The Coverage of the Vietnam War in People's Daily, 1965-1976


Korean Minjok Leadership Academy
LHJ



Table of Contents


Third Draft (Final Draft), Oct. 20 2013
Second Draft , Oct. 20 2013
First Draft , Oct. 15 2013



Third Draft . . Go to Teacher's Comment

The Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda on the Vietnam War, 1965-1976 As Reflected in People's Daily and other sources

Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. General Features
III. Trend
IV. Motives
V. Final Analysis
Notes
Bibliography

I. Introduction
            The art of wartime propaganda is as old as war itself. When a war breaks out, the offensive and defensive operations occur not only with bullets and bombs but also with hearts and minds of people from both sides. Early in the Spring and Autumn Period when feudal states in China were fighting against each other, Confucius noted the importance of the "rectification of names" in establishing a stable government. (1) "Rectification of names" is also essential in winning a war. A persuasive justification for the war, whether it is legitimate and truthful or not, is a prerequisite for mustering people's moral support, and it takes an organized, deliberate effort to convince people of such justification and to maximize the public's enthusiasm for a war. And the consequence is usually, as Winston Churchill testifies, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." (2) Indeed, to create justifications and to promote certain images, propaganda is inevitably composed of fraud, manipulation, exaggeration, and omission, emasculating the public's perception of objective truths.
            Though having a long history and having been well developed, wartime propaganda became even more systemized and sophisticated after the two world wars. Then, during the Cold War, just as the Western bloc led by Washington and the Eastern bloc headed by Moscow engaged in psychological and ideological warfare and sometimes physical clashes, the intensity and domain of propaganda were further enhanced. Some of the most conspicuous evidence of such propaganda can be seen in the Indochina Wars, especially the Second Indochina War. A war commonly called as the Vietnam War, it was the battleground between South Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam (ROV), and its opponents, the South Vietnamese-based communist Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). But it wasn't just a civil war. Rather, it was a confrontation between two major Cold War powers and a microcosm of worldwide conflicts. Therefore, in this war, not only the local forces but also the foreign allies had had to actively engage in propaganda in and outside their own countries.
            This paper examines the propaganda activities by the Chinese Communist Party during the Vietnam War. The US propaganda for the Vietnam War has long been a subject of controversies as well as extensive research. However, propaganda by the other side of rivalry was much less studied. This paper, therefore, aims to shed light on the relatively neglected part of this costly psychological warfare of mass communication: what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the paramount controller of the Chinese government and military, had done to manipulate images of the Vietnam War and China's involvement in it.
            It's notable that CCP's propaganda tactic underwent several changes during the Vietnam War due to certain events both in China's domestic politics and international affairs. First of all, even though CCP remained at the side of North Vietnam throughout the Vietnam War, it had clearly developed a friendlier relationship with the United States, a country supposed to be its enemy as long as the war proceeds. In fact, Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 and the US President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 ended the total confrontation between the US and China that had lasted for almost a quarter century and thereby profoundly reshaped the Cold War relations. After the Vietnam War ended, China and US went a step further to establish a diplomatic relation, while tension mounted between China and its ex-ally North Vietnam that eventually a war broke between them in 1979. Secondly, CCP's relationship with another important ally of the communist bloc, the Soviet Union, soured following the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s and the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969. When antagonism was brewing between the two important allies of North Vietnam, Hanoi sided with the Soviet Union, which inevitably led to fissures in the Sino-Vietnamese relation. Thirdly, while the CCP was fighting a foreign war, it had to deal with social-political unrests within the country as well: from 1966 to 1976, the Cultural Revolution swept through the country, with great purges in the party and violent struggles among the masses. During the Revolution, the party leadership was unstable. Many leading figures of the party, such as Yang Shangkun (3), Luo Ruiqiang (4), and Liu Shaoqi, who had been involved in the Vietnamese affairs, experienced serious fluctuations in their political careers. The Revolution also affected the authority of the People's Liberation Army, pushing it to the center of national politics from 1967 to 1971, and then moving it out of the political arena after the death of defense minister Marshal Lin Biao in 1971 until Deng Xiaoping announced new military reforms in 1975 and worked to repair the damage done to the PLA. (5)
            The complexity of China's domestic and international politics impacted the CCP's propaganda strategies with regard to the Vietnamese affairs. CCP constantly adjusted the level of intensity and content of propaganda to promote certain images of the situation that best served the party's immediate interest. The goal of this paper is to dissect the changes in CCP's propaganda with regard to the Vietnam War and to explain their historical causes, CCP's intentions behind them, and consequences. To be more specific, this paper aims to answer the following questions:

                1. What are the general characteristics of CCP's propaganda on the Vietnam War?
                2. What are the changes that the CCP made when propagating the war to the Chinese public? How and to what extent were those changes carried out?
                3. What are the reasons or motivations for such propaganda tactics and policies?
                4. What are some of the consequences of such propaganda? How effective it was and how did the public react?

            To answer these questions, this study utilizes primary sources, the news articles published by the People's Daily on the Vietnamese affairs from 1965 to 1976 (6), along with the relevant postage stamps released by the China's Posts and Telecom Press in pertaining period. Both sources had been used by the CCP as major methods for propaganda.
            Established in 1948, People's Daily (or Renmin Ribao in Chinese) is daily newspaper published in Beijing as the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the CCP, and it is under regulation of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. It often carries political articles and speeches and reports made by government or party leaders. Many of its front page commentaries are written in the CCP's headquarters and then reprinted by other papers and broadcasted by radio and television stations, so one can say that the voice of People's Daily literally reverberates throughout the country. (7)Moreover, copies of People's Daily were usually publicized in display cases at street intersections, and some of its important articles were read at local party meetings, etc. (8) Therefore People's Daily has a great influence in deciding contents of other press and media and enjoys hegemony in shaping Chinese public opinion. Such news circulation process helps create consistency in mass media so that the party can push forward a strong, united propaganda front. Therefore, a properly selected articles from People's Daily can be a fair indicator of how the CCP propagate the Vietnam War to the public and what subtle but important changes had the CCP's propaganda undergone.
            Postage stamp is another frequently used tool for propaganda. Stamps are like small but effective posters due to the scale and scope of their distribution. In 1927, the Communist Party founded in China began using crude postage stamps it mass-produced for propaganda in its base territories. In 1949, when the CCP won national power, the party established the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to produce better-quality stamps designed to glorify the communist rule and impress the masses. (9) During the Cultural Revolution, the postal and telecommunications functions were separated for two years, and the stamp sales reduced. However, the images and texts on stamps remained no less propagandistic. A close study of postal stamps published each year can reveal the priority of the CCP's general propaganda policy at a specific period.
            In the rest of this paper, the combination of two types of sources will reveal the general features and evolving trend of the CCP's propaganda on the Vietnamese affairs, and then an analysis based on historical background and testimonies from memoirs will shed light on the motivations behind propaganda as well as the public's reaction to it.

II. General Features
            The Chinese used the term "the War against US Aggression and to Aid Vietnam" to refer to the Second Indochina War. Throughout the war, the CCP used propaganda to trigger enmity against the United States and its 'lackey (zou'gou)' South Vietnam while developing a sense of unity and solidarity with North Vietnam, the "brotherly comrade" of China. Some of the tactics used by People's Daily throughout the war to propagate the war are as following:
            The first notable tactic is to report extensively on anti-American sentiment around the world. Of the numerous articles related to the Vietnam War, the majority is about military actions or political decisions made about the war. However, there is also a considerable amount of articles reporting about civil reactions to the war not only in China and Vietnam but also in many other countries from Asia, Africa, Europe, North and Latin America. All of the reactions reported are anti-American: peoples were protesting against American intervention in the Vietnam War and various organizations were making public statements criticizing America's "imperialistic move."
            To highlight anti-American sentiment among the public, People's Daily frequently reported about campaigns, parades, assemblies, etc., joined by people from all walks of life. In addition, whenever there was an important event or an anniversary, the newspaper would publish telegrams from celebrities and civil and governmental organizations supporting North Vietnam and China. For example, the front page of the newspaper released on 10 February, 1965 reported that "2,500,000 people from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanning held a great demonstration: with the same hatred for the same enemy - the United States which is the robber - million people united as one man to aid our brotherly Vietnam." The subtitle of the article was "the national political association and all kinds of people's organizations and democratic associations expressed support for Vietnam's struggle against America; friends in our country who are from Vietnam and other countries joined local people to protest against the invasion of the American imperialists." The front-page article and the rest of the newspaper repeatedly elaborate on the regions, countries and organizations that held demonstrations. The number of population who demonstrated, contents and demands of demonstrations, and slogans that demonstrators had used are all reported in details. The second page is filled with telegrams from eleven nongovernmental organizations that express antagonism against the United States and support for Hanoi, and the sixth page only contains ten photos, all of which are about demonstrations. Out of forty-one articles published on 10 February, thirty-five are related to Vietnam War, and out of these thirty-five, twenty-one are about either demonstrations or anti-American telegrams.
            Not only that, the coverage of anti-American sentiments in countries other than China or Vietnam is also notable. From 1965 and onward, there were never any articles reporting about any people supporting the American intervention in the Vietnam War, but there were continuous and repeated reports on people - from not only African and Southeastern countries but also European countries and the United States - condemning the Washington's intervention. People's Daily has reported about anti-American demonstrations in Albania (14 Feb. 1965), Algeria (20 Mar. 1965), Argentina (17 Apr. 1965), Australia (13 Feb. 1965), Belgium (5 Apr. 1965), Bolivia (5 Apr. 1965), Britain (16 Dec. 1970), Burma (24 Mar. 1965), Cameroon (8 Jun. 1965), Canada (20 De. 1965), Ceylon (7 Nov. 1967), Chile (21 Feb. 1968), Colombia (18 Jul. 1968), Congo (5 Apr. 1965), Costa Rica (29 Nov. 1965), Cuba (11 Feb. 1965), Denmark (18 Apr. 1970), Finland (19 Apr. 1972), France (10 May 1971), Ghana (14 Apr. 1965), Greece (25 May 1965), Iceland (2 Jun. 1968), Indonesia (14 Feb. 1965), Japan (21 Aug. 1972), Lebanon (15 Feb. 1965), Laos (13 Feb. 1965), Mali (12 Apr. 1966), Mexico (24 Apr. 1966), Nepal (6 Feb. 1968), the Netherlands (23 Mar. 1965), New Zealand (15 Sep. 1968), North Korea (14 Feb. 1965), Norway (13 Apr. 1967), Pakistan (15 Apr. 1965), Peru (18 Jul. 1968), the Philippines (28 Mar. 1966), Singapore (31 Dec. 1972), Sweden (2 Jan. 1972), Tanzania (3 Feb. 1968), Thailand (12 Mar. 1965), Uruguay (23 Mar. 1965), West Germany (22 Dec. 1969), etc. (10) Some of the demonstrations that are reported were held by the public against their government in favor of Washington D.C. Some demonstrations include not just the mass protests but also certain celebrities or organizations declaring their positions against Washington D.C. The combination of these two types of articles is most conspicuously seen in the reports about anti-Vietnam War protests in the United States... People's Daily has published articles that are titled "The momentum of American people's movement against invasion in Vietnam increases. Johnson sent people to 'explain' but had no use" (27 Apr. 1965), "American people are awaking, fighting and marching: from October 10th to 17th, American people held a 'National Protest Day' demonstration against American invasion of Vietnam" (27 Nov. 1965), "the Blacks in the United States announce that they would never kill their Vietnamese brothers and would fight against invasion in Vietnam, determined to stay in the country and struggle for freedom" (21 Nov. 1966), "The enemy of America is not the Vietnamese people, but Johnson! There was a great protest against invasion broken out in Washington D.C. Protestors bravely fought against military guards and surrounded the United States Department of Defense, the American ruling clique being horrified" (23 Oc. 1967), "People from all walks of society held protests in support of the firm stance of the Vietnamese government, demanding the United States. government to sign treaty immediately" (19 Nov. 1972), "American people celebrate the grand victory of the Vietnamese people" (2 May 1975). The CCP portrayed its intervention in the Vietnam War as a fraternal responsibility and a movement to spreading revolutionary ideas while the American intervention as an imperialistic invasion that even its own people protested against. An article "People from all around the world side with the Vietnamese people: even the peoples from Latin America, Europe and Oceania gathered and protested against the invasion of the American imperialists" (12 May 1972) well illustrates what the CCP wanted to propagate in and outside the country. Clearly, when the CCP said that "people from all around the world side with the Vietnamese people," it was rather trying to encourage people from China and around the world to do so by telling them "everybody else is doing it."
            The second common tactic is to report Vietnamese victories and wartime heroes in details while totally omitting the defeats. By highlighting victories and downplaying defeats, the CCP created an image of heroic and prevailing communist force as opposed to that of a defeated and weakened enemy. Not only that, stories of heroic figures including soldiers, women and teenagers from North Vietnam encourage emotional responses from readers. By spreading such stories, the CCP can more effectively develop a public sense of unity and empathy toward North Vietnam.
            The coverage of the Tet Offensive is a typical example of such tactic in People's Daily. One of the largest military campaigns in the Vietnam War, it lasted from the end of January to September of 1968. 45,000 soldiers from Viet Cong and the NVA were killed and 6,991 captured while the combined forces of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam suffered 4,234 dead. (11) Clearly, the Tet Offensive was militarily a defeat for the communist bloc. (12) However, the propagandistic media coverage by People's Daily presented quite a different picture. The first report on the Offensive was published on 3 February 1968 in an article titled "The paper tiger of the American imperialism was revealed in its true colors on January 1st when military forces of the Viet Cong gave a surprise attack on the American 'embassy' in Saigon, and the American invaders were throw off their feet and hurried fleeing for their lives." Thereafter, People's Daily had been reporting victories won by the Vietnamese with specific details and numbers. Some articles are as short and concise as" North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians blew up five American jets and an artillery regiment in Guangping damaged one American carrier" (2 Aug. 1968) and "the Vietnamese people shot down five aircrafts of the American "(10 Jun. 1968). Sometimes, articles would provide numbers regarding how many enemies were defeated and to what extent Vietnam had advanced: "The army and the people of the southern and middle regions of South Vietnam have killed more than sixty thousand enemies, broken more than six thousand military vehicles, and damaged nearly two hundred aircrafts; people from some provinces smashed the enemy and wiped out a great number of the American puppet soldiers and the accomplice armies" (29 Jun. 1968). Out of all the articles published during the Tet Offensive, the first time when any loss on the communist side was mentioned was on 2 February 1968 in an article titled: "The Vietnamese people are determined to punish the American imperialists and their lackeys; Foreign Ministry of Vietnam made an announcement strongly criticizing the United States that bombed the northern regions on the New Year day; the Viet Cong condemned the United States that had destroyed the New Year ceasefire agreement." Without any further explanations, the article gives an impression that it was the United States that had broken the ceasefire agreement by attacking North Vietnam. Furthermore, Furthermore, the reference to the bombings by the U.S. Air Force was for the purpose of reinforcing how determined the Vietnamese people were and to justify the Viet Cong condemnation of the United States The second and last article that mentions the loss of the communist side is the one titled "Foreign Ministry of Vietnam made an announcement strongly criticizing the barbarous act of the American imperialists who bombed the Chinese cargo freighters." In this article, the United States was again the subject of blame and accusation. All in all, despite the heavy casualties and damages inflicted upon the communist armies, hardly any were mentioned in the newspaper during the Tet Operation. Instead, the Chinese media kept publicizing the communist victories including the occupation of Saigon without ever revealing its being retaken by the Americans.
            In addition to informative articles that give numbers or overviews of the Vietnamese success, there are also detailed and sometimes even dramatic narratives of wartime heroes who had made praiseworthy deeds of scarification or had made important contributions to certain battles or operations. For example, on 14 February 1968, People's Daily published on the last page a "only the hero can drive away tigers and panthers" series of articles that introduce Xiongqiang Lai who fought to death against an enemy force four times bigger than his force, Mr. T (T Da'ye) who cleverly hid bombs in a box that the enemies were likely to mistake as a treasure box and try to open, guerrilla force in a province which used the enemies' bombs to kill the enemies, and another guerrilla group which used wooden guns to frighten away enemies and acquired real guns from them. There are also many reports on women's contributions to the war and stories of heroines. For example, one article introduces the deeds of a "brave and determined" female soldier, A-li (7 Mar. 1968). She was said to have used clever tricks to set up traps to kill the Americans. Next to the article, there is also a photo of her holding a rifle and a poem praising the outstanding shooting skills of the Vietnamese women. On the same page of the newspaper, there are three more articles on the Vietnamese women making contributions to the war. Portrayals of heroes and heroines create an ideal image of solder and civilian in readers' minds and thereby motivate people to follow the example of those "ideal" deeds.
            Besides omission of North Vietnamese losses, People's Daily also omits coverage of the Chinese sent to North Vietnam by the CCP. During the Vietnam War, the CCP not only sent materialistic aids to North Vietnam but also provided it with surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine sweeping and logistics units. That means the Chinese engineers, soldiers, technicians, etc., were sent into North Vietnamese's territories. However, they were hardly mentioned in People's Daily. The reason might be that the CCP wanted to avoid talking about the Chinese casualties to the public and to minimize people's concern that China would engage in "another Korean War."
            Thirdly and lastly, terminology is an important factor that influences people's perceptions of different countries and therefore is often deliberately employed for a propagandistic end. Countries engaged in wars often use terms that have a positive or negative connotation instead of neutral ones to characterize objects as either allies or enemies. However, the use of terminology can vary based on the progress of wars and the relation of gain and loss. This is exactly what happened in the Vietnam War. The use of terminology will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

