various forms of fraud, both clear and suspected one, which involves intervention of government authority and various political institutions. The judgmental criteria are highly dependent on the report of international press, while referring to historical contexts are needed to make it valid and implicate its meaning on the level of democracy in Western Africa. (More information can be added in the introduction and it is subject to change according to the further study of research)

II. Definition
            - I will discuss about the concept of followings: Election fraud, Democratization, procedural democracy, substantive democracy)

III. Method of study
            - There are three things that are components of method of study: Countries, selection of election period, sources
- Countries: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ivory coast(Cote d'Ivoire), Ghana
- The selection of election Period: Multi-party election, presidential
- International press: New York Times, IFES election guide, Washington post.
1. Nigeria
? presidential: 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011
2. Benin
? presidential: 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011
3. Togo
? Presidential: 1993, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2010
4. Ghana
? Presidential: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004
5. Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)
? Presidential: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010

IV. Historical context: Decolonization and single party system

V. Two basic criteria of democratic election
            -Forms of election unqualified for procedural democracy
-Forms of election unqualified for substantive democracy, while qualifying procedural democracy

VI. The election in Nigeria
i. Historical context before 1990
④ The legacy of colonialism and military rule
⑤ Ethnic and religious conflicts: Hausa-Fulani(Muslim), Yoruba(Muslim, Christian), Igbo(Christian)
⑥ The government of Ibrahim Bagangida right before 1992 supposed election
ii. Elections after 1990
① The presidential election in 1993
? The delay of election to 10/1993(Involvement of Nigeria court)
? The abolition of political activity of 13, while remaining 5 that are loyal to present government.
? The suspension of election by commission appointed by Babangida June 17/1993
? The nullification of election in June 23/1993
? The detainment of opponents against governmental decision(Opponent calling for international sanction that bans the import of crude oil to Western world)
② The presidential election in 1999(being researched, yet unfinished)
③ The presidential election in 2003(being researched, yet unfinished)
④ The presidential election in 2007(being researched, yet unfinished)
⑤ The presidential election in 2011 (being researched, yet unfinished)
⑥ Classification of political engineering and analysis in relationship with democratic regime
VII. The election in Benin
VIII. The election in Togo
IX. The election in Ivory Coast
X. The election in Ghana
XI. The classification of election fraud and analysis
XII. Conclusion



List of References . . Go to Teacher's Comment

A. Primary sources

1. New York Times - Keywords: fraud, presidential election, vote poll (http://www.nytimes.com)
2. Refer to appendix below for further information
3. IEFS election guide: Election profile: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory coast (http://www.electionguide.org)
4. African election data base: Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory coast (http://africanelections.tripod.com)

B. secondary sources

1. Robert I. Rotberg, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Action, Nigeria elections and continuing challenges, 2007, posted by Google books.
2. Victor Oguejiofor Okafor, Nigeria's stumbling democracy and its implications for Africa's democratic movement, 2007, posted by Google books.
3. W. Joseph Campebll, The emergent independent press in Benin and Cote d'Ivoire: from voice of the state to Advocate of democracy , 1998 posted by Google books.
4. Web page: The library of Congress: A country study: Ivory Coast http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/citoc.html
5 Web page: The library of Congress: A Country study: Nigeria http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ngtoc.html
6. Web page: The library of Congress: A Country study: Ghana http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/ghtoc.html
7. Web page: Election monitoring report compiled by the network of mobile election monitors(NMEM) on the Nigerian presidential elections held on April 21st 2007 http://www.kiwanja.net/miscellaneous/NMEM_Election_Report.pdf

Appendix : List of Relevant NYT Articles

A. Nigeria

1. Nigeria Court Ruling Delays Presidential Election(June 11, 1993)
2. Nigeria’s leader offers concession(November 24, 1993)
3. Nigeria Bars News of Presidential Election Results(June 14, 1993)
4. Nigerian Military Ruler Announces New Elections(June 26, 1993)
5. On Eve of Strike, Nigeria Detains Opponents(August 11, 1993)
6. Nigeria suspends Results of Vote that was to restore democracy(June 17,1993)
7. Nigeria’s Ruler a Puzzle to His people(July 7, 1993)
8. In Choosing Nigeria Candidate, an Effort at Parity(February 7, 1999)
9. Former Military Ruler Wins Nigerian Presidential Vote(March 1, 1999)
10. Era Limits Its President to 2 Terms(February 25, 1999)
11. Contenders to Lead Nigeria Face Off in a Bitter Primary(February 15, 1999)
12. Vague on Reforms, Nigeria's President-Elect Woos New York(March 30, 1999)
13. Narrow Edge in Nigerian Legislative Races(February 22, 1999)
14. Nigerian Opposition Candidate Calls for New Election(April 24, 2003)
15. Fraud and Fear Mar Election in Nigeria, Monitors Say(April 22, 2003)
16. Challenger in Nigeria Warns of Protests if Election Is Fradulent (April 17, 2003)
17. Turbulence Stalks Further Nigeria Elections(April 19, 2003)
18. Nigerians Go to Polls in Test of Democracy(April 20, 2003)
19. Nigerian President Declared Winner Amid Cries of Fraud(April 23, 2003)
20. Governing Party Wins in Nigeria, but Many Claim Fraud(April 24, 2007)
21. Corruption Charges Keep Opposition Figure Off Nigeria Ballot(March 16, 2007)
22. Opposition Candidates Threaten to Boycott Nigerian Election(April 19, 2007)
23. Nigeria's Top Court Says Officials Illegally Excluded Candidate(April 17, 2007)
24. Nigeria's Imperiled Elections(April 11, 2007)
25. Fears of Fraud Grow Before Nigerian Vote(April 21, 2007)
26. Africa’s Crisis of Democracy ( April 23, 2007)
27. Millions Vote in Nigeria, but Intimidation Is Widespread(April 15, 2007)
28. Betraying a Democratic Legacy(April 25, 2007)
29. Nigeria's Flawed Election(June 3, 2007)
30. President Of Nigeria Is Re-elected In Clean Poll (April 19, 2011)

B. Benin

1. FREE VOTE IN BENIN ITS FIRST IN YEARS (March 10, 1991)
2. EARLY VOTE CLOSE IN BENIN'S ELECTION (March 12, 1991)



Working Table of Contents First Draft, Sept. 5th 2011 . . Go to Teacher's Comment

I. Introduction
II. Definition
III. Method of study
IV. Historical context of West Africa before 1990: Military regime and single party
V. Two criteria of democratic elections
VI. The elections in Nigeria
VI.1. Historical context before 1990
VI.1.1 The legacy of colonialism and military rule
VI.1.2 Ethnic and religious conflicts: Hausa-Fulani (Muslim), Yoruba (Muslim, Christian), Igbo (Christian)
VI.1.3 The government of Ibrahim Bagangida right before 1992 supposed election
VI.2. The presidential election in 1993
VI.3. The presidential election in 1999
VI.4. The presidential election in 2003
VI.5. The presidential election in 2007
VI.6. The presidential election in 2011
VII. Classification of political engineering and analysis in relationship with democratic regime
VIII. The elections in Benin
IX. The elections in Togo
X. The elections in Ghana
XI. The elections in Ivory Coast.
XII. The classification of election frauds and analysis
XIII. Conclusion
(More sub-category can be added)