The British Conquest and the Colonization of the Sudan 1896-1899


Korean Minjok Leadership Academy
LJH



Table of Contents


Third Draft , Sept. 9th 2010
Second Draft , Sept. 5th 2010
First Draft , Sept. 3rd 2010
References , Dec. 13th 2010
Working Table of Contents , Dec. 13th 2010



Third Draft, Sept. 9th 2010 . . Go to Teacher's Comment

Introduction
            In the late nineteenth century, the powers of Europe were competing for territory in Africa, a process of invasion, occupation, and colonization that historians commonly refer to as the Scramble for Africa. The 1880s and 1890s were times of transition, when indirect rule through military influence and economic dependence was substituted by the direct conquest and administration by European powers, as nine tenths of the African continent was split up among European governments within just sixteen years (1).
            Of all the powers of Europe, Britain had stood out in its dominance over the global economy and politics through the establishment of the British Empire, a vast dominion of territories that encompassed nearly a quarter of the world¡¯s land surface by late nineteenth century (2). Trade and commerce among the various dominions supported the British economy, and India was at the heart of this international trade. Consequently, securing the passage to India was naturally of vital importance to Britain. Securing the Suez Canal, the ¡°second lifeline to India,¡± was top on Britain¡¯s priority list (3).
            At first, however, Egypt was not the primary concern of the cabinet in London; it was the Ottoman Empire (4). The British provided massive aid to the Turks in an effort to build up the Ottomans as a shield against the Russians, whom the British saw could possible threaten the Suez passage from the North. The British relied on the combined force of the British Navy with allied Turkish troops in the Near East to protect the route to India from potential Russian threats. Egypt, therefore, was of very little concern until the 1880s, as the case went that should Constantinople fall to the Russians, the Suez Canal would be easily accessible to Russian incursion regardless of the situation in Egypt. In fact, the original English strategy was to keep the Sultan and the Khedive as close allies who could act as reliable checks to Russian dreams of expansion. As Benjamin Disraeli remarked on 23 October 1876, it was the belief of the British Government that ¡°Constantinople is the key of India, and not Egypt and the Suez Canal.¡± (56)
            Nonetheless, the British were dragged into Egypt. In 1876, the Sultan became bankrupt, as was the case with the Khedive. Europeans began to demand the money the Khedive had borrowed, and the French went so far as to depose Ismail as Khedive. The British too decided to intervene in order to keep the balance of power with France. Yet, the general policy of the British remained non-intervention. (7)
            The decisive turning point was the Urabi revolt (1879-82), in which Egyptian soldiers against European influence and modernization efforts rose up against the Khedival government. To preserve its own interests, the British invaded Alexandria and established a permanent British advisor in the Khedive¡¯s court. The cabinet was prompted by the need to protect the Suez Canal and to preserve individual citizen¡¯s claims to the Egyptian treasury. Following the Battle of Tel el-Kebir on 13 September 1882, in which the British crushed the Urabi revolt, Egypt became a de-facto protectorate of Britain.

Gordon and the Mahdi
            The Egyptian rule over the Sudan began with the initial invasion of 1820. In 1860, the Egyptian government prohibited the slave trade after continued pressure from Britain. (8) The slave trade was of great economic importance to the Sudanese, and thus dissatisfaction grew from the native population under Egyptian rule. (9)
            Furthermore, the prevalent exploitation and corruption of the parasitic bureaucracy of the Egyptian-administrated Sudan contributed to the increase in social discontent. (10) ¡°England and the Soudan,¡± a New York Times article published on 7 March 1884, writes: ¡°But it would be hard to find any barbarism which could gain much by an admixture of the ¡®civilization¡¯ of Egyptian officialism, rotten to the very core, and black with every crime not requiring courage.¡± The article also mentions the Egyptian provincial governors who exploited the population of the ¡°poor wretch¡± to provide for himself and his men. On the whole, the decades of Egyptian rule had generated a deeply-ingrained hatred of the foreigners in Egypt, and the mood was ripe for a revolution.
            In 1881, a nationwide revolt with partly religious motivation broke out under the leadership of Mohammed Ahmed, the self-proclaimed mahdi. (11) Several Egyptian attempts to quell the revolt ended in vain, and the Mahdist movement increased its sphere of influence to dominate most of the Sudan.
            In 1882, the Ansar, (12) armed with spears and swords, overwhelmed a 7,000-men Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and seized their rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this victory by laying siege to Al Ubayyid and starving it into submission after four months. The Ansar, now 30,000 men strong, then defeated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. The Mahdi followed by capturing Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian in the khedive's service, who later became the first Egyptian appointed governor of Darfur Province. This defeat signaled the beginning of the loss of Egyptian control of the Soudan, and by January 1884, the Mahdist forces were threatening Khartoum, the capital of Egyptian Sudan.
            In response, the British government sent Charles Gordon to Khartoum to lead the evacuation of Egyptians and Europeans from the city. Upon his arrival on 18 February 1884, Gordon realized that any evacuation would be of great risk of losing many men as the Mahdi¡¯s men were very nearby. Thus he resolved to make preparations for a siege of the city and called for reinforcements from Egypt and Britain.
            Gladstone¡¯s cabinet in London was reluctant to involve itself into the Sudan conflict. The Liberals were firmly against colonial expansion, and Gladstone did not want to risk stretching the British Empire to the Sudan. Nonetheless, the public and the Queen put pressure on the government to take measures to rescue Gordon, the Queen remarking that she was ¡°much aggrieved and annoyed¡± about the Egyptian situation. (13) The public too did not wish the ¡°brave champion of the English cause¡± to be allowed to be killed by fanatic barbarians. (14) In May, The New York Times writes:
            ¡°The newspapers, in this country and in England, which approve the abandonment of Gordon do not represent the feeling of the British people. As we have said before, if calamity befell Bordon it would be directly traceable to the criminal negligence of Mr. Gladstone¡¯s Government, and would be the signal for the overwhelming defeat of that Government.¡± (15)
            After much delay, a relief mission was organized, but Khartoum fell to the Mahdist forces on Jan 26th, 1885, days before the British rescue mission arrived at the city. The cabinet immediately ordered General Garnet Wolseley, in charge of the rescue mission, to retreat to the Egyptian border, and ultimately decided to abandon the Sudan to the Mahdists.
            Unhindered by British intervention, the Ansar continued its conquest after Khartoum towards the South, and by the end of 1885, only the areas surrounding Wadi Halfa on the Northern frontier, Suakin on the Eastern coast, and Equatoria on the Southern strip remained free of Mahdist occupation.

Europe and Sudan 1884-1885
            Although it was politically crucial for Gladstone to save Gordon, it was perceived that the occupation of the Sudan would bring little to Britain. The New York Times calls Gladstone¡¯s decision to abandon the Sudan ¡°sensible¡± and dismisses the argument imperialists make about the suppression of the slave trade and the extension of British markets. The article concludes that as it is ¡°evident that there is no money in it,¡± it is the ¡°dictate of common sense¡± for Britain to abandon the Sudan. (16) Another New York Times article from January 1884 also calls the decision ¡°wise,¡± as the Soudan will not be an ¡°asset¡± but a ¡°liability¡± to Britain. (17) A Mahdist Soudan itself was viewed as no real threat to British interests, and the burden of financing the campaign was perceived to be greater than the potential benefit Britain could gain from such missions of conquest. Lastly, with regards to the English sentiments which fear the revival of the slave trade, anti-imperialists argued that such concerns were not necessary as the slave trade cannot function when the Egyptian market is closed, effectively rebutting the humanitarian argument for invasion made at the time.
            As for its sheer location, the Sudan was recognized as being strategically important to Britain even before the Mahdist rebellion. The preservation of the ¡°Egyptian Highway¡± (18) which lay at the core of England¡¯s Eastern Empire was deemed necessary well before 1884, and the British were making sure that no other European power got itself involved in the Upper Nile Valley. The French had their eyes on Egypt and the Sudan as well, however. The French construction of the Suez Canal well demonstrated the start of this, and The New York Times writes in 1884 that ¡°France, ostensibly neutral, is watching keenly for any chance of advantageous intervention.¡± (19) Moreover, the Italians, a relatively new colonial power, were also interested in the Nile area. Italy expressed its wish to send 20,000 troops in to the Sudan and to occupy it in August 1885, a proposal that was never realized. (20)

The British after Gordon
            The British were not idle after the Mahdi seized control over the Sudan. Horatio Kitchener played a major role in the preparation for what would make possible the re-conquest of the Sudan.(22) Appointed as Governor of Suakin in 1886, Kitchener was promoted to Sirdar of the Egyptian Army in 1892. (23) He succeeded in raising the native army, as he increased the number of competent black troops and strengthened their training.
            After Gordon, the attitude of most politicians in Britain had shifted to favor staying in Egypt. Unlike before, the only major politicians remaining as fervent advocates of withdrawal were Gladstone and his close supporters. Despite continued requests by the French for withdrawal from Egypt, the government responded by saying that Egypt would collapse without British military presence and continued to exert influences in the Khedive¡¯s court. By 1889, Cairo had become the pivot of the British Mediterranean strategy.
            Having decided to keep Egypt for Britain, Lord Evelyn Baring, the British Consul-General in Cairo, came to the conclusion that Britain could not afford to let any other European power obtain a hold over any part of the Nile Valley. This meant that the Upper Nile would have to be protected from European encroachment, as threats of enemies damming the Upper Nile and starving Egypt were seriously menacing to Britain.
            Nonetheless, many were reluctant to engage in a full scale invasion. Baring strongly advised Salisbury against it, as its huge costs came as a significant burden. (23) The Dervishes had no technology to dam up the upper Nile, and thus presented little threat to the security of Egypt. There was no compelling need to step in.
            In the minds of Englishmen another major factor was in play - British prestige. The belief in the excellence of moral suasion and free partnership of the mid-century was now fading away, as Boers and Irishmen used their rights against the British and as Indians and Burmans went against Britain as well. The British were driven into preferring cold administration and control, and prestige and insurance became important. Policy grew more committed to warding off of hypothetical dangers. Fear of the worst was driving policymaking to a great extent. (24)
            Around late 1890, Baring was more willing to support the re-conquest of the Sudan. He pointed at three main reasons. First, diplomacy could not be relied upon forever to keep foreign powers out of the Nile. Second, the Mahdist forces were quickly losing control, meaning that the military expeditions could succeed quickly and without much difficulty. Lastly, Egyptian finances had improved considerably, making it possible for Egypt to pay for the expedition.
            This led to the conquest of Tokar in February 1891, which not only meant territorial expansion on the Red Sea coast for the British but also a generally increased military presence in the Sudan. (25) The conquest was seen as a potential first step in the re-conquest of the Sudan, something which was increasingly viewed as inevitable due to Italian advances and Dervish atrocities. (2627)