III. Trend
            The CCP didn't insist on the same propaganda policies throughout the war. This chapter aims to analyze how propaganda policies changed over time based on three indicators: how many articles were published on the Vietnamese affair per year, what term the CCP used to refer to the United States, and how often People's Daily used a Vietnamese press as news source.
            Before a qualitative examination of propaganda, a quantitative analysis will be helpful for understanding how the CCP controlled its propaganda on the Vietnam War. The following graph indicates the number of articles published in People's Daily that are related to Vietnam and/or the Vietnam War by year from 1965 to 1976. The articles that include one or more of the following keywords are considered to be related to Vietnam and/or the Vietnam War: "Vietnam (yue'nan)", "Vietnam War (yue'nan'zhan'zheng)", "Fight against U.S. and Aid Vietnam (kang'mei'yuan'chao)", "Aid Vietnam and fight against U.S. (yuan'chao'kang'mei)", and "South Vietnam (nan'yue)." The number of articles reveals the intensity of propaganda and the CCP's interest in the Vietnamese affairs. (13)



            In 1965, the most number of reports were published in People's Daily on the Vietnamese affairs. Then the number steadily decreases until it reaches the lowest point in 1969 in which the number of articles is about 8 percent of that in 1965. Considering that in 1968 and 1969, the greatest number of casualties occurred and the war was fought most intensely, the dramatically decreased frequency of reports is rather unusual. (14) Then after 1969, the frequency gradually increases until 1972; nonetheless, in 1972, the number of articles is still just about half the number in 1965. Then the number decreases again. In 1975, the Second Indochina War ended. The fervor of propaganda dropped significantly.
            In order to understand the causes for such changes in frequency of reports, it's crucial to understand the changes in contents and tones of the articles first. Hereafter, two specific changes will be examined: first, terms used to refer to U.S. and Vietnam and second, sources of news.
            First of all, as briefly mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, terminology itself can convey an attitude toward a subject. The use of terminology as a propaganda tactic is most obvious in the way the CCP refers to the United States.
            Overall, the most frequently used term to characterize the United states as an enemy is "the American imperialists (mei'di)." And the second most frequently used term that contains a negative connotation is "robber (qiang'dao)", or "American robber (mei'guo'qiang'dao)." The following graph is to the show the trend of how frequently the United States was referred as either one of these two negative words. The red line in graph 2 shows the number of the propagandistic terms, "the U.S. imperialists" and "American robber", that appear in titles of articles on the Vietnamese affairs per year. The blue line indicates the number of the neutral term "the United States" that appears in titles of the articles on the Vietnamese affairs each year. (15) Sometimes other phrases like "paper tiger (zhi'lao'hu)", "puppet army (wei'jun)", "murderer (sha'ren'fan)", etc. are used as well. However, because they are rarely used, they are not counted in graph 2.



            In 1965, there are more neutral terms used than propagandistic terms. However, from 1966 until 1972, there are more propagandistic terms used. Since 1973, the use of propagandistic terms to refer to the United States drops rapidly and has been used less often than neutral terms. However, the shape of the lines in graph 2 is influenced by the total number of times that the United States is mentioned in People's Daily. The following graph gives a more accurate picture of how often a propagandistic term is used in each year. In graph 3, the ratio of the number of a propagandistic term used to the number of a neutral term used in each year is shown. The vertical axis represents how many times a negative term is used for every one neutral term used every year.



            The use of negative term increases steadily from 1965 to 1971 except for the slight drop in 1969. 1970 and 1971 are the peak years in which the negative term is used most frequently. For every "the United States" used, there are nearly four negative terms like "imperialists" or "robbers" used to characterize the United States. In 1972, the ratio suddenly decreases. The ratio drops from nearly 4 to just a little above 1. The ratio continues to drop after 1973 and since that year more neutral term is used than a negative one.
            Secondly, it is important to look at how the CCP utilized different news source for its reports on the Vietnam War. A significant part of sources for People's Daily is from Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of China that is subordinate to the State Council and is obliged to report to the CCP's Propaganda and Public Information Departments. (16) During the Cultural Revolution, People's Daily imported from Xinhua News Agency an extensive amount of raw news and prepackaged editorialized propaganda on both domestic and international issues. (17)
            Not only that, during the Vietnam War, People's Daily also uses a plenty of source from Nhan Dan (Vietnamese for The People), the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam. First published in 11 May 1951, Nhan Dan serves to be "the voice of the Party, State and people of Vietnam."
            The articles based on Nhan Dan includes those condemning the United States: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan says the Johnson government's invasion into Vietnam is an act of causing trouble to itself; the strategies of expansion and invasion would only deepen the danger it is facing" (19 February 1965). There are also articles praising the Chinese efforts for the war: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan and People's Army Newspaper (18) published editorials celebrating the great success of China in the hydrogen bomb experiment; it would be a heavy strike against American imperialism and a strong encouragement for the Southern Vietnamese people to struggle against the American imperialists and to gain victory" (1 Jan. 1969). There are those reaffirming the Vietnam's determination for the war: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan celebrated the twenty third anniversaries of the National Anti-American Day and spread the revolutionary spirit to liberate the people and to resist any new colonialism in territories of Vietnam" (20 Mar. 1973).
When People's Daily appears to simply restate what was reported in Nhan Dan without further editorial comments or explanations, it is actually propagating the Vietnamese stance in the war to the Chinese public by treating materials from Nhan Dan as fact, rather than just one perspective that needs to be verified and researched. It is also notable that the frequency of using Nhan Dan as a news source changes overtime. In the following graph, the vertical axis represents the number of percentage of the People's Daily articles on the Vietnamese affairs that were based on a North Vietnamese news source like Nhan Dan, People's Army Newspaper, the Voice of Vietnam, and Study, a magazine published in North Vietnam.



            The graph shows that from 1965 to 1968, the use of North Vietnamese sources decreases. But from 1969 to 1971, it increases rapidly and the relatively high level of usage is maintained till 1973. Then it begins to drop since 1973.
            It is shown that 1965 is the year when the quantitative intensity of propaganda is the most noticeable: the number of articles is the most. In 1967~1968, there is a drop in the intensity of propaganda, and Nhan Dan was used less frequently as a news source. From 1970 to 1972, the number of articles published on the Vietnam War resurges, more negative image of the U.S. was propagated through effective use of terminology and Nhan Dan was more used as a news source. And finally 1973 is a great turning point for all three indicators, reflected the lowered enthusiasm of the CCP for propaganda.
            A look at postage stamps issued by the People's Republic of China on the topic of Vietnam can also reveal something about the CCP's propaganda policies. Among all the stamps that the People's Republic of China have published, there are four stamps released that are related to Vietnam. The first one is issued in 1960 and titled "celebrating 15th Anniversary of the Founding of Democratic Republic of Vietnam." The second one is issued in 1963 and titled "support to South Vietnamese People's struggle for liberation." The third one is issued in 1964 and titled "the heroic people of South Vietnam are bound to win." And the last one is issued in 1965 and titled "support Vietnamese People's patriotic and just struggle against American Imperialism." Though as a source base, stamps stand no comparison to the newspaper articles, the absence of stamp issued related the Vietnam War after 1965 says something.

IV. Motives
            This chapter will divide the Vietnam into four stages and analyze the CCP's ideological and strategic considerations behind propaganda of each of the following periods: 1965-1966, 1967-1969, 1970-1972 and 1973-1976.
            Since the frequency of reports on Vietnamese affairs started to wane immediately after the war got intensified, the first two years of the war witnessed the highest rate of coverage of Vietnamese affairs in People's Daily. Such a high intensity of reports and propaganda during the escalation of war was motivated by a combination of domestic concerns and international circumstances.
            Domestically, Mao was preparing for reinforcement and solidification of his power in the communist party which was later realized in the Cultural Revolution starting from 1966. In order to do so, he needed stimulus to mobilize the Chinese population and radicalize the domestic politics. Since the creation of a perception of China facing serious foreign threats would help strengthen the dynamics of revolutionary mobilization and radicalization at home, as well as his authority and controlling position in China's political life, he switched from a rather lukewarm support for North Vietnam which he had demonstrated earlier to a more enthusiastic promise of aid and more active propaganda activity.
            The highly enthusiastic propaganda on the Vietnam War is also consistent with China's attempt to gain leadership in the international communist movement. Beijing perceived Ho's war of national liberation as a vital part of a world proletarian revolutionary movement; according to Mao, the success of "national revolutionary" struggle was the key to the defense of socialist states from imperialist attack and to the ultimate success of the global revolutionary struggle. (19) People's Daily frequent reference to the anti-American and pro-Communism movements in Asia, Africa and Latin American confirms the CCP's intentions to promote revolutionary movement in such areas and to demonstrate to the Third World that Beijing was an ally and spokesman of national liberation struggles.
            The CCP's ardent support for Hanoi's war of national liberation is also linked with its growing antagonism against the Soviet Union. The Destalinization movement in the Soviet Union deeply concerned the communists in China and triggered criticism that the Soviet was pursuing revisionism and attempting to return to capitalism. As two pillars of the communist world, China and the Soviet Union was contesting for who had "the true communism" at the time, and what the CCP could do to legitimize its criticism of Soviet revisionist foreign policy and to claim leadership in the communist would was to give full support for North Vietnam and heavily propagate such an act both domestically and internationally. (20)
            Though not the most decisive factor, the Chinese perception of the United States as a threat to security of China also contributed to the extensiveness of propaganda at the very beginning of the war. Mao had hoped to break the "ring of encirclement" by American imperialism and to secure the China's southern border by eliminating the chances of the Americans' establishing bases in Vietnam as they did in Korea and Taiwan. (21) That's also why when the United States' involvement in Vietnam escalated, Beijing felt obliged to in send man power in addition to materialistic aids that China had been sending to North Vietnam since the 1950s. After the term "struggle against the United States and aid Vietnam" first appeared in People's Daily in 4 April 1965, the CCP sent surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine sweeping and logistics units to North Vietnam to maintain bridges and roads threatened by American air attacks and to enable Hanoi to send more NVA troops to the South to fight Americans.
            As listed above, a strategic consideration of the international setting and Mao's drive to rapidly transform the Chinese state and society in 1965 and 1966 contributed to the CCP's propaganda policies regard to the Vietnamese affairs and the CCP's need to keep the tone of propaganda strong and loud. Propaganda's general tendency to emphasize the world peoples' support for the communist side of rivalry while downplaying the military acts of the Chinese troops in Vietnam again confirms the vital role of the CCP's ideological consideration in the entire war and propaganda movement.
            From 1967 to 1969, despite that the CCP had sent an increasing number of units and aids to Vietnam and that the battles were fought most intensely during those three years, the number of times the Vietnamese affairs were reported in People's Daily decreased rapidly. At the same time, Nhan Dan was used less frequently as a news source for People's Daily, especially in 1967 and 1968. Such trend is again related to China's domestic circumstances where the escalated Cultural Revolution threw the nation into incontrollable turmoil. It also correlates to the looming fissures in the alliance between China and North Vietnam that was once claimed "between brotherly comrades."
            Domestically, the Red Guards tore apart any existing orders of society and even split into factions rivaling each other. The resulting anarchy, terror, and paralysis completely disrupted the urban economy; industrial production for 1968 dipped 12 percent below that of 1966. (22) Disillusioned by the unrest of which he was losing control and the factional struggles of the Red Guards, Mao decided to tune down the call for revolutionary radicalism and to dispatch officers and soldiers to reintroduce orders to schools, factories, and government agencies. And the most ardent supporters of so-called Maoism, the Red Guards, were scattered in Down to the Countryside Movement. Propaganda, understandably, became less of a priority compared to when Mao wanted to initiate the movement.
            Internationally, the Sino-Vietnamese alliance deteriorated. Since the considerations underlying the China's and North Vietnam's respective policies were driven by distinct priorities - North Vietnam was mainly concerned about how to unify their country by winning this war, while China was more driven by Mao's desire to use the Vietnam conflict to promote China's "continuous revolution" - problems between the two countries began to develop and gradually turned into friction ever since 1965. (23) The gap between Beijing and Hanoi was widened by the antagonism between Beijing and Moscow. By 1968, the Chinese saw that Hanoi was growing closer to Moscow than to Beijing: as an example, when a series of conflicts occurred between Chinese troops and Soviet military personnel in Vietnam, the Vietnamese authorities stood on the side of the Soviets and alleged that the Chinese "had impinged upon Vietnam's sovereignty." (24)
            Apparently, China's domestic situation and Mao's needs had changed by 1967 to 1969. In the meantime, Beijing's relationships with major powers began to change. While its relationship with Moscow deteriorated, even leading to a border clash in March 1969, Beijing began to perceive the United States less as a potential threat and reconsider the role of the US could play in China's security needs. (25) These rapidly changing conditions altered Beijing's attitude toward the Vietnam War and made a radical approach and fervent propaganda obsolete, reducing the number of times the Vietnam War was reported in People's Daily. The widening gap between Beijing and Hanoi also accounts for the growing reluctance of People's Daily to quote the Vietnamese news source.
            Portrayal of the Vietnam War by the People's Daily articles from 1970 to 1972 is characterized with slightly more frequent use of negative terms to characterize the United States, an increasing number of reports on Vietnamese affairs, and an increasing use of North Vietnamese sources. The CCP's propaganda policies are rather interesting during this period considering that there were attempts made by the internal leadership of China and the United States to establish a friendlier relationship with each other. But on the surface, the two countries had to remain enemies against each other.
            In 1971, Ping pong diplomacy hinted for the first time of an improved Sino-American relation. Just as the war still raged in Vietnam, the first group of Americans was allowed into China since the Communist takeover in 1949, paving the way for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. In 1971, there was another round of intimate contacts between the two countries during Kissinger's visit to Beijing. However, it must be noted that all diplomatic negotiations were done in back-channel contacts and were remained secret until Nixon's visit in 1972. The negative image of the United States presented in the CCP's propaganda could not be changed in an instant. Propaganda requires a gradual shift of focus and subtle change of tone. So it was not until after Nixon's visit that Beijing began to present the United States in a much friendlier image to the Chinese public.
            On top of that, the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War became less enthusiastic during this period. Facing the heavy casualties the United States suffered from battles like the Tet Offensive and the growing pressure from the anti-war movement in the nation, the United States had little choices left but to launch and accelerate its "Vietnamization." In 1970, Nixon had announced the phased withdrawal of 150,000 troops over the next year. In 1972, Nixon ended all draft calls, and in 1973 the draft was abolished in favor of an all-volunteer military.
            The signs of the United States' withdrawal from the war created an environment easier for Beijing to approach the United States. Perhaps the ambiguous situation of Beijing that it was working for a better relationship with the United States but still was engaging in a war against the United States can account for the higher frequency of the People's Daily relying on Nhan Dan as a news source. The majority of the People's Daily articles that quote Nhan Dan convey anti-American message. But since such message is simply quoted but not the official stance or an editorial of People's Daily, the CCP can avoid directly criticizing the United States while achieving the effects of criticism.
            The year 1973 is another turning point. Since 1973, the number of articles on the Vietnam War in People's Daily dropped continuously, and negative terms were used much less frequently to refer to the United States (in fact, from 1973 and onward, neutral terms were used more often than negative terms). Vietnamese sources like Nhan Dan were used less often as a news source than years between 1970 and 1972 but were still used substantially. Such trend is closely related to the United States' policies regarding the Vietnam War.
            After Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and decades of anti-war movements inside the United States, the American leaders decided to pull off the American forces from Vietnam. On 27 January 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam was signed by representatives of the South Vietnamese communist forces, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States. A cease-fire would go into effect the following morning throughout North and South Vietnam, and within 60 days all U.S. forces would be withdrawn, all U.S. bases dismantled, and all prisoners of war released. (26) At this point, there was no longer the need for Beijing to be hostile toward the United States. Ready to open a new chapter of the relationship between the world's most powerful nation and the most populous one, the CCP's enthusiasm for propaganda on the Vietnamese affairs quickly waned just ten years after its peak.

V. Final Analysis
            This paper has demonstrated: firstly, the CCP used propagandistic portrayal of the Vietnam War in People's Daily to manipulate people's perception of the war, to encourage anti-American sentiments and manipulate public opinion; and secondly the CCP's propaganda policies on the Vietnam War have subtly changed according to China's domestic and international conditions.
            Unlike the United States during the same era, China had a lot of totalitarian elements in its governmental and social system. The party had the total control over the press. The party ideologies permeate throughout the society, and the party line is the supreme guideline for every decision made in the country. In the United States, there were heated controversies regarding the government's decision to intervene in the Vietnam War, and, just as People's Daily had substantially reported about, there were anti-war movements which became an important part of the American history. However, in China, any conspicuous movement against the government's decision was impossible. The Chinese public was in a rather passive position where they had to accept the party's rhetoric and portrayal of the war.
            One thing notable is that while the Vietnam War escalated in late 1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese were rather reluctant to get involved in this war. The Chinese had learned a hard lesson in the Korean War in which 180,000 Chinese had sacrificed their lives. Hou Zhenlu, a Chinese colonel from the Railroad Engineering Corps of PLA who participated in the Vietnam War testified that: "I never thought, nobody did, that China would fight America again the Vietnam War twelve years later." (27) The complex history and sensitive issues regarding Sino-American relationship required the CCP to be strategic in its propaganda, giving a rather convincing portrayal of the war while manipulating people's perception of it.
            This paper has analyzed how the CCP had done strategic propaganda based on several statistics and found out that progress of the Cultural Revolution and Beijing's relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union were most important factors that influenced intensity as well as content of propaganda. Nonetheless, I recognize that there are several potential mistakes or bias in this paper. First, some statistics may have exaggerated some factors. For example, graph 4 shows very small differences among values. Thus, it cannot be certain that when the CCP increased or reduced its reliance on Vietnamese sources for People's Daily articles, whether it had done so intentionally or not. Secondly, this paper heavily bases itself on one Chinese source People's Daily. Though it is true that People's Daily was a powerful propaganda method during that period, it is still a concern that many other propaganda channels are ignored. Also, a lack of foreign sources or Chinese sources written from other perspectives, i.e. opponents of the Chinese intervention, might add some bias to analysis of this paper.


Notes
(1)      Cull 2003, p.73.
(2)      Shah 2005
(3)      Yang Shangkun was the director of the Party's General Office.
(4)      Luo Ruiqiang was the chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He had headed the Chinese military delegation in a visit to Hanoi in 1963 in which China promised that if the Americans were to attack North Vietnam, China would come to its defense.
(5)      Li 2012, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
(6)      Even though the Vietnam War ended in 1975, it is worthy to examine the articles published in 1976 as well since the aftermath of a war is also a part of what the CCP might want to propagate. In case of the postage stamps, this paper will cover all stamps related to Vietnam throughout the 1960s.
(7)      Liu 1998, p.1.
(8)      "Renmin Ribao." Encyclopaedia Britannica .
(9)      Cull 2003, p.312.
(10)      The date indicated in each parenthesis is not necessarily the only date on which demonstration was reported, neither is it the date when the demonstration actually happened. Demonstrations in some countries are more frequently reported than in others.
(11)      Moise 1998
(12)      Smith 2000, "Table: 1968 Tet Offensive"
(13)      Some of the articles that contain only the keyword "Vietnam" may not have any relationship with the Vietnam War itself. However, such articles are still included in the statistic, because they reflect the CCP's relationship with Vietnam and how much the CCP took interest in this relationship.
(14)      Smith 2000, "Table: 1968 Tet Offensive"
(15)      Only the number of certain terms that appear in the titles is counted, since the same term is often used repeatedly in one article.
(16)      The Wikipedia article "Xinhua News Agency" says: "People's Daily, for example, uses Xinhua material for approximately 25 percent of its stories." But the statement is not yet verified.
(17)      Dial 1972 p.306.
(18)      The official newspaper of the North Vietnamese army.
(19)      Zhang 1996 p.733.
(20)      Li 1998, p.111.
(21)      Zhang 1996 p.734.
(22)      Lieberthal, "Cultural Revolution," Encyclopaedia Britannica.
(23)      Jian 1995, 1964-69," p.380.
(24)      ibid., p.383.
(25)      ibid., p.384.
(26)      Spector, "Vietnam War", Encyclopaedia Britannica
(27)      Li 2010, p.216.


Bibliography

Secondary Sources:

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(1)      Cull, Nicholas John., David Holbrook. Culbert, and David Welch. Propaganda and mass persuasion: A historical encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003.
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(3)      "Renmin Ribao" Encyclopaedia Britannica. .
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(5)      Tucker, Spencer. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A political, social, and military history. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998.
(6)      Lieberthal, Kenneth G. "Cultural Revolution." Encyclopaedia Britannica. .
(7)      "War Against U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam ()." Baidu Encyclopedia (). .
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(8)      Brady, Anne-Marie. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
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(12)      Kamalipour, Yahya R., and Nancy Snow. War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004.
(13)      Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008.
(14)      Liu, Guixia. Containment and Confrontation: Sino-American Relations during the Vietnam War, 1961-1973. (, 1961-1973). Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press of China, 2007.
(15)      Liu, Guoli. "China-U.S. Relations and the Vietnam War." Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations. Lanham: University Press of America, 1998.
(16)      Pan, Yining. Sino-U.S. Confrontation in Indochina, 1949-1973 (, 1949-1973). Guangzhou: Zhongshan UP. 2011.
(17)      Li, Xiaobing, and Hongshan Li. "Reassessing China's Role in the Vietnam War; Some Mysteries Explored." China and the United States: A New Cold War History. Lanham: University P of America, 1998.
(18)      Roberts, Priscilla Mary. Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center P, 2006.

Academic Sources, journals -

(All the websites were accessed in Sep. and/or Oct. 2013) (19)      Dial, Roger L. "The New China News Agency and Foreign Policy in China." International Journal 26 (1972): 3.
(20)      Jian, Chen. "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69." The China Quarterly 142 (1995): 356-387.
(21)      Liu, Allison. "Don't Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era." Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. 2 (1994): 1-99.
(22)      Mao, Lin. "China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War; January to July 1965." Journal of Cold War Studies 11 (2009): 35-69.
(23)      Wu, Guoguang. "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People's Daily." The China Quarterly 137 (1994): 194-211.
(24)      Zhang, Xiaoming. "The Vietnam war, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective." The Journal of Military History 6 (1996): 731-62.

Others, websites -
(All the websites were accessed in Sep. and/or Oct. 2013)

(25)      "Basic Information about People's Daily ()." People. May 2003. People's Daily. .
(26)      "China Sacrifices Itself to Support Vietnam Against U.S.. 320 Thousand people Participated in the War ()." People: Henan Channel. Ed. Liangfeng Zhao. 19 Aug. 2009. People's Daily. .
(27)      Moise, Edwin E. "The Tet Offensive and its Aftermath." Clemson: Edwin Moise's Home Page. 6 Nov. 1998.
(28)      Shah, Anup. "War, Propaganda and the Media." Global Issues. 31 Mar. 2005. .
(29)      Smith, Ray. "Casualties - US vs NVA/VC." 1st Battalion 69th Armor. 23 Jan. 2000. .
(30)      Wang, Xiaoli. " An Account of New China's 320 Thousand Soldiers Fighting Against U.S. and Supporting Vietnam ()." People. 2010. People's Daily .

Primary Sources:

(31)      Newspaper - Articles from People's Daily:




(32)      Memoirs - Li, Xiaobing. Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans. Lexington, KY: University P of Kentucky, 2010.

(33)      Stamps - Postage Stamps Catalogue of the People's Republic of China. Beijing: People's Posts & Telecom Press. 2009.