France, Italy, Germany, and the Congo Free State
            During this period, the French echoed their claims over the Nile River and exerted its power in the diplomatic tables. In June 1889, Spuller, the French Foreign Minister, tried to get Salisbury to agree on terms for a withdrawal from Egypt, an offer that was declined by London. However, talks with France over African territories were never abandoned by Britain, and with the principle of handing over interests in West Africa to the French for concessions in the East, negotiations continued.
            The continuation of negotiations was virtually unavoidable as Salisbury had forgotten that France had been part of a 1862 treaty regarding the status of Zanzibar and thus had right to be involved in further treaties regarding the state when signing the Anglo-German Agreement in 1 July 1890. The knowledge that Britain and Germany had signed a treaty without any French consultation was badly received in Paris, and the French demanded compensation.
            At first, the French demanded for recognition of its gains in Tunisia However, there was firm Italian opposition, one which was backed by the Germans. So Salisbury looked to West Africa. The two countries agreed to a French boundary that gave the French the whole of Upper Niger, central and western Sudan, and a free hand in Madagascar. The agreement was signed on 5 August 1890. (28)
            The French, however, had not abandoned their ambitions on the Nile. The Colonial Party regretted not involving France in the Egyptian affairs when Britain did, and sought to increase France¡¯s presence in East Africa. (29) France continued to challenge the agreements between England and other European powers, and with the Italian conquest of Kassala, French toleration for what was going on in the Upper Nile was up. (30) Furthermore, France was pushing for Menelik of Ethiopia to sign a treaty opening up the supply line to Ethiopia, and a channel for constant trade and interaction was opened between French Somaliland and Ethiopia. (31)
            Italy had its own ambitions in East Africa. The Italian public felt that they had gotten too little in Africa, and Signor Francesco Crispi was being heavily criticized for his rather submissive attitudes towards Great Britain. (32) In May 1889, Crispi signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Ethiopia, stripping Ethiopia of its diplomatic powers and proclaiming it an Italian protectorate to the powers of Europe according to the Italian version of the treaty. (33) Article 17 of the Italian version of the treaty required all foreign affairs to go through Italy, and this was recognized by Queen Victoria and Kaiser Wilhelm although France refused to approve the treaty. (34) The Italian prime minister also claimed the town of Kassala, a town at the Atbara tributary of the Nile, and expressed its ambitions for more coastal territory. This was not received well by the British. Soon after the news reached London, Baring advised Salisbury: ¡°they would soon strike the valley of the Nile¡¦at Khartoum¡¦the establishment of a civilized power in the Nile Valley would be a calamity to Egypt. Whatever power holds the Upper Nile Valley must, by the mere force of its geographical situation, dominate Egypt.¡± (35) The original argument for abandoning the Sudan in 1884 had been based on the point that Great Britain was closer to Khartoum than any other major power, but now it was becoming uncertain whether this premise would still hold true in future years. Furthermore, Kassala was a very important spot in the East African trade, possibly even bringing in economic motives for Britain to prevent Italian domination of the area. However, Baring was careful not to get Salisbury to stop the Italian advance at the expense of a premature conquest of the Sudan, for he feared this would disorganize Egyptian finances. Instead, he advised Salisbury to maintain a strictly defensive policy.
            Salisbury first resorted to diplomacy. On 7 March 1890, Salisbury summoned the Italian ambassador in London and warned the Italians to stay away from the Nile. Later, he also sent Baring to Rome to try to set limits to Italian advances. The talks with Crispi were a failure, and the negotiations were not yielding fruitful resolutions. (36) By February 1891, however, Crispi was out of office, and in March and April of that year his successor made agreements with the British which surrendered to Britain the Italian claims to the Nile Valley.
            Nonetheless, with Crispi back in power in 1893, the Italians attacked the Mahdists at the Battle of Kassala on 17 July 1894, taking control over the Kassala region. Around this time, Crispi expressly laid out his wish to remain in amiable relations with England, as he wanted to use English assistance in resolving various issues, mostly with France blocking Italian advances. With this conquest, word of a possible re-conquest of the Sudan led by the British and supported by the Italians was raised, as Kassala could provide a convenient starting point for the march into Khartoum and Omdurman. (37)
            In Germany under Bismarck, the main objective of foreign policy was to prevent other major powers from allying with France. During the Egyptian crisis in 1882, Bismarck was doing his best in exploiting the crisis to drive Britain and France apart. In 1889, the Germans were pushing for a drive into the African interior under the leadership of Wilhelm II who had risen to the throne in the previous year. However, the actions of the emperor were checked by Bismarck, and in January 1889 the Chancellor offered the British an alliance as a way to balance the growing ties between France and Russia.
            The major issue between the Germans and the British was Uganda. Uganda was located at the heart of the Nile basin, and Lord Salisbury had decided that it was essential to get hold of the area. The problem was the German protectorate over the Zanzibar territories just east of the Nile Basin. Meanwhile, Bismarck had been replaced by Caprivi as Chancellor. The British wanted the Germans out of Uganda, and Salisbury notified the German ambassador in May 1890 that Uganda should be under British influence, a notification which quickly led to the drafting of an Anglo-German agreement regarding the African issue as a whole. The Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty was signed in 1 July 1890. The treaty handed the Germans the Caprivi Strip in Southern Africa as well as the islands of Heligoland in the North Sea. In return, the British were handed over the Zanzibar lands and other parts of East Africa as well as a vow from the Germans not to interfere in British affairs regarding the Sultanate of Zanzibar.
            Lastly, the Congo Free State was also involved in the affairs of the Nile. As a result of the 1894 British-Congolese Treaty, the Lado Enclave was leased to King Leopold II of Belgium until his death. The Belgians proceeded to establish posts along the Nile as far north as Lado in the newly-acquired territory, and although the Belgians posed no threat to British hegemony in the region, they occupied a significant portion of the White Nile until Leopold¡¯s death in 1910. (38)

Ethiopia
            In February 1893, Menelik announced to both Rome and Paris that he would renounce the Treaty of Wuchale as of 1 May 1894. On 5 May 1894, an Anglo-Italian protocol was issued, which placed the hinterland of France¡¯s Obok colony (39) in Italian hands. Paris quickly understood that the British were trying to close off French access to the Nile valley from the east, and strove to preserve Ethiopian independence. Leonce Lagarde, the governor of French Somaliland, continuously supplied the Ethiopians with modern weaponry from Djibouti under the approval of the Quai d¡¯Orsay. (4041) On 2 March 1896, the Ethiopians crushed the Italians in the Battle of Adowa, halting Italian expansion and causing the fall of Crispi¡¯s cabinet.
            Salisbury was alarmed by the situation in Ethiopia. Menelik had exchanged messengers with the Khalifa and declared good intentions. With the French, who had provided the vital help in the war against the Italians, Menelik pledged support for France¡¯s aspirations in the Upper Nile and promised to contain the British with French-armed Ethiopian soldiers on 30 January 1897. (41) Although Menelik did not intend to fulfill all of his promises, the contacts between Addis Abeba, Omdurman, and Paris had reached the Foreign Office, and this was enough to cause much anxiety in London. (43)
            The British quickly responded by sending a mission to Addis Abeba led by Rennel Rodd in April 1897, leading to the signing of the secret agreement not to ship weapons to Sudan in the Anglo-Ethiopian settlement of 14 May 1897. (44)

The Invasion
            Alarmed by the Abyssinian success and the Dervish threat to Kassala, the British government decided to assist Italy by making a demonstration in Northern Sudan. (45) The goal of the mission was soon extended to the re-conquest of the Dongola province, about a third of the way down from Wadi Halfa to Khartoum. Ideally, Egypt was to pay for the operation, but as its financial conditions rendered this practically impossible. Consequently, an application was made for a grant from the reserve funds of the Caisse de la Dette (46), a council of European commissioners responsible for managing Egypt¡¯s financial state, and the application was approved with a 4-2 decision. Germany, Austria, and Italy sided with England while France and Russia voting against the proposal. (47) The mission began under Kitchener¡¯s command in March 1896, with a force of 25,800 men, 8600 of them British
            In early 1896, however, the public was clearly against the full-scale invasion of the Sudan. The New York Times writes on 16 March 1896 that ¡°If the English Government shall determine upon a serious forward movement in what was a dozen years ago the Egyptian Soudan, it will be difficult to explain its motives satisfactorily to the average Englishman.¡± (48) On the 29th of the same month, The New York Times writes from London that ¡°Cromer, Military Experts, and the People Oppose the Scheme¡± as a subheading (49). The article goes on to state that only Sirdar Kitchener and his staff who ¡°sniff promotion in the desert air¡± really like the thing. The ¡°impossibility of holding the Soudan even after it has been conquered,¡± on the other hand, is holding the top decision-makers back.
            Nonetheless, the mission continued. Kitchener had trained a significant army of natives during his tenure as governor-general of the Eastern Sudan, making it possible for action to be taken immediately after the cabinet had approved of the invasion. By September 1896, Kitchener¡¯s men had conquered Dongola, but the British Government was still reluctant to commit itself to a full-scale invasion.

French Advances
            On 5 February 1897, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in Parliament that further advances of Egyptian troops would be made towards Khartoum. Parliament moved to pay an advance for the costs of the expedition, to be paid back later by Egypt. Meanwhile, France was on the move. In 1896, France recognized the Soudan as an independent state under the suzerainty of the Sultan or Turkey. ¡°France is acting in these regions by the express desire of the Mahdi, and in conformity of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,¡± writes the Eclair, a French newspaper. (50) France sent Major Jean-Baptist Marchand to the Nile region on 25 June 1896. Furthermore, three French missions were sent to Khartoum in 1897 after the pact between the French and the Mahdi. (51)
            By 1898, French actions in the Sudan became much more manifest. Missions sent by the French government penetrated into Bahr-El-Ghazel, a province located in the Southwest. Military tension was also to be found in the region, as the possibility of a French-Abyssinian-Russian alliance arose. (52) Furthermore, the French offered the Khalifa, also known as Il Taaisha protection under French influence, demanding that he hoist the French flag over Khartoum.
            The Khalifa declined the offer. Various interpretations exist about his reasons why, but most conclude that the Khalifa valued free rule over ensured protection under French influence. (53)
            Meanwhile, on January 1898, most of the Egyptian army had made its way south to a point where the Nile met the Atbara. After decimating the Mahdist forces, Kitchener asked the British Government for assistance as he moved deeper into the Sudan. On September 2nd, he had 8,200 British and 17,000 Egyptian and Sudanese men assembled only seven miles north of Omdurman. (54) Later that day, the Battle of Omdurman, which killed 10,000 Ansars and destroyed Mahdist Soudan, was fought and won by the British and Egyptian forces.

After Omdurman
            While Kitchener was fighting in Omdurman, French military presence in Fashoda, a town 400 miles south of Sudan, had become a reality. L¡¯Echo de Paris, a French newspaper, was declaring that ¡°The Sirdar¡¯s forces dare not fire upon Major Marchand, for France is behind him. England must now consent to a European conference, unless she wants war.¡± (5) In response to the situation, Britain ordered Kitchener to head to Fashoda where the French troops were positioned. The mood for war was growing. In November, Britain was making preparations for war at an extraordinary scale ¡°never seen since Napoleon¡¯s time.¡± (56) Marchand had established military posts in Bahr-el-Ghazel, which was reachable by water from the other French colonies. France demanded access to the Nile, a right which she has declared she will rather fight for than forgo. Lord Salisbury, however, had also declared that the territories of the Egyptian Soudan were absolutely un-negotiable. Should France gain a strip of the Sudan, it could easily cut the British Cape to Cairo route, send gunboats down the Nile, and to threaten Lower Egypt directly. Damming the Nile was also a real threat that Britain desperately wanted to prevent. Fear of war wasn¡¯t going to stop a military clash.
            The possibility of a strengthened French-Russian alliance, one that had begun in 1892, was brought up in the British and American papers around then. (57) As it turns out, Russia had offered to join France in a war against Great Britain at the time, an offer that was declined by the French. (58) With all these possibilities, Major Marchand¡¯s actions in Fashoda alarmed the British, and Kitchener¡¯s troops made it down to Fashoda and negotiations took place between Britain and France, Britain repeating its position that the Nile Valley was absolutely unnegotiable. On 4 November 1898, Delcasse, the French Foreign Minister, gave in to British pressure and ordered Marchand to withdraw from Fashoda, primarily for two main reasons. (59) France¡¯s relative weakness in naval force reduced its chances for victory, and France needed England¡¯s support in case of a German aggression, as the fear of a second Franco-Prussian war was always on the minds of the French. However, Delcasse did continue to push for a string of smaller posts that would have allowed the French to control a corridor to the White Nile. Lord Salisbury rejected France's idea of occupying forts, as he sought to fully control the headwaters of the Nile. A few months later, on 21 Mar 1899, the disputes between France and England over Upper Nile Valley was terminated by an agreement signed by Lord Salisbury and Paul Cambon. (60) France had renounced all claims to Fashoda, and the Nile Valley was secured for Britain.