Table 1. Selected Sets of Stamps
Label Name Number of Stamps Released Year
C83 Celebrating 15th Anniversary of the Founding of Democratic Republic of Vietnam 2 1960
C101 Support South Vietnamese People's Struggle For Liberation 2 1963
C105 The Heroic People of South Vietnam Are Bound to Win 1 1964
C117 Support Vietnamese People's Patriotic and Just Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism 4 1965




Second Draft . . Go to Teacher's Comment

The Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda on the Vietnam War, 1965-1976 As Reflected in People's Daily and other sources

Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. General Features
III. Trend
IV. Motivations
V. Consequences
VI. Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography

I. Introduction
The art of wartime propaganda is as old as war itself. When a war breaks out, the offensive and defensive operations occur not only with bullets and bombs but also with hearts and minds of people from both sides. Early in the Spring and Autumn Period when feudal states in China were fighting against each other, Confucius noted the importance of the "rectification of names" in establishing a stable government. (1) "Rectification of names" is also essential in winning a war. A persuasive justification for the war, whether it is legitimate and truthful or not, is a prerequisite for mustering people's moral support, and it takes an organized, deliberate effort to convince people of such justification and to maximize the public's enthusiasm for a war. And the consequence is usually, as Winston Churchill testifies, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." (2) Indeed, to create justifications and to promote certain images, propaganda is inevitably composed of fraud, manipulation, exaggeration, and omission, emasculating the public's perception of objective truths.
Though having a long history and having been well developed, wartime propaganda became even more systemized and sophisticated after the two world wars. Then, during the Cold War, just as the Western bloc led by Washington and the Eastern bloc headed by Moscow engaged in psychological and ideological warfare and sometimes physical clashes, the intensity and domain of propaganda were further enhanced. Some of the most conspicuous evidence of such propaganda can be seen in the Indochina Wars, especially the Second Indochina War. A war commonly called as the Vietnam War, it was the battleground between South Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam (ROV), and its opponents, the South Vietnamese-based communist Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). But it wasn't just a civil war. Rather, it was a confrontation between two major Cold War powers and a microcosm of worldwide conflicts. Therefore, in this war, not only the local forces but also the foreign allies had had to actively engage in propaganda in and outside their own countries.
This paper examines the propaganda activities by the Chinese Communist Party during the Vietnam War. The US propaganda for the Vietnam War has long been a subject of controversies as well as extensive research. However, propaganda by the other side of rivalry was much less studied. This paper, therefore, aims to shed light on the relatively neglected part of this costly psychological warfare of mass communication: what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the paramount controller of the Chinese government and military, had done to manipulate images of the Vietnam War and China's involvement in it.
It's notable that CCP's propaganda tactic underwent several changes during the Vietnam War due to certain events in China's domestic politics and international affairs. First of all, even though CCP remained at the side of North Vietnam throughout the Vietnam War, it had clearly developed a friendlier relationship with the United States, a country supposed to be its enemy as long as the war proceeds. In fact, Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 and the US President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 ended the total confrontation between the US and China that had lasted for almost a quarter century and thereby profoundly reshaped the Cold War relations. After the Vietnam War ended, China and US went a step further to establish a diplomatic relation, while tension mounted between China and its ex-ally North Vietnam that eventually a war broke between them in 1979. Secondly, CCP's relationship with another important ally of the communist bloc, the Soviet Union, soured following the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s and the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969. When antagonism was brewing between the two important allies of North Vietnam, Hanoi sided with the Soviet Union, which inevitably led to fissures in the Sino-Vietnamese relation. Thirdly, while the CCP was fighting a foreign war, it had to deal with social-political unrests within the country as well: from 1966 to 1976, the Cultural Revolution swept through the country, with great purges in the party and violent struggles among the masses. During the Revolution, the party leadership was unstable. Many leading figures of the party, such as Yang Shangkun (3), Luo Ruiqiang (4), and Liu Shaoqi, who had been involved in the Vietnamese affairs, experienced serious fluctuations in their political careers. The Revolution also affected the authority of the People's Liberation Army, pushing it to the center of national politics from 1967 to 1971, and then moving it out of the political arena after the death of defense minister Marshal Lin Biao in 1971 until Deng Xiaoping announced new military reforms in 1975 and worked to repair the damage done to the PLA. (5)
The complexity of China's domestic and international politics impacted the CCP's propaganda strategies with regard to the Vietnamese affairs. CCP constantly adjusted the level of intensity and content of propaganda to promote certain images of the situation that best served the party's immediate interest. The goal of this paper is to dissect the changes in CCP's propaganda with regard to the Vietnam War and to explain their historical causes, CCP's intentions behind them, and consequences. To be more specific, this paper aims to answer the following questions:

1. What are the general characteristics of CCP's propaganda on the Vietnam War?
2. What are the changes that the CCP made when propagating the war to the Chinese public? How and to what extent were those changes carried out?
3. What are the reasons or motivations for such propaganda tactics and policies?
4. What are some of the consequences of such propaganda? How effective it was and how did the public react?

To answer these questions, this study utilizes primary sources, the news articles published by the People's Daily on the Vietnamese affairs from 1965 to 1976, along with the relevant postage stamps released by the China's Posts and Telecom Press in pertaining period. (6) Both sources had been used by the CCP as major methods for propaganda.
Established in 1948, People's Daily (or Renmin Ribao in Chinese) is daily newspaper published in Beijing as the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the CCP, and it is under regulation of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. It often carries political articles and speeches and reports made by government or party leaders. Many of its front page commentaries are written in the CCP's headquarters and then reprinted by other papers and broadcasted by radio and television stations, so one can say that the voice of People's Daily literally reverberates throughout the country. (7) Moreover, copies of People's Daily were usually publicized in display cases at street intersections, and some of its important articles were read at local party meetings, etc. (8) Therefore People's Daily has a great influence in deciding contents of other press and media and enjoys hegemony in shaping Chinese public opinion. Such news circulation process helps create consistency in mass media so that the party can push forward a strong, united propaganda front. Therefore, a properly selected articles from People's Daily can be a fair indicator of how the CCP propagate the Vietnam War to the public and what subtle but important changes had the CCP's propaganda undergone.
Postage stamp is another frequently used tool for propaganda. Stamps are like small but effective posters due to the scale and scope of their distribution. In 1927, the communist China began using crude postage stamps it mass-produced for propaganda in its base territories. In 1949, when the CCP won national power, the party established the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to produce better-quality stamps designed to glorify the communist rule and impress the masses. (9) During the Cultural Revolution, the postal and telecommunications functions were separated for two years, and the stamp sales reduced. However, the images and texts on stamps remained no less propagandistic. A close study of postal stamps published each year can reveal the priority of the CCP's general propaganda policy at a specific period.
In the rest of this paper, the combination of two types of sources will reveal the general features and evolving trend of the CCP's propaganda on the Vietnamese affairs, and then an analysis based on historical background and testimonies from memoirs will shed light on the motivations behind propaganda as well as the public's reaction to it.

II. General Features
The Chinese used the term "the War against US Aggression and to Aid Vietnam" to refer to the Second Indochina War. Throughout the war, the CCP used propaganda to trigger enmity against the United States and its 'lackey (zou'gou)' South Vietnam while developing a sense of unity and solidarity with North Vietnam, the "brotherly comrade" of China. Some of the tactics used by People's Daily throughout the war to propagate the war are as following:
The first notable tactic is to report extensively on anti-American sentiment around the world. Of the numerous articles related to the Vietnam War, the majority is about military actions or political decisions made about the war. However, there is also a considerable amount of articles reporting about civil reactions to the war not only in China and Vietnam but also in many other countries from Asia, Africa, Europe, North and Latin Americas. All of the reactions reported are anti-American: peoples were protesting against American intervention in the Vietnam War and various organizations were making public statements criticizing America's "imperialistic move."
To highlight anti-American sentiment among the public, People's Daily frequently reported about campaigns, parades, assemblies, etc., joined by people from all walks of life. In addition, whenever there was an important event or an anniversary, the newspaper would publish telegrams from celebrities and civil and governmental organizations supporting North Vietnam and China. For example, the front page of the newspaper released on 10 February, 1965 reported that "2,500,000 people from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanning held a great demonstration: with the same hatred for the same enemy - the United States which is the robber - million people united as one man to aid our brotherly Vietnam." The subtitle of the article was "the national political association and all kinds of people's organizations and democratic associations expressed support for Vietnam's struggle against America; friends in our country who are from Vietnam and other countries joined local people to protest against the invasion of the American imperialists." The front-page article and the rest of the newspaper repeatedly elaborate on the regions, countries and organizations that held demonstrations. The number of population who demonstrated, contents and demands of demonstrations, and slogans that demonstrators had used are all reported in details. The second page is filled with telegrams from eleven nongovernmental organizations that express antagonism against the United States and support for Vietnam, and the sixth page only contains ten photos, all of which are about demonstrations. Out of forty-one articles published on 10 February, thirty-five are related to Vietnam War, and out of these thirty-five, twenty-one are about either demonstrations or anti-American telegrams.
Not only that, the coverage of anti-American sentiments in countries other than China or Vietnam is also notable. From 1965 and onward, there were never any articles reporting about any people supporting the American intervention in the Vietnam War, but there were continuous and repeated reports on people - from not only African and Southeastern countries but also European countries and the Untied States - condemning the Washington's intervention. People's Daily has reported about anti-American demonstrations in Albania (14 Feb. 1965), Algeria (20 Mar. 1965), Argentina (17 Apr. 1965), Australia (13 Feb. 1965), Belgium (5 Apr. 1965), Bolivia (5 Apr. 1965), Britain (16 Dec. 1970), Burma (24 Mar. 1965), Cameroon (8 Jun. 1965), Canada (20 De. 1965), Ceylon (7 Nov. 1967), Chile (21 Feb. 1968), Colombia (18 Jul. 1968), Congo (5 Apr. 1965), Costa Rica (29 Nov. 1965), Cuba (11 Feb. 1965), Denmark (18 Apr. 1970), Finland (19 Apr. 1972), France (10 May 1971), Ghana (14 Apr. 1965), Greece (25 May 1965), Iceland (2 Jun. 1968), Indonesia (14 Feb. 1965), Japan (21 Aug. 1972), Lebanon (15 Feb. 1965), Laos (13 Feb. 1965), Mali (12 Apr. 1966), Mexico (24 Apr. 1966), Nepal (6 Feb. 1968), the Netherlands (23 Mar. 1965), New Zealand (15 Sep. 1968), North Korea (14 Feb. 1965), Norway (13 Apr. 1967), Pakistan (15 Apr. 1965), Peru (18 Jul. 1968), the Philippines (28 Mar. 1966), Singapore (31 Dec. 1972), Sweden (2 Jan. 1972), Tanzania (3 Feb. 1968), Thailand (12 Mar. 1965), Uruguay (23 Mar. 1965), West Germany (22 Dec. 1969), etc. (10) Some of the demonstrations that are reported were held by the public against their government in favor of Washington D.C. Some demonstrations include not just the mass protests but also certain celebrities or organizations declaring their positions against Washington D.C. The combination of these two types of articles is most conspicuously seen in the reports about anti-Vietnam War protests in the United States... People's Daily has published articles that are titled "The momentum of American people's movement against invasion in Vietnam increases. Johnson sent people to 'explain' but had no use" (27 Apr. 1965), "American people are awaking, fighting and marching: from October 10th to 17th, American people held a 'National Protest Day' demonstration against American invasion of Vietnam" (27 Nov. 1965), "the Blacks in the United States announce that they would never kill their Vietnamese brothers and would fight against invasion in Vietnam, determined to stay in the country and struggle for freedom" (21 Nov. 1966), "The enemy of America is not the Vietnamese people, but Johnson! There was a great protest against invasion broken out in Washington D.C. Protestors bravely fought against military guards and surrounded the United States Department of Defense, the American ruling clique being horrified" (23 Oc. 1967), "People from all walks of society held protests in support of the firm stance of the Vietnamese government, demanding the United States. government to sign treaty immediately" (19 Nov. 1972), "American people celebrate the grand victory of the Vietnamese people" (2 May 1975). The CCP portrayed its intervention in the Vietnam War as a fraternal responsibility and a movement to spreading revolutionary ideas while the American intervention as an imperialistic invasion that even its own people protested against. An article "People from all around the world side with the Vietnamese people: even the peoples from Latin America, Europe and Oceania gathered and protested against the invasion of the American imperialists" (12 May 1972) well illustrates what the CCP wanted to propagate in and outside the country. Clearly, when the CCP said that "people from all around the world side with the Vietnamese people," it was rather trying to encourage people from China and around the world to do so by telling them "everybody else is doing it."
The second common tactic is to report Vietnamese victories and wartime heroes in details while totally omitting the defeats. By highlighting victories and downplaying defeats, the CCP created an image of heroic and prevailing communist force as opposed to that of a defeated and weakened enemy. Not only that, stories of heroic figures including soldiers, women and teenagers from North Vietnam encourage emotional responses from readers. By spreading such stories, the CCP can more effectively develop a public sense of unity and empathy toward North Vietnam.
The coverage of the Tet Offensive is a typical example of such tactic in People's Daily. One of the largest military campaigns in the Vietnam War, it lasted from the end of January to September of 1968. According to an American source, 45,000 people from NVA were killed and 6,991 captured while 4,324 were killed in the combined forces of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. (11) Clearly, the Tet Offensive was militarily a defeat for the communist bloc and substantially weakened its force. (12) However, the propagandistic media coverage by People's Daily presnted quite a different picture. The first report on the Offensive was published on 3 February 1968 in an article titled "The paper tiger of the American imperialism was revealed in its true colors on January 1st when military forces of the Viet Cong gave a surprise attack on the American 'embassy' in Saigon, and the American invaders were throw off their feet and hurried fleeing for their lives." Thereafter, People's Daily had been reporting victories won by the Vietnamese with specific details and numbers. Some articles are as short and concise as" North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians blew up five American jets and an artillery regiment in Guangping damaged one American carrier" (2 Aug. 1968) and "the Vietnamese people shot down five aircrafts of the American "(10 Jun. 1968). Sometimes, articles would provide numbers regarding how many enemies were defeated and to what extent Vietnam had advanced: "The army and the people of the southern and middle regions of South Vietnam have killed more than sixty thousand enemies, broken more than six thousand military vehicles, and damaged nearly two hundred aircrafts; people from some provinces smashed the enemy and wiped out a great number of the American puppet soldiers and the accomplice armies" (29 Jun. 1968). Out of all the articles published during the Tet Offensive, the first time when any loss on the communist side was mentioned was on 2 February 1968 in an article titled: "The Vietnamese people are determined to punish the American imperialists and their lackeys; Foreign Ministry of Vietnam made an announcement strongly criticizing the United States that bombed the northern regions on the New Year day; the Viet Cong condemned the United States that had destroyed the New Year ceasefire agreement." Without any further explanations, the article gives an impression that it was the United States that had broken the ceasefire agreement by attacking North Vietnam. Furthermore, the reference to the American army's bombings was for the purpose of reinforcing how determined the Vietnamese people were and to justify the Viet Cong condemnation of the United States The second and last article that mentions the loss of the communist side is the one titled "Foreign Ministry of Vietnam made an announcement strongly criticizing the barbarous act of the American imperialists who bombed the Chinese cargo freighters." In this article, the United States was again the subject of blame and accusation. All in all, despite the heavy casualties and damages inflicted upon the communist armies, hardly any were mentioned in the newspaper during the Tet Operation. Instead, the Chinese media kept publicizing the communist victories including the occupation of Saigon without ever revealing its being retaken by the Americans.
In addition to informative articles that give numbers or overviews of the Vietnamese success, there are also detailed and sometimes even dramatic narratives of wartime heroes who had made praiseworthy deeds of scarification or had made important contributions to certain battles or operations. For example, on 14 February 1968, People's Daily published on the last page a "only the hero can drive away tigers and panthers" series of articles that introduce Xiongqiang Lai who fought to death against an enemy force four times bigger than his force, Mr. T (T Da'ye) who cleverly hid bombs in a box that the enemies were likely to mistake as a treasure box and try to open, guerrilla force in a province which used the enemies' bombs to kill the enemies, and another guerrilla group which used wooden guns to frighten away enemies and acquired real guns from them. There are also many reports on women's contributions to the war and stories of heroines. For example, one article introduces the deeds of a "brave and determined" female soldier, A-li (7 Mar. 1968). She was said to have used clever tricks to set up traps to kill the Americans. Next to the article, there is also a photo of her holding a rifle and a poem praising the outstanding shooting skills of the Vietnamese women. On the same page of the newspaper, there are three more articles on the Vietnamese women making contributions to the war. Portrayals of heroes and heroines create an ideal image of solder and civilian in readers' minds and thereby motivate people to follow the example of those "ideal" deeds.
Besides omission of North Vietnamese losses, People's Daily also omits coverage of the Chinese sent to North Vietnam by the CCP. During the Vietnam War, the CCP not only sent materialistic aids to North Vietnam but also provided it with surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine sweeping and logistics units. That means the Chinese engineers, soldiers, technicians, etc., were sent into North Vietnamese's territories. However, they were hardly mentioned in People's Daily. The reason might be that the CCP wanted to avoid talking about the Chinese casualties to the public and to minimize people's concern that China would engage in "another Korean War."
Thirdly and lastly, terminology is an important factor that influences people's perceptions of different countries and therefore is often deliberately employed for a propagandistic end. Countries engaged in wars often use terms that have a positive or negative connotation instead of neutral ones to characterize objects as either allies or enemies. However, the use of terminology can vary based on the progress of wars and the relation of gain and loss. This is exactly what happened in the Vietnam War. The use of terminology will be examined in detail in the next chapter.

III. Trend
The CCP didn't insist on the same propaganda policies throughout the war. This chapter aims to analyze how propaganda policies changed over time based on three indicators: how many articles were published on the Vietnamese affair per year, what term the CCP used to refer to the United States, and how often People's Daily used a Vietnamese press as news source.
Before a qualitative examination of propaganda, a quantitative analysis will be helpful for understanding how the CCP controlled its propaganda on the Vietnam War. The following graph indicates the number of articles published in People's Daily that are related to Vietnam and/or the Vietnam War by year from 1965 to 1976. The articles that include one or more of the following keywords are considered to be related to Vietnam and/or the Vietnam War: "Vietnam (yue'nan)", "Vietnam War (yue'nan'zhan'zheng)", "Fight against U.S. and Aid Vietnam (kang'mei'yuan'chao)", "Aid Vietnam and fight against U.S. (yuan'chao'kang'mei)", and "South Vietnam (nan'yue)." The number of articles reveals the intensity of propaganda and the CCP's interest in the Vietnamese affairs. (13)



In 1965, the most number of reports were published in People's Daily on the Vietnamese affairs. Then the number steadily decreases until it reaches the lowest point in 1969 in which the number of articles is about 8 percent of that in 1965. Considering that in 1968 and 1969, the greatest number of casualties occurred and the war was fought most intensely, the dramatically decreased frequency of reports is rather unusual. (14) Then after 1969, the frequency gradually increases until 1972; nonetheless, in 1972, the number of articles is still just about half the number in 1965. Then the number decreases again. In 1975, the Second Indochina War ended. The fervor of propaganda dropped significantly.
In order to understand the causes for such changes in frequency of reports, it's crucial to understand the changes in contents and tones of the articles first. Hereafter, two specific changes will be examined: first, terms used to refer to U.S. and Vietnam and second, sources of news.
First of all, as briefly mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, terminology itself can convey an attitude toward a subject. The use of terminology as a propaganda tactic is most obvious in the way the CCP refers to the United States.
Overall, the most frequently used term to characterize the United states as an enemy is "the American imperialists (mei'di)." And the second most frequently used term that contains a negative connotation is "robber (qiang'dao)", or "American robber (mei'guo'qiang'dao)." The following graph is to the show the trend of how frequently the United States was referred as either one of these two negative words. The red line in graph 2 shows the number of the propagandistic terms, "the U.S. imperialists" and "American robber", that appear in titles of articles on the Vietnamese affairs per year. The blue line indicates the number of the neutral term "the United States" that appears in titles of the articles on the Vietnamese affairs each year. (15) Sometimes other phrases like "paper tiger (zhi'lao'hu)", "puppet army (wei'jun)", "murderer (sha'ren'fan)", etc. are used as well. However, because they are rarely used, they are not counted in graph 2.



According to the graph, in 1965, there are more neutral terms used than propagandistic terms. However, from 1966 until 1972, there are more propagandistic terms used. Since 1973, the use of propagandistic terms to refer to the United States drops rapidly and has been used less often than neutral terms. However, the shape of the lines in graph 2 is influenced by the total number of times that the United States is mentioned in People's Daily. The following graph gives a more accurate picture of how often a propagandistic term is used in each year. In graph 3, the ratio of the number of a propagandistic term used to the number of a neutral term used in each year is shown. The vertical axis represents how many times a negative term is used for every one neutral term used every year.



The use of negative term increases steadily from 1965 to 1971 except for the slight drop in 1969. 1970 and 1971 are the peak years in which the negative term is used most frequently. For every "the United States" used, there are nearly four negative terms like "imperialists" or "robbers" used to characterize the United States. In 1972, the ratio suddenly decreases. The ratio drops from nearly 4 to just a little above 1. The ratio continues to drop after 1973 and since that year more neutral term is used than a negative one.
Secondly, it is important to look at how the CCP utilized different news source for its reports on the Vietnam War. A significant part of sources for People's Daily is from Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of China that is subordinate to the State Council and is obliged to report to the CCP's Propaganda and Public Information Departments. (16) During the Cultural Revolution, People's Daily imported from Xinhua News Agency an extensive amount of raw news and prepackaged editorialized propaganda on both domestic and international issues. (17)
Not only that, during the Vietnam War, People's Daily also uses a plenty of source from Nhan Dan (Vietnamese for The People), the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam. First published in 11 May 1951, Nhan Dan serves to be "the voice of the Party, State and people of Vietnam." The articles based on Nhan Dan includes those condemning the United States: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan says the Johnson government's invasion into Vietnam is an act of causing trouble to itself; the strategies of expansion and invasion would only deepen the danger it is facing" (19 February 1965). There are also articles praising the Chinese efforts for the war: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan and People's Army Newspaper (18) published editorials celebrating the great success of China in the hydrogen bomb experiment; it would be a heavy strike against American imperialism and a strong encouragement for the Southern Vietnamese people to struggle against the American imperialists and to gain victory" (1 Jan. 1969). There are those reaffirming the Vietnam's determination for the war: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan celebrated the twenty third anniversaries of the National Anti-American Day and spread the revolutionary spirit to liberate the people and to resist any new colonialism in territories of Vietnam" (20 Mar. 1973).
When People's Daily appears to simply restate what was reported in Nhan Dan without further editorial comments or explanations, it is actually propagating the Vietnamese stance in the war to the Chinese public by treating materials from Nhan Dan as fact, rather than just one perspective that needs to be verified and researched. It is also notable that the frequency of using Nhan Dan as a news source changes overtime. In the following graph, the vertical axis represents the number of percentage of the People's Daily articles on the Vietnamese affairs that were based on a North Vietnamese news source like Nhan Dan, People's Army Newspaper, the Voice of Vietnam, and Study, a magazine published in North Vietnam.



The graph shows that from 1965 to 1968, the use of North Vietnamese sources decreases. But from 1969 to 1971, it increases rapidly and the relatively high level of usage is maintained till 1973. Then it begins to drop since 1973.
According to the analysis so far, 1965 is the year when the quantitative intensity of propaganda is the most noticeable: the number of articles is the most. In 1967~1968, there is a drop in the intensity of propaganda, and Nhan Dan was used less frequently as a news source. From 1970 to 1972, the number of articles published on the Vietnam War resurges, more negative image of the U.S. was propagated through effective use of terminology and Nhan Dan was more used as a news source. And finally 1973 is a great turning point for all three indicators, reflected the lowered enthusiasm of the CCP for propaganda.
Before moving on the next chapter to analyze motivations of the CCP behind such changes, I will look at how the CCP used postage stamps to propagate the war as well. Among all the stamps that the People's Republic of China have published, there are four stamps released that are related to Vietnam. The first one is issued in 1960 and titled "celebrating 15th Anniversary of the Founding of Democratic Republic of Vietnam." The second one is issued in 1963 and titled "support to South Vietnamese People's struggle for liberation." The third one is issued in 1964 and titled "the heroic people of South Vietnam are bound to win." And the last one is issued in 1965 and titled "support Vietnamese People's patriotic and just struggle against American Imperialism." Though as a source base, stamps stand no comparison to the newspaper articles, the absence of stamp issued related the Vietnam War after 1965 says something.