Conclusion
            British foreign policy in the late 19th century took an extremely pragmatic approach of realpolitik. From Gladstone¡¯s initial refusal to rescue Gordon to Salisbury¡¯s push into the Sudan at times of public disapproval, it was strictly Britain¡¯s perceived strategic interests that drove diplomatic and military actions along the Nile Valley.
            The Suez Canal was important to so many British interests both commercial and strategic that its safety was generally well accepted as a vital national concern. (61) Therefore, Britain¡¯s policy in the Near East focused on securing the passage to India and the East, and here came about the necessity to protect Egypt from foreign powers. The importance of the Sudan arose in this very context.
            By the resources it had to offer or the commercial benefits the land could provide, the Sudan was far from a lucrative possession. However, due to Sudan¡¯s strategic location at the Upper Nile, control over the Sudan meant that the flow of the Nile could be interrupted, and Egypt could be threatened with starvation, flooding, and direct military incursions. This strategic nature of Sudan¡¯s location made it a key British interest to keep the Sudan off any power which could realize such possible threats.
            London did not view the Mahdist regime to possess the ability to actualize such claims, and thus saw no need to deplete Egyptian and English resources to conquer a vast expanse of the desert. With other European powers, however, the situation was quite different. On a broad level, Britain used diplomacy to block off potential threats to the Nile Valley, as the pacts with Germany, Italy, and Abyssinia demonstrate. The only major European power which was unwilling to accept an entirely English Nile Valley was France, and France was why Salisbury wanted to conquer the Sudan.
            Salisbury did not want to play a game where the joint force of the French from the South and Russians from the North threatened to cut off the highway to the East. The frequent French diplomatic activities with the Khalifa and Abyssinia alarmed London, and the military actualization of the beginning of such a plan unfolding was the decisive factor that persuaded Salisbury that Britain could no longer leave the Upper Nile Valley unguarded.
            Upon the making of the decision, Salisbury was determined to clear the Nile Valley of the French, and such determinations were well revealed during the mobilization of the military in the later months of 1898. Britain¡¯s naval superiority and France¡¯s acknowledgement of its prospects in a military clash with Britain led to the fruition of a diplomatic victory for Britain in March 1899. The Sudan was conquered, the Nile was safe, and Britain had triumphed over France.

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¡°Lord Cromer¡¯s Report on Egypt,¡± The Times, 5 May 1898. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 22, 2011).
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¡°The Affairs of England: Italy¡¯s Proposal to Occupy the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 18 August 1885 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F00E3DD153FE533A2575BC1A96E9C94649FD7CF (accessed March 13, 2011).
¡°The Eastern Troubles: General Gordon¡¯s Important Mission to the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 20 Jan 1884 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9903E6D9163AEF33A25753C2A9679C94659FD7CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
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¡°The Nile Campaign,¡± The Times, 12 September 1898. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 22, 2011).
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¡°The Operations on the Nile,¡± The Times, 20 March 1896. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
¡°The Partition of the Soudan,¡± The Times, 2 August 1894. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
¡°The Soudan,¡± The Times, 6 August 1894. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
¡°The Upper Nile Valley,¡± The Times, 30 March 1895. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
¡°To Govern the Soudan: Agreement between Great Britain and Egypt as to Control,¡± The New York Times, 20 Jan 1899 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9401E2D7163DE433A25753C2A9679C94689ED7CF (accessed March 15, 2011)
¡°Wanted To Fight Britain: Russia Offered to Aid France at the Time of the Fashoda Affair,¡± The New York Times, 19 February 1904 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A0CE7D71530E132A2575AC1A9649C946597D6CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
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Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria's Little Wars. New York: Norton, 1985.
Harlow, Barbara, and Mia Carter. Archives of Empire Volume II. The Scramble for Africa. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003.
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Marcus, Harold G.. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
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Wack, Henry Wellington. The Story of the Congo Free State. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1905.

Endnotes

(1) Ronald Edward Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism. (London: Macmillan,1965) p.17
(2) Encyclopedia Britannica Online, ¡°British Empire, (Historical State, United Kingdom),¡± http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/80013/British-Empire (accessed August 26, 2011).
(3) Robinson, p. 16
(4) Ibid., p. 77
(5) Ibid., p. 82
(6) Benjamin Disraeli was the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 20 February 1874 to 21 April 1880
(7) Robinson, p. 94
(8) Mohammad Hassan Fadllala, Short History of Sudan. (New York: iUniverse, 2004.) p. 26
(9) Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria¡¯s Little Wars. (New York: Norton, 1985) p. 270
(10) Farllala, p. 24
(11) ¡°Mahdi¡± is Arabic for ¡°The Expected One.¡±
(12) ¡°Ansar¡± is the Arabic term for ¡°helpers¡± and in the context of nineteenth century Sudan refers to the followers of Muhammad Ahmad (The Mahdi) and his descendants.
(13) Farwell, p. 280
(14) ¡°England and the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 1 May 1884 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C0DE6D8113BE033A25752C0A9639C94659FD7CF (accessed March 16, 2011).
(15) Ibid.
(16) Ibid.
(17) ¡°¡®British Interests¡¯ in the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 10 January 1884 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9E02E5D91538E033A25753C1A9679C94659FD7CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
(18) ¡°England and the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 16 March 1896 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9400EED61F39E033A25755C1A9659C94679ED7CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
(19) Ibid
(20) ¡°The Affairs of England: Italy¡¯s Proposal to Occupy the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 18 August 1885 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F00E3DD153FE533A2575BC1A96E9C94649FD7CF (accessed March 13, 2011).
(21) Horatio Kitchener was a British soldier and administrator who was appointed commander of the Egyptian Army in 1892 and led the Anglo-Egyptian ¡°reconquest¡± of the Sudan.
(22) Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban, Richard A. Lobban Jr. and John Obert Voll, Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. (2nd ed. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1992) p. 114 (23) Robinson, p. 284
(24) Ibid., p. 288
(25) Tokar is a small town near the Red Sea located approximately 100 kilometers Southeast of Suakin.
(26) ¡°Egypt and the Soudan,¡± The Times, 17 March 1891. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
(27) The term ¡°Dervish¡± originally refers to someone treading a Sufi Muslim ascetic path, but here it is used as a generic and pejorative term for the opposing Islamic entity and all members of the Mahdist institutions and organizations.
(28) ¡°Sudan¡± in this context refers to the vast stretch of land south of the Sahara from the Atlantic to the Pacific, not the former territories of the Egyptian Sudan.
(29) The Colonial Party, also called the French Colonial Union (Union Coloniale Francaise, was an influential group of French Merchants established for the purpose of promoting continued French colonialism.
(30) Kassala is a town located about 400 kilometers East of Khartoum, located just west of Italian Eritrea, a colony established in 1890 as a part of Italian East Africa.
(31) Menelik II was emperor of Ethiopia from 1889 to 1913.
(32) ¡°England and Italy in Africa,¡± The Times, 23 August 1890. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
(33) The Treaty of Wuchale was a treaty signed by Ethiopian King Menelik II of Shewa with Count Pietro Antonelli of Italy on 2 May 1889. The treaty ceded Ethopian territories to Italy in return for financial assistance and military supplies. Disputes over Article 17 of the treaty caused the First Italo-Ethiopian War. The Italian version of the article stated that Ethiopia was obliged to conduct all foreign affairs through Italy, declaring Ethiopia a de-facto Italian protectorate. However, the Amharic (Ethiopian) version of the treaty merely gave Ethiopia the option of communicating with other foreign powers through Italy.
(34) Harold G. Marcus. A History of Ethiopia. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994) p. 92
(35) Robinson
(36) Francesco Crispi was the Prime Minister of Italy from 29 July 1887 to 6 February 1891 and from 15 December 1893 to 10 March 1896 (37) ¡°England and Italy in the Soudan,¡± The Times, 6 September 1894. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 22, 2011).
(38) Henry Wellington Wack. The Story of the Congo Free State. (New York and London: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1905) p. 210
(39) Obok is a small port town in Djibouti, in what used to be French Somaliland. Here the Obok Colony can be interpreted as French Somaliland.
(40) Quai d¡¯Orsay is a wharf in Paris, and the site of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the mid nineteenth century. Here Quai d¡¯Orsay is synonymous with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(41) Marcus, p. 95
(42) Ibid., p. 102
(43) Addis Abeba became the capital of Ethiopia with the rise of Menelik II as Emperor of Ethopia.
(44) Wack, p. 103
(45) Winston Churchill. The River War. (Doylestown, Pa.: Wildside Press, 2002) p. 83
(46) Caisse de la Dette (French for Commission of the Public Debt) was an international commission established by Khedival decree on 2 May 1876 to supervise the Egyptian payment of the loans to the European governments following the construction of the Suez Canal.
(47) Churchill, p. 85
(48) ¡°England and the Soudan,¡± The New York Times, 16 March 1896 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9400EED61F39E033A25755C1A9659C94679ED7CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
(49) ¡°Future of the Soudan: Slatin Pasha¡¯s Study of it and His Conclusions,¡± The New York Times, 29 March 1896 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D02E4D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF (accessed March 17, 2011).
(50) ¡°French Help for the Mahdi,¡± The New York Times, 29 October 1897 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9402EFD71F39E433A2575AC2A9669D94669ED7CF (accessed March 13, 2011).
(51) Ibid
(52) ¡°Situation in Africa Serious,¡± The New York Times, 16 January 1898 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A00E0DC1638E433A25755C1A9679C94699ED7CF (accessed March 11, 2011).
(53) ¡°The Khalifa¡¯s Position,¡± The New York Times, 15 June 1899 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9800E2DE173DE433A25756C1A9609C94689ED7CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
(54) Farwell, p. 35
(55) ¡°Britain¡¯s Advance in Africa,¡± The New York Times, 18 September 1898 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=F00D12F93A5D11738DDDA10994D1405B8885F0D3 (accessed March 11, 2011)
(56) ¡°France and England: War Preparations Pushed with the Greatest Energy,¡± The New York Times, 6 November 1898 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9407E1DA1030E333A25755C0A9679D94699ED7CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
(57) "Avalon Project - The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention - August 18, 1892." Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/frrumil.asp (accessed August 25, 2011).
(58) ¡°Wanted To Fight Britain: Russia Offered to Aid France at the Time of the Fashoda Affair,¡± The New York Times, 19 February 1904 http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A0CE7D71530E132A2575AC1A9649C946597D6CF (accessed March 15, 2011).
(59) "Theophile Delcasse (French Statesman) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/156455/Theophile-Delcasse (accessed August 17, 2011).
(60) Paul Camdon was the French ambassador to Britain from 1898 to 1920
(61) Robinson, p. 119




Second Draft, Sept. 5th 2010 . . Go to Teacher's Comment

The British Conquest of the Sudan
The Clash of European Interests and the Motives behind the British Decision

Introduction
            The Sudan is a huge expanse of wasteland. The area is inhospitable for many, and the constant ethnic conflicts make the area unattractive for governance. A land with very little to offer other than slaves, the Sudan was not the ideal colony as imagined by the Europeans. Thus, the British decision to invade and conquer the Sudan was prompted by motives other than economic. Unlike most African colonies, where the craving for more natural resources and a larger market for finished products fueled the colonial enterprises, in the Sudan there were other factors in play.
            British foreign policy cannot be understood without a comprehensive understanding of the British Colonial Empire. Under different party leadership, the emphasis on expansion differed greatly, but by the late nineteenth century, Britain¡¯s colonial empire had expanded to a degree that it was impossible to conceive of an abandonment of such lands, even with the Liberals in power.
            India was Britain¡¯s most prized colony. International trade fueled the prosperity of the British economy, and India was Britain¡¯s most important trade partner, the crown jewel of the British crown. Ergo, securing the passage to India was vital to the British (p16, Gallagher).
            At first, Egypt was not the primary concern of the cabinet in London; it was the Ottoman Empire (p77, Gallagher). The British provided massive aid to the Turks in an effort to build up the Ottomans as a shield against the Russians. The British relied on the combined force of the British Navy with allied Turkish troops in the Near East to protect the route to India from potential Russian threats. Egypt, therefore, was of very little concern until the 1880s, as the case went that should Constantinople fall to the Russians, the Suez Canal would be easily accessible to Russian incursion regardless of the situation in Egypt. In fact, the original English strategy was to keep the Sultan and the Khedive as close allies who could act as reliable checks to Russian dreams of expansion. As Benjamin Disraeli (endnote needed) remarked, it was the belief of the British Government that ¡°Constantinople is the key of India, and not Egypt and the Suez Canal.¡± (p82, Gallagher)
            The situation began to change with the advent of the 1870s, when the Turkish Empire began to show signs of rampant corruption and possible collapse. Moreover, the Ottoman atrocities against Christian rebels in the Balkans made it politically difficult for the government to fully support the Sultan due to domestic public pressure.
            Nonetheless, the British were dragged into Egypt. In 1876, the Sultan became bankrupt, and so was the case with the Khedive. Europeans began to demand the money the Khedive had borrowed, and the French went so far as to depose Ismail as Khedive. The British too decided to intervene in order to keep the balance of power with France. Yet, the general policy of the British remained non-intervention (p94, Gallagher)
            The decisive turning point was the Urabi revolt (1879-82), in which Egyptian soldiers against European influence and modernization efforts rose up against the Khedival government. To preserve its own interests, the British invaded Alexandria and established a permanent British advisor in the Khedive¡¯s court. The cabinet was prompted by the need to protect the Suez Canal and to preserve individual citizen¡¯s claims to the Egyptian treasury. Following the Battle of Tel el-Kebir on September 13th, 1882, in which the British crushed the Urabi revolt, Egypt became a de-facto protectorate of Britain.