IV. Motivations
This chapter will divide the Vietnam into four stages and analyze the CCP's ideological and strategic considerations behind propaganda of each of the following periods: 1965-1966, 1967-1969, 1970-1972 and 1973-1976.
Since the frequency of reports on Vietnamese affairs started to wane immediately after the war got intensified, the first two years of the war witnessed the highest rate of coverage of Vietnamese affairs in People's Daily. Such a high intensity of reports and propaganda during the escalation of war was motivated by a combination of domestic concerns and international circumstances.
Domestically, Mao was preparing for reinforcement and solidification of his power in the communist party which was later realized in the Cultural Revolution starting from 1966. In order to do so, he needed stimulus to mobilize the Chinese population and radicalize the domestic politics. Since the creation of a perception of China facing serious foreign threats would help strengthen the dynamics of revolutionary mobilization and radicalization at home, as well as his authority and controlling position in China's political life, he switched from a rather lukewarm support for North Vietnam which he had demonstrated earlier to a more enthusiastic promise of aid and more active propaganda activity.
The highly enthusiastic propaganda on the Vietnam War is also consistent with China's attempt to gain leadership in the international communist movement. Beijing perceived Ho's war of national liberation as a vital part of a world proletarian revolutionary movement; according to Mao, the success of "national revolutionary" struggle was the key to the defense of socialist states from imperialist attack and to the ultimate success of the global revolutionary struggle. (19) People's Daily frequent reference to the anti-American and pro-Communism movements in Asia, Africa and Latin American confirms the CCP's intentions to promote revolutionary movement in such areas and to demonstrate to the Third World that Beijing was an ally and spokesman of national liberation struggles.
The CCP's ardent support for Hanoi's war of national liberation is also linked with its growing antagonism against the Soviet Union. The "de-Stalinization" movement in the Soviet Union deeply concerned the communists in China and triggered criticism that the Soviet was pursuing revisionism and attempting to return to capitalism. As two pillars of the communist world, China and the Soviet Union was contesting for who had "the true communism" at the time, and what the CCP could do to legitimize its criticism of Soviet revisionist foreign policy and to claim leadership in the communist would was to give full support for North Vietnam and heavily propagate such an act both domestically and internationally. (20)
Though not the most decisive factor, the Chinese perception of the United States as a threat to security of China also contributed to the extensiveness of propaganda at the very beginning of the war. Mao had hoped to break the "ring of encirclement" by American imperialism and to secure the China's southern border by eliminating the chances of the Americans' establishing bases in Vietnam as they did in Korea and Taiwan. (21) That's also why when the United States' involvement in Vietnam escalated, Beijing felt obliged to in send man power in addition to materialistic aids that China had been sending to North Vietnam since the 1950s. After the term "struggle against the United States and aid Vietnam" first appeared in People's Daily in 4 April 1965, the CCP sent surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery, railroad, engineering, mine sweeping and logistics units to North Vietnam to maintain bridges and roads threatened by American air attacks and to enable Hanoi to send more NVA troops to the South to fight Americans.
As listed above, a strategic consideration of the international setting and Mao's drive to rapidly transform the Chinese state and society in 1965 and 1966 contributed to the CCP's propaganda policies regard to the Vietnamese affairs and the CCP's need to keep the tone of propaganda strong and loud. Propaganda's general tendency to emphasize the world peoples' support for the communist side of rivalry while downplaying the military acts of the Chinese troops in Vietnam again confirms the vital role of the CCP's ideological consideration in the entire war and propaganda movement.
From 1967 to 1969, despite that the CCP had sent an increasing number of units and aids to Vietnam and that the battles were fought most intensely during those three years, the number of times the Vietnamese affairs were reported in People's Daily decreased rapidly. At the same time, Nhan Dan was used less frequently as a news source for People's Daily, especially in 1967 and 1968. Such trend is again related to China's domestic circumstances where the escalated Cultural Revolution threw the nation into incontrollable turmoil. It also correlates to the looming fissures in the alliance between China and North Vietnam that was once claimed "between brotherly comrades."
Domestically, the Red Guards tore apart any existing orders of society and even split into factions rivaling each other. The resulting anarchy, terror, and paralysis completely disrupted the urban economy; industrial production for 1968 dipped 12 percent below that of 1966. (22) Disillusioned by the unrests of which he was losing control and the factional struggles of the Red Guards, Mao decided to tune down the call for revolutionary radicalism and to dispatch officers and soldiers to reintroduce orders to schools, factories, and government agencies. And the most ardent supporters of so-called Maoism, the Red Guards, were scattered in Down to the Countryside Movement. Propaganda, understandably, became less of a priority compared to when Mao wanted to initiate the movement.
Internationally, the Sino-Vietnamese alliance deteriorated. Since the considerations underlying the China's and North Vietnam's respective policies were driven by distinct priorities - North Vietnam was mainly concerned about how to unify their country by winning this war, while China was more driven by Mao's desire to use the Vietnam conflict to promote China's "continuous revolution" - problems between the two countries began to develop and gradually turned into friction ever since 1965. (23) The gap between Beijing and Hanoi was widened by the antagonism between Beijing and Moscow. By 1968, the Chinese saw that Hanoi was growing closer to Moscow than to Beijing: as an example, when a series of conflicts occurred between Chinese troops and Soviet military personnel in Vietnam, the Vietnamese authorities stood on the side of the Soviets and alleged that the Chinese "had impinged upon Vietnam's sovereignty." (24)
Apparently, China's domestic situation and Mao's needs had changed by 1967 to 1969. In the meantime, Beijing's relationships with major powers began to change. While its relationship with Moscow deteriorated, even leading to a border clash in March 1969, Beijing began to perceive the United States less as a potential threat and reconsider the role of the US could play in China's security needs. (25) These rapidly changing conditions altered Beijing's attitude toward the Vietnam War and made a radical approach and fervent propaganda obsolete, reducing the number of times the Vietnam War was reported in People's Daily. The widening gap between Beijing and Hanoi also accounts for the growing reluctance of People's Daily to quote the Vietnamese news source.
Portrayal of the Vietnam War by the People's Daily articles from 1970 to 1972 is characterized with slightly more frequent use of negative terms to characterize the United States, an increasing number of reports on Vietnamese affairs, and an increasing use of North Vietnamese sources. The CCP's propaganda policies are rather interesting during this period considering that there were attempts made by the internal leadership of China and the United States to establish a friendlier relationship with each other. But on the surface, the two countries had to remain enemies against each other.
In 1971, Ping pong diplomacy hinted for the first time of an improved Sino-American relation. Just as the war still raged in Vietnam, the first group of Americans was allowed into China since the Communist takeover in 1949, paving the way for Nixon's visit to China in 1972. In 1971, there was another round of intimate contacts between the two countries during Kissinger's visit to Beijing. However, it must be noted that all diplomatic negotiations were done in back-channel contacts and were remained secret until Nixon's visit in 1972. The negative image of the United States presented in the CCP's propaganda could not be changed in an instant. Propaganda requires a gradual shift of focus and subtle change of tone. So it was not until after Nixon's visit that Beijing began to present the United States in a much friendlier image to the Chinese public.
On top of that, the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War became less enthusiastic during this period. Facing the heavy casualties the United States suffered from battles like the Tet Offensive and the growing pressure from the anti-war movement in the nation, the United States had little choices left but to launch and accelerate its "Vietnamization." In 1970, Nixon had announced the phased withdrawal of 150,000 troops over the next year. In 1972, Nixon ended all draft calls, and in 1973 the draft was abolished in favor of an all-volunteer military.
The signs of the United States' withdrawal from the war created an environment easier for Beijing to approach the United States. Perhaps the ambiguous situation of Beijing that it was working for a better relationship with the United States but still was engaging in a war against the United States can account for the higher frequency of the People's Daily relying on Nhan Dan as a news source. The majority of the People's Daily articles that quote Nhan Dan convey anti-American message. But since such message is simply quoted but not the official stance or an editorial of People's Daily, the CCP can avoid directly criticizing the United States while achieving the effects of criticism.
The year 1973 is another turning point. Since 1973, the number of articles on the Vietnam War in People's Daily dropped continuously, and negative terms were used much less frequently to refer to the United States (in fact, from 1973 and onward, neutral terms were used more often than negative terms). Vietnamese sources like Nhan Dan were used less often as a news source than years between 1970 and 1972 but were still used substantially. Such trend is closely related to the United States' policies regarding the Vietnam War.
After Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and decades of anti-war movements inside the United States, the American leaders decided to pull off the American forces from Vietnam. On 27 January 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam was signed by representatives of the South Vietnamese communist forces, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States. A cease-fire would go into effect the following morning throughout North and South Vietnam, and within 60 days all U.S. forces would be withdrawn, all U.S. bases dismantled, and all prisoners of war released. (26) At this point, there was no longer the need for Beijing to be hostile toward the United States. Ready to open a new chapter of the relationship between the world's most powerful nation and the most populous one, the CCP's enthusiasm for propaganda on the Vietnamese affairs quickly waned just ten years after its peak.

V. Conclusion
So far, this paper has demonstrated: firstly, the CCP used propagandistic portrayal of the Vietnam War in People's Daily to manipulate people's perception of the war, to encourage anti-American sentiments and manipulate public opinion; and secondly the CCP's propaganda policies on the Vietnam War have subtly changed according to China's domestic and international conditions.
Unlike the United States during the same era, China had a lot of totalitarian elements in its governmental and social system. The party had the total control over the press. The party ideologies permeate throughout the society, and the party line is the supreme guideline for every decision made in the country. In the United States, there were heated controversies regarding the government's decision to intervene in the Vietnam War, and, just as People's Daily had substantially reported about, there were anti-war movements which became an important part of the American history. However, in China, any conspicuous movement against the government's decision was impossible. The Chinese public was in a rather passive position where they had to accept the party's rhetoric and portrayal of the war.
One thing notable is that while the Vietnam War escalated in late 1950s and early 1960s, the Chinese were rather reluctant to get involved in this war. The Chinese had learned a hard lesson in the Korean War in which 180,000 Chinese had sacrificed their lives. Hou Zhenlu, a Chinese colonel from the Railroad Engineering Corps of PLA who participated in the Vietnam War testified that: "I never thought, nobody did, that China would fight America again the Vietnam War twelve years later." (27) The complex history and sensitive issues regarding Sino-American relationship required the CCP to be strategic in its propaganda, giving a rather convincing portrayal of the war while manipulating people's perception of it.
This paper has analyzed how the CCP had done strategic propaganda based on several statistics and found out that progress of the Cultural Revolution and Beijing's relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union were most important factors that influenced intensity as well as content of propaganda. Nonetheless, I recognize that there are several potential mistakes or bias in this paper. First, some statistics may have exaggerated some factors. For example, graph 4 shows very small differences among values. Thus, it cannot be certain that when the CCP increased or reduced its reliance on Vietnamese sources for People's Daily articles, whether it had done so intentionally or not. Secondly, this paper heavily bases itself on one Chinese source People's Daily. Though it is true that People's Daily was a powerful propaganda method during that period, it is still a concern that many other propaganda channels are ignored. Also, a lack of foreign sources or Chinese sources written from other perspectives, i.e. opponents of the Chinese intervention, might add some bias to analysis of this paper.


Notes
(1) Cull, Propaganda and mass persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present, p.73.
(2) Anup, http://www.globalissues.org/article/157/war-propaganda-and-the-media.
(3) Yang Shangkun was the director of the Party's General Office.
(4) Luo Ruiqiang was the chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He had headed the Chinese military delegation in a visit to Hanoi in 1963 in which China promised that if the Americans were to attack North Vietnam, China would come to its defense.
(5) Li, China at War: An Encyclopedia, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
(6) Even though the Vietnam War ended in 1975, it is worthy to examine the articles published in 1976 as well since the aftermath of a war is also a part of what the CCP might want to propagate. In case of the postage stamps, this paper will cover all stamps related to Vietnam throughout the 1960s.
(7) Liu, Image, Perception, and the Making of US-China Relations, p.1.
(8) "Renmin Ribao." Britannica Encyclopedia.
(9) Cull, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, p.312.
(10) The date indicated in each parenthesis is not necessarily the only date on which demonstration was reported, neither is it the date when the demonstration actually happened. Demonstrations in some countries are more frequently reported than in others.
(11) Moise, http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/edmoise/viet8.html.
(12) Smith, "Table: 1968 Tet Offensive," http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html.
(13) Some of the articles that contain only the keyword "Vietnam" may not have any relationship with the Vietnam War itself. However, such articles are still included in the statistic, because they reflect the CCP's relationship with Vietnam and how much the CCP took interest in this relationship.
(14) Smith, "Table: 1968 Tet Offensive," http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html.
(15) Only the number of certain terms that appear in the titles is counted, since the same term is often used repeatedly in one article.
(16) A Wikipedia article "Xinhua News Agency" says: "People's Daily, for example, uses Xinhua material for approximately 25 percent of its stories." But the statement is not yet verified.
(17) Dial, "The New China News Agency and Foreign Policy in China," p.306.
(18) The official newspaper of the North Vietnamese army.
(19) Zhang, "The Vietnam war, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," p.733.
(20) Li, China and the United States: A New Cold War History, p111.
(21) Zhang, "The Vietnam war, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," p.734.
(22) Lieberthal, http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/146249/Cultural-Revolution/283837/Rise-and-fall-of-Lin-Biao-1969-71
(23) Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69," p.380.
(24) Ibid, p.383.
(25) Ibid, p.384.
(26) Spector, http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/628478/Vietnam-War.
(27) Li, Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans, p.216.


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Newspaper - Articles from People's Daily:




Memoirs - Li, Xiaobing. Voices from the Vietnam War: Stories from American, Asian, and Russian Veterans. Lexington, KY: University P of Kentucky, 2010.

Stamps - Postage Stamps Catalogue of the People's Republic of China. Beijing: People's Posts & Telecom Press. 2009.


Table 1. Selected Sets of Stamps
Label Name Number of Stamps Released Year
C83 Celebrating 15th Anniversary of the Founding of Democratic Republic of Vietnam 2 1960
C101 Support South Vietnamese People's Struggle For Liberation 2 1963
C105 The Heroic People of South Vietnam Are Bound to Win 1 1964
C117 Support Vietnamese People's Patriotic and Just Struggle Against U.S. Imperialism 4 1965




First Draft . . Go to Teacher's Comment

Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. General Features
III. Trend
IV. Intentions
V. Consequences
VI. Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography

I. Introduction
The art of wartime propaganda is as old as war itself. When a war breaks out, the operation of offense and defense occur not only with bullets and bombs but also with hearts and minds of people from both sides. Early in the Spring and Autumn Period when individual feudal states in China were struggling against each other, Confucius noted the importance of the "rectification of names" in establishing a stable government (1). "Rectification of names" is equally important in winning a war. A persuasive justification for the war, whether it is legitimate in real or not, is a prerequisite for gaining people's moral support, and it always takes an organized and deliberate effort to convince people of such justification and maximize people's enthusiasm for a war. Winston Churchill's words, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies," (1a) testifies how the efforts to create certain justifications and images of a war, often assisted by fraud, manipulation, exaggeration, and omission through mass communication - the definition of propaganda?emasculate the public's perception of truths.
Though already having a long history, wartime propaganda became more systematic and influential after the world had experienced the two World Wars. During the Cold War, just as the Western bloc led by Washington and the Eastern bloc headed by Moscow engaged in psychological and ideological warfare and sometimes physical clashes, the intensity and domain of propaganda were significantly increased. Some of the most conspicuous evidence of such propaganda can be found in the Indochina Wars, especially the Second Indochina War. A war that is commonly referred as the Vietnam War, it was the battleground between South Vietnamese government and its opponents, both the South Vietnamese-based communist Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). But the two sides were also backed by their respective allies: the South was aided by the United States and its allies such as South Korea, while the North received helps from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Therefore, in this war, not only the local forces but also the foreign allies had had to actively propagate the war within and outside each of their own countries.
This paper examines the propagandistic work conducted by China since the outbreak until the end of the Second Indochina War, a time frame that covers about ten years. For this period, the American propaganda regarding the Vietnam War and the U.S. policies against Vietnam has raised controversy in both the public and academia and thus has been extensively researched. However, the propaganda work done by the other side of the rivalry was less studied. This paper, therefore, aims to shed light on that relatively neglected part of a paramount psychological warfare of mass media and mass communication, with an exclusive focus on what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - the party that was the sole controller of both the Chinese government and military - had done to manipulate its images of the wars and China's involvement.
CCP's strategies regarding propaganda on the Second Indochina War had undergone changes over time due to several events in China's domestic politics and its international relations in the pertaining period. First of all, despite that the CCP remained the ally of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, it had changed its attitude toward the United States, a country supposed to be an enemy of China throughout the war: Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 as well as the U.S. President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 started a friendlier Sino-American relationship and thereby profoundly reshape the Cold War world. After the Vietnam War ended, the tension between China and its ex-ally Vietnam mounted. In the year of 1979, China announced a war against Vietnam, an event that just coincided with the establishment of a diplomatic relationship between China and U.S. Secondly, the CCP's relationship with another important ally of the communist bloc, the Soviet Union, soured following the Sino-Soviet Split in the 1960s and the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969. North Vietnam, which received aids from both countries during the Vietnam War, sided with the Soviet Union when the two countries were at odds with each other. Thirdly, as just the CCP was fighting a foreign war, it had to deal with serious social-political unrests inside the country as well: from 1966 to 1976, the Cultural Revolution swept through the country, creating great purges in the party and violent struggles among the masses. During the Revolution, the party leadership was unstable. Many leading figures of the party who had concerned with decision makings and executions regarding Vietnam affairs - for example, Yang Shangkun, director of the Party's General Office, and Luo Ruiqiang (2), the chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Liu Shaoqi, the second most important person in the party - experienced serious fluctuations in their political careers. The movement also affected the authority of the PLA, pushing it to the center of the national politics in 1967-1971, but then moving it out of the political arena after the death of defense minister Marshal Lin Biao until Deng Xiaoping announced new military reforms in 1975 and tried to repair the damage done to the PLA. (3)
Such complexity of China's domestic and international politics impacted the CCP's propaganda strategies regarding all affairs related to Vietnam. Both intensity and content of propaganda changed over the period to manipulate people's perception of the situation and certain image of wars according to the CCP's immediate interests. The goal of this paper is to dissect such changes and to find the historical causes, the CCP's intentions behind them, and the consequences. To be more specific, this paper aims to answer the following questions:
1. What are the general features of propaganda on Vietnam that were maintained throughout this era?
2. What are the changes in the trend of propaganda on Vietnam? How and to what extent did those changes carried out?
3. What are the reasons or motivations that resulted in changes? What is the inter-relationship between certain historical events and the CCP's propagandistic portrayal of Vietnam?
4. What are consequences of such propaganda? How effective it was and how did the public react?
To answer these questions, this study utilizes the primary sources, the articles from the People's Daily that cover Vietnam from 1965 to 1976, supplemented by the relevant postage stamps released by the China's Posts and Telecom Press during the pertaining period (4). Both sources are among the main methods that the CCP had employed to propagate diverse issues, including the Indochina wars.
Established in 1948, People's Daily (or Renmin Ribao in Chinese) is daily newspaper published in Beijing as the mouthpiece of the Central Committee of the CCP and under regulation of the Propaganda department of the Central Committee. It carries political articles and speeches and reports made by government or party leaders. Moreover, many of its front page commentaries are written in Zhongnanhai and then reprinted by other papers and broadcast by radio and television stations, so the voice of People's Daily literally reverberates throughout the country (5). Copies of People's Daily were usually publicized in display cases at street intersections, and some of its important articles were read at local party meetings and quoted in Radio Beijing programs, etc. (6) It also has a great influence in deciding the content of other press and media and enjoys hegemony in shaping Chinese public opinion, since main materials that appear in it must be reprinted or rebroadcasted by other newspapers or television. Such circulation process creates consistency in mass media that can push forward a united, strong propaganda front. Therefore, the a proper selection of original articles from People's Daily can be a fair indicator of how the CCP propagate events related to Vietnam to the public and the subtle but important changes that occurred in the course of propaganda.
Postage stamps have used as a tool for propaganda ever since its emergence. They are like small but effective posters due to the scale and scope of their distribution. In 1927, the Communist China began using the crude postage stamps it mass-produced for propaganda in their base territories, and in 1949, when the CCP won national power, the party established the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to produce better-quality stamps designed to glorify the communist rule and impress the masses (7). During the Cultural Revolution, the postal and telecommunications functions were separated for two years, and the stamp sales reduced as well. However, the images and texts on stamps remained no less propagandistic. A close study of postal stamps can reveal the general picture as well as priority of the CCP's general propaganda policy at a specific period.
In the rest of this paper, the combination of two types of sources will reveal the general features and evolving trend of the CCP's propaganda on the Vietnam affairs, and then an analysis based on historical background and real testimonies from memoirs will explain the motivations behind the propaganda as well as the public's reactions to it.

II. General Features
The Chinese used the terminology the "War against U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam" for the Second Indochina War. Throughout the course of war, the CCP tried to use propaganda to foster enmity against U.S. and develop a sense of unity and solidarity with North Vietnam, the "brotherly comrade" of China, as opposed to South Vietnam which was commonly referred as a "lackey (zougou) of the U.S." Some of the specific propaganda tactics used consistently by the People's Daily during the war are as following: The first notable tactic is to report extensively on the anti-American sentiment around the world. Of the numerous articles related to Vietnam, the majority is about the military actions or political decisions made about the war. However, there is also a considerable amount of articles reporting about the civil reactions to the war in not only China and Vietnam but also other countries from Asia, Africa, North and Latin Americas. All of the reactions reported are anti-American, with peoples' campaigning and various organizations' making public statements in denouncement of America's "imperialistic invasion.'
To portray the anti-American sentiment among the public, People's Daily frequently reported about campaigns, parades, assemblies, etc. joined by people from all walks of society. In addition, whenever there was an important event or an anniversary, the newspaper would publish telegram of the messages supporting Vietnam from individuals, often celebrities, and civil organizations. For example, the front page of the newspaper released on 10 February, 1965 reported that "2,500,000 people from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanning held a great demonstration: with the same hatred for the same enemy, U.S. the robber, million people united as one man to aid the brotherly Vietnam." The subtitle of the article was "the national political association and all kinds of people's organizations and democratic associations voice out to support Vietnam's struggle against America, friends in our country who are from Vietnam and other countries join local people to protest against the invasion of the Imperialistic America." The front-page article and even the rest of the newspaper repeatedly elaborate on the regions, countries and organizations that had had demonstrations: the number of people from each of them, the contents and demands of demonstrators, and the slogans used, etc. The second page is filled with telegrams from eleven nongovernmental organizations that express antagonism against U.S. and support for Vietnam, and the sixth page only contains ten photos, all of which are about demonstrations. Out of forty-one articles published on 10 February, thirty-five are related to Vietnam War, and out of these thirty-five, twenty-one are about either demonstrations or anti-American telegrams. 1965 is the year when demonstrations were at its peak, so they are inevitably given a prominent coverage in newspaper; however, even after 1965, the extensive reports on public sentiment continued throughout the war, encouraging further anti-Americanism and creating a sense of unity in supporting Vietnam.
Not only that, People's Daily's coverage of anti-American sentiments in countries other than China or Vietnam also works effectively. From 1965 and onward, there were never any articles reporting about people from any countries who supported the American intervention in the Vietnam War, but there were continuous and repeated reports on people - from not only African and Southeastern countries but also European countries and U.S. - condemning U.S.'s intervention. People's Daily has reported about anti-American demonstrations in Albania (14 Feb. 1965), Algeria (20 Mar. 1065), Argentina (17 Apr. 1965), Australia (13 Feb. 1965), Belgium (5 Apr. 1965), Bolivia (5 Apr. 1965), Britain (16 Dec. 1970), Burma (24 Mar. 1965), Cameroon (8 Jun. 1965), Canada (20 De. 1965), Ceylon (7 Nov. 1967), Chile (21 Feb. 1968), Columbia (18 Jul. 1968), Congo (5 Apr. 1965), Costa Rica (29 Nov. 1965), Cuba (11 Feb. 1965), Denmark (18 Apr. 1970), Finland (19 Apr. 1972), France (10 May 1971), Ghana (14 Apr. 1965), Greece (25 May 1965), Iceland (2 Jun. 1968), Indonesia (14 Feb. 1965), Japan (21 Aug. 1972), Lebanon (15 Feb. 1965), Laos (13 Feb. 1965), Mali (12 Apr. 1966), Mexico (24 Apr. 1966), Nepal (6 Feb. 1968), the Netherlands (23 Mar. 1965), New Zealand (15 Sep. 1968), North Korea (14 Feb. 1965), Norway (13 Apr. 1967), Pakistan (15 Apr. 1965), Peru (18 Jul. 1968), the Phillipines (28 Mar. 1966), Singapore (31 Dec. 1972), Sweden (2 Jan. 1972), Tanzania (3 Feb. 1968), Thailand (12 Mar. 1965), Uruguay (23 Mar. 1965), West Germany (22 Dec. 1969), etc. (8) Some of the reported demonstrations were held by the public against their government in favor of the U.S. Some demonstrations include not just the mass protests but also certain celebrities or organizations declaring their positions against the U.S. The combination of these two types of articles is conspicuously seen in the reports about anti-Vietnam War protests in the U.S., which is the most heavily propagated demonstration. People's Daily has published articles that are titled "The momentum of American people's movement against invasion in Vietnam increases. Johnson sends people to 'explain' which has no use" (27 Apr. 1965), "American people are awaking, fighting and marching: from October 10th to 17th, American people held a 'National Protest Day' demonstration against American invasion of Vietnam" (27 Nov. 1965), "the Blacks in the U.S. announce that they would never kill the Vietnamese brothers and would fight against invasion in Vietnam, determined to stay in the country and struggle for freedom" (21 Nov. 1966), "The enemy of the American people is not the Vietnamese people, but Johnson! There was a great protest against invasion broken out in Washington D.C. Protestors bravely fought against military guards and surrounded the U.S. Department of Defense, the American ruling clique being horrified" (23 Oc. 1967), "People from all walks of society held protests and expressed support the firm stance of the Vietnamese government, demanding the U.S. government to sign treaty immediately" (19 Nov. 1972), "American people celebrate the grand victory of the Vietnamese people." (2 May 1975) The CCP portrayed its intervention in the Vietnam War as a brotherly responsibility of helping a nation in danger and spreading revolutionary movements while the U.S.'s intervention as an invasion that even its own people were against. An article "People from all around the world side with the Vietnamese people: even the peoples from Latin America, Europe and Oceania gathered and protested against the invasion of the U.S. imperialists" (12 May 1972) provides a picture of the image that the CCP tried to propagate both domestically and internationally. Clearly, when the CCP said that "people from all around the world side with the Vietnamese people," it was rather encourage people from China and around the world to do so by saying that "everybody else is doing it."
The second common tactic is to report the Vietnamese victory and wartime heroes in details but totally omit the defeats. By highlighting victories and downplaying defeats, the CCP created a heroic and prevailing image of the communist force as opposed to the defeated and weak image of the enemies. Not only that, the stories of heroic figures including soldiers, women and teenagers from Vietnam are effective in arousing empathic sensations from readers. By spreading such stories, the CCP can more effectively develop a public sense of unity and empathy toward Vietnam.
Such tactic is best exemplified by the People's Daily's coverage of the Tet Offensive. One of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War, it lasted from the end of January to September of 1968. With 45,000 people killed and 6,991 captured for the NVA while 4324 killed for the combined forces of the U.S. and the Republic of Vietnam, the Tet Offensive was militarily a defeat for the Communists that weakened them very substantially. (9/10) However, the propagandistic media coverage by People's Daily provided quite a different picture. The first report on the Offensive was published on 3 February 1968 in an article titled "The paper tiger of the U.S. imperialism were revealed in its true colors on January 1st: the military forces of the Viet Cong gave a surprise attack on the U.S. 'embassy' in Saigon, and the American invaders were throw off their feet and hurried fleeing for their lives." Thereafter, People's Daily reported victories of the Vietnamese with specific details and numbers. Some articles are as short and concise as "the North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians blew up five American jets and an artillery regiment in Guangping damaged one American carrier" (2 Aug. 1968) or even just "the Vietnamese people shot down five aircrafts of the U.S. robbers" (10 Jun. 1968). Sometimes, articles would elaborate more on the success of the Vietnamese people and provide numbers regarding how many enemies were defeated and to what extent Vietnam had advanced: "the army and the people of the southern and middle regions of South Vietnam have killed more than sixty thousand enemies, broken more than six thousand military vehicles, and damaged nearly two hundred aircrafts; people from some provinces smashed the enemy and wiped out a great number of the American puppet soldiers and the accomplice armies" (29 Jun. 1968). Out of all the articles published during the Tet Offensive, the first time when the losses of the communist side were mentioned was on 2 February 1968 in an article titled: "The Vietnamese people are determined to punish the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys; Foreign Ministry of Vietnam made an announcement strongly criticizing the U.S. that bombs the northern region during the New Year; the Viet Cong condemned the U.S. that destroyed the New Year ceasefire." Without any further explanations, the article gives an impression that it was the U.S. that broke the ceasefire agreement and made an attack on North Vietnam. Furthermore, the mention of the U.S. bombings was solely for the purpose of reinforcing how determined the Vietnamese people were and to justify the Viet Cong condemnation of the U.S. The second and the last article that mentions the loss of the communist side is the one titled "Foreign Ministry of Vietnam made an announcement strongly criticizing the barbarous act of the U.S. imperialists who bombed the Chinese cargo freighters." In this article, the U.S. was again the subject of blame and accusation that used violence against a private freighter. All in all, despite the heavy casualties and damages inflicted upon the communist armies, hardly any were mentioned in the newspaper during the Tet Operation, and media just kept publicizing the communist victories including the occupation of Saigon without ever revealing its being retaken by the Americans.
In addition to the informative articles that simply give numbers or overviews of the Vietnamese success, there are also detailed and sometimes even dramatic narratives of wartime heroes who either had made praiseworthy deeds of scarification or had made important contributions to certain battles or operations. For example, on 14 February 1968, People's Daily published on the last page a "only the hero can drive away tigers and panthers" series of articles that introduce Xiongqiang Lai who fought to death against an enemy force four times bigger than his force, Mr. T (T Daye) who cleverly hid bombs in a box that the enemies were likely to mistake as a treasure box and try to open, guerrilla members in a province who used the enemies' bombs to kill the enemies, and other guerrilla members who used wooden guns to frighten enemies and acquired real guns from them. There are also many reports on women's contributions to the war and stories of heroines. For example, one article introduces the deeds of a "brave and determined" female soldier, A-li (7 Mar. 1968). She was said to have used clever tactics to set up traps to kill the Americans. There is also a photo of her holding a rifle and a poem praising the outstanding shooting skills of the Vietnamese women along with the article. On the same page of the newspaper, there are three more articles on the Vietnamese women making contributions to the war. Portrayals of heroes and heroines create an ideal image of solder and civilian in readers' minds and thereby motivate people to follow the example of those ideal persons by fully supporting the war.
Thirdly and lastly, terminology is also an important factor that influences people's perceptions of different countries and therefore is often deliberately employed for a propagandistic end. Countries engaged in wars often use terms that have a positive or a negative connotation instead of neutral ones to characterize objects as either allies or enemies. However, the use of terminology can vary according to the progress of wars. The term that is used for one country may change depending on the change in the relation in gain and loss. This is exactly what happened in the Vietnam War. Because there are changes in the terminologies employed, the use of terminology as a propagandistic mean will be examined in the next chapter along with other changes.