Gordon and the Mahdi
            The Egyptian rule over the Sudan began with the initial invasion of 1820. In the following decades, the Egyptians imposed heavy taxation and abolished slavery. The slave trade was of great economic importance to the Sudanese (270, Farwell), and thus dissatisfaction grew from the native population under Egyptian rule.
            Furthermore, the prevalent exploitation and corruption in the Egyptian-administrated Sudan contributed to the increase in social discontent. ¡°England and the Soudan,¡± a New York Times article published on 7 March 1884, writes: ¡°But it would be hard to find any barbarism which could gain much by an admixture of the ¡®civilization¡¯ of Egyptian officialism, rotten to the very core, and black with every crime not requiring courage.¡± The article continues that atrocities of the slave trade that persisted, in which an ¡°upward of 30,000 slaves perished yearly from hunger or ill-treatment on their way down the Valley of the Nile.¡± The article also mentions the Egyptian provincial governors who exploited the population of the ¡°poor wretch¡± to provide for himself and his men.. On the whole, the decades of Egyptian rule had generated a deeply-ingrained hatred of the foreigners in Egypt, and the mood was ripe for a revolution.
            In 1881, a nationwide revolt with partly religious motivation broke out under the leadership of Mohammed Ahmed, the self-proclaimed mahdi (Arabic for ¡°the expected one¡±). Several Egyptian attempts to quell the revolt ended in vain, and the Mahdist movement increased its sphere of influence to dominate most of the Sudan.
            In 1882, the Ansar (the Mahdist army), armed with spears and swords, overwhelmed a 7,000-men Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and seized their rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this victory by laying siege to Al Ubayyid and starving it into submission after four months. The Ansar, now 30,000 men strong, then defeated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. The Mahdi followed by capturing Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian in the khedive's service, who later became the first Egyptian appointed governor of Darfur Province. This defeat signaled the beginning of the loss of Egyptian control of the Soudan, and by January 1884, the Mahdist forces were threatening Khartoum, the capital of Egyptian Sudan.
            In response, the British government sent General Charles Gordon to Khartoum to lead the evacuation of Egyptians and Europeans from the city. Upon his arrival on 18 February 1884, Gordon realized that any evacuation would be of great risk of losing many men as the Mahdi¡¯s men were very nearby. Thus he resolved to make preparations for a siege of the city and called for reinforcements from Egypt and Britain.
            Gladstone¡¯s cabinet in London was reluctant to involve itself into the Sudan conflict. The Liberals were firmly against colonial expansion, and Gladstone did not want to risk stretching the British Empire to the Sudan. Nonetheless, the public and the Queen put pressure on the government to take measures to rescue Gordon, the Queen remarking that she was ¡°much aggrieved and annoyed¡± about the Egyptian situation (Farwell, 280). In May, the press argued that it would be the¡°criminal negligence of Mr. Gladstone¡¯s government¡± responsible should things go wrong in Khartoum and that such an occasion would signal ¡°the overwhelming defeat of that government.¡± (England and the Soudan, May 1884). The feelings of the British people would not tolerate leaving a ¡°brave champion of the English cause¡± to be murdered by fanatical barbarians.
            After much delay, a relief mission was organized, but Khartoum fell on Jan 26th, 1885, days before the British rescue mission arrived at the city. The cabinet immediately ordered General Garnet Wolseley, in charge of the rescue mission, to retreat to the Egyptian border, and ultimately decided to abandon the Sudan to the Mahdists.
            Unhindered by British intervention, the Ansar continued its conquest after Khartoum towards the South, and by the end of 1885, only the areas surrounding Wadi Halfa on the Northern frontier and Suakin on the Eastern coast remained under Anglo-Egyptian command.

The European Perception
            Although it was politically crucial for Gladstone to save Gordon, it was perceived that the occupation of the Sudan would bring little to Britain. The New York Times calls Gladstone¡¯s decision to abandon the Sudan ¡°sensible¡± and dismisses the argument imperialists make about the suppression of the slave trade and the extension of British markets. The article concludes that as it is ¡°evident that there is no money in it,¡± it is the ¡°dictate of common sense¡± for Britain to abandon the Sudan (England and the Soudan, May 1884. Another New York Times article from January 1884 also calls the decision ¡°wise,¡± as the Soudan will not be an ¡°asset¡± but a ¡°liability¡± to Britain (British Interests in the Soudan, Jan 1884). A Mahdist Soudan itself was viewed as no real threat to British interests, and the burden of financing the campaign was perceived to be greater than the potential benefit Britain could gain from such missions of conquest. Lastly, with regards to the English sentiments which fear the revival of the slave trade, anti-imperialists argued that such concerns were not necessary as the slave trade cannot function when the Egyptian market is closed, effectively rebutting the humanitarian argument for invasion made at the time.
            As for its sheer location, the Sudan was recognized as being strategically important to Britain even before the Mahdist rebellion. The preservation of the ¡°Egyptian Highway¡± which lay at the core of England¡¯s Eastern Empire was deemed necessary well before 1884, and the British were making sure that no other European power got itself involved in the Upper Nile Valley. The French had their eyes on Egypt and the Sudan as well, however. The French construction of the Suez Canal well demonstrated the start of this, and the New York Times writes in 1884 that ¡°France, ostensibly neutral, is watching keenly for any chance of advantageous intervention.¡± (England and the Soudan, Mar 1884) Moreover, the Italians, a relatively new colonial power, were also interested in the Nile area. Italy expressed its wish to send 20,000 troops in to the Sudan and to occupy it in August 1885, a proposal that was never realized (The Affairs of England, NYT, Aug 1885).

The British after Gordon
            The British were not idle after the Madhi seized control over the Sudan. Horatio Kitchener (endnote needed) played a major role in the preparation for what would make possible the re-conquest of the Sudan. Appointed as Governor of Suakin in 1886, Kitchener was promoted to Sirdar (endnote needed) of the Egyptian Army. He succeeded in raising the native army, as he increased the number of competent black troops and strengthened their training.
            After Gordon, the attitude of most politicians in Britain had shifted to favor staying in Egypt. Unlike before, the only major politicians remaining as fervent advocates of withdrawal were Gladstone and his close supporters. Despite continued requests by the French for withdrawal from Egypt, the government responded by saying that Egypt would collapse without British military presence and continued to exert influences in the Khedive¡¯s court. By 1889, Cairo had become the pivot of the British Mediterranean strategy.
            Having decided to keep Egypt for Britain, Lord Evelyn Baring, the British Consul-General in Cairo, came to the conclusion that Britain could not afford to let any other European power obtain a hold over any part of the Nile Valley. This meant that the Upper Nile would have to be protected from European encroachment, as threats of enemies damming the Upper Nile and starving Egypt were seriously menacing to Britain.
            Nonetheless, many were reluctant to engage in a full scale invasion. Baring strongly advised Salisbury against it, as its huge costs came as a significant burden (p284, Gallagher). The Dervishes had no technology to dam up the upper Nile, and thus presented little threat to the security of Egypt. There was no compelling need to step in.
            In the minds of Englishmen another major factor was in play?British prestige. The belief in the excellence of moral suasion and free partnership of the mid-century was now fading away, as Boers and Irishmen used their rights against the British and as Indians and Burmans went against Britain as well. The British were driven into preferring cold administration and control, and prestige and insurance became important. Policy grew more committed to warding off of hypothetical dangers. Fear of the worst was driving policymaking to a great extent (p288, Gallagher). Around late 1890, Baring was more willing to support the re-conquest of the Sudan. He pointed at three main reasons. First, diplomacy could not be relied upon forever to keep foreign powers out of the Nile. Second, the Dervishes (endnote needed) were quickly losing control, meaning that the military expeditions could succeed quickly and without much difficulty. Lastly, Egyptian finances had improved considerably, making it possible for Egypt to pay for the expedition.
            This led to the conquest of Tokar (endnote needed) in February 1891, which not only meant territorial expansion on the Red Sea coast for the British but also a generally increased military presence in the Sudan. The conquest was seen as a potential first step in the re-conquest of the Sudan, something which was increasingly viewed as inevitable due to Italian advances and Dervish atrocities (TOL, 1891 Mar 17).

France, Italy, and Germany
            During this period, the French echoed their claims over the Nile River and exerted its power in the diplomatic tables. In June 1889, Spuller, the French Foreign Minister, tried to get Salisbury to agree on terms for a withdrawal from Egypt, an offer that was declined by London. However, talks with France over African territories were never abandoned by Britain, and with the principle of handing over interests in West Africa to the French for concessions in the East, negotiations continued.
            The continuation of negotiations was virtually unavoidable as Salisbury had forgotten that France had been part of a 1862 treaty regarding the status of Zanzibar and thus had right to be involved in further treaties regarding the state when signing the Anglo-German Agreement in July 1st, 1890. The knowledge that Britain and Germany had signed a treaty without any French consultation was badly received in Paris, and the French demanded compensation.
            At first, the French demanded for recognition of its gains in Tunisia However, there was firm Italian opposition, one which was backed by the Germans. So Salisbury looked to West Africa. The two countries agreed to a French boundary that gave the French the whole of Upper Niger, central and western Sudan (territories in West and Central Africa south of the Sahara), and a free hand in Madagascar. The agreement was signed on August 5th, 1890.
            The French, however, had not abandoned their ambitions on the Nile. The Colonial Party (endnote needed) regretted not involving France in the Egyptian affairs when Britain did, and sought to increase France¡¯s presence in East Africa. France continued to challenge the agreements between England and other European powers, and with the Italian conquest of Kassala (endnote needed), French toleration for what was going on in the Upper Nile was up. Furthermore, France was pushing for Menilek of Ethiopia to sign a treaty opening up the supply line to Ethiopia, and a channel for constant trade and interaction was opened between French Somaliland and Ethiopia.
            Italy had its own ambitions in East Africa. The Italian public felt that they had gotten too little in Africa, and Signor Francesco Crispi was being heavily criticized for his rather submissive attitudes towards Great Britain (TOL, 1890 Aug 2). In May 1889, Crispi signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Ethiopia?stripping Ethiopia of its diplomatic powers and proclaiming it an Italian protectorate to the powers of Europe. Article 17 of the Italian version of the treaty required all foreign affairs to go through Italy, and this was recognized by Queen Victoria and Kaiser Wilhelm although France refused to approve the treaty (Marcus, p92). The Italian prime minister also claimed the town of Kassala, a town at the Atbara tributary of the Nile, and expressed its ambitions for more coastal territory. This was not received well by the British. Soon after the news reached London, Baring advised Salisbury: ¡°they would soon strike the valley of the Nile¡¦at Khartoum¡¦the establishment of a civilized power in the Nile Valley would be a calamity to Egypt. Whatever power holds the Upper Nile Valley must, by the mere force of its geographical situation, dominate Egypt.¡± The original argument for abandoning the Sudan in 1884 had been based on the point that Great Britain was closer to Khartoum than any other major power, but now it was becoming uncertain whether this premise would still hold true in future years. Furthermore, Kassala was a very important spot in the East African trade, possibly even bringing in economic motives for Britain to prevent Italian domination of the area. However, Baring was careful not to get Salisbury to stop the Italian advance at the expense of a premature conquest of the Sudan, for he feared this would disorganize Egyptian finances. Instead, he advised Salisbury to maintain a strictly defensive policy.
            Salisbury first resorted to diplomacy. On 7 March 1890, Salisbury summoned the Italian ambassador in London and warned the Italians off the Nile. Later, he also sent Baring to Rome to try to set limits to Italian advances. However, from around this time a new strategy was forming?direct military conquest.
            The talks with Crispi were a failure, and the negotiations were not yielding fruitful resolutions. By February 1891, however, Crispi was out of office, and in March and April of that year his successor made agreements with the British which gave Salisbury the surrender of the Italian claims to the Nile Valley.
            Nonetheless, with Crispi back in power in 1893, the Italians attacked the Mahdists at the Battle of Kassala on July 17th, 1894, taking control over the Kassala region. Around this time, Crispi expressly laid out his wish to remain in amiable relations with England, as he wanted to use English assistance in resolving various issues, mostly with France blocking Italian advances. With this conquest, word of a possible re-conquest of the Sudan led by the British and supported by the Italians was raised, as Kassala could provide a convenient starting point for the march into Khartoum and Omdurman (TOL, 1894 Sep 6).
            In Germany under Bismarck, the main objective of foreign policy was to prevent other major powers from allying with France. During the Egyptian crisis in 1882, Bismarck was doing his best in exploiting the crisis to drive Britain and France apart. In 1889, the Germans were pushing for a drive into the African interior under the leadership of Wilhelm II who had risen to the throne in the previous year. However, the actions of the emperor were checked by Bismarck, and in January 1889 the Chancellor offered the British an alliance as a way to balance the growing ties between France and Russia.
            The major issue between the Germans and the British was Uganda. Uganda was located at the heart of the Nile basin, and Lord Salisbury had decided that it was essential to get hold of the area. The problem was the German protectorate over the Zanzibar territories just east of the Nile Basin. Meanwhile, Bismarck had been replaced by Caprivi as Chancellor. The British wanted the Germans out of Uganda, and Salisbury notified the German ambassador in May 1890 that Uganda should be under British influence, a notification which quickly led to the drafting of an Anglo-German agreement regarding the African issue as a whole. The Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty was signed in 1 July 1890. The treaty handed the Germans the Caprivi Strip in Southern Africa as well as the islands of Heligoland in the North Sea. In return, the British were handed over the Zanzibar lands and other parts of East Africa as well as a vow from the Germans not to interfere in British affairs regarding the Sultanate of Zanzibar.

Ethiopia
            In February 1893, Menilek announced to both Rome and Paris that he would renounce the Treaty of Wuchale as of 1 May 1894. On 5 May 1894, an Anglo-Italian protocol was issued, which placed the hinterland of France¡¯s Obok colony (French Somaliland) in Italian hands. Paris quickly understood that the British were trying to close off French access to the Nile valley from the east, and strove to preserve Ethiopian independence. Leonce Lagarde, the governor of French Somaliland, continuously supplied the Ethiopians with modern weaponry from Djibouti under the approval of the Quai d¡¯Orsay (the French Foreign Ministry) (Ethiopia, p95). On 2 March 1896, the Ethiopians crushed the Italians in the Battle of Adowa, halting Italian expansion and bringing Crispi down from office.
            Salisbury was alarmed by the situation in Ethiopia. Menilek had exchanged messengers with the Khalifa and declared good intentions. With the French, who had provided the vital help in the war against the Italians, Menilek pledged support for France¡¯s aspirations in the Upper Nile and promised to contain the British with French-armed Ethiopian soldiers on 30 January 1897 (Ethiopia, 102). Although Menilek did not intend to fulfill all of his promises, the contacts between Addis Abeba (endnote needed), Omdurman, and Paris had reached the Foreign Office, and this was enough to cause much anxiety in London.
            The British quickly responded by sending a mission to Addis Abeba led by Rennel Rodd in April 1897, leading to the signing of the secret agreement not to ship weapons to Sudan in the Anglo-Ethiopian settlement of 14 May 1897 (Ethiopia p103).

The Invasion
            Alarmed by the Abyssinian success and the Dervish threat to Kassala, the British government decided to assist Italy by making a demonstration in Northern Sudan (River War, 83) The goal of the mission was soon extended to the re-conquest of the Dongola province (endnote needed), about a third of the way down from Wadi Halfa to Khartoum. Ideally, Egypt was to pay for the operation, but as its financial conditions rendered it practically impossible. Consequently, an application was made for a grant from the reserve funds of the Caisse de la Dette (endnote needed), a council of European commissioners responsible for managing Egypt¡¯s financial state, and the application was approved with a 4-2 decision. Germany, Austria, and Italy sided with England while France and Russia voting against the proposal (p85, the river war). The mission began under Kitchener¡¯s command in March 1896, with a force of 25,800 men, 8600 of them British
            In early 1896, however, the public was clearly against the full-scale invasion of the Sudan. The New York Times writes on March 16th, 1896 that ¡°If the English Government shall determine upon a serious forward movement in what was a dozen years ago the Egyptian Soudan, it will be difficult to explain its motives satisfactorily to the average Englishman.¡± (England and the Soudan, Mar 1896) On the 29th of the same month, in an article London and Soudan War, The New York Times writes from London that ¡°Cromer, Military Experts, and the People Oppose the Scheme¡± as a subheading. The article goes on to state that only Sirdar Kitchener and his staff who ¡°sniff promotion in the desert air¡± really like the thing. The ¡°impossibility of holding the Soudan even after it has been conquered,¡± on the other hand, is holding the top decision-makers back.
            Nonetheless, the mission continued. Kitchener had trained a significant army of natives during his tenure as governor-general of the Eastern Sudan, making it possible for action to be taken immediately after the cabinet had approved of the invasion. Yet there were several problems that the British faced. First and foremost lay supplies and transport. Omdurman, the Dervish capital, was located a thousand miles away from Cairo, much of it covered in desert. To worsen the situation, there were cataracts on the way as well, making effective land transportation difficult. This problem was overcome by an engineer by the name Edouard Girouard, who led the construction of railroads to bypass the cataracts. By September 1896, Kitchener¡¯s men had conquered Dongola, but the British Government was still reluctant to commit itself to a full-scale invasion.

French Advances
            On February 5th, 1897, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in Parliament that further advances of Egyptian troops would be made towards Khartoum. Parliament moved to pay an advance for the costs of the expedition, to be paid back later by Egypt.
            Meanwhile, France was on the move. In 1896, France recognized the Soudan as an independent state under the suzerainty of the Sultan or Turkey. ¡°France is acting in these regions by the express desire of the Mahdi, and in conformity of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,¡± writes the Eclair, a French newspaper. Major Marchand (endnote needed) was sent to the Nile region on 25 June 1896. Furthermore, three French missions were sent to Khartoum in 1897 after the pact between the French and the Mahdi. (French Help for the Mahdi, Oct 1897)
            By 1898, French actions in the Sudan became much more manifest. Missions sent by the French government penetrated into Bahr-El-Ghazel, the most fertile province in the Sudan located in the Southwest. Military tension was also to be found in the region, as the possibility of a French-Abyssinian-Russian union arose. (Situation in Africa Serious, NYT, Jan 1898) Furthermore, the French offered the Khalifa protection under French influence, demanding that he hoist the French flag over Khartoum.
            Despite the offer, the Khalifa did not want to rule under French influence. The Khalifa, also known as Il Taaisha (Abdullah al-Taaisha) could have accepted Marchand¡¯s demand to hoist the French flag over Khartoum, but opted not to. Various interpretations exist about this, but most conclude that the Khalifa valued free rule over ensured protection under French influence. (The Khalifa¡¯s Position, NYT, 1899)
            Meanwhile, on January 1898, most of the Egyptian army had made its way south to a point where the Nile met the Atbara. After decimating the Dervishes, Kitchener asked the Government for assistance as he moved deeper into the Sudan. On September 2nd, he had 8,200 British and 17,000 Egyptian and Sudanese men assembled only seven miles north of Omdurman (Farwell, 335). The Battle of Omdurman, which killed 10,000 Ansars and destroyed Mahdist Soudan, was fought and won on the same day.

After Omdurman
            While Kitchener was fighting in Omdurman, French military presence in Fashoda, a town 400 miles south of Sudan, had become a reality. L¡¯Echo de Paris, a French newspaper, was declaring that ¡°The Sirdar¡¯s forces dare not fire upon Major Marchand, for France is behind him. England must now consent to a European conference, unless she wants war.¡± (Britain¡¯s Advances in Africa, NYT, Sep 1898) In response to the situation, Britain ordered Kitchener to head to Fashoda where the French troops were positioned. The mood for war was growing. In November, Britain was making preparations for war at an extraordinary scale ¡°never seen since Napoleon¡¯s time.¡± (France and England, NYT, Nov 1898) Marchand had established military posts in Bahr-el-Ghazel, which was reachable by water from the other French colonies. France demanded access to the Nile, a right which she has declared she will rather fight for than forgo. Lord Salisbury, however, had also declared that the territories of the Egyptian Soudan were absolutely un-negotiable. Should France gain a strip of the Sudan, it could easily cut the British Cape to Cairo route, send gunboats down the Nile, and to threaten lower Egypt directly. Damming the Nile was also a real threat that Britain desperately wanted to prevent. Fear of war wasn¡¯t going to stop a military clash.
            The possibility of a strengthened French-Russian alliance, one that had begun in 1892 (Avalon Project), was brought up in the British and American papers around then. As it turns out, Russia had offered to join France in a war against Great Britain at the time, an offer that was declined by the French. (Wanted to Fight Britain, NYT, 1904)
            With all these possibilities, Major Marchand¡¯s actions in Fashoda alarmed the British, and Kitchener¡¯s troops made it down to Fashoda and negotiations took place between Britain and France, Britain repeating its position that the Nile Valley was absolutely unnegotiable.
            On November 4, 1898, Delcasse (Britannica), the French Foreign Minister, gave in to British pressure and ordered Marchand to withdraw from Fashoda, primarily for two main reasons. France¡¯s relative weakness in naval force reduced its chances for victory, and France needed England¡¯s support in case of a German aggression, as the fear of a second Franco-Prussian war was always on the minds of the French. However, Delcasse did continue to push for a string of smaller posts that would have allowed the French to control a corridor to the White Nile. Lord Salisbury rejected France's idea of occupying forts, as he sought to fully control the headwaters of the Nile. A few months later, on 21 Mar 1899, the disputes between France and England over Upper Nile Valley was terminated by an agreement signed by Lord Salisbury and Paul Cambon (endnote necessary Britannica). France had renounced all claims to Fashoda, and the Nile Valley was secured for Britain.

Conclusion
            British foreign policy in the late 19th century took an extremely pragmatic approach of realpolitik. From Gladstone¡¯s initial refusal to rescue Gordon to Salisbury¡¯s push into the Sudan at times of public disapproval, it was strictly Britain¡¯s perceived strategic interests that drove diplomatic and military actions along the Nile Valley.
            The Suez Canal was important to so many British interests both commercial and strategic that its safety was generally well accepted as a vital national concern (Gallagher p119). Therefore, Britain¡¯s policy in the Near East focused on securing the passage to India and the East, and here came about the necessity to protect Egypt from foreign powers. The importance of the Sudan arose in this very context.
            By the resources it could provide or the commercial benefits the land could provide, the Sudan was far from a lucrative possession. However, as the source of the Nile, control over the Sudan meant that the flow of the Nile could be interrupted, and Egypt could be threatened with starvation, flooding, and direct military incursions. This strategic nature of Sudan¡¯s location made it a key British interest to keep the Sudan off any power which could realize such possible threats.
            London did not view the Mahdist regime to possess the ability to actualize such claims, and thus saw no need to deplete Egyptian and English resources to conquer a vast expanse of the desert. With other European powers, however, the situation was quite different. On a broad level, Britain used diplomacy to block off potential threats to the Nile Valley, as the pacts with Germany, Italy, and Abyssinia demonstrate. The only major European power which was unwilling to accept an entirely English Nile Valley was France, and France was why Salisbury wanted to conquer the Sudan.
            Salisbury did not want to play a game where the joint force of the French from the South and Russians from the North threatened to cut off the highway to the East. The frequent French diplomatic activities with the Khalifa and Abyssinia alarmed London, and the military actualization of the beginning of a such a plan unfolding was the decisive factor that persuaded Salisbury that Britain could no longer leave the Upper Nile Valley unguarded.
            Upon the making of the decision, Salisbury was determined to clear the Nile Valley of the French, and such determinations were well revealed during the mobilization of the military in the later months of 1898. Britain¡¯s naval superiority and France¡¯s acknowledgement of its prospects in a military clash with Britain led to the fruition of a diplomatic victory for Britain in March 1899. The Sudan was conquered, the Nile was safe, and Britain had triumphed over France.

Endnotes

Benjamin Disraeli: British Prime Minister 1874-1880)
Paul Cambon: French Ambassador to Britain (1898-1920)

Bibliography

Primary Sources

"Avalon Project - The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention - August 18, 1892." Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/frrumil.asp (accessed August 23, 2011).
Churchill, Winston . The River War. Doylestown, Pa.: Wildside Press, 2002.
Times of London, "England and Italy in Africa." August 23, 1890. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).
Times of London, "Italy, England, Abyssinia, and the Soudan." January 3, 1890. http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ (accessed August 20, 2011).