III. Trend
The CCP didn't insist on the same strategies and extent of propaganda throughout the ten years of the Vietnam War. Also, when the Vietnam War ended, the CCP's relationship with Vietnam underwent a dramatic change that it couldn't maintain the same attitude towards Vietnam and other related countries as the attitude it had previously. Propaganda, therefore, also went through subtle yet important changes during the period between 1965 and 1976.
Before a qualitative examination of specific changes in the contents of propaganda, a holistic analysis on quantity of propaganda is helpful for understanding how the CCP controlled its propaganda on the Vietnam War. The following chart graphs the number of articles published in People's daily that are related to Vietnam and/or the Vietnam War by year from 1965 to 1976. The articles that include one or more of the following keywords are considered to be related to Vietnam and/or the Vietnam War: "Vietnam (yue'nan)", "Vietnam War (yue'nan'zhan'zheng)", "Fight against U.S. and Aid Vietnam (kang'mei'yuan'chao)", "Aid Vietnam and fight against U.S. (yuan'chao'kang'mei)", and South Vietnam (nan'yue)."
(Graph 1)

The graph has a distinct trend in frequency. 1965 is the year when the report on the Vietnam affair is most frequently published and propaganda was most actively carried out. Then the number steadily decreases until reach a lowest point in 1969 in which the number of articles is almost just 8 percent of that in 1965. Considering that the year 1968 and 1969 is when the most casualties occurred for all parties of the Vietnam War, which means the war was most intensely fought in these two years, the dramatically decreased frequency of reports is rather unusual (11). Then after 1969, the frequency gradually increases until 1972; nonetheless, in 1972, the number of articles is still just about half the number in 1965. Then the number decreases again. In 1975, the Second Indochina War ended. The fervor of propaganda dropped significantly.
In order to understand the causes for such changes in frequency of the articles, or the intensity of the CCP's propaganda on the Vietnam affair, it's crucial to understand the changes in contents and tones of the articles first. Hereafter, three specific changes will be examined: terminology used to refer to U.S. and Vietnam, news source, and emphasis on cultural events.
First of all, as briefly mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, terminology itself can convey a message about the attitude toward an object. And though the CCP had attempted to use certain terminologies to refer to the U.S. as a propaganda tactic, the use of terminologies underwent subtle changes over the Vietnam War.
Overall, the most frequently used terminology to characterize the U.S. as an enemy is "the U.S. imperialists (mei'di)." And the second most frequently used terminology that contains a negative connotation is "robber (qiang'dao)", or "American robber (mei'guo'qiang'dao)." The following graph is to the show the trend of how frequently the U.S. was referred as either one of the two negative words. The red line in graph 2 shows the number of the propagandistic terminology, "the U.S. imperialists" and "American robber", used to refer to the U.S. in the titles of the articles published on the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1976. The blue line indicates the number of the neutral term "the U.S" used in the titles of the articles published on the Vietnam War during the same period (12). Sometimes other phrases like "paper tiger (zhi'lao'hu)", "puppet army (wei'jun)", "murderer (sha'ren'fan)", etc. are used as well. However, because they are only occasionally used, they are not counted in graph 2.

(Graph 2)

According to the graph, in 1965, there are more neutral terms used than propagandistic terms. However, from 196 until 1972, there are more propagandistic terms used. Since 1973, the use of propagandistic terms to refer to the U.S. drops rapidly and was below the use of neutral terms. However, the visual image of graph 2 is highly affected by the total number of the U.S. mentioned in the People's Daily. The following graph gives a more accurate picture of how often a propagandistic terminology is used in each year. In graph 3, the ratio of the number of a propagandistic terminology used to the number of a neutral terminology used to characterize the U.S. in each year is shown. The vertical line is the percentage of the number of a propagandistic terminology used per that of a neutral one.

(Graph 3)

The use of a negative terminology increases steadily from 1965 until 1971 except for the slight drop in 1969. 1970 and 1971 are the peak years when the negative terminology is used most frequently. For every the U.S. used, there are nearly four negative terms like "imperialists" or "robbers" used. In 1972, the ratio underwent a sudden decrease. The ratio drops from nearly 4 to just a little above 1. The ratio continues to drop after 1973 and since that that year the ratio is below 1, meaning that more neutral terms are used than negative ones.
Secondly, different news sources are used in different years. A significant percentage of the source for People's Daily is from Xinhua News Agency, the official press agency of China that is subordinate to the State Council and reports to the CCP's Propaganda and Public Information Departments (13). However, during the Vietnam War, People's Daily also uses a lot of source from Nhan Dan (Vietnamese for The People), the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Vietnam. First published in 11 May 1951, Nhan Dan serves to be "the voice of the Party, State and people of Vietnam."
The articles based on Nhan Dan includes those condemning the U.S.: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan says the Johnson government invading Vietnam is causing trouble to itself; expanding the invading strategies would only deepen its danger" (19 February 1965). There are also those praising the Chinese efforts for the war: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan and People's Army Newspaper published editorials celebrating the great success of China in the hydrogen bomb experiment; it would be a heavy strike against the American imperialism and a strong encouragement for the Southern Vietnamese people to struggle against the U.S. imperialists and to gain victory" (1 Jan. 1969). There are those reaffirming the Vietnam's determination in the war: "Vietnam's Nhan Dan celebrated the twenty three anniversaries of the National An-American Day and spread the revolutionary spirit to liberate the people and to resist any new colonialism in any part of their own land" (20 Mar. 1973).
When People's Daily appears to simply restate what was reported in Nhan Dan without further comments or distortions, it is actually propagate the Vietnamese stance in the war to the Chinese public by treating materials from Nhan Dan as fact, rather than just one perspective that needs to be verified and researched. It is also notable that the frequency of appearance of news source from Nhan Dan changes overtime. The following graph is based on how many percent of the articles published People's Daily that is relevant to Vietnam or the Vietnam War got their sources from Nhan Dan.

(Graph 4)

The graph shows that from 1965 to 1968, the number of Nhan Dan used as a news source is decreasing, but from 1969 to 1971, it increases rapidly and the relatively high level of Nhan Dan as a news source is maintained till 1973, but drops later on.
According to the analysis so far, 1965 is the year when the quantitative intensity of propaganda is the most noticeable: the number of articles is the most. In 1967-1968, there is a drop in the intensity of propaganda and Nhan Dan was less used as a news source. From 1970 to 1972, the number of articles published on the Vietnam War resurges, more negative image of the U.S. was propagated through certain terminologies and Nhan Dan was more used as a news source. And finally 1973 is a great turning point for all three indicators, reflected the lowered enthusiasm of the CCP for propaganda.
Before moving on the next chapter to analyze the intentions behind such changes, it is worthy to look at how the CCP used postage stamps to propagate the war. Out of the entire history of the People's Republic of China, there were four stamps released that are relevant to Vietnam. The first one is published in 1960 that is to celebrate 15th Anniversary of the Founding of Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The second one is published in 1963 to show support to South Vietnamese People's struggle for liberation. The third one is to affirm that the heroic people of South Vietnam are bound to win. And the last one is published in 1965 that shows support for Vietnamese People's patriotic and just struggle against U.S. Imperialism. The years of publications show that the CCP actively voiced its support for the Vietnamese' struggle, but after 1965, despite the beginning of the real Vietnam War and the Chinese army's participation in the war, the party never published any more stamps to commemorate for or support the Vietnamese people. There was neither any stamps published to celebrate of the end of the war. This trend is consistent of graph 1 which shows that the number of articles propagating the Vietnam War is the greatest in 1965 out of the ten years of war.

IV. Intentions
What is going to be included in this chapter?
1. An analysis of the CCP's relationship with U.S, and how it effects the propaganda
2. An analysis of the CCP's relationship with the Soviet Union, and how it effects the propaganda
3. An analysis of the CCP's relationship with Vietnam, and how it effects the propaganda
4. Domestic politics' influence on the propaganda

V. Consequences
What is going to be included in this chapter?
1. Positive reactions from the public: active participation/volunteering for war reflected from the figures and statistics + people's positive attitude and emotional sensation toward the war that is reflected in memoirs
2. Negative reactions: (not found yet)
3. Public reactions to the inconsistency of the CCP's attitude toward the U.S. (not found yet)
4. Evaluate how effective the CCP's propaganda on the Vietnam War was, and how does it contribute to the communist side of the war?
5. Difference of China's propaganda from other nations' propaganda (not sure about this)

VI. Conclusion
What is going to be included in this chapter?
1. Summary of the paper
2. What this paper possibly missed, what is the possible bias, what is the possible errors in the production of charts and graphs
3. Evaluate the significance of wartime propaganda

Note
(1) Mitter, p.73.
(2) He had headed the Chinese military delegation in a visit to Hanoi in 1963 in which China promised that if the Americans were to attack North Vietnam, China would come to its defense.
(3) Li, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv.
(4) Even though the Vietnam War ended in 1975, it is worthy to examine the articles published in 1976 as well since the aftermath of a war is also a part of what the CCP might want to propagate. In case of the postage stamps, this paper will cover all stamps related to Vietnam throughout the 1960s.
(5) Liu, p.1.
(6) "Renmin Ribao." Britannica Encyclopedia.
(7) Cull, p.312.
(8) The date indicated in each parenthesis is not necessarily the only date on which demonstration was reported, neither is it the date when the demonstration actually happened. Demonstrations in some countries are more frequently reported than in others.
(9) Smith. "Table: 1968 Tet Offensive." http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html.
(10) Moise. http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/edmoise/viet8.html
(11) Smith. "Table: 1968 Tet Offensive." http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html.
(12) Only the number of certain terminologies that appear in the titles is counted. The same terminology is often used repeatedly in one article. The length or content of the article can influence the number of terminology used, while the purpose of the graph is to capture the general trend of the journalists' intentions in propagating certain image of the U.S.
(13) A Wikipedia article "Xinhua News Agency" says: "People's Daily, for example, uses Xinhua material for approximately 25 percent of its stories." But the statement is not yet verified.

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Liu, Guoli. "China-U.S. Relations and the Vietnam War." Image, Perception, and the Making of U.S.-China Relations. Lanham: University P of America, 1998.
Pan, Yining. Sino-U.S. Confrontation in Indochina, 1949-1973 (ڸ?1949-1973). Zhongshan UP. 2011.
Li, Xiaobing, and Hongshan Li. "Reassessing China's Role in the Vietnam War; Some Mysteries Explored." China and the United States: A New Cold War History. Lanham: University P of America, 1998.
Roberts, Priscilla Mary. Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World beyond Asia. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center P, 2006.
Whiting, Allen Suess. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan P, 1975.

Academic Sources, journals -
Jian, Chen. "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964?69." The China Quarterly 142 (1995): 356-387.
Liu, Allison. "Don't Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era." Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. 2 (1994): 1-99.
Mao, Lin. "China and the Escalation of the Vietnam War; January to July 1965." Journal of Cold War Studies 11 (2009): 35-69.
Wu, Guoguang. "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People's Daily." The China Quarterly 137 (1994): 194-211.
Zhang, Xiaoming. "The Vietnam war, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective." The Journal of Military History 6 (1996): 731-62.

Others, websites -
"Basic Information about People's Daily (??)." People. May 2003. People's Daily. .
"China and Vietnam: A timeline of conflict." CNN. 27 June 2011. Cable News Network. .
"China Sacrifices Itself to Support Vietnam Against U.S.. 320 million people Participated in the War (?ڸ 32ز????)." People: Henan Channel. Ed. Liangfeng Zhao. 19 Aug. 2009. People's Daily. .
Moise, Edwin E. "The Tet Offensive and its Aftermath." Clemson: Edwin Moise's Home Page. 6 Nov. 1998.
Sha, Anup. "War, Propaganda and the Media." Global Issues. 31 Mar. 2005. .
Smith, Ray. "Casualties ? US vs NVA/VC." 1st Battalion 69th Armor. 23 Jan. 2000. .
Wang, Xiaoli. " An Account of New China's 320 Million Soldiers Fighting Against U.S. and Supporting Vietnam (?32ز?ڸ??)." People. 2010. People's Daily .
(All the websites were accessed in Sep. and/or Oct. 2013)

Primary Sources:
Newspaper -
Articles from the China Daily.