Secondary Sources

Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria's Little Wars. New York: Norton, 1985.
Harlow, Barbara, and Mia Carter. Archives of Empire Volume II. The Scramble for Africa. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003.
Lobban, Carolyn, Richard Lobban, and John Obert Voll. Historical Dictionary of the Sudan. 2nd ed. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1992.
"Paul Cambon (French Diplomat) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/90588/Paul-Cambon (accessed August 18, 2011).
Marcus, Harold G.. A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Robinson, Ronald Edward, and John Gallagher. Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism. London: Macmillan, 1965.
"Theophile Delcasse (French Statesman) -- Britannica Online Encyclopedia." Encyclopedia - Britannica Online Encyclopedia. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/156455/Theophile-Delcasse (accessed August 17, 2011).



First Draft, Sept. 2nd 2010 . . Go to Teacher's Comment

I. Introduction
II. The British Empire
II.1. India
II.2. Egypt
III. The Sudan Before 1896
III.1. Egyptian Rule
III.2. The Mahdi
III.3. Gordon
III.4. Perception of British Interests in the Sudan
III.5. British and European Actions in the Sudan
IV. European Colonial Policy in East Africa: 1890s
IV.1. Britain up to 1895
IV.2. France
IV.3. Italy
IV.4. Germany
V. The Invasion
V.1. Leading to the Invasion 1898-1896
V.2. British Public Opinion
V.3. The Reconquest Begins
V.4. French Advances
V.5. Final Strike
VI. The Aftermath
VII. Conclusion
VIII. Notes
IX. Reference List


I. Introduction
            The Sudan is a huge expanse of wasteland. The area is inhospitable for many, and constant ethnic conflict makes the area unattractive for governance. A land with very little to offer other than slaves, the Sudan was not the ideal colony imagined by the Europeans. This very nature of the Sudan makes it more appealing as a subject of study. Why did the British invade the Sudan ? It wasn¡¯t gold, nor was it rubber. Then what prompted British involvement in the Sudan? This is the question I wish to delve into greater depths.

II. The British Empire
            British foreign policy cannot be understood without a comprehensive understanding of the British colonial empire. Under different party leadership, the emphasis on expansion differed greatly, but by the late nineteenth century, Britain¡¯s colonial empire had expanded to a degree that it was impossible to conceive an abandonment of such lands, even with the liberals in power.

II.1. India
            India was Britain¡¯s most prized colony. Free trade fueled the prosperity of the British economy, and India was Britain¡¯s most important trade partner, the crown jewel of the British crown. Ergo, securing the passage to India was vital to the British (p16, Gallagher).

II.2. Egypt
            At fist, Egypt was not the primary concern of the cabinet in London; it was the Ottoman Empire (p77, Gallagher). The focus of British foreign policy was thus on Constantinople, not Cairo. The British provided massive aid to the Turks in an effort to build up the Ottomans as a shield against the Russian. The British relied on a combination of the Navy with allied Turkish troops in the near East to protect the route to India from potential Russian threats. Egypt, until the 1880s, was of very little concern, as the case went that should Constantinople fall to the Russians, the Suez Canal would be easily accessible to Russian incursion. In fact, the original English method was to keep the Sultan and the Khedive as close allies who could act as reliable checks to Russian dreams of expansion. As Benjamin Disraeli said, ¡°Constantinople is the key of India, and not Egypt and the Suez Canal.¡± (p82, Gallagher)
            The situation began to change with the advent of the 1870s, when the Turkish Empire began to show signs of rampant corruption and possible collapse. Moreover, with the Ottoman atrocities against Christian rebels made it politically difficult for the government to fully support the Sultan.
            Nonetheless, the British were dragged into Egypt. In 1876, the Sultan became bankrupt, and so was the case with the Khedive. Europeans began to demand the money the Khedive had borrowed, and the French went far to depose Ismail as Khedive. The British had to step in to keep the balance with France. Yet, the general policy of the British remained non-intervention (p94, Gallagher)
            The decisive event was the Urabi revolt (1879-82), in which Egyptian soldiers against European influence and modernization efforts rose up against the Khedival government. To preserve its own interests, the British invaded Alexandria and established a permanent British advisor in the Khedive¡¯s court. The need to protect the Suez Canal and to preserve individual citizen¡¯s claims to the Egyptian treasury was what prompted action from the British. By 1883, Egypt had become a de-facto protectorate of Britain (p130, Gallagher)

III. The Sudan Before 1896

III.1. Egyptian Rule
            The Egyptian rule over the Sudan began with the invasion of 1820. In the following decades, the Egyptians imposed heavy taxation and abolished slavery. The slave trade was of great economic importance to the Sudanese (270, Farwell), and thus dissatisfaction grew from the native population.
            The western view of the Egyptian rule over the Soudan was clearly negative. England and the Soudan, a New York Times article published in March 1884, writes: ¡°But it would be hard to find any barbarism which could gain much by an admixture of the ¡®civilization¡¯ of Egyptian officialism, rotten to the very core, and black with every crime not requiring courage.¡± The article continues that atrocities of the slave trade that persisted, in which an ¡°upward of 30,000 slaves perished yearly from hunger or ill-treatment on their way down the Valley of the Nile.¡± It also mentions the Egyptian provincial governors who exploited the population of the ¡°poor wretch¡± to provide for himself and his men. ¡°It soon became abundantly evident that whatever Europe wished to see done on the Upper Nile must be done by herself,¡± the article concludes. Clearly, the situation in Sudan was bad, and social discontent was on the rise.

III.2. The Mahdi
            In 1881, a nationwide revolt with partly religious motivation broke out under the leadership of Mohammed Ahmed, the self-proclaimed mahdi (the expected one). Several Egyptian attempts to quell the revolt ended in vain, and the Mahdist movement increased their sphere of influence to dominate most of the Sudan.
            In 1882, the Ansar, armed with spears and swords, overwhelmed a 7,000-men Egyptian force not far from Al Ubayyid and seized their rifles and ammunition. The Mahdi followed up this victory by laying siege to Al Ubayyid and starving it into submission after four months. The Ansar, 30,000 men strong, then defeated an 8,000-man Egyptian relief force at Sheikan. Next the Mahdi captured Darfur and imprisoned Rudolf Slatin, an Austrian in the khedive's service, who later became the first Egyptian appointed governor of Darfur Province.
            This defeat signaled the loss of Egyptian control of the Soudan, and by 1884, the Mahdist forces were laying siege on Khartoum, the capital of Egyptian Sudan.

III.3. Gordon
            In response, in February 1884, the British government sent General Charles Gordon to Khartoum to lead the evacuation of Egyptians and Europeans from the city. Upon his arrival, Gordon realized that any evacuation would be of great risk of losing many men as the Mahdi¡¯s men were very nearby. Thus he resolved to make preparations for a siege of the city and called for reinforcements from Egypt and Britain.
            Gladstone¡¯s cabinet in London was reluctant to involve themselves into the Sudan conflict. The Liberals were firmly against colonial expansion, and Gladstone did not want to risk stretching the British Empire to the Sudan. Nonetheless, the public and the Queen pressed government to take measures to rescue Gordon, the Queen remarking that she was ¡°much aggrieved and annoyed¡± about the Egyptian situation (Farwell, 280). ¡°If calamity befell Gordon it would be directly traceable to the criminal negligence of Mr. Gladstone¡¯s government, and would be the signal for the overwhelming defeat of that government,¡± writes the New York Times in May 1884 (England and the Soudan, May 1884). The feelings of the British people would not tolerate leaving a ¡°brave champion of the English cause¡± to be murdered by fanatical barbarians.
            After much delay, a relief mission was organized, but Khartoum fell on Jan 26th, 1885. The cabinet immediately ordered Wolsely, who was leading the rescue mission, to retreat to the Egyptian border, and the mission stopped there.

III.4. Perception of British Interests in the Sudan
            Although it was politically crucial for Gladstone to save Gordon, it was perceived that the occupation of the Sudan would bring little to Britain. The New York Times calls Gladstone¡¯s decision to abandon the Sudan ¡°sensible¡± and dismisses the argument imperialists make about the suppression of the slave trade and the extension of British markets. The article concludes that as it is ¡°evident that there is no money in it,¡± it is the ¡°dictate of common sense¡± for Britain to abandon the Sudan (England and the Soudan, May 1884. Another New York Times article from January 1884 also calls the decision ¡°wise,¡± as the Soudan will not be an ¡°asset¡± but a ¡°liability¡± to Britain (British Interests in the Soudan, Jan 1884). The article continues that a Mahdist Soudan cannot threaten British interests, implying that the military expenditure to fight him would be a greater loss. Lastly, with regards to the English sentiments which fear the revival of the slave trade, such worries are not necessary as the slave trade cannot function when the Egyptian market is closed.

III.5. British and European Actions in Sudan
            Even before the Mahdist revolt, Sudan was recognized as being strategically important to Britain. The preservation of the ¡°Egyptian Highway¡± which lies at the core of England¡¯s Eastern empire was deemed necessary well before 1884.
            The French had their eye on Egypt and the Sudan as well, however. The French construction of the Suez Canal well demonstrated the start of this, and the New York Times writes in 1884 that ¡°France, ostensibly neutral, is watching keenly for any chance of advantageous intervention.¡± (England and the Soudan, Mar 1884)
            The Italians, also, were interested in the Nile area. Italy expressed its wish to send 20,000 troops in to the Sudan and to occupy it in August 1885, a proposal that was never realized (The Affairs of England, NYT, Aug 1885).
            The British were not idle after the Madhi seized control over the Sudan. Horatio Kitchener played a major role in the preparation for what would make possible the reconquest of the Sudan. Appointed as Governor of Suakin in 1886, Kitchener was promoted to Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. He succeeded in raising the native army, as he increased the number of competent black troops and strengthened their training.

IV. European Colonial Policy in East Africa: 1890s
            The 1890s were a time of colonial expansion. The French wanted the Sudan to link its possessions in the West with that of the East. The Italians and the Germans also took interest. The Belgians could get involved as well. The scramble for Africa was real.

IV.1. Britain up to 1895
            After Gordon, the attitude of most politicians in Britain had shifted to favor staying in Egypt. Unlike before, the only major politicians remaining as fervent advocates of withdrawal were Gladstone and his supporters. Despite continued requests by the French for withdrawal from Egypt, the government responded by saying that Egypt would collapse without British military presence and continued to exert influences in the Khedive¡¯s court. By 1889, Cairo had become the pivot of the British Mediterranean strategy.
            Having decided to keep Egypt for Britain, Lord Evelyn Baring, the British Consul-General, came to the conclusion that the British could not afford to let any other European power obtain a hold over any part of the Nile Valley. This meant that the upper Nile would have to be protected from European encroachment, as threats of enemies damming the Upper Nile and starving Egypt was a real threat to British interests.
            Nonetheless, many were reluctant to engage in a full scale invasion. Baring strongly advised Salisbury against it, as its huge costs came as a significant burden (p284, Gallagher). The Dervishes had no technology to dam up the upper Nile, and thus presented little threat to the security of Egypt. There was no compelling need to step in.
            In the minds of Englishmen another major factor was in play - British prestige. The belief in the excellence of moral suasion and free partnership of the mid-century was now fading away, as Boers and Irishmen used their rights against the British and as Indians and Burmans went against them too. The British were driven into preferring cold administration and control, and prestige and insurance became important. Policy grew more committed to warding off of hypothetical dangers. Fear of the worst was driving policymaking to a great extent (p288, Gallagher).
            Around late 1890, Baring was more willing to support the re-conquest of the Sudan. He pointed at three main reasons. First, diplomacy could not be relied upon forever to keep foreign powers out of the Nile. Second, the dervishes were quickly losing control, meaning that the military expeditions could succeed quickly. Lastly, Egyptian finances had improved considerably, making it possible for Egypt to pay for the expedition.
            This led to the conquest of Tokar in February 1891, which not only meant territorial expansion on the Red Sea coast for the British but also a generally increased military presence in the Sudan. The conquest was seen as a potential first step in the reconquest of the Sudan, something which was increasingly viewed as inevitable due to Italian advances and Dervish atrocities (TOL, 1891 Mar 17).

IV.2. France
            In 1889, the French made a request to the British government to leave Egypt altogether. In June, Spuller, the French Foreign Minister, tried to get Salisbury to agree on terms for a withdrawal from Egypt, an offer that was declined by Salisbury. However, talks with the French were never abandoned, and with the principle of handing over interests in West Africa to the French for concessions in the East, negotiations continued.
            Furthermore, in making the Anglo-German agreement, Salisbury had forgotten that France had been part of a 1862 treaty regarding the status of Zanzibar and thus had right to be involved in further treaties regarding the state. The knowledge that Britain and Germany had signed a treaty without any French consultation was badly received in Paris, and the French demanded compensation.
            At first, the French demanded for recognition of its gains in Tunisia However, the Italians were against it firmly, and they had German support. So Salisbury looked to West Africa. The two countries agreed to a French boundary that gave the French the whole of Upper Niger, central and western Sudan, and a free hand in Madagascar. The agreement was signed on August 5th, 1890.
            The French, however, had not abandoned their ambitions on the Nile. The Colonial Party regretted not involving France in the Egyptian affairs when Britain did, and sought to increase France¡¯s presence in East Africa. France continued to challenge the agreements between England and other European powers, and with the Italian conquest of Kassala, French toleration for what was going on in the Upper Nile was up. At the end of 1895, the French had prevented the Somali port of Zeyla from falling into Italian hands. Furthermore, they were pushing for Menelek of Ethiopia to sign a treaty with them, opening up the supply line to Ethiopia.

IV.3. Italy
            Italy had its own ambitions in East Africa. The Italian public felt that they had gotten too little in Africa, and Signor Crispi was being heavily criticized for his rather submissive attitudes towards Great Britain (TOL, 1890 Aug 2). In May 1889, Crispi, the Italian minister, signed the Treaty of Ucciali with Ethiopia?an agreement which gave the Italians great influence in Ethiopia. By 1890, the British press was seeing Abyssinia as an Italian ally, if not a vassal state (TOL, 1890 Jan3). The Italian prime minister also claimed the town of Kassala, a town at the Atbara tributary of the Nile, and expressed its ambitions for more coastal territory. This was not received well by the British. Soon after the news reached London, Baring advised Salisbury: ¡°they would soon strike the valley of the Nile¡¦at Khartoum¡¦the establishment of a civilized power in the Nile Valley would be a calamity to Egypt. Whatever power holds the Upper Nile Valley must, by the mere force of its geographical situation, dominate Egypt.¡± The original argument for abandoning the Sudan in 1884 had been based on the point that Great Britain was closer to Khartoum than any other major power, but now it was becoming uncertain whether this premise would still hold in future years. Furthermore, Kassala was a very important spot in the East African trade, possibly even bringing in economic motives for Britain to prevent Italian domination of the area. However, Baring was careful not to get Salisbury to stop the Italian advance at the expense of a premature conquest of the Sudan, for this would disorganize Egyptian finances. Instead, he advised Salisbury to maintain a strictly defensive policy.
            Salisbury first resorted to diplomacy. On March 7th, 1890, Salibury summoned the Italian ambassador in London and warned the Italinas off the Nile. Later, he also sent Baring to Rome to try to set limits to Italian advances. However, from around this time a new strategy was forming - conquest.
            The talks with Crispi were a failure, and the negotiations weren¡¯t going anywhere. By February 1891, however, Crispi was out of office, and in March and April of that year his successor made agreements with the British which gave Salisbury the surrender of the Italian claims to the Nile valley.
            Nonetheless, with Crispi back in power in 1893, the Italians attacked the Mahdists at the Battle of Kassala ion July 17th, 1894, taking control over the Kassala region. With this conquest, word of a possible reconquest of the Sudan led by the British and supported by the Italians were raised, as Kassala would provide a convenient starting point for the march into Khartoum and Omdurman (TOL, 1894 Sep 6). Crispi expressly laid out his wish to remain in amiable relations with England, as he wanted to use English assistance in resolving various issues, mostly with France blocking Italian advances.

IV.4. Germany
            With Bismarck, the main objective of German foreign policy was to prevent other major powers from allying with France. During the Egyptian crisis in 1882, Bismarck was doing his best to exploit the crisis to drive Britain and France apart. In 1889, the Germans were pushing for a drive into the African interior under the leadership of Wilhelm II who had risen to the throne in the previous year. However, the actions of the emperor were checked by Bismarck, and in January 1889 the Chancellor offered the British an alliance as a way to balance the growing ties between France and Russia.
            The major issue between the Germans and the British was Uganda. Uganda was located at the heart of the Nile basin, and Lord Salisbury had decided that it was essential to get hold of the area. The problem was the German protectorate over the Zanzibar territories just east of the Nile Basin. Meanwhile, Bismarck had been replaced by Caprivi as Chancellor. The British wanted Germans out of Uganda, and Salisbury notified the German ambassador in May 1890 that Uganda should be under British influence, a notification which quickly led to the drafting of an Anglo-German agreement regarding the African issue as a whole. The Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty was signed in July 1, 1890. The treaty handed the Germans the Caprivi Strip in Southern Africa as well as the islands of Heligoland in the North Sea. In return, the British were handed over the Zanzibar lands and other parts of East Africa as well as a vow not to interfere in British affairs regarding the Sultanate of Zanzibar.

V. The Invasion

V.1. Leading to the Invasion 1895-1896
            On March 1895, action was taking place quickly. The Italians were suffering under joint Ethiopian and Dervish attack, and the Germans and Italians were calling out to Britain for assistance. King Menelek of Abyssinia was armed with French guns, and the Italian coastal strip of Eritrea was under threat.
            Salisbury was alarmed by their advances. It was not that he cared much for the Italians or the triple alliance, but the fact that should the Dervishes claim victory over the Italians, the Khalifate may become immensely strengthened. The Ethiopians too bothered Salisbury. They had joined forces with the Dervishes, and they were proving themselves to be more powerful than expected. Furthermore, were they to be tools of the French, signs of which were becoming more apparent with the passage of time, what Britain may have to face would be a greater French threat in east Africa.

V.2. British Public Opinion
            In 1896, the public was clearly against the full-scale invasion of the Sudan. The New York Times writes on March 16th, 1896 that ¡°If the English Government shall determine upon a serious forward movement in what was a dozen years ago the Egyptian Soudan, it will be difficult to explain its motives satisfactorily to the average Englishman.¡± (England and the Soudan, Mar 1896) On the 29th of the same month, in an article London and Soudan War, the New York Times writes that ¡°Cromer, Military Experts, and the People Oppose the Scheme¡± as a subheading. The article goes on to state that only Sirdar Kitchener and his staff who ¡°sniff promotion in the desert air¡± really like the thing. The ¡°impossibility of holding the Soudan even after it has been conquered,¡± on the other hand, is holding the top decision-makers back.

V.3. The Reconquest Begins
            On March 12th, 1895, Lord Salisbury announced the invasion of the Sudan, most likely in response to the threats posed by the French and her allies. Through previous treaties with Germany (1890) and Italy (1891), the whole of the region watered by the Western tributaries of the Nile, the area including Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatorial province, and a large portion of Darfur, were recognized as British territory (TOL, 1895 Mar 5). The mission began in March 1896, with a force of 25,800 men, 8600 of them British. The remainder was native troops, including six battalions recruited from Southern Sudan. (Onwar.com) The campaign was financed by Egypt.
            Kitchener had trained a significant army of natives during his tenure as governor-general of the Eastern Sudan, making it possible for action to be taken immediately after the cabinet had approved of the invasion. Yet there were several problems that the British faced. First and foremost lay supplies and transport. Omdurman, the Dervish capital, was located a thousand miles away from Cairo, much of it covered in desert. To worsen the situation, there were cataracts on the way as well, making effective land transportation difficult. This problem was overcome by a brilliant engineer by the name Edouard Girouard, who led the construction of railroads to bypass the cataracts. By September 1896, Kitchener¡¯s men had conquered Dongola, a town much further south than Suakin, but the British Government was still reluctant to commit itself to a full-scale invasion despite the popularity of the idea amongst the public and the urgings of the soldiers.
            There was no significant direct European action on the scene that prompted Salisbury to get on the move. The French had not materialized their claims on the Nile, as Marchand set sail in June 25th, 1896, a good three months after the beginning of the Sudan campaign. So it is safe to say that the invasion was not one made for the sake of a balance of power between European powers but one more centered on a better strategy for British interests in the Nile. Yet at this point Salisbury had not given the order for a full reconquest.

V.4. French Advances
            On February 5th, 1897, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced in Parliament that further advances of Egyptian troops would be made towards Khartoum. Parliament moved to pay an advance for the costs of the expedition, to be paid back later by Egypt.
            Meanwhile, France was on the move. In 1896, France recognized the Soudan as an independent state under the suzerainty of the Sultan or Turkey. ¡°France is acting in these regions by the express desire of the Mahdi, and in conformity of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,¡±writes the Eclair, a French newspaper. Furthermore, three French missions were sent to Khartoum in 1897 after the pact between the French and the Mahdi. (French Help for the Mahdi, Oct 1897)
            By 1898, French actions in the Sudan became much more manifest. Missions sent by the French government penetrated to Bahr-El-Ghazel, the most fertile province in the Sudan. Military tension was also to be found in the region, as the possibility of a French-Abyssinian-Russian union arose. (Situation in Africa Serious, NYT, Jan 1898) As the months passed, by September of that year, French military presence in Fashoda, a town 400 miles south of Sudan, had become a reality. L¡¯Echo de Paris, a French newspaper, was declaring that ¡°The Sirdar¡¯s forces dare not fire upon Major Marchand, for France is behind him. England must now consent to a European conference, unless she wants war.¡± (Britain¡¯s Advances in Africa, NYT, Sep 1898) The mood for war was growing. In November, Britain was making preparations for war at an extraordinary scale ¡°never seen since Napoleon¡¯s time.¡± (France and England, NYT, Nov 1898) Marchand had established military posts in Bahr-el-Ghazel, which was reachable by water from the other French colonies. France demanded access to the Nile, a right which she has declared she will rather fight for than forgo. Lord Salisbury, however, had also declared that the territories of the Egyptian Soudan were absolutely un-negotiable. Should France gain a strip of the Sudan, it could easily cut the British Cape to Cairo route, send gunboats down the Nile, and to threaten lower Egypt directly. Damming the Nile was also a real threat that Britain desperately wanted to prevent. Fear of war wasn¡¯t going to stop a military clash.
            The possibility of a French-Russian alliance was brought up in the British and American papers around then. As it turns out, Russia had offered to join France in a war against Great Britain at the time, an offer that was declined by the French. (Wanted to Fight Britain, NYT, 1904)
            As it turns out, the Khalifa did not want to rule under French influence. The Khalifa, also known as Il Taaisha (Abdullah al-Taaisha) could have accepted Marchand¡¯s demand to hoist the French flag over Khartoum, but chose not to. Various interpretations exist about this, mostly saying that the Khalifa valued free rule. (The Khalifa¡¯s Position, NYT, 1899)

V.5. Final Strike
            On January 1898, most of the Egyptian army had made its way south to a point where the Nile met the Atbara. After decimating the Dervishes, Kitchener asked the Government for assistance as he moved deeper into the Sudan. By September 2nd, he had 8,200 British and 17,000 Egyptian and Sudanese men assembled only seven miles north of Omdurman (Farwell, 335). A few battles followed, and by November of 1899, the Sudan was conquered - the Khalifa had died and the Mahdiya had collapsed.

VI. The Aftermath
            The conflict between the British and the French did not end with the conquest of Omdurman. Major Marchand¡¯s actions in Fashoda alarmed the British, and Britain was willing to risk war for the Nile Valley. Eventually, Kitchener¡¯s troops made it down to Fashoda and negotiations took place between Britain and France, Britain repeating its position that the Nile Valley was absolutely unnegotiable. In the end, the French gave in as France¡¯s relative weakness in naval force reduced its chances for victory. Furthermore, in strategic terms, France needed England¡¯s support in case of a German aggression. The situation, commonly known as the Fashoda crisis, thus ended with a British diplomatic victory.

VII. Conclusion

VIII. Notes

IX. Reference List

A. Primary Sources

The New York Times
Keyword: Soudan
1. 1896 - Future of the Soudan, Slatin Pasha¡¯s Study of It and his Conclusions http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D02E4D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF
2. 1896 ? England and the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9400EED61F39E033A25755C1A9659C94679ED7CF
3. 1896 ? New Publications: The Soudan of the Mahdi and the Khalifa http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9900E3D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF
4. 1899 ? To Govern the Soudan: Agreement Between Great Britain and Egypt as to Control http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9401E2D7163DE433A25753C2A9679C94689ED7CF
5. 1885 ? Giving Up the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9F07E4D7143FE533A25751C2A9649C94649FD7CF
6. 1884 ? The Eastern Troubles : General Gordon¡¯s Important Mission to the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9903E6D9163AEF33A25753C2A9679C94659FD7CF
7. 1899 ? The Khalifa¡¯s Position: Soudan & France? http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9800E2DE173DE433A25756C1A9609C94689ED7CF
8. 1885 ? The Affairs of England : Italy¡¯s Proposal to Occupy the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F00E3DD153FE533A2575BC1A96E9C94649FD7CF
9. 1884 ? England and the Soudan : The Real Question the Mastery of Egypt Itself http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9903E1DC113BE033A25754C0A9659C94659FD7CF
10. 1884 ? ¡°British Interests¡± in the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9E02E5D91538E033A25753C1A9679C94659FD7CF
11. 1884 ? England and the Soudan : An Editorial from Sir Samuel Baker http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C0DE6D8113BE033A25752C0A9639C94659FD7CF
12. 1898 ? How Rich is the Soudan? http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D07E7D91030E333A25750C1A9679D94699ED7CF
Keyword: Fashoda
1. 1904 ? Wanted To Fight Britain: Russia offered Aid to France at Time of the Fashoda Affair http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A0CE7D71530E132A2575AC1A9649C946597D6CF
2. 1898 ? Britain¡¯s Advance in Africa: France and England May Come to Serious Differences in Regard to Fashoda http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F07E3D81139E433A2575BC1A96F9C94699ED7CF
3. 1898?The End of the Fashoda Question http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D04E1DA1030E333A25755C0A9679D94699ED7CF
4. 1898?Situation in Africa Serious http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A00E0DC1638E433A25755C1A9679C94699ED7CF

Keyword: British Imperialism
1. 1900 ? The Victory of British Imperialism http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A03EFD9173FE433A25754C0A9669D946197D6CF
2. 1900 ? Chamberlain on Imperialism: A Splendid Isolation http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A07EED6173FE433A25756C2A9669D946197D6CF
3. 1900 ? England and Imperialism http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D03E1DF113EEF33A25756C0A96E9C946197D6CF
Other Related Keywords
1. 1897?French Help for the Mahdi http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9402EFD71F39E433A2575AC2A9669D94669ED7CF
2. 1897?A Challenge to France http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A06E2D61F39E733A25755C0A9649C94669ED7CF
3. 1896?London and Soudan War http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B05E6D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF
4. 1898?France and England; War Preparations http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9407E1DA1030E333A25755C0A9679D94699ED7CF

The Times of London
* Accessible online at http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/ upon payment
1. The Situation on the Nile, Feb 7 1885
2. Italy, England, Abyssinia, and the Soudan, Jan 3 1890
3. England and Italy in Africa, Aug 23 1890
4. Egypt and the Soudan, Mar 17 1891
5. Abandoned Soudan, Oct 22 1892
6. France, May 17 1893
7. France and England in Central Africa, Jun 4 1894
8. The Partition of the Soudan, Aug 2 1894
9. The Soudan, Aug 6 1894
10. England and Italy in the Soudan, Sep 6 1894
11. The French in the Soudan, Sep 15 1894
12. France, England, and the Upper Nile, Mar 5 1895
13. The Upper Nile Valley, Mar 30 1895
14. Latest Intelligence, Mar 20 1896
15. The Operations on the Nile, Mar 20 1896
16. Belgium and France on the Upper Nile, Dec 17 1897
17. Lord Cromer¡¯s Report on Egypt, May 5 1898
18. The Nile Campaign, Sep 12 1898
19. France and the Upper Nile, Oct 10 1898
20. Great Britain, France, and Fashoda, Oct 12 1898
21. Great Britain, France, and Fashoda, Oct 14 1898
22. France and Fashoda, Oct 21 1898
23. France and Fashoda, Oct 24 1898
24. The Operations in the Sudan, Dec 10 1898
25. France, England, and Germany, Dec 13 1898
26. France, England, and Germany, Dec 14 1898
27. England and France in Africa, Mar 22 1898.

B. Secondary Sources
1. Article: History of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Anglo-Egyptian_Sudan
2. Webpage: Soudan-Britain¡¯s Southern Policy from the Web Version of the Sudan: A Country Study by Helen Chaplin Metz http://countrystudies.us/sudan/
3. Archives of Empire Volume II: The Scramble for Africa Edited by Barbara Harlow and Mia Carter, Published by Duke University Press 2003
4. The History of British Journalism, Volume I by Alexander Andrews, Published by Richard Bentley 1859
5. The History of British Journalism, Volume II by Alexander Andrews, Published by Richard Bentley 1859
6. The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III The Nineteenth Century by Andrew Porter, Oxford University Press 1999
7. Webpage: Types of British Colonial Rule in Africa http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/articles/pages/5921/TYPES-OF-BRITISH-COLONIAL-RULE-IN-AFRICA.html
8. Webpage: Anglo-Sudan War. 1884-1898 from War Times Index http://www.wartimesindex.co.uk/infopage.php?menu=wars&display=EgyptAndSudan
9. Article: Mahdist War from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahdist_War
To Be Analyzed
9. Sirdar and Khalifa or The Reconquest of the Soudan 1898 by Bennet Burleigh, Elibron Classics http://www.amazon.com/gp/search?index=books&linkCode=qs&keywords=1402192991
10. Queen Victoria¡¯s Little Wars by Byron Farwell http://www.amazon.com/dp/0393302350/ref=pe_113430_17759490_pd_recs_email_dt_t6

____________________________- Additional Sources (Wikipedia)
Article: Urabi Revolt from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urabi_revolt
Article: Franceso Crispi http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crispi
Article: Battle of Adowa http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_Of_Adowa
Article: Evelyn Baring, 1st Earl of Cromer http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evelyn_Baring,_1st_Earl_of_Cromer
Article: Fashoda Crisis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fashoda_Crisis



List of References, First Draft, Dec. 13th 2010 . . Go to Teacher's Comment

Selection of Sources

Guideline :

A. Published Region/Country
B. Year of Publication
C. Stance
D. Characteristics
E. Source

The New York Times
A. New York City, United States
B. 1851-Present
C.
D. Strength in Editorial Section
E. The New York Times from Encyclopedia Britannica Online http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/412546/The-New-York-Times

The London Gazette
A. London, England, United Kingdom
B. November 7th, 1665~Present
C.
D. Oldest Surviving English Newspaper, Official Newspaper of the UK Govt
E. The London Gazette from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_London_Gazette

The Times of London
A. London, England, United Kingdom
B. January 1st, 1785~Present
C. Moderately Center-Right
D. First to Send War Correspondents
E. Times of London Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Times_of_London

The Straits Times
A. Singapore, Singapore
B. July 15th, 1845~Present
C.
D.
E. The Straits Times from Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Straits_Times

XI. Reference List

A. Primary Sources

The New York Times

Keyword: Soudan
1. 1896 - Future of the Soudan, Slatin Pasha¡¯s Study of It and his Conclusions http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D02E4D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF
2. 1896 - England and the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9400EED61F39E033A25755C1A9659C94679ED7CF
3. 1896 - New Publications : The Soudan of the Mahdi and the Khalifa http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9900E3D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF
4. 1899 - To Govern the Soudan : Agreement Between Great Britain and Egypt as to Control http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9401E2D7163DE433A25753C2A9679C94689ED7CF
5. 1885 - Giving Up the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9F07E4D7143FE533A25751C2A9649C94649FD7CF
6. 1884 - The Eastern Troubles : General Gordon¡¯s Important Mission to the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9903E6D9163AEF33A25753C2A9679C94659FD7CF
7. 1899 - The Khalifa¡¯s Position : Soudan & France - http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9800E2DE173DE433A25756C1A9609C94689ED7CF
8. 1885 - The Affairs of England : Italy¡¯s Proposal to Occupy the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F00E3DD153FE533A2575BC1A96E9C94649FD7CF
9. 1884 - England and the Soudan : The Real Question the Mastery of Egypt Itself http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9903E1DC113BE033A25754C0A9659C94659FD7CF
10. 1884 - "British Interests" in the Soudan http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9E02E5D91538E033A25753C1A9679C94659FD7CF
11. 1884 - England and the Soudan : An Editorial from Sir Samuel Baker http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C0DE6D8113BE033A25752C0A9639C94659FD7CF
12. 1898 - How Rich is the Soudan ? http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D07E7D91030E333A25750C1A9679D94699ED7CF

Keyword: Fashoda
1. 1904 - Wanted To Fight Britain: Russia offered Aid to France at Time of the Fashoda Affair http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A0CE7D71530E132A2575AC1A9649C946597D6CF
2. 1898 - Britain's Advance in Africa: France and England May Come to Serious Differences in Regard to Fashoda http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9F07E3D81139E433A2575BC1A96F9C94699ED7CF
3. 1898 - The End of the Fashoda Question http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9D04E1DA1030E333A25755C0A9679D94699ED7CF
4. 1898 - Situation in Africa Serious http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A00E0DC1638E433A25755C1A9679C94699ED7CF

Keyword: British Imperialism
1. 1900 - The Victory of British Imperialism http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A03EFD9173FE433A25754C0A9669D946197D6CF
2. 1900 - Chamberlain on Imperialism: A Splendid Isolation http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A07EED6173FE433A25756C2A9669D946197D6CF
3. 1900 - England and Imperialism http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D03E1DF113EEF33A25756C0A96E9C946197D6CF

Other Related Keywords
1. 1897 - French Help for the Mahdi http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9402EFD71F39E433A2575AC2A9669D94669ED7CF
2. 1897 - A Challenge to France http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9A06E2D61F39E733A25755C0A9649C94669ED7CF
3. 1896 - London and Soudan War http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9B05E6D71730E033A2575AC2A9659C94679ED7CF
4. 1898 - France and England; War Preparations http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9407E1DA1030E333A25755C0A9679D94699ED7CF

B. Secondary Sources

1. Article: History of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Anglo-Egyptian_Sudan
2. Webpage: Soudan-Britain's Southern Policy from the Web Version of the Sudan: A Country Study by Helen Chaplin Metz http://countrystudies.us/sudan/
3. Archives of Empire Volume II: The Scramble for Africa Edited by Barbara Harlow and Mia Carter, Published by Duke University Press 2003
4. The History of British Journalism, Volume I by Alexander Andrews, Published by Richard Bentley 1859
5. The History of British Journalism, Volume II by Alexander Andrews, Published by Richard Bentley 1859
6. The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume III The Nineteenth Century by Andrew Porter, Oxford University Press 1999
7. Webpage: Types of British Colonial Rule in Africa http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/articles/pages/5921/TYPES-OF-BRITISH-COLONIAL-RULE-IN-AFRICA.html
8. Webpage: Anglo-Sudan War. 1884-1898 from War Times Index http://www.wartimesindex.co.uk/infopage.php?menu=wars&display=EgyptAndSudan

To Be Analyzed
9. Sirdar and Khalifa or The Reconquest of the Soudan 1898 by Bennet Burleigh, Elibron Classics http://www.amazon.com/gp/search?index=books&linkCode=qs&keywords=1402192991
10. Queen Victoria¡¯s Little Wars by Byron Farwell http://www.amazon.com/dp/0393302350/ref=pe_113430_17759490_pd_recs_email_dt_t6


Working Table of Contents, First Draft, Dec. 13th 2010 . . Go to Teacher's Comment

I. Abstract
II. Primary Source Basis
II.1 The London Gazette
II.2 Times of London
II.2 The Straits Times
II.2 The New York Times
III. Political System of Great Britain during the 19th Century
III.1 Parliamentary System
III.2 The Monarchy
III.3 The Press
III.4 Local Factors at a Colonial Level
IV. British Colonial Policy Prior to 1885
V. The Soudan
V.1 Geography
V.2 Socioeconomic Background
V.3 Governance and History Prior to 1885
VI. Charles Gordon's Expedition to the Soudan
VI.1 Background
VI.2 Chronology of Events
VI.3 The Soudan Debate 1884-85
VI.3 Political Impacts of Gordon¡¯s Expedition
VII. British Colonial Policy Between 1885 and 1897
VIII. The Scramble for Africa
VIII.1 Background
VIII.2 Impact on British Colonial Policy
IX. Conquest of the Soudan
IX.1 Political Will
IX.2 Egypt, Suez, and Soudan
IX.3 Justification for the Invasion
IX.4 Chronology of Events
IX.5 Impact and Reception at Homeland
IX.6 Impact on the Sudan and the Sudanese
X. Viewpoints of the Press
XI. Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography